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ABSTRACT
i
The East German industrial relations system was completely replaced by the transfer o f the West German 
dual system of industrial relations after political Unification in 1990. Works councils emerged, the former 
socialist trade unions were taken over by their western counterparts, and West German labour law and 
regulations were implemented.
The thesis focuses on the transformation of workplace relations, with special reference to the 
viewpoint of the workforce. It is argued that this approach, which has been so far neglected in the German 
literature, is necessary for a full understanding of the transformation processes.
The study examines firstly workers' (both union and non-union members) p ercep tion s  o f  
organisational changes and management, of their workfellows and their new collective representative 
machinery (works councils, union). Secondly, it analyses workers' reactions towards the establishment and 
functioning of the new interest institutions. This is done more specifically with regard to workers' 
inclination to participate in collective activities. By testing a selection of social psychological theories 
associated with the willingness to participate (theories of rational choice, o f social identity, o f frustration- 
aggression and of micro-mobilization), the core end product should be an understanding of who engages in 
collective activities in this specific cultural context and why. Furthermore, both dimensions, perceptions 
and reactions, are used to test the hypotheses of the literature that East German workers are strongly 
individualistic, instrumental and passive with regard to participation in collective activities; and that the 
newly established works councils and unions have not been successfully "institutionalised" from the 
viewpoint of the workforce.
The empirical study is based on a case study of a privatised textile company (including qualitative 
and quantitative methods) and on a questionnaire survey of a sample of members of the textile union in 
East Germany in more than 50 companies.
The main findings are that most workers seemed highly dissatisfied with the changes at their 
workplaces, had strong them-us feelings toward the management, believed in the value o f unions and 
collectivism, and expressed a considerable willingness to participate in collective activities. The new 
interest institutions were accepted as being necessary, even though their current work was more critically 
evaluated. This supports the argument that works councils and union have been successfully 
"institutionalised" from the workers' perspective. The major result however is that workers were not 
characterized by a strong individualism in contrast to the widespread hypothesis of the literature. Yet, they 
were difficult to be classified as pure collectivists or pure individualists because many displayed mixed 
responses regarding different issues. They were equally difficult to classify as purely instrumental, identity- 
oriented or otherwise regarding collective activities. Thus, the perceived instrumentality of collective action 
and institutions, union identity, the perception of collective interests and the attribution o f workplace 
problems all contributed to the prediction of individual participation in collective activities. No single 
examined theory provided a sufficient explanation on its own and they seemed to offer complementary 
rather than alternative explanations.
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1Chapter 1 Introduction
“As German unification proceeds, the transformation of political and industrial 
relations institutions in the East as well as the effect o f  unification on West 
German institutions will afford an exciting opportunity fo r  researchers in the 
coming years, one that may shed new light on our ideas o f institution building and 
transformation. Although the outcome will undoubtedly be the expansion o f West 
German institutions, including unions, works councils, and industrial relations 
practices, into the East, the actual functioning o f  these institutions in the new 
environment is arguably contingent." (Turner 1991: 242)
The formal transformation of the "socialist" industrial relations system of the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR)1 into a "modem, westem-style" system took place in a very 
short time during the unification process of the two German states (1990). The entire West 
German industrial relations system was transferred to the East. West German labour law 
and collective bargaining arrangements were introduced, employers' associations emerged, 
and the industrial branches of the central state trade union2 were taken over by their West 
German "counterparts" (see Fichter 1994, 1996; Weinert 1993). Works councils (which 
had formerly been forbidden) emerged in a large number of companies as a result of 
workforce initiatives, even before the West German Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) was officially introduced in East Germany. All this happened 
with virtually no resistance from the East German population (e.g. KreiBig 1994:2).
The transfer of western institutions to the East distinguishes the transformation in East 
Germany from the corresponding processes in other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. All post-socialist3 societies face the same basic problems, the simultaneous and 
quick transformation from one party system to a pluralistic democracy and from a planned
1 "GDR" is used in the following to refer to the former socialist state, whereas "East Germany" will be 
used more generally to refer to the past and to the present region. This region is today officially called the 
"five new Bundeslander".
2 Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (FDGB)
3 The term "post-socialist" will be used to refer to the still ongoing period of transformation from socialist 
state regimes to modem democracies. The term "socialism" is used rather than "communism" to be in line 
with the common German terminology with regard to the GDR.
2economy to a market economy. However, all countries except East Germany are 
experiencing a gradual "self-made" transformation, whereas East Germany went through 
an ad hoc, big-bang transformation as a result of the complete transplantation of an entirely 
new social system (e.g. Giesen and Leggewie 1991). Thus, the main characteristic of the 
transformation is the constitutional self-abolition and fusion with another country. The 
consequences, as well known, have been the territorial expansion of the West German 
institutional network of the political, legal, economic, monetary and social institutions and 
massive financial subsidies.
There is a debate as to what extent the specific East German transformation 
provides a competitive advantage or a burden for East Germany in comparison to its 
neighbouring states (e.g. Offe 1992; ReiBig 1993; Wiesenthal 1994). Most researchers 
point out that Unification as a mode of transformation does not appear to be an 
unambiguously advantageous process (e.g. Wiesenthal 1994:1). The less pleasant features 
of this particular unification have for example been the rapid decline of industrial 
production (of around 70%) and employment opportunities (of around 40% of total jobs in
1989) (Dathe and Schreiber 1993:44; Wiesenthal ibid.); the prospective returns on 
investment (e.g. unit labour costs) that are hardly better than in West Germany and 
probably less than in neighbour countries in the East (Wiesenthal ibid.); and finally the 
frustration and dissatisfaction amongst a considerable part of the population due to 
unexpected unemployment, increasing living costs and problems of adjusting to the new 
societal system (Offe 1992:38).
A major question of research is whether the institutional transfer of industrial 
relations into the East succeeded, thus whether the western institutions "function" in their 
new environment (see also Turner's quote above). There is growing evidence that although 
the industrial relations institutions are formally in place they do not yet function as they 
should according to the West German "norm". Thus, Turner's statement that the future 
development of East Germany is arguably contingent still holds true in 1996. As an 
example, employers' associations increasingly lack members (e.g. Schroeder 1994) and 
unions face tremendous problems with regard to membership decline and the virtual lack of 
workplace representation through voluntary union stewards (e.g. Fichter 1996).
3Most current research on the transformation of industrial relations in East Germany is 
preoccupied with the macro and meso (institutional) changes. A major example is the 
extensive literature on the emergence of works councils (e.g. Jander and Lutz 1991; 
Kadtler and Kottwitz 1994; KreiBig and Preusche 1992). The micro or actor level of 
employees during the transformation has so far been largely ignored (exceptions are 
Andretta et al. 1994; Alt et al. 1994). As Andretta et al. (1994:1) propose, this neglect 
might be due to the predominance of (macro) labour market problems (see also Dathe 
1993:30). It might be also due to the German academic tradition in the field of industrial 
relations, which is biased towards the analysis of institutions (e.g. Streeck 1981; Weischer
1993).
Thus, most research focuses on the question of whether the transferred industrial 
relations institutions function "properly" at a macro or at an institutional level. Current 
problems of the institutions are explained mainly in two ways. One approach argues that it 
may just be that more time is needed for industrial relations practice to adapt to the western 
standard (e.g. Weidenfeld and Korte 1991; Zapf 1993, 1994). This indirectly assumes an 
'inevitable' modernization process in East Germany in a predetermined direction (i.e. 
adaptation to the West). The other approach refers to problems lying within the 
institutions. They are seen either as inherent problems (e.g. the institutions are not properly 
equipped for the gravity of economic problems they face in the East) or as problems caused 
by specific strategies of the institutional actors (e.g. strategies of the West German unions 
during the transfer into the East) (see Jander and Lutz 1993; Kadtler and Kottwitz 1992, 
1994; Mahnkopf 1992b). This approach is based on social actor theoretical accounts on 
the transformation (e.g. Balaz 1992; Eberwein 1991; Klein 1992; Lehmbruch 1993; Peter 
1993; ReiBig 1993). These theorists argue that the transformation is not a priori determined 
by the macro and institutional changes (i.e. formal institutionalisation of western industrial 
relations system) but is open ended and partly dependent upon the affected social actors. 
Thus, the transformation is characterized by "a conscious change of the prevailing structure 
and order [of the GDR society] rather than by an inevitable structural transformation which 
the social actors cannot influence" (ReiBig 1993:3). With regard to the analysis of the 
functioning of institutions this theory puts great emphasis on the role of the affected social
4actors and their culture.4 For example, according to Jacoby (1994), institutional change 
will be effective and enduring only if it is accepted and supported by social actors rather 
than decreed by policy makers alone. Almond and Verba (1963) or Gabriel (1993) speak 
of the "interpersonal trust", Sztompka (1993) speaks of a specific "civic" or "discourse" 
culture, being the prerequisite to the formation of institutions. Moreover, Manytz 
(1994:23) emphasizes that only by examining the macro and micro levels together can the 
potential disintegration of both levels be examined, and that this potential is seen as being 
mainly responsible for institutional mal-functioning (also Lehmbruch 1993). In her view 
the potential tension between institutions and the individual behaviour of the actors is "one" 
if not "the" essential problem of the entire social transformation. To conclude, social actor 
theorists argue that East Germany experiences not just a transfer of industrial relations 
institutions, but an "autonomous" institutionalisation process.
However, although emphasizing the relevance of social actors in the transformation 
process most authors focus on institutional actors only (e.g. union officials, works 
councillors) thus neglecting the workforce as a potentially influencing actor (e.g. Jacoby
1994). In contrast, this study assumes that workers' attitudes and behaviour must be taken 
into account if we are truly to understand the transformation and institutionalisation 
processes. It is argued that this approach seems especially suitable to analyse the 
establishment and functioning of unions in the post-socialist economy, as a result of the 
dramatic changes in union-membership relations (from membership of a socialist "service 
station" to membership of a modem interest institution).
Some statements in the recent literature on East Germany also acknowledge this 
fact. Union membership is seen as a major reason for unions not functioning as effectively 
as they normally do in the western region. In the main, East German union members are 
said to be reluctant to engage in collective activities of all kinds, and this is seen to be a 
major problem for the (West) German unions (e.g. Armingeon 1991; Lippold et al. 1992; 
Mahnkopf 1992; Neubauer 1992). Indeed, Mahnkopf (1992:35) writes, "there is only a
4 Similar claims are made regarding the political transformation towards a democratic society. For example 
Popper (1990:16) claimed that "it is more difficult to pass over from totalitarianism to democracy than 
from democracy to totalitarianism. (...) Democracy calls for deep-going, value-oriented changes in the 
public mentality (...)."
small number of members who have an emotional relationship to the union, who identify 
with the content of union policies and are willing to participate in active and 'self- 
responsible' collective action". The increasing withdrawal from membership (e.g. during 
1992 union membership in the East has dropped by some 18% to just under 3,4 million)5, 
and the apparent lack of commitment and participation of members are interpreted as signs 
of an individualistic, instrumental membership (see also Heering and Schroeder 1995:176; 
Martens 1994:314). An implication is thereofre that they are different to their western 
counterparts. However, these claims are simply assertions which have rarely been 
examined either theoretically or empirically.
This study is based on the micro level of the workforce and analyses the transformation of 
workplace relations6 through the point of view of the workforce. It examines firstly 
workers' (both union and non-union members) perceptions of organisational changes and 
management, of their workfellows and of their new collective representative machinery 
(works council, union). Additionally, it analyses workers' reactions towards the 
establishment and functioning of the new interest institutions. This is done more 
specifically with regard to workers' inclination to participate in collective activities.
In sum, the study deals with three interrelated topics (in a layered way such as the 
make-upon) which take the form of an onion): first, the transfer of western industrial and 
workplace institutions in a specific context (i.e. the textile industry), workers' perceptions 
of this transformation at workplace level and finally, as the core of the study, workers' 
(re)actions in the form of their willingness to participate in collective activities.
The purpose of this study is thus threefold: firstly to describe the transformation of 
workplace relations in one particular industry (textiles), which has not been looked at in the 
transformation literature. In addition, most previous studies focused on the transformation 
of one institution only (e.g. the works council) or on the transformation of industrial 
relations at macro level without analysing workplace relations. The second purpose is to
5 1993 shows a similar picture and in 1994 membership dropped by 11% (Fichter 1994:61, 1996:12).
6 Workplace relations are defined as the various relations between management, unions, works councils and 
the workforce at company and shopfloor level.
6examine workers' perceptions during transformation and thus to contribute to a better 
understanding of the transforming workplace relations. For example, workers' views 
towards the new interest institutions can tell us something about the success of the 
institutionalisation of these industrial relations institutions at workplace level. Another task 
will be to examine the widespread hypothesis that East German workers are becoming 
strongly individualistic. The third purpose is to focus on workers' reactions, i.e. their 
willingness to participate in collective activities, and the possible explanations for variation 
amongst indivividuals. By testing a selection of social psychological theories7 associated 
with the willingness to participate, the core end product should be an understanding of 
who engages in collective activities in this specific cultural context and why.8 A major 
question here is whether the supposed passivity of these workers, if indeed it exists, is 
reflected in highly instrumental and individualistic decision-making processes. Moreover, 
since it is very rare for a set of theories to be tested simultaneously, the enquiry should also 
contribute to the general discussion of antecedents of collective activity. Finally, it should 
also test the applicability of these theories to a new cultural context.
The study is based on an extensive study of both the literature of union membership and 
the current literature of the transformation of industrial relations in East Germany. The 
empirical work comprises both a case study of a firm in the East German textile industry 
and a survey of union members throughout the East German branch of the textile union. 
More specifically, the case study comprises an analysis of company documents 
(agreements between the management and the works council), several interviews with the 
two full-time works councillors, and with members of management (director, plant 
directors, supervisors), and structured interviews with selected workers in Summer 1993
7 These theories are based on experience in western capitalist, advanced industrialised societies (mostly 
North America and Great Britain).
8 Another possible topic could have been an investigation of the reasons why East German workersjoined 
the new West German unions in the first place. However, although this research briefly tackles this 
question it is not a major focus for several reasons. Firstly, current participation decisions seem to be more 
suitable to analyse in terms of the actual working of the institutions and their membership relations than 
past decisions to join. Secondly, the acquisition of former FDGB members by the western unions was 
organised in such way that members were taken over "automatically" albeit with the right to declare their 
withdrawal. Arguably, most people did not consciously "join" the new union, they just stayed on. In 
addition, joining a union in Germany is not such a far reaching event as in the anglo-saxon countries (there 
is nothing comparable with the unionization process of voting in the US).
7and Summer 1994, as well as a large survey for the blue-collar workforce and smaller 
surveys of the works councillors and supervisors in 1993. The broader survey of the 
union members in the industry as a whole was conducted in early Summer 1994 and was 
accompanied by several interviews with the chief union official of the East German branch. 
Thus, the methodology comprises documentary, qualitative and quantitative methods, 
respectively a combination of a case study and a "cross-company" survey. The case 
study's documentary and interview data was mainly used to design the questionnaires as 
well as to assist in the analysis of the results. The additional union membership survey was 
used to firstly improve the questionnaire design of the case study survey and secondly to 
render the overall enquiry more representative.
The combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is regarded as a sensible 
methodology in this particular context. Firstly, research of transforming post-socialist 
societies had to start by scratch. It is a historically unique phenomenon and social sciences 
have not developed a specific methodology or theory for this kind of social transformation 
(e.g. Giesen and Leggewie 1991; Meier 1991; ReiBig 1992). Secondly, most East German 
as well as East European research is qualitative and case-study oriented (e.g. Petkov and 
Thirkell 1991:chp.4). In order to improve the representativeness of the findings this study 
attempted to introduce quantitative research methods. Both the case study and the textile 
union survey contain a works council questionnaire and a workforce/ membership 
questionnaire.
Furthermore, most previous research is inductive oriented and lacks a clearly 
argued theoretical framework. In applying the social psychological theories of collective 
action (which are mainly tested quantitatively in the literature) the study tries to circumvent 
the descriptive character of most studies on transforming societies.
The textile industry was selected for various reasons. This industrial sector was 
and still is severely affected by the Unification and the subsequent exposure to the world 
market (which led to a dramatic reduction in employment) and it is therefore a good 
representative of most of the East German industry (see Kuchle and Volkmann 1993). In 
addition, the textile industry is a sector which has not been looked at in the research of 
transformation and is also largely neglected in the general industrial relations studies in
8Germany. Furthermore, it is a female-dominated sector, which has rarely been examined in 
studies of union membership behaviour. As Snyder et al. (1986) note, most studies are 
male-dominated with regard to proportions of respondents, occupations, unions, and 
industrial sectors. Thus, possible tendencies of a passive and individualised workforce 
should become especially evident in the case of textile workers which are traditionally 
associated with a not militant union and which is traditionallly associated with a largely 
inactive female membership.
Finally, the focus was on blue collar rather than white collar workers since it was 
assumed that blue collar workers experienced greater organisational changes at their 
workplaces than white collars. In addition the textile union is a predominantly blue collar 
union.
This thesis is structured into four parts: firstly "the transformation of workplace relations" 
(chapters 2-4), secondly a theoretical part which introduces the conceptual and 
methodological tools of analysing workers' attitudes and behaviour (chapters 5-7), thirdly 
"workers' perceptions of the transforming workplace relations" (chapters 8-9), and 
fourthly "workers' (re)actions: their willingness to participate in collective activities" 
(chapters 10-11).
In Part 1, chapter 2 commences with defining "transformation" as a particular 
form of "social change", thus changes of the most significant characteristics of an entire 
social system such as the industrial relations system. The chapter then goes on to briefly 
describe the "socialist" system of industrial and workplace relations in the former GDR and 
characterizes it as a highly bureaucratic and centralist triumvirat regime of Party, union and 
enterprise directors with no independent interest representation of the workforce. Unions 
were instead transmission belts between the will of the Party state and the working class. 
Workplaces were characterized by the simultaneous existence of formal bureaucratic 
regulations and informal networks and practices, producing a sort of "pseudo- 
bureaucratic" or "pseudo-tayloristic" work organisation. With regard to workers' interest 
representation it is argued that most workers did not feel that they were represented by the 
union organisation. Some workers, however, were able to use their limited passive
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strength (e.g. due to high labour shortage, job security) to enter into informal bargaining 
on certain workplace issues with their supervisors, thus representing their interests 
themselves. A question this study will address is whether these informal networks resist 
the current institutionalisation of interest representation at workplace level.
Chapter 3 introduces the transformation of workplace relations by providing brief 
descriptions of the formal take-over procedure of the union branches of the FDGB (the 
former central union confederation) by the West German unions, of the establishment of 
the works councils, and finally of the most dominant changes of personnel management in 
the companies. The rest of the chapter is devoted to analysing the development of 
workplace relations practices by focusing on management and works council. The existing 
literature is reviewed and can be characterized as having two opposite views, an optimistic 
and a pessimistic view, of the characteristics and effectiveness of workplace relations with 
regard to workers' interest representation through the works council. It is argued that the 
existing discussions of the functioning of works councils and unions are mainly based on a 
list of various reasons as to why these institutions are not able to function properly, but 
without having been tested so far. The studies also fail to take into account workers' 
perceptions of these new institutions.
Chapter 4 introduces the empirical study by describing the wider industrial relations 
context of the textile industry. It outlines the chronology of the transformation of the textile 
union and the employers' association. The chapter then reports the results of a small-scale 
survey of the workplace climate perceived by a sample of works councillors in the textile 
industry. The major result is that works councils' relationships with management are 
perceived as generally harmonious, cooperative and "functioning". The councillors see 
themselves primarily as a link between company and workforce interests. This adds 
support to previous research. The last part of this chapter is devoted to discussing the 
organisational transformation of the case study firm, Bodywear, in the five years from 
1989 to 1994. The case study presents a successfully privatised firm with major changes in 
the work organisation and working conditions. The focus is on the practice of workplace 
relations, i.e. the attitudes and behaviour of the two actors, works council and 
management. Workplace relations are seen from both sides as generally harmonious, but
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this works council seems to put more emphasis on the interest representation of the 
workforce compared to the other councillors in the survey above.
In sum, Part 1 explores the formally successful transformation of workplace 
relations in the East German textile industry, emphasizing the tremendous changes which 
have occurred at most workplaces, the rapid transfer of the new interest institutions, and 
the generally positive views of the works councillors of their relationship with 
management.
However, focusing on the institutional actors at workplace level identifies clearly 
the need to explore workers' perceptions and reactions towards the ongoing changes at 
their workplaces and to take the workforce as an influencing actor in the practice and 
development of workplace relations seriously.
This is the topic of Part 2. It introduces an alternative approach to exploring workplace 
relations through the examination of workers' attitudes and behaviour.
Chapter 5 reviews the literature on former and current worker attitudes and 
identifies a major hypothesis of the individualisation of the East German workforce. The 
importance and centrality of work and the workplace in people's former lives is discussed, 
and the few empirical studies of the former GDR reveal a considerable amount of job 
dissatisfaction and them-and-us feelings towards management, and the perception of not 
being represented or helped by the union. The chapter then reviews the current literature on 
workers' attitudes towards the reorganisation of their workplaces and their new interest 
institutions. Workers are dissatisfied with the changing working conditions, especially 
with the increasing job insecurity and pay. Workers are also disillusioned about the 
effectiveness of works councils, but nevertheless have a positive attitude towards them. 
Most joined the union out of instrumental reasons, unions are seen as important 
organisations, and one large scale comparative study found some form of union 
participation to be low but higher than in West Germany.
Finally, the literature's explanations for workers' general passivity regarding 
collective activities are summarized, one approach emphasizing the legacy of the former 
passive behavioural patterns, another stream proposing an individualistic and instrumental
approach of workers to interest institutions and activity. The hypothesis of the 
individualisation of the workforce is further analysed. It is argued that analysing workers’ 
attitudes and behaviour towards interest representation and collective activities provides a 
good focus for the study of the individualisation hypothesis.
Chapter 6 surveys the theories on participation in collective activities. Four major 
socio-psychological theories, the theories of rational choice, social identity, frustration- 
aggression and micro-mobilization are critically discussed. These theories have rarely been 
tested together in previous (mainly anglo-saxon) research, and not at all in the East German 
(or indeed German) context. The theories' significance for the East German context will be 
tested in Part 4; however, the theories also provide the analytical tools for examining 
workers' perceptions of workplace relations, which are discussed in Part 3.
Chapter 7 is devoted to the methodology of the empirical studies, i.e. the 
workforce questionnaires. It commences by outlining the operationalisation of the theories 
discussed in the previous chapter. It then discusses the possible theoretical interrelations of 
the four major theories by reviewing previous empirical studies which tested some of the 
theories together. It will be argued that the four social psychological theories might be 
complementary rather than independent, competing explanations. The chapter finishes by 
introducing the two workforce studies.
Part 3 discusses workers' perceptions of the transforming workplace relations. Chapter 8 
deals with workers' perceptions of the organisational transformation, and chapter 9 deals 
with workers' perceptions of the new interest institutions. The discussions are mainly 
based on the frequency distributions of the two worker questionnaires, but they also refer 
to the interviews with a sample of workers in the case study company.
Chapter 8 results in an alarming picture of workers' perceptions of the current 
working conditions and management behaviour. Workers are highly dissatisfied with their 
working conditions and reveal a strong degree of "them-and-us" feelings. On the other 
hand, they strongly identify with their work group.
Chapter 9 reveals people's conviction of the need for these new interest 
institutions, although there is a mixed perception of the institutions' instrumentality
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regarding specific and broader issues of their interest representation. Union members show 
a strong degree of identification with the union, yet there is less interest in collective 
concerns.
In sum, this part provides the picture of a dissatisfied workforce which has so far 
experienced the transformation as an increasing threat to their job security, their working 
habits and their solidarity with colleagues. The new interest institutions on the other hand 
are welcomed and accepted. This provides an argument for the successful 
institutionalisation of works council and union as outlined in the previous part of the 
thesis. The effectiveness of these institutions however yields mixed responses according to 
the kind of issue involved. For example the unions are seen as effective with regard to 
collective bargaining and their concern for unemployment, but not with regard to more 
specific workplace issues. Finally, and importantly, workers do not comply with the 
stereotype of individualised East German workers; rather they believe in the values of 
unions and collectivism.
Part 4 deals with workers' (re)actions to the changes in their participation in collective 
activities. Chapter 10 discusses their level of willingness to particiate in collective 
activities. Overall, the participation level is quite high and certainly not lower than that 
normally described in western studies. Then, chapter 11 then focuses on the antecedents of 
willingness to participate in both surveys using multi-variate statistics (factor analysis, 
correlation and regression). Overall, no single theory yields encompassing predictive 
power. Instead the theories of rational choice and social identity yield the most significant 
antecedents. The theories of frustration-aggression and "micro-mobilization" were 
significant to a lesser extent. The data supports the earlier hypothesis that the antecedents, 
especially social identity and collective instrumentality, are highly intercorrelated. 
Moreover, social identity and collective instrumentality have a mutually reinforcing effect 
on participation rather than one playing the leading role as has been suggested in some 
previous research. The finding that East German workers are not exclusively guided by 
cost/benefit calculations in a context which makes instrumental approaches to collective
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activities highly probable (according to some theories outlined before) also reinforces the 
finding that these workers cannot be characterized as being individualistic.
Finally, chapter 12 summarizes and interrelates the various themes of this study. 
The appendix comprises all interview guidelines, copies of all (six) questionnaires 
(including the pilot study), and several statistical tables.
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PART 1
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Chapter 2 Industrial and workplace relations in the former GDR
The aim of this chapter is to outline the major characteristics of the former socialist 
workplace relations in East Germany which present the starting point of the transformation 
of workplace relations after Unification. In particular, it focuses on the former informal 
interest representation at shopfloor level. Introducing the background or context of the 
transformation illustrates the extent of the industrial relations transformation with regard to 
the institutional changes. Moreover, by discussing informal interest representation it also 
identifies an area which has the potential for "disturbing" the successful transformation at 
workplace level.
The chapter commences with defining the concept of "transformation" (2.1). It then 
outlines the former socialist system of industrial relations (2.2), which is followed by a 
discussion of the socialist workplace relations (2.3).
2 .1  Defining "transformation" of industrial relations
The term transformation is commonly used as a generic term to describe the various social 
changes and developments ongoing in post-socialist societies9. However, the term itself is 
rarely defined (see Bast-Haider 1992; ReiBig 1993c:3). Transformation will in this study 
be defined as a particular form of "social change" (e.g. Sztompka 1993), thus as a 
"process of changes in significant, typical characteristics of the structure of a social 
system" (Endruweit and Trommsdorf 1989:799), i.e. in the dominant institutional order 
(Lockwood in Zapf 1969:124). Thus, transformation describes a significant alteration of
9 The concept of 'transition' on the other hand has been challenged by some authors as value-ladden and 
deterministic, implying that these societies are inevitably 'on the road' to capitalism (Stark 1992).
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social structures (that is of social action and interaction), including the manifestations of 
such structures as embodied in norms, values, cultural products and symbols (Moore in 
Sills 1968:366). Transformation is then a departure from a relatively stable social structure 
(Zapf 1993), and as such has a departure point (e.g. the old system of industrial relations) 
and an arrival point.
Transformation in industrial relations is defined as a change of the whole industrial 
relations structure, not only of some actors and regulations, but of typical elements and 
their interaction within the system. In Central and Eastern Europe, including East 
Germany, one can observe changes in the labour laws and in the state's role in industrial 
relations, the emergence of capitalist owners and employers, and the emergence of works 
councils and western style trade unions. In addition, the social relations among the actors, 
their attitudes, norms and habits should change as well.
However, speaking of transformation in industrial relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe we need to firstly clarify whether there was an industrial relations system at all 
before, which is now being transformed, or whether we are currently experiencing the 
emergence of something new. This obviously depends on our definition of industrial 
relations. If we understand industrial relations for example to be "the various interrelations 
between actors, institutions and regulations of capital and labour, as deriving out of an 
institutionalisation of class antagonism" (Geiger 1949) and thus stress the irreconcilability 
of industrial conflict, then by definition no industrial relations system existed in socialism. 
The working class owned the means of production and class conflicts could not exist. On 
the other hand a more structuralist definition of industrial relations as "a network of (social, 
legal, economic,...) rules governing relationships of actors derived from an employment 
contract" (Schienstock 1982:14) can be applied to the socialist societies. Using the term 
"transformation" thus inevitably assumes the latter type of definition of industrial relations.
It should be also emphasized that the term transformation will be used with regard 
to East Germany as a continuing process. Although the formal transformation of 
institutions and regulations has been completed, it is frequently argued that this does not 
refer to the transformation of the social relations. The next section introduces the starting 
point of the transformation.
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2 .2  Industrial relations system in the GDR
The general elements of the industrial relations system under the previous socialist regimes 
in Central and Eastern Europe are well known and widely documented (e.g. Clarke 1995; 
Deppe and HoB 1989; Dittrich et al. 1992; Hethy 1990, 1991, 1994; Smith and Thompson 
1992; Szell 1992). It is intended therefore to give only a short overview of the formal 
system. In essence, all Eastern European countries practised the Stalinist model of 
industrial relations. This model evolved in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and was 
introduced in the rest of Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The nationalization 
of the means of production, along with a centralized planning system including strict 
norms and instructions for the production and distribution of goods, can be seen as 
fundamental elements of this model (Schienstock and Traxler 1993:3).
Perhaps the fundamental assumption of this industrial relations system was the 
existence of a single homogeneous, predominant "all-social interest" in the national 
economy and the wider society (Hethy ibid.). This social interest is claimed to originate 
from the public ownership of the means of production and from the exercise of power by 
the working class. As a consequence, a system theorist would argue that the economic and 
political social subsystems were not autonomous, independent areas (as "ideally" they are 
said to be in western societies) but were heavily interlinked at a formal and informal level 
(e.g. Luhmann 1987:32pp., 1989; Polany 1978). Similarly, the industrial relations actors 
(state, unions, employers) were seen to be united on behalf of the "socialist construction" 
(sozialistischer Aufbau) (Hethy 1990:10) and could not be identified as being autonomous. 
It expressed a unitarist view of the interests in society, thus denying the existence of 
differing/conflicting interests in society and in enterprises. Consequently the exploitation of 
the working class did not exist in theory. Collective labour disputes and conflicts of 
interests were looked upon as non-existent (strikes as actions of workers against their own 
interests were superfluous and forbidden by law). If divergences of interests appeared, 
they were interpreted as manifestations of individual misbehaviour, violations of the law or 
of the "socialist morality", or as "subversion" against the state, and were treated 
accordingly (Hethy 1991:126). In a highly centralized decision-making process the Party
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worked out the "one best way" for joint social action in industrial relations within the 
framework of a bureaucratic central planning system and closely supervises of the 
realization of the targets set by similarly rigid bureaucratic control (Hethy 1991:125). Thus 
it decided upon such matters as pay levels, and the size of the workforce. It relied in this 
respect almost exclusively on legislation and law enforcement, and left no space for any 
(official) bargaining between the parties.
Within the enterprise (VEB)10, industrial relations formally consisted of four main 
actors, the Party's enterprise branch11, the union (FDGB) enterprise branch (BGO)12, the 
directors13, and to some extent the secret service branch (Stasi) and the FDJ (state youth 
organisation). The first three formed a triumvirat, constituting one single monolithic bloc 
of power. Their functions were inseparably intertwined: the Party assumed managerial 
functions on the top state level (determining production, material, wages,..), the employer 
performed state functions related to employment and social policies (e.g. guaranteeing full 
employment, taking care of the accomodation of its workforce), and the unions acted in the 
place of managers in operating incentive schemes to promote production and by enforcing 
discipline. The directors often had additional Party mandates or other social duties 
indicating an additional personal interweaving of these areas (see KreiBig 1993). In more 
detail, the employers had officially no autonomous interests, which turned enterprise
19 VEB (volkseigener Betrieb,"people-owned enterprise"), was the official name for the socialist 
enterprises.
11 The Party (SED = Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) had representatives in each enterprise 
(Betriebsparteiorganisation). These had four major tasks: (i) to strengthen the ideological conviction of its 
Party members, (ii) to fight against imperialist influences, (iii) the political and ideological education of its 
members, and (iv) the education of its members in terms of discipline and work ethics (Unversohnlichkeit 
gegeniiber Mangeln) (Autorenkollektiv 1978:339).
12 BGO (Betriebsgewerkschaftsorganisation) was led by the BGL (Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung) consisted 
of full-time officials and was subdivided into sub-branches in each department, called AGL. The role of the 
BGL in GDR labour law was described as that of representing the interests of the workforce and fulfilling 
its constitutional rights (Arbeitsgesetzbuch 1977). The latter comprised the following explicit tasks: 
participating in the fulfillment of the plan, negotiating the work agreement, supporting the movement 
"work, learn, live socialist", organizing the "socialist competition" between brigades (brigades = workgroup 
units), supporting the intensification of production and controlling the improvement of productivity and of 
the working conditions, participating in the vocational and political qualification of the workforce, 
participating in working time/ holiday issues, distributing flats and holiday places, improving health and 
safety, supporting socialist work discipline, and participating in personnel policy (e.g. employment 
contracts, dismissals).
13 In the GDR this terminology was abolished, they were called instead "socialist leaders". The socialist 
leaders were by definition "socialist personalities, who led as commissioners of the working class and their 
marxist-leninist party a specific social institution (Autorenkollektiv, Okonomisches Lexikon, Bd. H-P, 
1979:395). Their official duties were (i) to fulfill the plan, (ii) to foster the personal development of the 
workers to become real socialist personalities, (iii) to improve not only workers' working but also living 
conditions, and (iv) to collaborate closely with the Party and union branch (Arbeitsgesetzbuch 1977).
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management into the executors of the "central will" of the economy. They were not free in 
their decision-making, they depended on the plan, and they were controlled externally by 
the higher bodies within the combine14 and the responsible ministry, as well as internally 
by the union and the Party branch. Without the agreement of the BPO (Party branch 
leader), as well as the official of the MfS (state security), the director (who as a SED 
member had to comply to the SED directives anyhow) could not make any decision. 
Additionally, the BGL was normally included in the collective decision-making, since it 
had to guarantee the realization of the plans. In short, management discretion was limited 
and managers' prerogatives derived only out of their appointment by the Party and as 
formal commissioners of the working class. Thus, whereas in capitalist firms structures of 
control are a consequence of managerial strategies, in socialist firms they were a 
consequence of state strategies (e.g. decisions to introduce brigades or to start a new 
discipline campaign were made at the state level).
Since there was a single predominant interest in the enterprise, and since the Party 
officially represented the working class, there was obviously no need for a representative 
body of the workers. The trade unions were therefore primarily transmission belts between 
Party and workforce and "schools for socialism" rather than representative bodies of 
worker interests. This interpretation of unions in socialist societies was developed by 
Lenin in the 1920s. The Leninist doctrine of dual functioning unions, called the "classic 
dualism", can be seen in the two sets of union functions. Firstly, there was the concern 
with mobilization of labour production, thus the management of labour in terms of 
maintaining discipline, mobilizing workers to higher productivity (e.g. via "socialist 
competiton", suggestion schemes (Neuererbewegung)), educating them in the spheres of 
production, management and ideology. This is summarized in the often quoted Leninist 
description of unions as "schools of administration, management and communism". 
Secondly, there was the concern with the protection of members' rights and interests, 
which meant in essence guardianship of the legal rights of members against managerial
14 The combine was the socialist type of a "holding", a vertically integrated conglomerate, whereby 
enterprises of different levels of the production of one product (e.g. textiles) were part o f one holding. The 
combines tended to be highly autarkic in their trading patterns, had monopoly control of their market 
segments and boasted their own supplying companies and social services.
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arbitrariness and the defence of labour interests when necessary. Legally, participation and 
co-determination rights of the workers in the GDR were in many areas more advanced than 
in the West German law (see Belwe 1979:216; Gill 1989:379; Lutz 1990:23; Pirker et al.
1990). The labour law (Arbeitsgesetzbuch 1977) nominated the BGL as the holder of 
company co-determination rights. Thus, the BGL had the right to "make suggestions and 
give comments to questions of company planning and management strategy". In addition, 
the BGL was in charge of the internal grievance procedure (Konfliktkommission).
Although the notion of dualism between both functions implies parity, there is 
widespread evidence that in practice the "production" function was far more important than 
the "protection" function (e.g. Freeman 1993b; Kirschner 1991:1034). This functional bias 
stemed directly from the concept of interests that underlies "classic dualism", i.e. the 
absence of "antagonistic" social conflicts within the socialist society. The unions were told 
to help resolve any possible minor discord and to ensure that it did not disturb the 
overriding harmony of relations between labour, management, party, and government. As 
a consequence the unions had to subordinate the protection of their members' interests to 
the promotion of Party policy, which axiomatically best served the true long term interests 
of all union members.
The notion of unitary socialist interest was also reflected in two organisational 
tenents of the union. Firstly, the production principle which made all those employed 
(managers and workers) in one sector eligible for union membership (i.e. socialist unions 
were industrial unions). Secondly, the widespread socialist organisational form of 
"democratic centralism" was also applied to the union organisation. Thus, it is clear that 
unions were a highly centralized system of bureaucratic decision-making. Power was 
highly centralized and in addition became subject to outside control by the Party at all 
levels. The union remained closely subordinate to the Party. In addition, the close 
collaboration between management and Party officials within the enterprise severely 
restricted independent union activity.
Finally, the workforce was officially seen as co-owners of the social property, and 
as obedient executors with their primary interest vested in an effective contribution to 
production and plan fulfillment (Hethy 1990:12). In theory they had institutionalised
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grievance mechanism (see above) and extensive formal co-determination rights concerning 
their work and shopfloor decision-making (Arbeitsgesetzbuch 1977). The following 
section will discuss the arguably different practice.
2 .3  Workplace relations in the GDR
This section outlines two major topics of the literature on workplace relations in GDR, the 
formal and informal system of workplace organisation, and the strong shopfloor position 
of workers (2.3.1). It then discusses the reasons provided (2.3.2) and concludes with 
some problems of this literature (2.3.3).
2.3 .1  Characteristics of workplace relations in the GDR
(i) The formal and informal system of workplace organisation
As with the system of industrial relations, the formal workplace relations of the socialist 
enterprises were designed in a highly bureaucratic, centralized way (Heidenreich 
1991:417). Socialist firms were managed according to centrally decided-upon production 
plans and prices, in combination with the granting of assigned quantities of necessary 
materials, equipment and employees (see Heidenreich ibid.). The production system, work 
organisation and personnel policies are described as tayloristic15 (e.g. Deppe and HoB 
1989:84; Heidenreich ibid.; VoBkamp and Wittke 1990:14). Several authors point out that 
in reality however this system was constantly undermined by informal networks16 (e.g. 
Heidenreich 1991, VoBkamp and Wittke 1991).
"Taylorism" is frequently used in the German literature without a precise definition. It generally refers to 
a highly bureaucratic, centralized organisation with a production system based on assembly lines, division 
of labour and "tayloristic" control mechanisms and personnel policies (e.g. piece rate pay).
16 Networks are defined as social relations of individuals with people within and outside their own 
household (Diewald 1995:223).
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For example, whereas in a western tayloristic firm the systematic analysis and design of 
work and production processes might be understood as an attempt to intensify 
standardisation and productivity, scientific management of the piece-rate system seemed to 
have had only limited influence on the real processes at the production level in socialist 
f irm s. The "scientific method trainers" seem to have been hindered in their proper working 
and ended up confirming workers' entitlement to their workplaces (workers try to keep 
their workplaces — low internal fluctuation) and their existing piece rate payment (groups 
faked working times etc.) (Heidenreich 1991:423). Furthermore, since the hierarchical 
organisation did not provide sufficient formal cross-coordination between the 
departments17, employees had to step in and create coordinations themselves within and 
between the enterprises. In other words, the market which was otherwise absent was 
provided by a "quasi-market" of personal contacts, networks and bribery ("I'll help you if 
you help me") (Fritze 1993:186). Thus, the work organisation became "politicized" and 
"personalized".18 There is widespread evidence that it was specifically frequent for 
shortages in production material to be organized in this way (e.g. Heidenreich 1991).
In sum, the authors suggest that scientific time and motion studies, the piece rate system 
and the formal organization had little real impact on the processes on the shopfloor (e.g. 
Heidenreich 1991). There is a widespread agreement that a parallel structure of formed, 
rational, scientific principles of organisation on one hand, and informal organisational 
practices on the other characterized the socialist organisation (e.g. Deppe and HoB 1989; 
Heering and Schroeder 1992; Heidenreich 1991; VoBkamp and Wittke 1990). However, 
there is a division of views among academics as to how to interpret this co-existence of 
formal and informal organisation.
The system has been described by one group of authors as a "pseudo-bureaucracy" 
or as "pseudo-Taylorism" (Alt et al. 1994:54; Heidenreich 1991b: 18, 1992:6), "quasi-
17 The official hierarchical centralized way of communication between departments resembled the 
tayloristic and socialist ideas of centralism (Heidenreich 1991:424). In addition, the absence of horizontal 
interdependencies between the departments was fostered by the heads of the departments themselves in order 
to increase their autonomy (so-called "little principalities").
18 The term "politicized" work organisation ("Politisierung") refers to the undermining of bureaucratic, 
formal rules by personal contacts and "connections".
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Taylorism" (Mako and Simonyi 1987); "reduced" Taylorism (Deppe 1991); "double 
reality" (Weltz 1988), "divergence between the formal structure and reality" (VoBkamp and 
Wittke 1990:23), or "noncontractual relations" (Rottenburg 1991:306). The conclusion of 
these writers is that the central characteristic of the GDR work organisation was 
"Taylorism" and the the departure from it (Schmidt 1995:2). This is not to say that an 
informal sector is not common in capitalist bureaucracies as well (e.g. Brown 1972; Hill 
1974; Donovan Report 1968), but that in socialist firms it was present to a distinctive 
degree.19 An important corollary according to these writers is that the position of workers 
towards management was more powerful than in the West and formal disciplinary rules 
and motivation strategies were less influential.
Writers on the other side however question that the postulated "tayloristic" system 
was really the official, formal system, since "the official collectivist ideology is not 
compatible with the tayloristic ideology" (Alt et al. 1994:54; Gensior 1992:273; Schmidt 
1995:2). In their view the importance of the work collective was fostered by the state 
ideology, it was supposed to integrate the "whole" personality of the worker. Thus, these 
authors do not perceive the informal networks or the work collective as deviant to the 
official doctrine but as the major official characteristic and thus prefer the term 
"bureaucratic paternalism" (Deppe and HoB 1989:25) to "pseudo-Taylorism".
(ii) The strong shopfloor position of workers
Despite the above mentioned differences there is an overall agreement in the literature that 
informal negotiations existed on the shopfloor - not only in East Germany, but in most 
other Central and Eastern European countries20 - and that they should be interpreted as an 
important outcome and also source of strength of the workforce at shopfloor level (e.g. 
Deppe 1989; Fritze 1993b; Heidenreich 1991; KreiBig 1993; Rottenburg 1992).21 The
19 For example in contrast to the socialist case, informal negotiations in capitalist enterprises are 
restricted by the formal industrial relations institutions, thus informal relations exist within  a formal 
framework (Heidenreich 1991b: 15).
20 For example in the Czech Republic (e.g. Pollert 1995) or Russia (e.g. Clarke 1993).
21 A well-known joke in Hungary was: "There are three workers: an American, a West German, and a 
Hungarian. The American eats five eggs for breakfast and goes to work in his Buick. At work he is 
exploited. The West German has three eggs and ham for breakfast and goes to work in his Opel. He is also
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literature defines a "strong" workforce with regard to its bargaining power in workplace 
negotiations. Authors generally argue that the strength of the workers' position is fostered 
by official policies such as a highly stable rate of pay, a high level of indirect income 
(subsidized rents and goods, as well as company welfare services) and low taxes (5% for 
blue collars). Moreover, it is said that it was quite common for highly skilled, productive 
blue collar workers, especially those doing piecework, to earn a similar if not higher wage 
than their superiors and than white collar staff.22 In addition however, there is evidence of 
workers' bargaining power in informal negotiations. For example, Heidenreich (1991) 
notes that working time was often not used productively (some cases report of 30% of the 
working time not being used), work intensity was low, and the frequent disruptions in 
material flow was used extensively for breaks.23 Lohr (1992) argues in her study24 that 
although the socialist enterprise aimed to create a holistic welfare/care system which 
intended to produce political conformity, there were various indicators that this did not 
prevent interest negotiations and conflicts on the shopfloor. The workforce regulated their 
mode of working and their cooperative relationships frequently amongst themselves, 
largely independently of formal standards. Thus, workers' contact with the company's 
hierarchy is said to have been mediated above all by their informal negotiating relationships 
with their supervisors. Major personnel issues (e.g. overtime, piece rates, shift work, 
breaks) were often informally negotiated between work groups and their supervisors, who 
had no real authority25. Lohr concludes that conflict regulation was determined not by 
institutional, written, suable rights and duties, but through the real power positions of the 
actors and that this was arguably to the advantage of the workers, not of the management at
exploited at work. The Hungarian has one egg for breakfast and no meat. He goes to work on a bus but he 
is not exploited. At work he rules." (joke from the Hungarian shopfloor, quoted in Burawoy 1992: 35).
22 E.g. Heidenreich (199lb: 15) mentions that in one of his case study textile firms the supervisors earned 
1,100-1,200 Mark gross (=800 Mark net, since taxes for white collars were higher), whereas good sewers 
earned 1,000-1,200 Mark net. He also states that in the overall economy in 1988 the (net) earnings of East 
German supervisors were 8% higher than that of all production workers (also Stephan and Wiedemann 
1990:561). Adler and Kretzschmar (1993:114) state that in their case study a qualified blue collar worker 
earned on average 934— 1,031 Mark net, and a qualified white collar worker 970— 1,193 Mark net. Thus, 
there was no monetary incentive to become a supervisor (Alt et al. 1994:84).
23 A good example are the long work cycles: In the case study, Bodywear, the sewing time in former times 
for one model was 100-300 minutes, i.e. 5-15 minutes per seamstress in a group comprising 20 persons. 
The average work cycles in Western firms of 1-2 minutes were virtually unknown in the East.
24 Based on a joint DFG-project of Humboldt University and University of Erlangen-Ntimberg comprising 
8 case studies of firms in East Berlin.
25 The informal bargaining of the piece rate was particularly crucial, since basic pay was on average only 
40% of total earnings.
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that time (ibid.: 160). In a nutshell, she asserts that the formal interest representation of the 
union (BGL) was marginal (also Kirschner 1991:1034; KreiBig 1993:120). In other 
words, informal negotiations at shopfloor level provided the interest representation that 
was otherwise lacking (VoBkamp and Wittke 1991:32). Authors agree that although the 
BGL sometimes did provide a grievance path, it never provided a real "voice", i.e. 
representation of workers' interests. The union mainly promoted workers' involvement in 
production, and subordinated any short-term preferences of the workers to the overriding 
interest of economic growth. Empirical studies now reveal that most workers regarded 
unions as having primarily a service function in social affairs (e.g. distribution of holiday 
places) (David 1992:133; see also chapter 9).
2.3 .2  Reasons for informal networks
There are various reasons given for the informal networks and the supposed "passive 
strength" of workers. Firstly they were a result of the permanent shortage of labour in the 
socialist "shortage economies" (Kornai 1986) with supervisors dependent on their 
workforce.26 In addition, it has been argued that the supervisors were often former 
workmates (and often not the best ones) (Alt et al. 1994:84; Heidenreich ibid.: 12). 
Secondly, the extensive legal protection against dismissals (i.e. right to work, job security) 
suspended traditional management controls and disciplinary measures, and limited the 
possibilities for motivation policies (e.g. Heidenreich 1992:8). Thirdly, the low turnover 
and (geographically) decentralized production units and company social functions (leisure 
facilities etc.) fostered a very cosy, personal atmosphere and sense of community which 
supported informal relations. Also, the competition between and within the hierarchical 
levels of the enterprise was low due to small income differences and other "equalisation" 
policies (Diewald 1995:235). Fourthly, the GDR's official image as "the state of workers
26 Labour as with other production factors was utilized inefficiently and stockpiled (due to the "soft budget 
constraints" companies had no interest in utilizing labour economically and wage costs were low anyhow 
due to the high living cost subsidies). This made the enterprise dependent on workers to comply with extra 
work and creativity when production bottlenecks arrived, i.e. to agree to work in "impossible" working 
conditions with overtime and insufficient material.
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and farmers" and management being officially the commissioner of workers added to the 
social status of the workforce on shopfloor level. Fifthly, as mentioned above management 
actions were "personalised" and "politicized" (thus not guided by economically rational 
criteria). Sixthly, the limited autonomy of firms forced managers to conform to the 
externally made decisions. Any confrontation with the superiors was therefore dangerous 
in terms of their own career. Accordingly, management feared any industrial unrest 
amongst their workforce, and this fear took priority over the aim of increasing labour 
performance (Fritze 1993b:201; KreiBig 1993:111). Furthermore, it is argued that the 
absence of real interest representation by the unions forced workers to represent their 
interests on their own. Lastly, the informal negotiations and networks, although they 
increased the power of workers were beneficial for both sides. For management they met 
the official objectives (ensured worker compliance), and for workers they rendered their 
work life as comfortable as possible (VoBkamp and Wittke 1991:31). Thus, there was a 
practical rationale for working on this slow track, because effort was not rewarded: "You 
sometimes worked for four hours and were paid for eight" (worker quote in Bodywear 
case study, see chapter 8).
The literature speaks of a "plan fulfillment pact" (Planerfiillungspakt) between 
workers and management/ supervisors (Heidenreich 1991,1992; Kern and Land 1991; 
VoBkamp and Wittke 1990:25), or "emergency communities" (Notgemeinschaft) 
(Senghaas-Knobloch 1992:300). In some sense, both sides profited but with regard to the 
economy and society as a whole this practice was not beneficial at all. Thus, although the 
enterprise achieved considerable flexibility and some kind of worker compliance, the 
informal contract fostered the indifference of workers towards the production and quality 
of the product. The "politicization" of the work organisation is often used by authors to 
explain the structural inflexibility of the enterprises (despite their strong potential for 
improvisation) and the aversion to innovation is seen as a major characteristic of socialist 
firms in the GDR (e.g. Heidenreich 1992:11). Authors conclude that the informal system 
was complementary to the formal system but at the same time stood "at crossways" to it. 
Thus, the informal system increasingly undermined and provided a substitute for the 
formal system, but paradoxically also stabilized it at the same time.
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2 .3 .3  Problems of this literature
Six issues of the above literature on informal networks should be briefly discusses. 
Firstly, as mentioned above the literature is entirely based oh retrospective data (since GDR 
scientists did not commonly research the practices of workplace relations), which 
inevitably implies methodological problems (see Diewald 1995; Marz 1992; Lange 1992). 
As Marz (1992) argues people easily tend to conceive the past in a different, rosier light 
from what it really was.
Secondly, informal networks might be a phenomenon restricted to certain industrial 
sectors or occupations. Diewald finds in his study27 that the "personal quality" of the 
relations28 at the workplace in the retrospective perception of workers varied little between 
different occupations and income levels (1995:245). However the perceived usefulness of 
the networks was seen to vary between job levels and industrial sectors. They were 
perceived as highly useful in the metal industry for example, and in addition white collars 
perceived them as more useful than skilled and unskilled workers.
Thirdly, it can be questioned whether the informal networks also inevitably 
incorporated informal bargaining arrangements. For example in our case study firm 
informal networks might have existed in former times, yet there is little evidence that 
workers were involved in heavy informal bargaining with their supervisors. Also, one 
could argue that a lot happened in a rather indirect, implicit way. For example, coming to 
work late is not an indicator of an active, conscious bargaining between the two sides.
Fourthly, one can argue that even if workers had a relatively high degree of control 
over the way they produced, it does not necessarily mean they had actual power (see 
Clarke 1995). For example, they could only escape from potentially dissatisfying working 
conditions in individual ways (e.g. absenteeism, alcoholism, low motivation, 
psychological withdrawal, poor discipline), since they had little possibility of collective 
resistance. In Hirschman's terms (1982) there was no "voice" available and "exit" was 
limited (i.e. the working conditions were not significantly different in other enterprises).
27 Longitudinal survey of 2,323 East Germans in 1991/2 and 1993.
28 Relations are seen as a "social resource", for example did you get personal help from colleagues, and 
were these networks used to talk about politics/general topics.
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Furthermore, one should not think that informal bargaining was always free of problems 
and friction. Workers were never sure exactly how far they could go and there were 
obviously conflicts amongst workers, e.g. older workers may not have been keen to get 
overtime work, whereas the younger ones wanted the extra pay (see Freeman 1993b). 
Finally, some authors state that workers were mainly reacting rather than becoming 
proactive (Kirschner 1991:1035). This can be partly explained by the limited scope of 
action (e.g. limited bargaining scope at the shopfloor, since a lot was decided at a higher 
level, i.e. Party, see also Clarke et al. 1993: chp. 1). To conclude, several authors have 
pointed out that the strong position or bargaining power of the workforce on the shopfloor 
can only be seen as a form of "passive strength" (Kern and Land 1991; VoBkamp and 
Wittke 1991) or "informal power" (David 1992:130).
Fifthly, a related question is that of workers power. Studies of Hungary have 
suggested that there was a significant distinction between core and peripheral workers 
(Burawoy 1985). Core work groups took the key role in informal negotiating whilst the 
rest were more passive. Core workers had a strategic function in the production process or 
were in important departments (e.g. export) with high qualifications, peripheral workers 
were in less important, less well paid jobs and found it more difficult to participate in 
bargaining. With regard to the GDR Diewald (1995) finds in his study that women were 
less likely to perceive the networks as instrumental than men, a finding which cannot be 
traced back to job segregation. It seems that females were less integrated into these 
networks than males (ibid.: 147). On the other hand age cohorts did not seem to matter in 
his sample. He concludes that informal networks did not necessarily even out imbalances 
but rather increased existing inequalities amongst different types of workers (e.g. 
skilled/unskilled, male/female).
Finally, the degree to which informal bargaining substituted entirely for official 
worker representation is still a moot point. Riithers (1972:43) for example mentions that 
85% of the conflicts over labour law (Arbeitsrechtsstreitigkeiten) were regulated by the 
official conflict commission. There is also evidence of cases where the BGL (union 
branch) tried to foster workers interests. For example, KreiBig (1993:110)29 explains that
29 Based on case studies in the tools and electrotechnical industry in Saxony during the 1980s.
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the BGL sought to achieve its ends mainly through collaboration and not confrontation 
with the directors. Differences had to be settled through amicable negotiation and not by 
adversarial collective bargaining. Where management really infringed members' interests 
(e.g. health and safety), the union might have protested and referred matters to higher 
authorities for arbitration. Obviously, there was no room for industrial action, strikes being 
seen as symptoms of union failure rather than legitimate weapons. However KreiBig found 
that in many cases the management agreed to workers' demands in order to avoid unrest 
and scolding from above. In addition, in some cases the good connections of union 
officials with the above political or union ranks could well undermine the power of 
directors and Party officials in the enterprise. Nevertheless KreiBig does not want to 
suggest that the BGL was anything more than a "moderator" and "buffer" for management 
policies (ibid.: 120).
In sum, regarding the outlined methodological and contextual problems one 
wonders why the thesis of substantial informal bargaining arrangements and strong 
workforce power was so quickly taken for granted in the research community. It would 
seem worthwhile to substantiate the argument by studying these proposed characteristics in 
different industrial sectors, production systems and workforce members.
Conclusion of Chapter 2
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Outlining the socialist industrial relations system provided the background for 
understanding the post-1989 transformation of industrial relations institutions, which will 
be discussed in the next chapter. In more detail, the chapter emphasized the bureaucratic, 
hierachical organisation of socialist enterprises and work organisation, the "cooperation" 
between the three major actors on top level (triumvirat) and the absense of an effective 
institutional representation of workers' interests (i.e. by the unions). This might have an 
impact on workers' current relationship to their new, West German interest institutions 
(unions, works councils). The chapter also reported the literatures' interpretation of the 
former workplace relations as being characterized by substantial informal networks and 
bargaining arrangements. Despite the outlined problems of this interpretation, informal 
negotiations might well have been an important feature of the socialist shopfloor reality in 
specific sectors or enteprises. It seems therefore worthwhile to investigate whether those 
informal networks were succeeded by the formalisation of interest representation after 
Unification. This will be addressed in the workforce surveys in Part 3. The next chapter 
introduces the literature on the transformation of workplace relations.
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Chapter 3 Transformation of workplace relations in East Germany: 
review of literature
This chapter introduces the transformation of workplace relations by reviewing the current, 
mainly institutional, literature on the establishment and development of industrial relations 
during the transformation. It attempts to cluster the existing literature into specific 
arguments, although this turns out to be difficult because of the sometimes overlapping, 
somewhat fragmented, and still developing nature of the arguments of "work in progress". 
Evaluation of the material is also quite complicated, especially since the empirical basis is 
in some cases not always clearly expressed.
There are two sections: 3.1 describes the formal transformation of the main actors 
of workplace relations: unions, works councils and management. 3.2 deals with the 
current state of workplace practices and focuses in particular on the works council, its 
effectiveness in representing workers interests and its institutionalisation.
3 .1  "Formal" transformation of industrial relations actors
3 .1 .1  The acquisition of the FDGB30
The transformation of the socialist state union, FDGB, turned out to be an acquisition of 
the individual industrial union branches by their West German counterparts, after a short 
attempt to rescue and reform the FDGB on its own (see Fichter 1996; Fichter and 
Kurbjuhn 1993; Hertle and Weinert 1991; Klinzing 1992; Pirker et al. 1990a; Weinert 
1993). How likely it was that such a reform would succeed and why it failed are the 
subjects of various studies (e.g. Fichter and Lutz 1991; Hertle 1990; Pirker et al. 
1990a,b). The FDGB decided at the end of January 1990 to create financially independent,
30 The following account draws heavily on Fichter's work (esp. 1996, 1994). His work is partly based on a 
project with Kurbjuhn (1993) which involved interviews with 17 East German and 33 West German union 
officials who are responsible for the new Lander (German states) in the sixteen unions affiliated to the DGB 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund).
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industrial unions. However, the DGB unions expected at that time, according to Fichter 
(1996:6,1991), a thorough process of democratization and decentralization to ensue, and 
also that unions in West and East Germany would find "a suitable basis for cooperative 
relations and possible amalgamation". Fichter argues that the West German unions had no 
interest in the rapid acquisition of their socialist counterparts. But the West German unions 
seemed to have overestimated the political potential of the East German citizens' 
movement, which was quickly overwhelmed by the popular demand to become part of 
West Germany and gain access to the Deutschmark zone. After the landslide election 
victory of the CDU-led East German "Allianz ftir Deutschland" in March 1990, a takeover 
strategy with the goal of "incorporation" assumed priority in Bonn (Fichter 1996:7). As the 
speed of this began to accelerate, the DGB unions then faced the choice of either 
"mounting a breakneck effort to implement their organisational jurisdiction into the GDR or 
finding the eastern part of a united Germany virtually devoid of functioning unions" 
(Fichter 1994:52). Armingeon (1991:34) talks of a "Zugszwang" (tight spot) for the West 
German unions after the West German economic system and the collective labour 
legislation were extended to the East. Within only a few months (March to September
1990) the West German unions then organized the "jurisdictional" and organizational 
expansion to the East. On June 8th 1990 the decision was made (within the DGB) to 
liquidate the FDGB a few months later (September 14th 1990). The acquisition of the 
single union branches started during the Summer of 1990 and the successful takeover of 
the membership took place between Autumn 1990 and Spring 1991. The organizational 
expansion of all DGB unions was completed by Autumn of 1991.31 This process was 
supported by the West German government, as well as by the West German employers' 
associations, i.e. BDA32 (Wilke and Muller 1991:267). The DGB and BDA discovered a 
common interest in transferring western collective bargaining instruments as quickly as 
possible to the East. The consensus between the two organisations seems to have been 
designed to remove all doubt regarding the future of their established structures, norms and 
institutional arrangements in the unified Germany (Fichter 1996:5; Wilke and Muller
3 1 There is a debate as to how far it was the political circumstances, the DGB or the FDGB who initiated 
the merging process (e.g. Fichter 1994:52; Ansorg and Hurtgen 1992; Lippold et al. 1993).
32 Bundesverband Deutscher Arbeitgeber (in charge of collective bargaining issues and social politics).
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1991:271) which could also be interpreted as a move to reduce possible competition from 
the East.33 At any rate, it required the establishment of employers' associations (which will 
not dealt with here, but see chapter 4), and trade unions in the East.
The acquisition strategy chosen by most West German unions is interpreted by many 
observers as "a conservative (risk avoiding) approach designed to retain maximum control 
over the many uncertainties ahead" (e.g. Fichter 1994:53). Most unions did indeed take a 
pragmatic stance, arguing that it made sense to take advantage of the existing FDGB 
infrastructures and resources (buildings, vehicles etc.). The transformation in the end 
resulted in the complete takeover of both members and union property and assets. It should 
also be noted that the new union structure in East Germany is a copy of the western model, 
whether or not this model is an appropriate one (see also Jander and VoB 1991). This 
meant that the acquisition of most unions was not accompanied by any democratic 
"discourse" or learning process or examination of whether there was anything worthwhile 
which could be kept from the socialist unions. Furthermore, there was no common 
approach or discussion amongst the western unions about the possible challenges of the 
very different historical, cultural, and socio-economic legacies in East Germany (Fichter 
1996:8). Fichter suggests further that union leaders ignored grass root and shop floor 
initiatives associated with the East German citizens movement and rebuffed all efforts by 
critical voices within their own camp to promote the idea of coupling the expansion process 
with necessary internal organizational reforms34 (see also Mahnkopf 1991, 1993).
The take over resulted in large gains in membership in the two years immediately 
after Unification in 1990 (see table 3.1). Since then, membership has been declining 
throughout the country in the wake of economic recession and - especially in the East - 
massive de-industrialization and job losses (Fichter 1996:11; Wiesenthal 1994:7). At the 
end of 1991 the DGB enjoyed an increase in membership of 49% (= 3,862,490 new 
members) (Kittner 1994:91). This meant that in 1990 only 10% of the East German
33 See also their joint agreement to a uniform economic and social system in a unified Germany 
(DGB/BDA, Gemeinsame Erklarung zu einer einheitlichen Wirtschafts-und Sozialordnung in beiden 
deutschen Staaten, March 9th, 1990 in: DGB Informationsdienst ID7).
34 This refers to the current debate within German unions and the DGB about internal organisational 
reforms (e.g. Leif et al. 1993; Mahnkopf 1993:10).
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workers failed join to the new western unions (Lecher 1990:320). In 1991 union density in 
East Germany was 59% compared to 29% in West Germany.35 This dramatic increase in 
total membership was evidently a surprise for the western unions, many of whom had 
expected a massive exodus of FDGB members (e.g. textile union, GTB, see Wilke and 
Muller 1991:263). That this did not happen was possibly due to the heightened insecurity 
and loss of orientation throughout the rapid Unification and transformation process, e.g. 
the increasing fear of the consequences of the introduction of the market economy 
(unemployment, social security,..) and the conviction that the unions could help. Thus, 
several authors claim that there was a widespread belief amongst the East German 
workforce that West German unions could guarantee a quick improvement of living and 
working conditions (e.g. Fichter 1994:56).
Even so large an increase in membership cannot be assumed to have led to an 
increase in union power, and it is argued that density figures in East German will 
eventually fall to the comparable West German level (Kittner 1994:84; Mahnkopf 1993). 
By 1992 DGB membership had already decreased by 6.7%; whereas the old Lander 
recorded a reduction of only 0.2%, the new Lander showed a decrease of 18.4% (Kittner 
1994:92). A year later DGB membership dropped a further 6.6%, with East Germany 
accounting for 64% of the total decrease (Die Quelle, Junel994:14). Losses among 
members under 25 years of age in East Germany have been particularly high, ranging 
between 20 and 25% a year since 1992 (Fichter 1996:13). The ratio of female to male 
members in East Germany, while declining, is still almost twice as high as in West 
Germany (1994: 46%/25%) (Fichter ibid.). Finally, although the loss of members in the 
East has slackened over the past two years there is still no certainty that a stable level of 
membership is within reach (Fichter 1996:13).
35 According to the authors' calculations, density here is based on the employed labour force (see table
below). Mahnkopf quotes different densities: 50% for East Germany and 35% for West Germany (1993:8), 
but does not say how she defined densities. Official union statistics do not publish density figures.
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table 3.1: Membership figures of the DGB
(31.12) DGB total DGB West DGB East % of total West
density3**
East density
1989 7,861,000 7,861,000 ./. ./. 31.89 % ./.
1990 11,564,923 7,937,923 3,627,000 31.36% 31.17% 45.33%
(40.30% )37
1991 11,800,413 7,642,587 4,157,826 35.23% 29.19% 60.64 % 
(49.37%)
1992 11,015,612 7,623,865 3,391,747 30.79% 28.89% 56.82%
(43.08%)
1993 10,290,152 7,383,500 2,906,652 28.25% 28.47% 50.60%
(38.11%)
1994 9,768,373 7,179,123 2,589,250 26.51% 28.09% 44.73%
source: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (Sonderheft Arbeitsstatistik) for all years, 
Buechtemann and Schupp (1992), Kittner (1995); own calculations o f the densities.
3 .1 .2  The establishment of works councils
Works councils were forbidden in East Germany after 1946, when the SBZ government 
(Soviet military zone) abolished them and - against heavy resistance - replaced them with 
local union branches: the BGL38 (Bust-Bartels 1980; Gill 1991; Lutz 1991; Suckuts 
1982).39 Following the turnaround in October 1989 there was a short period when the 
FDGB and the BGL tried to reform themselves but without any success (see above). 
However, in a large number of enterprises active groups were established within the 
workforce or within the BGL itself who initiated the closure of the old BGL. The literature 
commonly argues that these groups were disillusioned by the BGL's effort to represent 
workers' interests, and had lost their last remnants of respect and trust when the BGL did
3*> Density is defined here as DGB union membership (thus without DAB, DBB, CGB) as a percentage of 
the total employed labour force ("Beschaftigte Arbeitnehmer").
Densities in brackets give DGB union membership as a percentage o f the total labour force (incl. 
unemployed) ("Erwerbspersonen").
38 BGL was the FDGB company branch (see chapter 2).
39 This was one measure o f the GDR state to change unions' role from its traditional defensive role to an 
industrial-political role within the construction of the socialist state.
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not participate in the "revolutionary" period in the enterprises (e.g. Kirschner 1991). The 
literature is however divided on the reasons as to why these worker councils were 
established. The main point of contention is whether they indicate an interest by workers in 
"industrial democracy" (improving workers interest representation), or whether they were 
merely a vehicle to support management in introducing organisational changes. In short, 
there are two opposite groups of research.
Firstly, WISOC in Chemnitz (e.g. Ermischer, KreiBig, Lungwitz, Preusche), 
whose associates have carried out various case studies of companies in Saxony from 1989 
onwards. In their view worker councils40 were "democratically elected forms of employee 
'bottom-up' participation, developed for the first time after more than 40 years" (e.g. 
Ermischer and Preusche 1995:53)41, which fulfilled the "need of East German employees 
for self-realisation, to develop their own creativity, to be involved in decision-making 
processes, for general involvement and information" (ibid.).
Secondly, the Berlin/ Gottingen project (Kadtler, Kottwitz, Jander, Lutz, 
Rosenbaum, Weinert) who do not interpret the emergence of worker councils as a sign of 
expanding industrial democracy.42 The basic argument for these analysts is that these 
worker councils did not represent a push for democratic reforms in the socialist firms, but 
instead emerged as a result of political protests against the SED regime (in order to stop the 
"red socks" in the enterprises, i.e. to get rid of the Stasi and Party) and to support the 
reconstruction of the enterprise. Industrial democracy is not seen to be the reason for 
establishing the worker councils, because they were not linked to any civil movements 
outside the firm and because people aimed for a restructuring process through harmonious 
workplace relations ("partnership"). WISOC however argues that improving employee's 
voice in the enterprise was one reason for the establishment of these councils.
40 The term "worker councils" will be used for the councils established in 1989/early 1990 which were not 
under West German law, and "works councils" will be used for councils under (West) German law 
(Betriebsrate), thus after the mid 1990s.
Based on case studies in six companies of the machine industry in Saxony.
42 Expert interviews and documentary work in 40 companies in Saxony and Thiiringen during the 
unification period (1989/90) and six intensive longitudinal case studies (mainly from interviews with works 
councils) in these regions, plus equivalent investigations around Berlin (22 companies) till 1992/3 (see 
Jander and Lutz 1991; Kadtler and Kottwitz 1994), make up their empirical underpinning.
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To conclude, their different interpretation might well be due to their different empirical 
samples which may present regional differences (Berlin - Saxony, the centre of civil 
movement). A more likely reason seems to lie however in their different understanding of 
"industrial democracy", which neither side defines with precision. Furthermore, neither 
side provides explicit and sufficient evidence to support their views, and hinders a final 
evaluation.
Finally, the West German Works Constitution Act (BetrVG 1972)43, the foundation of 
works councils, was introduced on June 1st 1990 (Wirtschafts- und Wahrungsunion), 
along with other labour laws (e.g. "the law against wrongful dismissal" 
[Kiindigungsschutzgesetz]) before the political Unification (October 3th 1990). 
Consequently, all existing, "unlawful" worker councils had to be newly elected under the 
German law, existing company agreements had to be amended, and works councils were 
introduced in places where they did not yet exist. This had to be achieved within a two year 
period (until 30.6.1992). In most companies works councils seem to have been established 
from the mid 1990s onwards (earlier than the transfer of employers' associations and 
western unions).44
43 The German industrial relations system is often described as a "dual system". This means that at the 
industry level, interest representation is conducted on a voluntary basis through the institutions of 
collective bargaining between unions and employers' associations, whereas domestic/ company level 
negotiations are conducted on a statutory basis between works councils and individual employers. The 
statutory framework at the workplace is provided by the 1972 Works Constitution Act (BetrVG). Under 
this legislation works councils are elected in all workplaces with over five employees and are responsible 
for representing and protecting employee interests at the workplace. As statutory bodies, works councils are 
formally independent of the unions and are elected by the whole workforce. The law does not permit 
councils to bargain on issues already covered in collective agreements such as pay (only in cases where 
wages are paid in excess of collectively agreed rates the council can bargain with the employer). In addition, 
the works council has several information, consultant and co-determination rights concerning various 
social, personnel and economic issues (e.g. overtime pay, working times, redundancies, recruitment). 
Alongside the statutory council, the unions maintain a network of stewards (Vertrauensleute) at the 
workplace. Unlike the council, the body of stewards is an integral part of the union organisation and not 
subject to the Works Constitution Act (partly quoted from Mahnkopf 1993:10). For further infomation on 
the "dual system" of German industrial relations see Adams and Rummel (1977), Berghahn and Karsten 
(1987), Streeck (1984a), Thelen (1991).
44 No data is available on the precise number of East German firms having a works council (according to 
Niedenhoff o f IDW Koln, or see Schneider in Kittner 1995).
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3 .1 .3  Personnel management in transition
The existing empirical research on organisational transformation is mainly based on case 
studies. These often follow the modernisation processes of one or more firms or of a 
whole industrial sector (e.g. Dorr and Schmidt 1992; Edwards and Lawrence 1994; 
Heidenreich 1993; Kiichle and Volkmann 1993; Niebur 1992; Wittke et al. 1993), and 
often focus on the effectiveness of modernisation and restructuring in terms of productivity 
and competitiveness (e.g. Griinert 1992), but are not concerned with its impact on 
workers' attitudes and behaviour. Most studies refer to privatised companies, where the 
process of organisational restructuring was begun earlier than in the Treuhand45 owned 
firms.
Two different tendencies are taking shape. One group of researchers argue that we 
see innovative, socially engaged managers who introduce "innovative" personnel methods 
such as total quality management (TQM) or human resource management (HRM). 
Managers are therefore seen to build on the old informal partnerships and networks on the 
shopfloor and to be attempting to get the workforce to agree to a new "modernisation pact" 
instead of the old shopfloor "survival pacts" (see Bluhm 1992; and chapter 2). This view is 
supported by the WISOC group. For example Preusche (1994) argues that East German 
managers in her sample (managers of seven companies in the Saxon metal industry)46 
were, due to their prior socialisation, more "humanistically oriented" and thus care for 
harmonious employee relations (see also section 3.2.1). Furthermore, Lang (1992:139) 
found in his comparative study of (155) West and (291) East German managers a more 
"cooperative and social orientation" in the East German work behaviour. In the same vein
4  ^ The Treuhandanstalt Berlin was the state privatisation agency which started its work in 1991. The 
Treuhand took over the assets and liabilities (over 100 Mrd Deutsche Mark) of the East German combines 
(VEB's). In 1992 the Treuhand had responsibility for over 5,100 companies (Treuhand prospectus 
"Entschlossen Sanieren" 1992:17). In the end of 1994/beginning of 1995 the Treuhand had completed its 
work o f privatising most of the firms and was dissolved (being substituted by regional "holdings").
46 This study was based on structured interviews with 23 managers of these companies, as well as on 
interviews with two works councillors of each company.
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Stratemann (1993:21) showed in her study47 that East German managers score a stronger 
"responsibility for employees" than their western counterparts.
However, one can argue that this proposed "social behaviour" does not necessarily 
mean that East German managers will install employee involvement. Neither does it say 
anything about management's relationship with the works councils. It may equally lead to 
a patriarchal form of employee relations, with works councils being ignored. It would also 
be natural to speculate about whether most new management techniques are being typically 
introduced by the western headquarters rather than on the initiative of East German 
management. Finally, Heidenreich (1993:94) argues that it is utopian to think that under 
the current labour market circumstances companies could build on the old "survival pacts".
The other, more pessimistic group of researchers argue that these innovative 
enterprises are rare exceptions, they are islands largely cut off from their surroundings, 
and mostly to be found in the automoblie industry (e.g. VW in Saxony, General Motors 
(Opel) in Eisenstadt, see Mahnkopf 1993:5)48. For these writers the major trend seems 
instead to be a revival of the Fordist organisation and control principles. The argument is 
that management wants to optimize the already existing "Tayloristic" organisation (as 
defined in chapter 2), which was impossible in former times due to the continous 
production problems and the powerful position of the workers on the shopfloor (e.g. Lohr
1992). Today, power relations have changed and real "Taylorism" can finally be practiced. 
Thus, management does not try to establish a new "pact" (informal agreement) with the 
workforce but instead tries to motivate them by fear. Several studies support this (e.g. 
Edeling 1992:55; Heering and Schroeder 1992:24; Lohr 1992; VoBkamp and Wittke
1991). Heidenreich (1991a:33) observes in his study49 a tendency towards "structural- 
conservative" (struktur- konservativ), rigid-tayloristic forms of work organisation. He 
argues that East German managers have begun to act (for the first time) without any social
47 Based on a study of the Institute of Economic Psychology in Dortmund (WIP) on the economically 
relevant psychological characteristics of East Germans. Further details about this study are published in 
Stratemann (1991).
48 Mahnkopf bases her arguments on interviews with union officials and works council members in 
Brandenburg during 1991. We are not told how many interviews she conducted nor in which industries they 
took place (see Mahnkopf 1993:1).
49 Based on 12 case studies (92 interviews with managers and works councillors in these case studies and a 
few other companies from various industrial sectors).
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responsibility, and that especially in crisis situations they often do not inform the 
workforce about the future of the company and, if they do, do so only to secure obedience. 
It is claimed that these practices will eventually lead to worker resistance and inflexibility 
(also Bluhm 1992; Kern and Land 1991; Lohr 1992:165; Voskamp and Wittke 1991). 
Thus, instead of creating innovative workplaces, it merely leads to a "downward spiral" 
(Kem and Land 1991).
To conclude, one might describe the two scenarios as a "modernisation" and a 
"polarisation" scenario (Jurgens 1993). However, it is not possible at this stage to make 
final evaluations as to whether more tayloristic or more flexible production forms will be 
the common feature in East Germany. Sufficient representative data is not available, and 
the restructuring of work organisation and personnel management in many companies is 
still in flux. It will depend for example on the kind of industries which are developing 
(thus only distribution and mass production ones as most western firms are establishing at 
the moment) (see Schuldt 1994) and it might also depend on the background of the 
management, whether they come from West Germany/ foreign countries or whether they 
are the old directors or new East Germans. It will be one task of the case study later on to 
examine the possible applicability of these scenarios in the textile industry.
3 .2  Current practice of workplace relations
Having discussed the formal establishment of unions, the emergence of works councils 
and the changes in management style, we now focus on the characteristics of the evolving 
workplace relations. There is a considerable amount of research on the development of 
works councils, mostly based on expert interviews and/or case studies of specific 
companies (interviews with management and works councillors) (e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 
1993; David 1992; Mickler et al. 1992; Roske and Wassermann 1991; SOFI group 
Gottingen [e.g. Bluhm, Kern and Land, Kirschner, VoBkamp and Wittke]; Berlin/ 
Gottingen group and WISOC group, as above). This review will focus on the development
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and quality of the works council-management relationship (i.e. workplace relations in a 
narrow sense). Three interrelated questions arise. Firstly, can we characterize a typical 
works council-management relationship in East Germany? (3.2.1) Secondly, how 
successful/ effective is the current works council's interest representation? (3.2.2) And 
thirdly, have works councils been successfully "institutionalized" so that workplace 
relations have become formalised? (3.2.3)
3.2 .1  Works council - management relationship: "Co-management" or
"works council as an extended arm of management"?
The research on workplace relations distinguishes between the period before and after 
privatisation, since privatisation is seen as having a radical impact on workplace relations 
(e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 1993:6; Ermischer and Preusche 1992; Htirtgen 1992). With 
regard to the first period, one may distinguish two views (which resemble the above 
outlined views regarding the establishment of works councils), one arguing that the 
relationship was essentially harmonious, the other arguing that it was one in which the 
works council was subservient. In more detail, the first group sees the enterprise as being 
characterized by a cooperative relationship, i.e. "co-management" (Ermischer and Preusche
1993) or "partnership for progress/construction" ("Aufbau-partnerschaft") (Roske and 
Wassermann 1991), and give three main reasons.
Firstly, there was the former socialisation and “collective" experiences in the 
socialist workplaces (e.g. life-long employment in the same firm, everyone knew each 
other, no extreme social status differences between management and workers) (see section 
3.1.3).
Secondly, there was the actual inter-dependence of the two actors: it is argued that 
both parties had an equal status in the beginning, where management was sometimes even 
in a weaker situation since it had to earn/regain legitimacy from the workforce (i.e. 
unclarified power relations, i.e. "power vacuum" [Machtvakuum]) (e.g. Kirschner 
1992:85). Consequently, management was dependent on the works council to get the
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support of the workforce for any restructuring. Moreover, both parties faced radical 
challenges from the plants' internal and external environment. It is argued that this worked 
as a force for cooperative relations in order to have at least one stabilizing factor during the 
difficult survival process. According to Ermischer and Preusche (1995:55) "the 
cooperation enhanced the plant level process of transformation and helped to compensate 
for the lack of experience of both management and the works council with the strange 
economic and legal system". One should also note that the common "enemy" Treuhand 
(the state privatisation agency) arguably induced "emergency associations" (Not- 
gemeinschaften).
Thirdly, there was the unifying aim of (a) preparing the enterprise for the market 
economy (e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 1993:9), and (b) of dismantling the political structures, 
i.e. "de-ideologisation" of the work structure and organisation (e.g. getting rid of the "red 
socks"). Some even argue that there has been a third common aim, the development of 
more employee involvement (Ermischer and Preusche 1992:2).
In sum, these authors conclude that co-management emerged as a typical trend in 
their case study companies because of the specific internal situations after the "Wende" 
(turnaround). Ermischer and Preusche's empirical investigation (interviews in 34 
companies of mostly the metal industry in Saxony from 1991 onwards) bases its 
conclusion on the finding that in the majority of cases the management and works council 
saw their relationship as a positive, cooperative relationship with the aim of achieving 
consensus (1993:185).
However, we are not told which interview questions were asked, nor are important 
terms like "cooperation" clearly defined. For example, the perception of "shared goals" 
does not necessarily lead to co-management or effective codetermination. It is also possible 
that the works council, since it shares the same goals as management, does not see the 
need to become pro-active. This view is supported by the other group of academics who 
propose that cooperative works councils in East Germany are "extended arms of 
management" rather than effective worker institutions. Some of their arguments will be 
reviewed:
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Jander and Lutz (1991:411) of the Berlin/Gottingen group found in their survey (outlined 
above, 3.1.2) that cases of pro-active works councils were the exception rather than the 
rule, and speculate that they were likely to have been concentrated around Leipzig and 
Dresden (the home of the civil movement). They also found that even in the beginning 
when works councils formally attended management meetings they did not participate 
greatly in the decision making, but basically agreed to decisions which sounded 
economically rational. For example, there was no works council in their sample which had 
developed alternatives to management's reconstruction concept. In general, works 
councillors were found to be very open to economic arguments because of their belief that 
economic irrationality led the former system into ruin. Economic rationality and especially 
technological progress are often seen as panaceas (also Dathe and Schreiber 1993:42; 
David 1992:132-134). Mickler et al.'s case study of VW gives an impressive account of 
the works council's agreement to the introduction of lean production without any 
restrictions (1992:16). Moreover, according to Jander and Lutz (ibid.)'s observation East 
German works councils generally did not and still do not mobilize against staff reductions, 
because they are accepted as unavoidable. They also typically avoid any politicisation of 
labour relations since it is seen as the core reason for the old mis-management. 
Consequently, as for example Kadtler and Kottwitz (1994) argue, the "works council as a 
partner/arm of management" type is often believed by works councillors themselves to be 
the ideal type (see Kotthoffs typology in section 3.2.2). Accordingly, as the authors 
conclude, the relationship between management and works council is not seen by the 
councillors as the expression of any fundamental conflict of interest but as a "functional 
complementary relationship". Similarly, Kadtler and Kottwitz's study (1994) finds that 
works councils, albeit having realized that their scope for action is very limited, were 
persuaded that cooperation is best. The authors mention that "it is not the announcement of 
a third or fourth redundancy round which causes a 'hardening of the fronts' but instead the 
times when management violates the rights of the works council or is guilty of 
negligence". Thus, only when informal norms were violated, did the works council 
become "aggressive".50
50 The author observed the same in a chemical company which she visited in Bitterfeld in 1993. It
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Jander and Lutz also remark that the early attendance of the worker council at board 
meetings in some firms could easily be seen more as a management strategy to get the 
workers to accept organisational changes than as an indicator of co-management. In 
addition, Kadtler (1992:8-10) cannot find any evidence to suggest that there were conflicts 
in the early period (Winter 1989) in those enterprises with extensive rights for their worker 
councils over the introduction of the more restrictive German works councils law. He goes 
so far as to argue that even if the broader participation rights would had been kept, the 
outcome of "co-management" would have been the same, largely due to the particular 
economic and political context.
Similar to their interpretation of the origins of worker councils the two groups 
provide different interpretations of the works council development, in these the WISOC 
group might be labelled as more positive/optimistic, and the Berlin/Gottingen group as 
more negative/pessimistic.
With regard to workplace relations after privatisation there is more agreement 
among researchers. It is argued that workforce, works council and management no longer 
jointly face the Treuhand in safeguarding the interests of the enterprise. The classic 
division of interests between capital and labour becomes more explicit (Ermischer and 
Preusche 1995:59; Lungwitz and Preusche 1994). Workplace relations become 
characterized on the one side by management strengthening its position (e.g. legitimized by 
new owners or by a management buy-out), frequently reinforcing "taylorist" control and 
disciplinary methods (e.g. Bluhm 1992; Lippold et al. 1992; Voskamp and Wittke 1991). 
On the other side the deteriorating economic situation reduces the task of works councils to 
that of administrating redundancies instead of "co-managing" the on-going reorganisation. 
For example, Mickler et al.'s case study (1992) of the new Volkswagen car factory in 
Saxony showed that the informal "survival pacts" which existed in 1990 were by 1992 
starting to fall apart: management wanted more productivity and the workforce wanted to 
keep their traditional piece rates and customs. Thus, Mickler et al. write, "not the 
democratisation of workplace relations, but company survival, massive redundancies and
experienced mass redundancies without any interference from the works council or workforce, but when 
management once violated a specific legal (information) right of the works council, the works council 
organized an immediate walkout.
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the securing of a minimum social standard determines the daily work of the councils" 
(1993:21). Finally, one should not forget that privatisation often leads to the employment 
of West German or foreign managers who are likely to challenge the established East 
German community (see Aderhold et al. 1994).
In conclusion, most of the literature agrees that there has been a shift and development in 
works council-management relations. However, it is not entirely clear what the 
development is about. Firstly, the characterisation by some researchers of early workplace 
relations as cooperative would be enhanced by defining the concepts, "cooperation" or "co­
management". Is it a "real" cooperation, say between two equally strong partners51, or is it 
more a one-sided acquiescence on the part of the works council? Furthermore, is a 
representation of workers interests possible at all in a co-management arrangement?
Secondly, the argument that "cooperation" has declined since privatisation does not 
say what it has been substituted by. Does "non-cooperation" mean a conflictual 
relationship or does it mean that the works council becomes (or continues to be) an 
extended arm of management, thus administering management functions, as Mahnkopf 
(1991:280) or Jander and Lutz (1991) argue? Obviously, it is difficult at this stage to make 
clear judgements about this development, so that statements inevitably remain vague, e.g. 
Ermischer and Preusche's (1995:60) conclusion that their case studies in 1994 show "more 
conflictual relations without the loss of cooperation". In addition, the discussion on "co­
management or conflict" seems to be burdened with the problem that the authors seem to 
have different understandings of what they mean by these terms, and that the concepts 
themselves are difficult to operationalize. One way to circumvent the problem of measuring 
cooperation would be to examine whether works councils can manage to represent interests 
effectively or not. This will be topic of the following section.
51 Cooperation is often defined differently, e.g. that people willingly cooperate because of mutual gains 
(see Axelrod 1990).
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3 .2 .2  Effective interest representation: problems of the works councils
There is little (West) German research evaluating the quality of workplace relations and in 
particular examining the interrelation between the two actors in terms of effective interest 
representation (effective from the view of the workforce). Works councils in general have 
only gained academic interest in recent years52, and most studies so far have concentrated 
on the contextual changes and challenges (e.g. new technology, lean production). The only 
major study which focuses on the quality of interest representation is Kotthoffs 
longitudinal case study analysis of 64 companies (1981, 1994)53, which created a useful 
typology of effective and ineffective works councils and distinguished between the 
categories as follows: (i) deficient forms of interest representation: "the ignored works 
council"; "the isolated works council"; "the works council as an extended arm of 
management"; and (ii) effective forms of (autonomous) interest representation: "the 
respected, cooperative works council"; "the respected, steadfast works council"; and "the 
works council as a cooperative hostile power".
It is hard to measure the effectiveness of interest representation especially during 
times of transformation. The most common approach in the current East German literature 
is to outline some problems which works councils are currently facing and to assert (rather 
than to analyse) that these problems hinder the proper functioning of works councils. 
There are various problems mentioned in the literature (more by the Berlin/Gottingen group 
than by WISOC) and it is difficult to disentangle them: (i) the intensified classical dilemma 
of works councils between the interests of company and workforce; (ii) the unsuitability of 
the West German industrial relations system in the East German context; (iii) problems due 
to the newness of the institution; (iv) the problematic union-works council relationship; and 
(v) the low image of the works council. In the following, these five problems will be 
briefly outlined:
52 For example Hoffmann et al. (1987); Trinczek (1987, 1989, 1993); Promberger (1991); Weinert (1984).
53 In various industries in Baden-Wurtemberg in 1974/5, and 15 years later he looked at the same case 
studies again to measure possible changes in workplace relations.
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(i) The intensified classical dilemma of works councils between the 
interests of company and workforce
Jander and Lutz (1991:2) state that interest representation in East Germany has to deal 
with a fundamental dilemma: on the one side enterprises are confronted with global 
competition which makes modernisation and reorganisation (including the reduction of 
staff overheads) necessary and which leaves little room for negotiation or alternative ideas; 
on the other side the works council wants to fulfill its task of representing the immediate 
social interests of the workforce. Also Kottwitz (1991:417) emphasizes the economic 
constraints works councils face in her sample of works councils in Leipzig and Dresden. 
However, one might wonder whether West German works councils do not also face 
severe economic constraints, and do not also have to deal with Jander and Lutz's 
"fundamental dilemma". An additional question is why this situation should prevent works 
councils from functioning properly, i.e. from representing workers' interests effectively 
under the given conditions.54
(ii) The unsuitability of the West German industrial relations system in 
the East German context
A related argument refers to the non-existence of economically prosperous firms in East 
Germany, and such firms are assumed to be a necessary precondition for the successful 
functioning of the West German industrial relations system (Kadtler and Kottwitz 1994:19, 
1992:3). Yet, the authors leave the consequences of this conjecture open. Does this mean 
that the western industrial relations system is intrinsically unsuitable for the East? Jander 
and Lutz (1993:16) are more specific in arguing that the institutions are overstrained and 
cannot cope with the vast problems of privatisation and de-industrialisation, and that this 
indicates that these institutions (e.g.works councils) are not made for managing the 
transformation from planned to market economy. This thesis has been taken on by other
54 Obviously this depends on one's definition of "effective" representation, either in a ideal-typical way or 
in a realistic way taking the given situation into account.
47
authors as well (see Gut et al. 1993; Jacoby 1994:24; Mahnkopf 1992b), who go on to 
speculate that this presumed inability to cope with the economic problems could jeopardise 
the much needed social integration of the eastern society and could in the long term hinder 
the successful institutionalisation of industrial relations. To give one example: Kadtler 
(1993:3) states that the right of the works council to be informed about any plans of 
management which will affect the employment situation of the firm (e.g. privatisation, 
acquisition) was repealed during the privatisation process so that all Treuhand negotiations 
took place without the works councillors and sometimes also without management. Thus, 
crucial decisions took place outside the realm of the firm and thereby outside the domain of 
co-determination (also Dathe and Schreiber 1992:13). Yet, one can argue on the other side 
that these exceptional measures were taken in order to adapt the western regulations to the 
specific East German situation, exactly what the authors demand.
In short, we are not provided with a convincing argument as to why all these 
problems should evoke a dysfunctioning of the works councils and thus also prove the 
unsuitability of the West German industrial relations system. The authors do not give 
evidence as to why the East German works councils should act in a significantly different 
way from that of their western counterparts. Furthermore, without wanting to go into the 
debate as to how far the situation in the East today is comparable with that of West 
Germany after 1945 (see Jacoby 1994), it seems a dubious assertion that the West German 
industrial relations system only "works" in prosperous economic situations. The system 
seems to have managed various recessions during the last few decades in West Germany.
(iii) Problems due to the novelty of the institution
The third problem said to hinder the proper functioning of the works councils is the 
novelty of the institution; works councillors still have to gain experience and learn their 
trade. One might object that management also needs time to adjust to the new situation. 
Additionally, other sources have for example stated that the lack of information, e.g. on 
western labour law, was quickly addressed by the East German works councils (Gut et al. 
1993:48).
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A related point refers to the different background of East German councillors which makes 
them behave differently from their western colleagues. For example, Mahnkopf 
(1991:275) or Jander and Lutz (1993) argue that the "tacit skills" necessary for the 
effective articulation and representation of interests are lacking. They can only be learned 
with time and experience. However, they do not specify these skills.
Additionally, Mahnkopf (1991:281) speculates that works councils' avoidance of 
conflictual struggles with management not only result from their inexperience and their 
uncertainty about legal rights, but also from the fact that they often actually "hide" behind 
the legislation, trying to legitimize their passivity and unwillingness to become active. 
Thus, references to the authority of the law are used as an excuse for inaction 
("handlungsentlastende Funktion"). This argument assumes that the former East German 
"socialisation" process provoked the avoidance of individual responsibility and "proaction" 
(see section 3.3.3). However, the author does not provide any evidence to support this 
assertion.
Finally, works councils frequently lack the vision to generate forces from within 
the enterprise in order to influence higher level industrial relations or politics — except in 
the case of rescuing a single, insolvent firm when the liquidator is the government or 
Treuhand (e.g. the famous Bischofferode's hunger strike was initiated by the works 
council). According to the Berlin/Gottingen group there is also a strict differentation to be 
made between the works council's work and its councillors' private political engagement 
(also David 1992:134)55. Whilst in West Germany both areas are often interconnected, 
East Germans dismiss this because of past experience (e.g. Kadtler and Kottwitz 
1994:29). This observation has been questioned in other studies which have instead found 
highly political works councils (e.g. Dathe and Schreiber 1993:21)56. All these statements 
however come from a small empirical basis.
55 Based on a literature review (no more details are provided).
56  Based on literature review, and own interviews with 8 union officials and 4 works councillors of two 
companies and one personnel manager during the end of 1992/ beginning 1993.
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(iv) Problematic union-works council relationship
There is also an argument that works council-union relations are not at their best in East 
Germany. Unions have a conflictual relationship with East German works councils 
because of the rising "plant-level egoism", which is assumed to be more pronounced than 
that in West Germany (Lippold et al. 199257; Mahnkopf 1991:282, 1993:17). 
Furthermore, the sporadic attempts in the early years after the turnaround of some East 
German works councils to establish regional associations were seen by the unions as 
dangerous competition (see Jander and Lutz 1993b on the "works council conference"). It 
is also emphasized that a growing number of firms have no unionized works council (i.e. 
works councillors who are not union members), or even that firms have no works council 
at all (Mahnkopf 1993). Other sources report instead a high "unionization" of works 
councils (David 1992:131). Works councils which have merely a formal relationship with 
the union, but neither expect nor desire union advice are also observed. Also union 
stewards (Vertrauensleute) are virtually non existent in East German firms (as all studies 
confirm). Thus, Mahnkopf concludes that the relationship between East German works 
councils and unions is much looser than in the West (where plant-level representatives and 
the union movement are comparatively well-integrated) (Mahnkopf 1993:18)58. In 
addition, unions themselves are said not to be very successful in East Germany yet: density 
is generally declining (as shown in table 3.1), and there is an argument that unions face 
severe difficulties mobilising their members (Fichter 1995:16; Mahnkopf 1991, 1992). 
This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Besides, several authors suggest 
that unions have difficulty in establishing regional industrial policies which, as mentioned 
above, some authors regard as necessary to tackle the problems of unemployment 
efficiently (and which would require an uncommon collaboration of single unions at 
regional and local level) (Jander and VoB 1991; Kadtler and Kottwitz 1994:32; Lohr
1992).
^7 Lippold et al. base their argument on structured interviews with seven union officials of the IG Metall 
in Berlin, 11 Works councillors and managers, as well as on an analysis of union documents.
As noted above her empirical work is based on interviews with union officials and works councillors in 
Branderburg during 1991.
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In sum, the problems unions face impede their services for works councils at a time when 
works councils are especially dependent on powerful and helpful unions. Rosenbaum and 
Weinert (1991:19) therefore conjecture that workplace interest representation will only 
become fully accepted and effective if the dual system of workplace and industrial interest 
representation work well together (as they do in West Germany), and where unions have 
the key role to play .
(v) The low image of the works council
Finally, there is the assertion that the current problems works councils face (and which 
account for their apparent poor performance) make the workforce perceive them as 
ineffective. This in return weakens the power of works councils (see Jander et al. 1992). 
An additional problem mentioned by Jander and Lutz (1991) is that workers' interests in 
the firms are highly heterogenous (e.g. the different group interests of short-term workers, 
workers in retraining, workers in "employment programmes" (ABMler), part-timers, and 
full-timers), and that it is difficult for any council to reconcile these interests. However, 
this task seems to be an inherent characteristic of any works council (and indeed union), 
whether in the East or the West.
In short, although most authors do not explicitly refer to the question of the effectiveness 
of works councils, they conclude that the problems discussed above do in fact constrain 
their functioning. Kadtler and Kottwitz (1993:4) conclude that the deficiencies in 
workplace relations have implications for the institutionalisation (functioning) of the whole 
industrial relations system. According to Jander and Lutz (1993) there is the paradox that 
although the West German industrial relations system was transferred without any 
adjustments to the particular East German situation, East Germany could very well end up 
not practising the same industrial relations as the West, especially due to the ineffective 
works councils (see also Jacoby 1994). The likely scenario is therefore a few companies 
with "good" workplace relations surrounded by a majority of companies with poor co­
determination practices (see also Mahnkopf 1991).
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However, as already mentioned the authors do not provide evidence as to why these 
problems render works councils ineffective, nor do they analyse whether these problems 
are short-term (due to the novelty of the institutions) or long-term (due to the structural 
unsuitability of western regulations in the East).
In addition, there are other points which are not discussed. For example, we are 
not told how the problems interact with each other and whether they are valid for all or 
most councils, i.e. representative. It has also not been tested how far these problems, 
rather than, for example, uncooperative management account for the works council's 
ineffectiveness. Moreover, since these studies are mostly based on expert interviews with 
union officials and works councillors, it might be useful to have more case studies of 
individual firms including interviews with the workforce (as for example the Mickler et al. 
study). However, criticising these research projects one should always keep in mind that 
this research area covers new ground and several projects are still on-going.
Finally, one can think of two possibilities for approaching the question of the quality of 
interest representation in a more thorough way: one could investigate empirically possible 
clusters or types of works councils or one could try to apply Kotthoff s typology of West 
German works councils to the East. Thus, this study does not entirely agree with the 
objections of David (1992) or Lippold et al. (1992:97) that the application of "West" 
typologies is problematic, since "they cannot do justice to the specific East German 
circumstances and cannot thus account for the new forms of works council which are 
being established there". Instead one can argue that only by using some theoretical 
framework or ideal types it is possible to account for differences and deviations. On the 
other hand one could focus on the "customers" of works councils, the workforce, and 
analyse their perceptions of the works council's effectiveness. This is the approach used in 
this study (see chapter 9).
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3 .2 .3  Institutionalized works councils and the formalisation of workplace
relations
The question of effective interest representation is closely related to the question of whether 
the works council has been "successfully" institutionalised. The latter can be seen as a 
necessary precondition for the former. "Institutionalisation" will be defined as the process 
of setting up new institutions59 in a specific context. In the East German context it is 
equivalent to the political science term "successful institutional transfer", i.e. one "that 
must be pulled by social actors rather than decreed by policy makers alone" (Jacoby 
1995:2). Success might be defined, as Jacoby does, "on the basis of the criteria of those 
actors advocating the transfer". However, this approach seems too abstract to be 
operationalised in our context. For example, who exactly are the actors advocating the 
transfer of works councils? East German workers, worker councils, West German 
industrial relations actors, such as unions and employers' associations, or the German 
law?
This study will therefore take a different approach and distinguish between 
"formal" and "informal" institutionalisation. The former indicates how far the institution is 
legally founded, i.e. how far the legal requirements have been fulfilled. The latter refers to 
the relationship between the institution and management and between the institution and its 
"members", the workforce. Thus, on the one side: does management accept the works 
council as a bargaining partner in the enterprise? On the other side: does the workforce 
accept the works council as a new institution, trust it, and take advantage of its services? 
This should then tell us whether the former "informal" workplace relations have been 
formalised, i.e. substituted by the council (allowing a certain mix of formal and informal 
relations).
59 Institutions are defined as social constructs which are created for a specific cause, and determine "what 
has to be done" in the long term (Lipp in Endruweit and Trommsdorff 1989:307). They are multi­
functional but with one main function, multi-dimensional, stabilize the tensions between the individual and 
society, and have a specific "Leitidee" (ideology), at least in the German sociological tradition (e.g. Gehlen 
1956; Schelsky 1952).
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The common opinion is that formal, legal institutionalisation has been successful (see also 
chapter 1), but the literature is ambivalent about informal institutionalisation. Fichter 
(1996:2) talks of "the uncompleted crucial step from institutional transfer to 
institutionalisation" of industrial relations in the East. The Berlin/Gottingen group argues 
that although the institutions exist, the network of informal and formal norms, habits, co­
operation and forms of conflict resolution between the actors has not yet been achieved in 
the East (e.g. Kadtler and Kottwitz 1994:19).
In more detail, with regard to works council-management relations, depending on 
how the development of workplace relations in the last few years is interpreted, some 
authors are more optimistic than others. For example, the WISOC group (e.g. Ermischer 
and Preusche) declare that in the instances where "co-management" is practiced, it is 
indeed effective, and thus institutionalised. The Berlin/Gottingen group (e.g. Jander and 
Lutz) on the other hand is more pessimistic stating that the works councils are not working 
effectively at all (due to the problems outlined above) and are therefore not properly 
institutionalised (also Lippold et al. 1992:96).
With regard to the works council-workforce relationship the question is, as 
mentioned above, whether the earlier informal negotiations (or the mixture of formal and 
informal relations, see chapter 2) have been substituted by formal interest representation 
through the works council. There is overall agreement that the traditional behavioural 
patterns and rules have been lost. For example, Kern and Land (1991)60 argue on the basis 
of their case study that the former informal networks and "plan fulfillment pact" (see 
chapter 2) have been destroyed, and that the workforce is happy to get rid of the informal 
networks, since they are seen as illegal and part of the old, inefficient system (also 
Kirschner 1991; Lippold et al. 1992). Yet, opinions are split about what has been 
established instead. Kem and Land do not make any judgements, but others are more 
optimistic in that they see the formalisation taking place. Kirschner (1991:1041)61 for 
example interprets the new formalised regulations (e.g. labour law) as the new basis of
60 Kem and Land belong to the SOFI research group which investigated one case company during 1990, 
about which we are not told more specific details (see VoBkamp and Wittke 1991).
61 Kirschner bases his discussion on the SOFI case study (see above) plus two other intensive case studies 
(including observatory participation in the works council o f these companies for two weeks) during 1992.
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working together, which both sides (management and workforce) accept and legitimize. 
Lippold et al. (1992:76)62 observed that works councils are currently determined to make 
formal, written agreements, and stick to the law in a pedantic way (also Alt et al. 1993:20). 
Furthermore, Kirschner (1992:87) observed that the works councils may even become the 
only actor of interest representation. The workforce retires from any direct interest 
representation and the works council itself becomes more and more distant from the 
workforce (p.88).
Others are more cautious and argue that even if formalisation has taken place so far, 
an increasingly disappointed workforce might also threaten it. Gut et al. (1993: 52)63 
stress the danger (but without giving evidence) that the perceived ineffectiveness of the 
works council will encourage the old informal, company specific practices to return, which 
could erode the formal regulations. Senghaas-Knobloch (1992) found evidence in her 
study64 that people increasingly bemoan the loss of the former “cushy” informal system 
and the related solidarity. This however does not necessarily mean that they will react by 
forming new informal relations.
In sum, there are two scenarios of the institutionalisation of the works council, one 
optimistic and one pessimistic. Both are speculative and are based on opinions of the so- 
called experts (works councillors, managers) but not of the workforce itself. As mentioned 
before, this might be a major deficiency of all studies on workplace relations reviewed in 
the last two sections and is a reason for this study to focus on the workforce.
Measuring "institutionalisation" of works councils by investigating the attitudes and 
behaviour of the workforce involved might include the following attitudinal and 
behavioural dimensions (table 5.3) which will be used in this study and which are further 
manifested in the following discussions on worker attitudes and behaviour (e.g. chapters 6 
and 7). In addition, it is argued that the discussion of institutionalisation of the works 
council can be also be applied to the institutionalisation of the new West German unions in
62 Study as outlined above, footnote 58.
63 Their study is based on surveys of 12 companies and expert interviews, we are not given any further 
details of these investigations.
64 Based on 29 intensive (two-five hour long) interviews and two days of research seminars during 1990 
and 1991 with managers, engineers, union officials, works councillors, and researchers.
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East Germany. An additional measurement is then the identification with the union, and 
also the level of union membership might tell us something about the success of the 
institutionalisation of the union. These variables will be further discussed and developed in 
Part 2.
table 3.2: attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of the institutionalisation of interest representation from the 
viewpoint of the workforce
d im e n s io n s______________________________________________
— acceptance of the institution___________________
—  utilization (e.g. consultation for grievance 
procedures)__________________________________
— active support (e.g. voting of works councillors)
— perception of an effective institution___________
— interest in issues of the institutions____________
— union identity________________________________
— union membership____________________________
Conclusion of Chapter 3
It might be useful to summarize the institutional literature on workplace relations into two 
broad arguments, a positive/optimistic and a negative/pessimistic position, which go 
through all discussed items of workplace relations (table 3.3).
table 3.3: classification of two main streams in the literature regarding workplace relations in East Germany
main reason for 
emergence of 
worker councils
management
style
works council 
-management 
relations
effectiveness 
of works council
institutionalisation 
of works council
Optimists
e-g.
wisoc
"industrial
democracy"
"HRM" co-management* no comment yes
Pessimists
e-g-
Berlin/
Gottingen
reconstruction of 
the enterprise, 
"consumer 
revolution"
"Taylorism" works council as 
extended arm of 
management
not effectively 
working due to 
various problems
no
* "co-management" will be interpreted as a cooperative works council who tries to represent workers' interests 
without loosing sight of the companies' situation and needs.
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Obviously, these two groups are "ideal types". Reasons for this division are difficult to 
find. There is some suggestion that East German researchers are more inclined to optimism 
whereas West Germans are more pessimistic. This might be true about the East German 
WISOC team and West German Berlin/Gottingen group, yet does not work for most other 
projects (e.g. the Hannover study by Mickler et al.) which include both West and East 
German researchers. The optimism/pessimism about the transformation of workplace 
relations is also found with regard to the entire industrial relations transformation in the 
East and its impact on the German industrial relations system as a whole. Famous 
protagonists are thus Lowell Turner the "Optimist" (e.g. 1992) and Wolfgang Streeck the 
"Pessimist" (e.g. 1995).
To conclude, this chapter discussed the take-over of the socialist unions, the changes in 
personnel management styles, the establishment of works councils and their subsequent 
problems as seen by the literature. Questions arose as to whether the works council has 
been institutionalised and is "effectively" working in terms of interest representation. 
Whether the works council is institutionalised by now, i.e. whether workplace relations are 
formalised, becomes a crucial issue especially with regard the informal networks discussed 
in chapter 2, which have existed to some degree on the socialist shopfloors. However, 
these issues have not yet been empirically tested to any satisfactory extent. In addition, 
most of the reviewed empirical studies on the development of works councils are based on 
interviews with the councillors only rather than on more comprehensive case studies and 
do not include workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the new institutions. This is also 
true for the discussion of the functioning and institutionalisation of the West German 
unions in East Germany. This study will focus on workers' attitudes and behaviour 
towards the new interest institutions. The next chapter introduces the study's empirical 
research by outlining the transformation of industrial and workplace relations in the textile 
industry.
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Chapter 4 Transformation of industrial and workplace relations in the 
textile industry
This chapter introduces the empirical work by outlining the wider industrial and workplace 
relations context in the textile sector in East Germany, as well as the organisational 
development of the case study firm. As mentioned in chapter 1 and as will be further 
outlined in chapter 7 the empirical work consists of a case study and a cross-company 
survey in the textile industry. This chapter will report only documentary data and the data 
of interviews with union officials and with managers and works councillors in the case 
study (see appendix: A 1.1) and thus will stay on an "institutional" level. The purpose is 
not only to provide background information for the following workforce surveys, but also 
to examine the applicability of some of the findings and hypotheses of the studies reviewed 
in the previous chapter in the context of the textile industry.
The first section commences with outlining the economic transformation of the 
textile industry (4.1), and continues with a more detailed account of the development of the 
employers' association, the union and collective bargaining in the textile industry (4.2). 
The workplace climate is then investigated in a small sample of textile companies (4.3).
The second section introduces the organisational transformation of the case study, 
Bodywear, as well as its workplace relations from the viewpoint of management and 
works councillors (4.4).
4 .1  The textile industry in East Germany post-1989
The socialist textile industry of the GDR consisted of nine textile combines with 
approximately 526 enterprises and with more than 220,000 employees (FAZ (18.10.94); 
Tarifgemeinschaft Masche Ost [TMO], employers' association, interview 8/1993). All 
combines were under the control of the "Textile, Clothes and Leather" Department of the 
Ministry for "light industries". The headquarters and the centralized design, product 
development and marketing facilities of all textile combines were situated in East Berlin,
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while the production plants were situated mostly in Brandenburg and Saxony (80% of the 
East German textile industry was in Saxony) (e.g. Rasche 1994:1). In 1990 these 
combines were decentralised into autonomous companies (e.g. AG, GmbH).65 The 
privatization agency, Treuhand, tried to privatize them but had little success by 1994 when 
it was disolved. By 1993 the Treuhand had privatized two third (200) of the textile firms 
still in operation, with still 100 firms Treuhand owned at that time (Handelsblatt no 14, 
21/1/1993). The rest were liquidated.66
Unification exposed East German industry overnight to western European and 
Third World competition and effectively eliminated the traditional Eastern European 
markets (e.g. for the textile industry every other workplace depended on this market). A 
rapid collapse of the economy followed. During the first half of 1990, i.e. before the 
"currency union", East German industrial production fell to 93% of its 1989 level and 
matters worsened dramatically with the introduction of the DM at a 1:1 conversion rate on 
1 July 1990. From July to December 1990 the economy-wide net production 
("Nettoproduktion")67 dropped by almost 50% (Buechtemann and Schupp 1992:95). 
Overall employment decreased by around 3 million to 6.3 million employees from 1989 to 
1994 (Nolte and Sitte 1995:302). 1.1 million people were officially unemployed, and the 
other 2 million were short term contract workers in "public job creation programmes" 
(ArbeitsbeschaffungsmaBnahmen, §249h Arbeitsforderungsgesetz); in retraining courses; 
in early retirement schemes or in the reserve labour force. Employment in the East German 
industrial sectors decreased by 63% from 3.4 million to 1.3 million during the same period 
(see Herbstgutachten 1994 des IWH). Although there were subsequently some signs of 
recovery (e.g. 9% increase of GDP in East Germany in 1994, Kittner et al. 1995:201) all 
expectations of equalizing the economic strength of the two regions before the end of this 
century evaporated. East Germany looks likely to remain for a long time a "dependence - 
and transfer economy" (see also Nolte and Sitte 1995:300).
65 Treuhand law ( §11 ff. "Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen Vermogens 
vom 17. Juni 1990"), which required this transformation process to be finished before 30.6.1990.
66 There are slightly divergent data found in another newspaper: 320 textile enterprises still existed in 
1993, the rest were liquidated. Of the existing, half are privatised, the other half owned by the Treuhand 
(FAZ 21/4/93).
67 Nettoproduktion: value of production minus input costs (e.g. raw materials).
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The transfer to a market economy was especially hard for the textile industry. This industry 
had major economic importance in East Germany for historical reasons (the centre of 
German textile manufacturing before the War was in Saxony), but was also affected by the 
socialist policy of "autarky". Its share of East German industrial production was 7% in 
1989, and its share of East German employment was 8%68 — compared with 3% in West 
Germany (Ktichle and Volkmann 1993). 67% of all textile employees in 1989 were female 
(Rasche 1994).
Between 1990 and 1993 the textile industry lost 72% of its net production 
(Statistisches Bundesamt). To take the example of 1992, the year with the most drastic 
employment reduction, the net production of the textile industry dropped by 25.3% (-2.6% 
average of all industrial sectors) (Ktichle and Volkmann 1993:5). Labour productivity 
(turnover per employee) remains around a third of that in the West German textile sector 
(Ktichle and Volkmann 1993:4). The figures are equally depressing with regard to the 
employment situation. Out of the more than 220,000 textile employees in 1989 only 10% 
are estimated to have survived into 1992 (Gebbert and Gebbert 1993:220; Jahresbericht 
1992 des Verbandes der Nord-Ostdeutschen Textilindustrie).69 In 1992 alone, the textile 
sector saw a decrease of 68% in its employment, compared with an average decrease of 
48% in the industrial sector overall ("verarbeitendes Gewerbe"). In Chemnitz (formerly 
Karl-Marx-Stadt) and the surrounding areas (the center for textile industry in Saxony and 
the location of the case study), the unemployment rate in the textile industry was 20% for 
women and 10% for men in August 1993.70 According to figures from the textile 
employers' association (TMO): employment in their associated firms fell from 20,670 to 
8,260 employees (-60%) during 1992 alone. Yet, this reduction process has to be 
understood in the context of the ongoing structural adaptation which occured in the West 
German textile industry especially during the 1970s and 1980s. Over the last 20 years 
textile has been a declining industry (between 1966 and 1990 employment fell by 40%
^8 Another source speaks of 12% (Rasche 1994).
69 Different sources provide different figures: e.g. NZ (5/8/1993): "in 1989 380,000 people worked in the 
textile industry, in 1993 50,000 had left with an estimated permanent employment level of 20,000". FAZ 
(18/10/1993): "In the four years after Unification the textile industry saw a drop from 220,000 to 27,766 
employees."
7^ Without counting people on short work contracts, in training centres and in public job creation 
programmes.
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from 406,000 to 164,000 and the number of enterprises decreased in the same period by 
65% from 5781 to 2074) (Gebbert and Gebbert ibid.).
4 .2  Establishment of the employers' association, trade union, and 
collective bargaining in the textile industry
(i) Employers' association
In the beginning of 1990 the German industrial association, BDI (Bundesverband der 
Deutschen Industrie) gave the green light for the establishment of the three industrial 
organisations (industry and trade councils, employers' associations [BDA], and industry 
associations) (see Henneberger 1993). By the end of 1990, texile employers' associations 
(at first independent from the West) were installed in all regions of the East. For example 
in Saxony and Thiiringen the "Verband der Baumwoll-Industrie Sachsen und Thiiringen" 
was created in April 1990. It later merged with the head (West) German textile employers' 
association (Textilgesamtverband, Stuttgart) and became the regional textile employers' 
association called "Verband der Nord-Ostdeutschen Textilindustrie".
Since its foundation, the textile employers' association has faced a constant 
decrease in membership due to both liquidations and dropping out. It is difficult to get 
precise data from the association, but during the three months from September to 
December 1992, the number of firms (textile and clothing) declined from 488 firms with 
37,500 employees to 371 firms with 34,129 employees. Of the 371 firms only 190 were 
affiliated to the employers' association. In the sector the case study belongs to, "Masche" 
(stockings, knitting and underwear), only 29 out of 50 firms were members of the 
employers' association in June 1993. One third of the 50 firms were still Treuhand owned 
in 1993 (TMO, interview 8/1993). It is also important to note that even fewer member 
firms joined collective bargaining agreements. For example, in 1992 the collective 
bargaining for the "Masche" subunit comprised 25 firms (including the case study firm), 
and 15 firms had "enterprise contracts" (Haustarifvertrag) with the union. There were also
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several firms who had illegal company-contracts with the works council or only individual 
employment contracts (according to the GTB official). In 1995 there were 51 clothing 
firms in the employers' association, of which only three accepted the collective bargaining 
outcomes. In the textile section (incorporating the "Masche" subunit since 1993) there were 
267 firms in 1995, whether members or not of the employers' association, of which 93 
agreed to collective bargaining and 31 to an enterprise contract (interview data of GTB Slid 
Ost).
To conclude, the drop out rate is definitely a major problem for the employers' 
associations, not only in the textile sector but overall in East Germany (see Mahnkopf 
1993:25). Yet, it is not clear to what extent this phenomenon will continue and challenge 
the German dual system of industrial relations. Some commentators argue that the 
importance of these problems has been exaggerated by the high level of public awareness 
(Schroeder in Kittner 1994:635). One should also not forget that privatization led to a 
significant decrease in average company size, which is likely to have had an effect on the 
firm's relationship to collective bargaining. Most textile firms today employ between 20- 
100 people only (TMO source).
(ii) Textile trade union GTB
The socialist FDGB-union "textile, clothes, leather" (Textil, Bekleidung, Leder = TeBeLe) 
had 570,000 members in 1989 (Wilke and Muller 1991:258)71, two thirds of them female. 
Chemnitz was the largest union district with 256,000 members in 1989. There were two 
West German equivalents, the GTB (Gewerkschaft Textil und Bekleidung) which was the 
tenth-largest DGB union with 250,783 members in 1990 (=3.2% of DGB membership) 
and the small "Leather" union with 44,583 members (second smallest DGB union).
During 1990 the TeBeLe dissolved voluntarily (officially on 31.12.1990) after 
trying to reform itself (see section 3.1.1) and its acquisition by the West German GTB 
took place (via coordination groups, round tables) resulting in a takeover of all members. 
However, the GTB differed from other western unions (especially IG Metall) in that they
71 Another source (Kiichle and Volkmann 1993) speaks of 601,747 members (31.12. 1989).
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tried to keep the staff of the socialist union, as long as they were supported by the 
members and had no former "Stasi"-affiliation. The GTB did not expect enormous 
membership increases, and even reduced its headquarters personnel at that time. However, 
out of 570,000 former FDGB textile members (including the leather section, and all the 
retired members) around 98,215 transferred to the GTB in 1990/91 (see table 4.1). This 
was an increase of 39% in the western membership level72. However, in the following 
years membership decreased constantly. For example, in 1992 the total membership 
decreased by 17.2% (43.5% in the East and 5.9% in the West) to 288,198.
Figures for the GTB East include the "South-East" district, which covers most of 
East Germany (Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Berlin/Brandenburg [also West Berlin]), and 
also the East German members which are incorporated in two West German districts 
(Frankfurt, Baveria).
table 4.1: membership figures of GTB
31.12. GTB total GTB East South-East 
distict of 
GTB
% of South- 
East of total
GTB total 
density
West density South-East
density
1989 250,783 47.0 %
1990 249,880 150,000 98,215* 39.30 %* n.a. 46.4 % 80% *
1991 348,095 104,837 69,484 19.96 % n.a. 46.2 % 70% *
1992 288,198 59,181 39,100 13.57 % n.a. 45.9 % 68 % *
1993 255,708 43,426 30,132 11.78 % 45.9% 45.0 % 56.5 %
1994 234,240 36,049 25,859 11.04 % 43.1% 42.7 % 48.2 %
1995 216,288 31,171 22,240 10.28 % n.a. n.a. 42.6 %**
source: Kittner 1993, 1994, 1995; DGB Pressedienst, GTB information 1995, 1996 
*= approximately, **= November 1995 , only companies with works council included
The South-East district is also the area where the studies reported here took place. 
Chemnitz is the district headquarters and oversaw five administration branches in 1995 
(eight in 1993). The leader and officials in this district are all East Germans. In 1993 there
72 DGB average gain was 48.7% (IG Metall for example achieved 32.9%) (Klinzing 1992).
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were 15 full-time union officials, out of which 8 were female (GTB source). The 
following table 4.2 gives more detailed information:
table 4.2: figures of the GTB South-East district
31.12
firms in
union
district*
firms 
with a 
works 
council
firms 
included 
in coll. 
bargain­
ing
employed 
people in the 
textile 
industry of 
this district*
total union 
members 
(see above)
female 
members (%
of total)***
. •
employed
union
members
rest:
unemployed 
, retired, 
apprentices
1991 1,769 635 146 138,280 69,484 52,251
(75.20%)
58,525 10,959
1992 488 n.a. n.a. 37,500 39,100 29,766
(76.13%)
23,438 15,662
1993 446 n.a. n.a. 29,141 30,132 23,230
(77.09%)
15,075 15,057
1994 449
(385**)
148 (out 
of 449)
115 28,070 29,859 19,912
(77.00%)
12,330 17,520
1995 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 22,439 17,138
(77.06%)
9,449 12,990
source: GTB South-East documents (the data is slightly different to the figures of the headquarters of the GTB in 
Diisseldorf)
*= approximately, different data from different sources, **= firms with over 20 employees, *** the percentage of 
female members in the East compares with around 60% female rate of total GTB members in Germany.
(iii) Development of collective bargaining
The first two collective bargaining rounds were according to the employer association 
characterized by insecure and unorthodox behaviour by the new actors (TMO official
1993). In August 1990 the first collective bargaining negotiations in East Germany took 
place between the GTB and the employers' association. At that time the employers' 
association was still affiliated to the industrial association which resulted in the combining 
of pay politics with industrial policies, quite unusual for West Germany. The TMO official 
stated that in the beginning roles were not yet clearly "understood", thus employers had to 
remind themselves that "they were not responsible anymore for the 'social functions' of the 
firms". In the following years bargaining typically became progressively more difficult.
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The second bargaining round in 1991 was already considered to be more severe by both 
sides. For the first time in its history the GTB had to agree to "get-out clauses" 
(Offnungsklausel) for 28 firms out of 146 firms. These allow firms in economic difficulty 
not to stick to the negotiated pay agreement but nevertheless to stay in the employers' 
association73. However, the union has to agree that the firm is indeed in economic 
difficulty. In 1992 this number increased to 34 firms.
A year later collective bargaining was even "tougher", according to the union 
official. During collective bargaining and at the time of a debate in Parliament on industrial 
policies for the East German textile industry there was a protest demonstration in Bonn 
organised by the GTB and supported by the employers' associations. Since these particular 
bargaining results were in force at the time of the fieldwork of this study, they deserve to 
be outlined in more detail. The result was a 5.60% pay increase from May 1993, and an 
additional 3.3 % from January 1994 until April 1994. Thus, by the end of 1993 the pay 
level for blue collar workers in the East German textile industry was 69.9% of the average 
pay level in the West (white collar 55.4%) (clothing industry: 66.3% blue collar, 55.4% 
white collar) (WSI Tarifarchiv, 1993).74 Including extra payments (such as holiday pay, 
"13th month" bonus, government bonuses ["vermogenswirksame Leistungen"]) the 
overall wage in the clothing industry for example decreased slightly to around 63% of the 
level in the W est75 In addition, one has to note that in West Germany the actual pay 
normally exceeds the negotiated basic pay (except in the public sector), while the actual pay 
levels in East Germany largely correspond to the official wage settlements (Mahnkopf 
1993:16). Compared to other industrial sectors the textile (and clothing) industry pays less 
— this is also the case in West Germany as well as in the former GDR. Furthermore, the 
ratio of "East-West" is worse than in other sectors: e.g. in the metal industry East blue 
collars were already earning 80% of the western level in 1993. The working week in the 
East is 40 hours compared to 37.5 hours in the West. Also, the East has 27 days holiday
73 A maximum of 50% reduction in the official pay level (Tarif) is possible but without any staff 
reductions.
74 The aim of adapting the East pay level step by step to the West level (Tarif) was first introduced in the 
bargaining agreement in the metal industry in March 1991, where both bargaining partners agreed to an 
adaptation process to be finished by April 1994 (Bispinck in Kittner 1993:172).
75 There are no differentiating data available regarding male and female earnings in the textile industry.
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compared to 30 days in the West, and holiday pay is not given in the East (the West gets 
758 DM holiday pay) (WSI Tarifarchiv, 31.12.1993).
In 1994 bargaining was very complicated and, as the chief official of the union 
noted, it was "the beginning of the end" ("Einstieg in den Ausstieg"). There was also 
industrial action for the first time: over 200 members demonstrated in front of the building 
where the bargaining took place. The pay level for the textile sector increased to 72% of the 
average pay in the West76. In 1995 bargaing was even worse. According to the chief GTB 
official after months of negotiations an agreement for the textile sector was only reached 
thanks to token strikes organised in seven sites (involving 4000 people) and a collection of 
signatures of union members. This was the first time people had gone on strike in the 
textile industry in East Germany. The result was a sequence of pay increases which totalled 
8.75% over the next 12 months.
In sum, the data reveals increasingly difficult bargaining rounds for the union. 
Comparing the ratios of pay level in the textile industry in the West/East with other 
industrial sectors, the bargaining results of the GTB were in 1994 in the fitfth lowest group 
of all 20 sectors (WSI Tarifarchiv 31.12.94: Bispinck in Kittner 1995:161). The West 
German pay result of the GTB in 1994 was also one of the lowest increases of all unions 
compared to 1993 (ibid.: 138).
With regard to the union's attitudes towards the employers it can be only deduced from the 
interviews the author had with the chief official of GTB South-East in 1993, 1994 and 
1995. No data is available on the employers' side. Overall, the chief union official revealed 
a pragmatic, "cooperative" attitude towards the employers, thus she was in favour of social 
partnership: "we are all sitting in the same boat", "I know of no employer who puts the 
profits in his/her own pockets". If she negotiates for example an "enterprise contract" 
(Haustarif) she takes the economic situation of that firm into account, although she is not 
sure whether the (West) German headquarters of the GTB likes this. She states that she is 
the "favourite enemy" of the chief official on the employers' side and both seem to be 
aware of their common interests. For example, at several occasions both visited together
76 87% in the metal industry (Saxony compared with Bavaria).
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companies which wanted to leave the employers' association to convince the management 
to reconsider this idea. This kind of working relationship is as she argued often criticised 
by the works councillors, who are sometimes more "opportunistic" and not very 
cooperative in their approach to management.
She prefers objective discussions instead of using rituals and ideologies during 
collective bargaining and is not happy that within the last two years collective bargaining 
has become increasingly conflictual. Her general aim is to make the union an even better 
service institution for members and the works councils. In 1994 she stated that she is not 
in favour of strikes: "there is no benefit to it in this economic situation, and firms are too 
small". However, in 1995 shortly after the successful ending of the collective bargaining 
conflict, she was entirely positive about the token strikes which were largely initiated by 
her. She firmly believed that without this instrument they would not have achieved an 
agreement. In addition, she argued that this strike was "good for the people in that they 
experienced for the first time the strength of collective action". However, this does not 
mean a turnaround of the unions' non-militant, cooperative strategies.
In sum, the data highlights the severe economic constraints upon the industrial relations 
actors in the textile industry, it described the quick learning process of both sides, union 
and employer association, in defining their roles and different interests after Unification. 
However, it is interesting to note the mutual agreement to pursue a cooperative rather than 
antagonistic strategy. Both sides are aware of their common interest in keeping collective 
bargaining alive, both organisations' existence depends on it. To what extent this "social 
partnership" strategy has evolved mainly due to the West German industrial relations 
regulations and the influence of the West German headquarters, or due to the actors' own 
beliefs and strategies is obviously hard to tell. Yet, as mentioned above the chief union 
official seemed to act quite independently from the headquarters. Thus, one might suggest 
that these actors have created their own strategies, which might partly be influenced by the 
structural conditions of the industrial relations system and partly by their own (socialist) 
background and experiences.
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4 .3  Workplace climate in the East German textile industry
This paragraph reports a small-scale survey of works councillors in the sample of textile 
firms of the East German district of the GTB which accompanied the GTB membership 
survey (see chapter 7). The questionnaire was sent (together with the union member 
questionnaires) in 1994 to the works councillors of the survey firms and was returned by 
53 works councils.77
The purpose was not only to obtain some background information on the surveyed 
companies (i), and to enable an examination of the representativeness of the case study 
firm, but also to apply a more structured method (compared to the research outlined in the 
previous chapter) to the investigation of the current "workplace climate" (management- 
works council relationship) from a works councillors' point of view (ii).78
(i) Background company information
Four topics were discussed, organisational changes (ownership, management, staff 
reductions, technology), workforce characteristics (male/female ratio), union membership 
(density), and incidents of industrial conflict. Most firms have been privatised (only 7 
were still owned by the Treuhand) and belong to West German or foreign companies or are 
privately owned (management-buy-out). This facilitates the comparison of the case study 
(privatised firm) and the GTB survey. Changes in management have occured in most sites. 
There is a mixed picture regarding old/new managers. 22 (out of 53) firms have either kept 
all or most former managers and 30 firms kept no or only very few former managers. At 
the supervisory level nothing really changed, 41 firms kept the former supervisors.
77 The return rate is not known, since it was beyond the authors' control to monitor the number of firms 
which received the questionnaire. In the most unlikely case that all unionized works councils in the district 
(148) had received a questionnaire, the rate would be 35.8%. The questionnaire was to be filled out by one 
full-time councillor, not necessarily the chief councillor. The questionnaire consists o f 29 questions 
altogether (first part see appendix: A 1.2.4). The second part consists o f 5-point Likert scale attitudinal 
questions which were adopted from Dastmalchian et al. (1991), Angle and Perry (1986) and Allen and 
Stephenson (1983).
78 It would have been too difficult to approach management in these companies, as access was secured 
through the union.
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Unfortunately there is no representative company data available either on the textile 
industry or on other industrial sectors.
However, the ownership is correlated with the changes at supervisory level 
(western-owned firms have more new supervisors than Treuhand owned), yet there was 
no correlation with the changes at board level.79
With regard to staff reductions, the size of the firms decreased considerably, 
supporting earlier made claims of this trend in the whole textile industry in East Germany. 
25 firms had less than 100 employees in 1994, whereas in 1989 22 firms employed 
between 200 and 1000 employees. Thus most firms reduced their staff by at least 50%, 
which was also not uncommon in other industries. With regard to the medium-term 
prospects of their firms, the respondents are split: 22 are sceptical and 20 are more 
optimistic (with western-owned firms more optimistic than Treuhand owned firms). 
Further reductions during the next 12 months are expected in 13 firms.
With regard to changes in the work organisation a majority invested in new 
machinery and restructured the production process. A majority of 49 works councils 
perceived the work pace on the shopfloor to have increased enormously from 1989. 
However the data does not ask for detailed information on any new production methods 
such as lean production. According to the union however no such innovation has been 
introduced with the emphasis instead on improving the existing assembly-style, 
"Tayloristic" production line.
With regard to the workforce, in only 3 firms was the female rate less than 50% of 
the total workforce, and in 16 firms it is higher than 90%. This confirms the female 
dominance in the textile workforce. Union density was still high, in 11 firms it was over 
80% and in 20 cases between 30 and 79% (which in average is in line with the union 
density of the district: 48.2%). Some respondents argued that in most cases membership 
dropped due to reductions in employment. However, union density was not correlated 
with the size of the workforce, though it was correlated with the female share in the 
workforce (the more females the stronger union density). Thus, it seems female workers 
were more inclined to join this union than their male colleagues (perhaps because their jobs
79 Correlation coefficient = .35** (**= p<= 0.10, *= p<=0.50)
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were more at risk).80 Moreover, union density was higher in western-owned firms than in 
Treuhand-owned firms.81 Various reasons might apply (e.g. employees might be 
completely disappointed by the unions' achievements in Treuhand firms).
There were only three incidences of industrial unrest so far, which supports the 
conception of the textile industry as a non militant sector. And the larger the female share in 
the workforce the lower was the likelihood of industrial unrest (which supports the well- 
known argument in the literature that females are less militant).82
Finally, with regard to the responding works councillors over half have been in this 
position since 1990/1. 16 were active members of the former union (BGL), and 34 were 
not. Thus, Martens' (1992) suggestion that old unionists are in a majority in East German 
works councils cannot be supported here. Furthermore, although not explicitely controlled 
for, one can assume that all respondents were union members (since the GTB only 
distributed questionnaires to unionized works councils83).
In sum, although there was some variation among the companies. Interviews with the 
officials at the employers' association and the union however highlighted the fact that these 
companies in overall represented typical firms in the industry which had experienced a 
considerable amount of job losses and organisational restructuring. As mentioned above, 
there are no comparable official figures for the textile industry.
(ii) Workplace climate from the viewpoint of the works councils
The idea was to apply a set of previously tested questions84 here in order to examine the 
quality of workplace relations (relation between works council and management) from the 
works councillors' viewpoint, and also to test the two opposite hypotheses of the 
literature, works council as co-manager or as extended arm of management (see chapter 3).
80 Correlation coefficient = .45**
8 1 Correlation coefficient = .36**
82 Correlation coefficient = .42**
83 Which means that at least the chief councillor is a union member.
84 See footnote 77.
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table 4.3: absolute level of items of works council-management relations (N= sample size)
strongly 
dis agree
no view agree strong N
In general relations between the works council 
and management in our company are good.
4 8 1 29 11
Management is a trustworthy bargaining partner. 5 12 6 21 8 52
Works council can only be successful if it 
harmoniously works together with management.
4 6 2 17 24 53
We often solve problems with management informally. 4 7 3 26 11 51
Management often involves works 
council in strategic planning.
13 17 1 14 8 53
We are never sufficiently informed by management 2 6 1 24 20 53
Management tries constantly to strenghten 
their power position.
2 7 3 22 19 53
Unions and employers have opposed interests. 3 6 3 29 12 53
We regard ourselves primarily as a connecting link 
between management and workforce.
2 2 3 14 31 52
We try to do the best for the firm even if 
this sometimes contradicts GTB's policies.
4 5 4 20 20 53
The works council here is strongly supported by 
workforce.
7 11 7 22 6 53
Management tries to foster a trustworthy 
relationship with the workforce.
4 14 3 22 10 53
The first eight questions analyse management-works council relationship, whereas the 
remaining questions explore broader related topics. Three quarters of the respondents 
agreed on most issues, and there are also virtually no missing answers.
In a nutshell, the relationship between management and works council is perceived 
as harmonious and trustful. Yet, management is perceived as sometimes less cooperative 
(e.g. providing insufficient information, and insufficient involvement in strategic planning) 
and as trying to strengthen its power (this is more perceived in financially "secure" than in 
"insecure" firms).85 Furthermore, the councillors acknowledge conflicting interests of 
employers and unions. It seems therefore that although the works councils are convinced 
of the necessity of harmonious relations, and are willing to do its part, they realize that 
management is sometimes less willing to cooperate, and they perceive the different 
interests of both sides as existing.
85 Correlation coefficient = .35**
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There were significant correlations between whether the general relationship is perceived as 
good and the number of former directors employed in this company86 and whether the 
councillor was a former BGL official87: Works councillors in a company with no former 
directors were more likely to perceive the relationship as "good" as in companies with 
former directors, and works councillors who were not former BGL officials were more 
likely to perceive the relationship as good than works councillors who were former BGL 
officials. Thus, contrary to some suggestions in the literature (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche 
1992) it may be that the old networks between directors and union officials are more 
obstructive than helpful in creating cooperative workplace relations in the privatised firms.
The general perception of the workplace relations is correlated with the following 
questions: the more works councils were involved in strategic planning (.35*) or feel 
sufficiently informed (-.38**), the more they perceived a positive relationship with 
management and the less likely they described management as strengthening its power. If 
management was perceived to strengthen its power, works councils were also more likely 
to perceive union - employer relations as antagonistic (.31*). In addition, there was also a 
correlation between the perception of a good relationship and the conviction that only a 
harmonious relation with management can make the works council successful (.31*). 
Moreover, companies which did not experience industrial conflicts were more likely to 
have this harmonious relationship (.35*). Furthermore, the more insecure the future of the 
firm, the more the works council saw the need for harmonious relationships (in the best 
interest of the workforce). This is a very interesting finding. At first sight one might 
interpret good relationships with management as coming out of a weak bargaining position 
of the works council. However, one could also interpret is as difficult times binding the 
two sides together. Interestingly there was no correlation between the extent of informal 
negotiations between management and works council and whether there are old or new 
directors on the board. This supports the thesis that informal relations are a common 
feature in West German workplaces and do not necessarily derive out of a "socialist 
legacy".
86 Correlation coefficient = .29*
87 Correlation coefficient= .27*
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Regarding the second part of the questionnaire, works councils were described primarily 
as connecting links between management and workforce, thus not as a pure interest 
representation, and consequently the well-being of the company was seen as of prime 
importance. This is also a typical phenomenon in West German studies (e.g. Kotthoff
1994) and in line with the legislative objectives (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). The data also 
adds support to the argument in the literature that "plant-level egoism" (e.g. Lippold et al. 
1992) predominates East German works councils.
Furthermore, management was seen as pursuing a trustworthy relationship with the 
workforce, which correlated with the general perception of good workplace relations88 and 
with works councils being described as a connecting link.89 Interestingly, the higher the 
share of females in the workforce, the more management was perceived as fostering a 
trustful relation with the workforce90, and the works councils as a connecting link91. 
Moreover, in western owned companies this management attempt is perceived stronger as 
in Treuhand-owned firms.92 Finally, the workforce was perceived as supporting the 
works council, especially in firms employing few former directors.93 Thus, the councillors 
argued that generally workplace relations are better in firms with new management than 
with the old directors, and the workforce seems to support the works council more in firms 
with new management. One could follow that the works council saw privatisation and new 
management as favourable conditions, whereas the workforce might have more them-and- 
us feelings towards the new management (and therefore supports their interest 
representation stronger). This will be further discussed in Part 3.
With regard to the literature reviewed in chapter 3, the findings contribute to three 
propositions. Firstly, they cannot support the widespread claim of researchers that 
workplace relations are going down the drain after privatisation (see chapter 3, 3.2.1). 
Obviously this data is a "snap shot", not longitudinal and thus does not provide 
information on possible changes before and after privatisation. Also, the small sample and
88 Correlation coefficient = .68**
89 Correlation coefficient = .32*
90 Correlation coefficient = .50**
91 Correlation coefficient = .31*
92 Correlation coefficient = .34*
93 Correlation coefficient = .29*
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the small number of questions do not allow a final judgement on the quality of works 
council-management relations. Nevertheless, the data gives a first indication that the 
current relationship in these firms, which are mostly privatised, is more or less 
harmonious. Surprisingly cooperation was more likely in privatised firms than in Treuhand 
firms, and more likely in the case of "new" managers and "new" works councillors.
Overall, the data adds support to the argument of "co-management" by the WISOC 
group (e.g. Ermischer and Preusche 1992). However, it challenges the argument that co­
management is at risk in firms after privatisation (e.g. WISOC, Ermischer and Preusche 
1995:59), and that privatisation is likely to cause a polarisation between the two sides (e.g. 
Kern and Land 1991). A rather straightforward explanation for our finding could be that 
the old relations between directors and worker representatives were highly distrustful and 
conflictual and privatisation enabled "fresh blood" to make a new start. The assumption is 
that both sides perceive cooperative relations as worthwhile (the councillors acknowledged 
this). It would be interesting to analyse if and why the new managers have the same 
conviction. The case study trys to explore this.
Secondly, the findings oppose the fear of some researchers (especially the 
Berlin/Gottingen group) that works councils are powerless "extended arms of 
management". Although the councillors in this sample are obviously not "conflictory, class 
conscious works councils" (see Kotthoffs typology 1981), they are aware of the different 
interests of capital and labour and also of the power balance within the firm. They also feel 
accepted by management as workplace partners. Thus, they surely do not represent 
Kotthoffs "deficient types" of works councils (isolated, ignored, extended arm of 
management), but more likely his "effective types", and here in particular the "respected, 
cooperative" works council. In other words, the data supports more the hypothesis of 
cooperative relationships than that of a one-sided acquiescence on the part of the works 
councils. Surely, the data does not allow any final conclusion regarding the practical 
effectiveness of the works councils' interest representation, and therefore the categorisation 
can be only hypothetical. The real effectiveness of these councils is better to be explored by 
methods such as non-participative observation or interviews with the workforce as has
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been done in the case study or by workforce questionnaires (see chapter 9). This brings us 
to the third contribution.
The finding that the works councils felt strongly supported by the workforce might 
be a first indicator of the works councils' functioning and indeed its institutionalisation 
(i.e. acceptance by the workforce). This finding also provides a contrasting picture to the 
literature's proposition of a disappointed and frustrated workforce regarding their works 
councils' limited possibilities for working effectively (e.g. Jander et al. 1992). Clearly, the 
data provides only the councillors' perceptions and one needs to know the perception of 
the workforce as well (see chapter 9). For example, this data does not tell us whether the 
workers' support is of a passive or active nature. Finally, this survey is also not suitable 
for discussing the various problems prohibiting works councils' functioning as outlined in 
chapter 3 (section 3.2.2). The works council questionnaire at Bodywear which deals with 
this issue (see below).
In sum, this survey obviously cannot provide an in-depth analysis of workplace relations 
as intensive case studies can provide. In particular it would be useful to ask the same 
questions to management as well, which as mentioned above was not possible. On the 
other hand it is rare to see a larger sample of works councils being examined and this in an 
industrial sector which is normally neglected in such an area of research. In a nutshell the 
data presented a harmonious relationship between management and works council, in 
particular in privatised firms with "new" managers and "new" councillors. This survey 
thus adds a different kind of data (i.e. of quantitative nature) to the existing literature and 
supports overall the finding of cooperative workplaces which was found in various other 
industrial sectors in the literature.
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4 .4  Transformation at the enterprise level: a case study in the textile 
industry
This section is divided into two parts, the first (4.4.1) presents the organisational 
transformation of the case study, as well as the changes in personnel policies and in 
management style. The second part (4.4.2) deals with its workplace relations from the 
viewpoint of management and works council, and the handling of specific workplace 
problems at the time of the fieldwork.
4 .4 .1  Organisational transformation
(i) Chronology of the organisational restructuring
The investigated case study is a producer of underwear and belonged to the "Masche" 
sector of the textile industry. The company was selected because it is one of the largest 
companies in the GTB South-East area, it is a full member of the employers’ association 
(thus under collective bargaining), was privatized very quickly and since then has 
experienced a thorough and "successful" transformation (in financial terms). The 
company, Bodywear is situated in Saxony, and was formerly the main GDR producer of 
underwear, named VEB Trikotwear.94 Trikotwear belonged to one of the large textile 
combines, VVB Trikotagen, which employed about 52,000 people in 52 enterprises. 
Bodywear was bought in 1991 by a German company (a major underwear producer in the 
up market sector) which is owned by a Swiss holding company, with headquarters and 
major plants in West Germany. Bodywear is today financially a 100% owned subsidary, 
but legally an autonomous company (AG). Even before Unification, Trikotwear had a 
"production contract" with this western firm and soon after the turnaround in 1989 
negotiations started about closer cooperation. In July 1990 VEB Trikotwear became 
Dessous AG (according to the newly introduced Treuhand law, see above). It then had a
94 To guarantee anonymity the names of the firm have been changed.
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loss of 5,875,917 DM in 1991 (first balance of 31.12.1991). After months of negotiations 
the Swiss decided to buy the company in July 1991 with a debt obligation of 4.1 million 
DM. It ran at a loss (which was mainly due to high depreciation rates) for the next two 
years until it reached 1993 and for the first time had a surplus (the only subsidary of the 
Swiss holding company to do so) and a turnover of 38 Million DM.
The company started to reorganize itself soon after autumn 1989 even before it was 
privatized. The old company director established an "action programme" to get all workers 
involved in the aim of increasing performance and productivity. Special work groups were 
created, not dissimilar to quality circles, with the major work group consisting of the 
director, the BGL, the Party secretary and shopfloor work group leaders (document 
Aktionsprogramm 17/11/89). However, the director was not seen as competent enough 
and was soon fired in December 1989. In his place the board of the combine appointed a 
trained engineer, who worked in the planning department of the combine. He introduced a 
new strategy to find a western investor as quickly as possible and meanwhile continued 
with the reorganisation. The new director's first idea was to continue with their own 
product line and additionally to produce certain segments for the Swiss company. But 
since the major market for Trikotwear (Eastern Europe) was vanishing and in East 
Germany nobody wanted to buy the old socialist fashion brands anymore, and also 
because the Swiss were not very happy about these two production paths, Trikotwear 
became more and more dependent on the ideas of the Swiss (director, interview 8/1993).
The reconstruction process started by decentralizing the plants. Trikotwear was already 
decentralized geographically (e.g. 25 production cells in the wider region in 198095). The 
firm managed to privatize/reprivatize or liquidate the majority of the smaller units and non­
production related workshops (such as tool shops, kindergarten). The main surviving 
production plants were reorganized and modernized: the three major departments, knitting, 
dyeing, sewing, became independent profit centres. The company then started to invest in 
buildings, machinery and internal redecoration during summer 1990, with the major
95 The idea behind that was to provide workplaces in each little village to make the transport for workers 
more convenient.
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investment going into new factory premises for the dyeing plant (now the most modem in 
Europe, with the latest environmental technology). 36 million DM in total was invested 
between 1990 and 1992 (a further 20 million was planned for the following two years). 
The renovation of the factory premises was particularly necessary96, and was completed 
long before the headquarters/ management building was renovated (summer 1993). 
Machinery was improved or substituted in all three production units as well as in the 
offices (e.g. copy machines, computers). The production process itself was not 
significantly changed.
The reorganisation of personnel started with the dismissal of pensioners (who were still 
working) and Vietnamese "guest workers" (who had to go back to their home country). 
Also, a reshuffling of staff took place: firstly, all jobs were internally advertised (as 
demanded by the works council, only later to go to the external labour market). However, 
most people applied for their old jobs. Middle management and supervisors (Meister) were 
nevertheless frequently substituted by East Germans deemed to be more competent and 
given another job. There are now three major middle managers, each responsible for one 
production unit (sewing, knitting, dyeing). The most important unit (sewing) is led by a 
West German (from the West German headquarters), the other two are East Germans. At 
the same time, redundant production workers, especially dyers and knitters, were offered a 
transfer to the sewing department instead of dismissal.97 The sewing plant was built up as 
the major and most labour intensive production unit. However, around 80% of workers 
did not take up this offer. Sewing pays less and has a bad image (as before in the former 
GDR: "those who sew are dull"). Thus, people preferred to go on dole, presumably in the 
belief that they would find a job somewhere else. This naive belief changed rapidly in the 
following years (director, interview 8/1993).
The director declared in his first company assembly (Betriebsversammlung) that 
there would be no redundancies without an internal job offer. It soon became clear 
however that he could not keep this promise. Especially in the administrative departments
96 It was raining through the factory roof in the dying plant, and people were standing up to their knees in 
water.
97 In former times reshuffling also existed and people were shifted around without being asked.
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the reduction of staff was necessary, due to the typical GDR employment ratio of 2:1 
"administration — production workers".98 Employees who were made redundant got 
compensation99 in line with the "social plan" of the Treuhand. In other words, this 
compensation was paid by the Treuhand, since at that time Bodywear was still Treuhand 
owned. No ABM's (retraining courses) existed at that time for the textile workers. The 
works council and personnel manager also agreed that redundancies should be made 
"sozialvertraglich", i.e. taking the personal social circumstances into account100. However, 
this was and is an informal agreement, which is not mentioned in the formal social contract 
between works council and management (Sozialplan). This "Sozialplan" primarily 
regulates the level of compensation (once the Treuhand was no longer in charge). Although 
the works council insisted that this arrangement works, they nevertheless admitted that bad 
performers were and are dismissed without taking their family circumstances into account.
Altogether Bodywear reduced its workforce from 2,232 employees (= 1,640 blue and 592 
white collars) in 1989 to 680 in May 1993, and to 625 employees in August 1994, a 
reduction of 72% over a period of five years. The redundancies mostly took place from 
May 1990 to May 1991. At the time of the case study (August 1993) the then 680 
employees comprised 490 production workers (blue collars) and 154 administrative staff 
(white collars) and "non-productives" (Ungewerbliche). The sewing plant alone employed 
379 workers in 1993. In 1994 there were 345 sewers, with 300 planned for end of 
1995.101
There was an interesting state of affairs in 1992 and 1993 when Bodywear wanted to 
recruit new workers on the external labour market because there was an increasing number 
of orders coming in. Such recruitment turned out to be very difficult, and so their staffing
98 This resulted primarily from the complicated hierachical coordination between departments and plants. 
For example at Trikotwear 450 people worked in administration. Today there are 30 people.
99 Maximum 5000 DM
100 German labour law forbids the dismissal of working mothers with children under three years only.
101 The workforce (1993) can be divided into: (i) knitting: 17 production workers and 9 people in 
administration; (ii) dyeing: 30 production workers and 10 people in administration; (iii) sewing: 379 
production workers and 44 people in administration; (iv) other units: cutting 38, product wrapping 26, 
logistics 12, transport 5, distribution 2 workers; (v) 72 Employees in central administrative units.
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plan had to be revised (originally the sewing plant planned to employ 600 workers to sew). 
The recruitment problem seemed to be mainly due to the bad image of the job, and also to 
the bad image of Bodywear itself during those years ("Bodywear concentration camp" it 
was called). They could thus not get enough applications (works councillor and director, 
interview in 1993). According to the director and works councillor the public thought that 
workers at Bodywear were not paid the agreed wage and were fired immediately if they did 
not meet the piece rate norms. This is surprising especially because Bodywear was and is 
one of the few firms which payid/pays the negotiated pay rates. However, unemployed 
workers, who were formerly sewing in a Treuhand owned firm, did not apply and 
preferred to stay on the dole, because their unemployment benefits were higher than what 
they would have earned at Bodywear. The reason was that the benefits were calculated on 
their former earnings (which were quite high due to low production norms in the Treuhand 
firms). Even the state employment agency (Arbeitsamt) failed (or did not want) to find any 
people for interviews. Interestingly not only the director but especially the chief works 
councillor were very angry about the employment agency's attitude. They saw it as a threat 
to the expansion plans of the plant. By 1994, the labour market situation had changed, but 
Bodywear was no longer seeking new sewers (due to less demand). By 1994/5 the labour 
market situation in that area was so depressed, that even small firms which were not 
unionized and paid around 4.50 DM an hour102 could still find people to work for them 
(according to the director and works councillor).
(ii) Changes in personnel policies and management style
The organisational restructuring also involved major changes in personnel management 
policies and practices, including payment systems, training, and working time. With 
regard to the payment and evaluation systems, the western job classification and payment 
system (which is negotiated by collective bargaining) was introduced in 1990.
Most changes were experienced in the sewing department. In the old system, 
sewers were paid by piece rate, and also earned a group (brigade) bonus. Bodywear
102 The official pay rate was 10.28 DM per hour for 100% norm for sewers in 1994.
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introduced new piece rates, i.e. norms103, which were more demanding than before. At 
first this caused a great deal of trouble as reported by the sewing director (interview 1993). 
Although in the beginning everyone got 100% pay (i.e. for fully meeting the newly 
introduced norm) the average individual performance fell from 120% (of the old norm) to 
40% (of the new norm) and the workplace climate became highly conflictual (in fact the 
director held a workforce meeting as the conflict escalated in order to ask whether the 
workforce even wanted him to stay, which seemed to have some impact). Changes were 
less severe in the other two plants (according to the views of the directors at these plants). 
Knitters used to work on piece rates plus group bonuses, and subsequently they worked 
on a new piece rate system without a bonus. Dyers worked on a piece rate system, which 
was abolished after 1989. Hourly pay was introduced instead, but in 1993 management 
decided to reintroduce a performance-related pay system (evaluation by supervisors) in 
addition to the basic hourly pay. All group bonuses were abolished.
There is great emphasis on quality and flexibility especially in the sewing plant, 
according to managers and works councillors. Whereas in the beginning Bodywear 
received only simple garments to produce, they are now able to produce more fashionable, 
i.e. more difficult, items. And both management and works council are proud of this. With 
regard to training, all sewers receive specific training to learn the approved Bodywear 
sewing methods, which meant that those who were used to sewing in their own way for 
often more than 20 years had suddenly to learn a different sewing technique104. Today a 
method trainer is linked to each working shift on a constant basis, and teaches the 
necessary sewing methods each time a new item has to be produced. A probation period of 
several days (with 100% pay) is given. New recruits get a probation period of four weeks, 
and a training period of ten days. In the first three months they are paid a minimum wage 
of 95% of the norm.
The East German managers and supervisors went to the West German main plant 
for a few months to be trained themsleves, and West German supervisors also came to
103 Thg norm determines how many pieces a worker has to produce in a specified time in order to get 
100% of the pay (basic pay). They are "scientifically" measured by REFA-trained engineers.
104 Formally there were also specific sewing methods such as TAN (technische Arbeitsnorm) and WAN  
(wissenschaftliche Arbeitsnorm) but they were not really practiced.
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Bodywear (some stayed for nearly a whole year). Sewers were then advised by western 
trainers to learn the formal western sewing methods. The director attended a course in 
management studies in Vienna.
There were also major changes in working time. Formerly workers worked 43.5 
hours per week. This figure has now been reduced to 40 hours, which makes eight hours 
plus an unpaid break of 30 minutes per day. Part-time work did not exist in the GDR, and 
still does not, although many female employees express a desire for it (according to the 
director and works council). Shift working was however commonplace in the GDR: dyers 
worked three shifts a day and this arrangement has continued, and knitters currently work 
two shifts as before. Only those in the sewing department never had shift work before. 
Today there are two shifts for all workers and one shift only for single mothers with 
children under 14 years (or older if the husband works three shifts). Shift working has no 
appeal for sewers. They truly hate it (see chapter 8).
Finally, all social services which the socialist enterprise previously provided were 
abolished (e.g. kindergarten), including the benefits for mothers (e.g. a day off a month 
called "houshold day"). Bodywear did however keep a company transport service, picking 
people up from home and bringing them back (since people now live quite far away and 
public transport is inadequate). They also set up an employee shop where Bodywear 
products can be bought at a special rate.
With regard to the changes in management style of the supervisors a small survey was 
conducted in 1993.105 The supervisor or Meister is responsible for a so-called "Meisterei", 
a large workgroup (shift).106 An average Meisterei in the sewing department consisted of 
42 workers. The survey suggested that the transformation led to an increase in 
supervisors' status, they felt more respected by managers and workers alike. On the other 
hand supervisors also felt more pressure at work and said that there is more competition 
among supervisors. This is a common finding in the literature (e.g. Lungwitz 1994:305).
105 Including 8 supervisors from all three plants (see appendix: A 1.2.1).
106 In 1993 there were 9 supervisors in sewing, 3 in dyeing, and 2 in knitting.
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With regard to supervisors' perceived changes in worker (Mitarbeiter107) supervisor 
relations, the supervisors declared that work pace is increasing. However, they thought 
that "teamspirit" still existed among the workforce. Most did not let workers participate in 
shop-floor decisions, control was tight, and they had a "traditional" view of pay as the 
major work motivator. These statements confirm the picture of a traditionally organized 
and managed company. Also, they thought that the capitalist system treats the workers in a 
more fair manner. Lastly, there was a divided view about whether workers complain less 
today than they previously did. In sum, the supervisors seemed to provide support for 
both scenarios in the literature (chapter 3:3.1.3): the "tayloristic" traditional management 
style108 (e.g. Mahnkopf 1991) and the "caring" East German manager-type (e.g. Lungwitz 
and Preusche 1994).
Summing up the various facets of the internal transformation of Bodywear, one can argue 
that a rigorous reorganisation took place on all hierarchical levels which implied 
rationalisation, new organisational structures (e.g. profit centres) and the adaptation of 
personnel management to western laws and regulations. This was achieved in a very short 
period of time without any direct employee participation or major interference by the works 
council. Not all personnel and social policies of the western plants have yet been 
introduced (e.g. consultation in social/private affairs, "Sozialberatungsstelle"). Overall, the 
production standards of the West German plants have been introduced, which are however 
quite traditional and therefore not linked to any fashionable management ideas such as 
TQM or HRM. Thus, there is a strong division of labour within the production arena and 
between decision-making and execution. Production workers have no real discretion over 
their work. Disciplinary measures are taken seriously and control is thought to be tight 
(interviews with production managers, workers, supervisor questionnaire). For example, 
"performance is crucial, otherwise you are sacked" (production manager S). In particular, 
the West German managing the sewing plant is a firm beliefer in "tayloristic" leadership
107 term "Mitarbeiter" is untranslatable, it means something like a "co-worker" but not as much as a 
"colleague".
108 "Taylorism" is used in the same way as it is used in this kind of literature (see chapter 2), which 
sometimes differs from the "original" Taylor, i.e. authoritarian and paternalistic management styles were 
not a contradiction for Taylor.
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styles. However, West German textile firms are also generally thought to be organised in 
highly "Tayloristic" ways. This is seen as more suitable for the production process (as the 
production manager of a major West German textile firm explained, interview Diisseldorf 
9/1995), or as Heidenreich (1991b) puts it, is caused by the industries' high labour 
intensity, large recruitment of "problematic" groups (women, foreigners) and the low 
flexibility of its machines. He argues further that the East German textile industry is an 
especially good example of this "Tayloristic" work organisation, since it relied in GDR 
times on low quality mass production, which again fostered tayloristic production forms. 
However, this company emphasized from the beginning the importance of their human 
resources for company performance, and took great interest in quality control and in 
selecting good workers and training them well.
4 .4 .2  Workplace relations at Bodywear
This section introduces the works council at Bodywear and its relation to the GTB and to 
the workforce (i). It then outlines management's (ii) and the works council's (iii) 
perceptions of the workplace relations. Four major workplace problems of that time and 
their handling are illustrated as examples of the relationship between the two actors in 
practice (iv). Finally, the works councillors were asked about the problems which impede 
an effective working of the works council (v).
(i) Establishment of the works council at Bodywear
The "turnaround" of worker representation happened at Trikotwear in spring 1990. In 
early 1990 a "union stewards" (Vertrauensleute) meeting and election was organised, 
which became highly conflictual because the BGL resisted the demands of some 
"reformers" to introduce a worker council (they got the idea when researching "what the 
West has got"). However, the election results supported the reformers who then succeeded 
in abolishing the BGL. In a subsequent poll of the workforce 90% voted for a new worker
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council, which was then created. The rights of this worker council resembled those 
allowed by the West German co-determination law (BetrVG).
The first works councillor (who remained in his post until 1995) was formerly 
active in the BGL, and is a male technician, which is a typical profession for East German 
councillors, or at least was in the early years (e.g. Kottwitz 1991). Technicians had contact 
with people in all departments through their work, and being highly skilled workers 
("Facharbeiter") they were interested in the firms reconstruction and in the introduction of 
better technology. The first vice councillor, female, was not active in the union before, but 
was voted in as a new steward in 1990.109 In July 1990 a new, "proper" works council 
under the (West) German law had to be formed, which made new elections necessary. The 
council consisted of 17 members at that time, including two full-timers (councillor and 
vice)110. 13 members were blue collars, four were white collars (including the two full­
time councillors).
Four years later (1994) the two full-time works councillors were re-elected. 
Turnout for this election was 85%, which was much higher than expected by the works 
councillors. Five former members did not want to be re-elected and had to be replaced. 17 
people were nominated, 11 had to be elected (due to the decreasing labour force). There 
were four white collars (one male, three females) and seven blue collars, three from the 
sewing department (female), one of the dyers (female), one from product packing 
(female), one from transport (male), and one engineer (male). Thus, eight out of the eleven 
were female. This female dominated works council is quite typical for the East German 
textile works councils (52% of all chief councillors are female and 62% of all council 
members in 1995, source: GTB Stid Ost), and in East Germany generally, it is no 
exception: according to Martens (1992:9) the female rate of councillors is "quite high" 
without however giving more information.
According to the chief councillor the works council should ideally work closely together 
with the main West German works council (Gesamtbetriebsrat), however he complained
109 She become chief councillor in 1995.
110 The co-determination law (BetrVG) determines the number of works council members in proporation 
to the size of the workforce, and also the percentage of white collar members.
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that the recession has weakened the previous harmonious relationship between all the 
works councils of the company in that it led to "plant-egoism"(insularity) and competition. 
Besides, in the early 1990s all works councils within the union district South-East used to 
meet regularly to discuss their problems but these meetings have been discontinued due to 
the worsening economic situation.
The works councillor seeked regular contact with the workforce but argued that the interest 
of the workers in the works council's work is decreasing. He accused them of being 
highly inactive with regard to collective issues. For example, Bodywear still has no union 
stewards. According to the councillor, workers in former times went to the BGL and were 
helped, especially if party members. There was also a lot of informal networking and 
nepotism (Gemauschel) going on. In modem, capitalist times the works council cannot 
help everybody and is therefore sometimes, wrongly he claimed, perceived as part of 
management.
Both works councillors and the chief union official stated that the relationship between 
works council and GTB is generally close and good. Bodywear is the largest unionized 
firm in the union district and both works councillors are engaged in union commitees. In 
the beginning (1990) there was a lot of joint activity between union and works council in 
order to unionize the workforce. Today, the union officials attend works council meetings 
but besides this are not very active at Bodywear. For the first time the GTB organised a 
two day information desk at Bodywear (in the canteen, management did not allow it to be 
inside the production hall) at the time of the author's fieldwork in 1993, and this was on 
the initiative of the works council. The works councillors did not regard themselves as 
representing the GTB. The union is primarily a service organisation for them. Company 
interests have priority, but they acknowledged the union position (this is also supported by 
the questionnaire results, see below). Union density at Bodywear was around 32% (the 
works council had no precise figures) and did not changed significantly over the last four 
years, however according to the councillor it would be lower if the union subscription was
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not deducted by check-off (1% of pay). The density was below the overall density of 57% 
(1993) in the union district.
In August 1995 an interesting event took place which supports the thesis that the 
councillors put the interests of the firm before union interests. As mentioned before the 
union was organising token strikes in several major companies during the collective 
bargaining period. Bodywear, being a major company, was asked to organise a similar 
strike. The works council discussed this in their meeting and the majority of members 
voted against it. This was a few days before the official workforce assembly took place. 
Shortly before the assembly started the chief union official (who usually attends) 
convinced the councillors to at least try a "sit-in" after the assembly had finished. 
Accordingly, the assembly was officially closed after twenty minutes, and then the GTB 
official asked the workers to remain (voluntarily) in their seats for 10 more minutes in 
order to strike. Most people (200) indeed stayed. Astonishingly, even the personnel 
manager who was attending the assembly, asked whether she could stay on and thus in 
effect joined the strike! However, according to the works councillor, many workers 
complained afterwards that they had felt overwhelmed by the union, that it was a lousy 
strategy of the union and that they had not wanted to strike. The councillor agreed with the 
workers' view. In the interview the councillor was convinced that most workers did not 
really understand what was going on. Truely the fact that the personnel manager stayed on 
supports this argument. The union official however argued that the workers stayed 
voluntarily and that they had the opportunity to leave. This was the first industrial action in 
the history of Bodywear.
(ii) Management's views of works council and union
Sources are interviews (in 1993/1994) with the chief executive, the three directors of the 
plants (especially the director of the sewing plant) and discussions with the personnel 
managers (head and assistant) (see appendix: A 1.1), and a questionnaire which was filled
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out by the head of the personnel department (see appendix: A 1.2.2, an identical 
questionnaire was filled out by the works council, see below).
Overall, the general conclusion of all sources is that the works council is an 
accepted partner, and that the relationship with the council is functioning, although 
differences can and do exist. The works council is definitely not seen as an arm of 
management. In the following the positions are outlined in more detail:
The chief executive had no problems in negotiating with the works council, but 
"we are not friends". Whereas in the first years he negotiated directly with the works 
council, at the time of the interview it was the personnel department or production 
managers themselves who did the job. This was because, according to him, he had too 
much other work to do, being in charge now of the two Czech/Slovak plants.
The director of the sewing department, the West German middle manager, 
recounted a different relationship with the works council. Although he acknowledged the 
need for a good relationship, he did not seem to care for it much and assumed that it is the 
works council's responsibility (rather than his) to compromise. He also thought that there 
were some "troublemakers" in the works council, and that a lot of sewers frequently went 
to the works council and complained (interview, August 1993). In 1995 he took over the 
day-to-day management of the whole company, due to the chief executives' main 
responsibilities in the Czech plant. In an interview in September 1995, he still considered 
the works council more as "a millstone around his neck" rather than a legitime institution, 
and only seemed to negotiate with them "because it is the law". Whether works council - 
management relations were now changing and deteriorating could not be confirmed at this 
time. However, the major day-to-day bargaining partner of the works council remained the 
personnnel department. It is therefore that the questionnaire (table 4.3) is taken as the most 
important source of management's view on workplace relations.
The personnel manager was more in line with the chief executive and saw the 
works council as a responsible and fair bargaining partner, who cares about the well-being 
of the firm, does not want to weaken the discipline of the workforce, and to provoke 
disputes at every opportunity. Problems are often regulated informally. The council was
88
not seen as a mouthpiece of the union. Management was said to inform the works council 
extensively.
Yet, on the other side the personnel manager argued that management does not 
really respect the views of the works council, and that they would prefer not to have a 
council at all. Similarly, the works council was not perceived as trying to cooperate with 
management, and it did not, she believed, really understand the problems and worries of 
management. In general the relations between works council and management were 
considered as poor. Interestingly, she did not answer the question about whether the 
works council should have more co-determination rights on economic issues. Perhaps this 
question was too theoretical and abstract, perhaps it was just something she had never 
thought about and had no strong views on.
These statements to some extent contradict the personnel managers' views as 
expressed above. One reason might be that at the time of this survey the works council and 
management had a major disagreement about on Saturday work (see below) and the more 
negative views of the works council might be influenced a result of this particular dispute. 
It seems safe therefore to conclude that in overall the personnel manager seem to indicate a 
respectful relationship with the works council which works to a greater or lesser degree, 
although differences can and do exist. The works council is definitely not perceived as an 
arm of management. Also, the interviews with the head and assistant personnel manager 
revealed that despite heavy differences of opinion they care about the "harmonious" 
relationship with the works council, and prefer "rational" discussions to ideological fights. 
They have their offices next to each other, know each other from the old days, and have 
breakfast together every day. Thus, as also the chief councillor claimed, "personal relations 
should not suffer".
Finally, the personnel manager acknowledged that the works council has strong 
support among the workforce, but that the workforce is not very interested in the quality of 
the relationship between management and council.
With regard to the union, the chief executive argued that Bodywear has no intention of 
quitting the employers' association and would have even considered a company-contract
with the GTB if regional collective bargaining had fallen apart, which was a real possibility 
in the 1993 round. It is not clear whether this attitude derives from a conviction of the need 
for collective bargaining or of unions in general or whether this is just following the line 
set by the headquarters in the West. However, he was convinced of the need for high pay 
in order to motivate people and as a principle of justice ("we are doing good work here"). 
On the other hand he perceived a low wage level as necessary to secure Bodywears' 
competitiveness on the external as well as on the internal market. For example, the recent 
acquisition of a textile company in the Czech Republic meant that Bodywear competed with 
wages there which were about one fifth of the East German wages. The director had an 
objective relationship with the GTB chief official ("she is a trade unionist but nevertheless 
quite serious and rational"). The personnel manager saw in general divergent interests 
between employers and unions, but regarded the GTB to be a responsible bargaining 
partner (see questionnaire). Thus, in sum Bodywear accepted the union as a legitimate 
collective bargaining partner.
(iii) Workplace relations from the viewpoint of works council
The works council's view on workplace relations will be presented mainly on the basis of 
a questionnaire which incorporates identical questions to the above questionnaire of the 
personnel manager, and which was filled in by the chief and vice works councillor (see 
appendix: A 1.2.3). The questions are identical to those of the works council questionnaire 
of the GTB survey (see table 4.3).111
The councillors' answers are compared with those of the personnel managers' at 
Bodywear, and with the other works councillors' of the GTB survey. The interviews 
conducted in 1993/1994 with both councillors will also be incorporated in the discussion.
Firstly, the management - works council relationship was seen as overally 
cooperative, in contrast to the personnel managers' view. Management was seen as a
m  The GTB survey was also distributed to the Bodywear works council and was filled out by six, not 
full-time members of the works council.
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responsible bargaining partner (which is in line with what the personnel manager thought 
about the works council), and as a cooperative partner (whereas the personnel manager 
described the council as not cooperative). They also agreed that problems are often solved 
informally, as did the personnel manager. These different perceptions of both sides are 
quite interesting: the works council's opinion of management and their relationship was 
more positive than the personnel managers' view of the council.
The councillors also expressed slightly less positive views. For example, 
management was accused of exploiting each opportunity to improve their power position 
(whereas the personnel manager did not think the same of the works council). Moreover, 
they were unsure whether management understands the problems of the workforce, and 
whether management would prefer not to have a council. The negative views were 
supported in the interviews. For example, the chief official did not want to be elected again 
in four years time and chose to take retirement instead in 1995. Although he is, as he says, 
"married" to this enterprise: his grandfather and father both worked here and he has known 
this company from childhood. However, he is fed up having less and less opportunities to 
improve the social conditions in the firm. "It isn't fun anymore and it is getting worse 
every year. Your hands are bound, because the demand is down. ... The constantly 
increasing pressures on sewers' performance and the increasing threat on those who want 
to consult the works council is just capitalism at its worst" (interview in August 1994).
On the other hand, the councillors agreed that management informs the council 
sufficiently, and also that management respects the views of the council, in contrast to the 
manager's expressed view. However, the "part-time" council members had a different 
view: they did not agree that management is informing the works council sufficiently, and 
they also disagreed that problems are often solved informally with management. This 
difference to the chief councillors' view might indicate that the chief councillors primarily 
communicate informally with management without informing their colleagues. Thus, they 
might have an informal communications which are often hidden to their colleagues. This is 
a phenomenon which also Kothoff frequently observed in his study (1994). This is 
supported by the fact that the works council leader also sits on the supervisory board of
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Bodywear (comprising two shareholder representatives, one workforce representative), 
which gives him access to more information, but not he argued really influence.
With regard to the works council - union relationship, there was a disagreement 
among the two councillors whether the council represents the GTB in the company. Yet, 
both regarded themselves as trying to achieve the best for the company even if not in line 
with official union policy. This is in line with the personnel manager's view. The GTB 
was also not regarded as intervening in company concerns. Moreover, unions and 
employers were seen as having divergent positions, as did the personnel manager. The 
works council did not agree that the GTB represents the members from the West rather 
than the East, and the interests of the officials rather than those of the membership.
Finally, management was not seen as having strong support among the workforce, 
and the councillors thought, in contrast to the personnel manager, that the workforce does 
indeed have an interest in the quality of the relation between works council and 
management. With regard to the question of more co-determination rights (a classic topic 
of discussion among unionists) one councillor agreed strongly, the other however chose 
not to answer. It might be concluded that this issue is not high on the agenda of this works 
council.
In sum, despite the mixed accounts it seems safe to argue that in overall the 
councillors' overall perceptions of management were more positive than the more divergent 
statements of the personnel manager. Yet, both parties seemed to indicate a more or less 
working and respectful relationship, although differences between both sides can and do 
exist. Both sides supported the interpetation that the works council is independent from the 
GTB and from management. One might conclude that the works council seemed to 
belonged to the category of works council which provides an "effective" interest 
representation (see Kotthoffs typology, chapter 3). It seems that the works council 
understood itself as a representative of workers' interests, as well as an "Ordnungsfaktor", 
an institution which guarantees the proper functioning and organisation of the workplace. 
This thesis has to be further examined by the workforce view of the effectiveness of the 
works council (chapter 9).
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Finally, comparing Bodywear with the other works councils of the GTB survey, in most 
questions Bodywear revealed similar views, i.e. a generally positive account of workplace 
relations. The only major difference was that Bodywear disagreed that "the works council 
can only be successful if it works harmoniously with management" whereas nearly 80% of 
the works council survey agreed. This might indicate that Bodywear had a more 
independent, even powerful and definitely not "collaborative" and perhaps also more 
effective works council than the rest of this sample.
(iv) Workplace problems
Finally, to illustrate the current workplace relations at the time of investigation (summer 
1993) four major examples of workplace problems and how management and the work 
council were dealing with them are reported. With regard to the first two problems, high 
absenteeism rate and low labour productivity the works council has no legal co­
determination rights, whereas it has legal rights regarding the last two issues, the closure 
of the knitting department, and the introduction of overtime/ Saturday work.112
1. Firstly, absenteeism was a serious problem in the sewing plant until 1994. 
Absenteeism figures were similar to the high levels in the former GDR. For example, in 
1989 296.7 working hours per person out of 2188.1 hours per annum were lost, out of 
which for example 186.6 hours were due to sickness, 6.7 hours due to defective 
machinery, 11.3 unpaid, and 2.5 unexplained). This absenteeism figure amounted to 15% 
of total working time. In September 1992 the average absenteeism rate in the sewing plant 
was 13.1%, which was still above the average Bodywear total of 9.8%. A year later the 
rate declined to 10.18% (compared to 9.04% total). However, the absenteeism rate of 
Bodywear was higher than that of the West German plants (around 7%).
The director related this problem to the increasing "private stress" of the employees 
(e.g. household, small children without kindergarten, husband often unemployed). But
112 See footnote 43 in chapter 3.
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also due to the fear of not being able to learn the new sewing methods when new items 
were to be produced. Accordingly, absenteeism rates rose each time new sewing products 
were introduced. The director's strategy was to speak to each individual, explaining to 
them that they need not fear being sacked, and that it was important for the companies' 
success and for their colleagues that they come to work. In addition the supervisors were 
told to make people feel that they were missed if they did not come to work. Since this did 
not help achieve any sustainable improvement, the director repeated the talks a year later in 
1993, making it very clear that if they did not perform to their best ability their jobs will be 
put at risk due to the increasing Czech competition (besides two plants had already closed 
in West Germany). So far (1994) these measures have worked. These interventions were 
not opposed by the works council. The councillors shared the concern of management, but 
blamed the increasing work pace and stress at work. However, they stayed very much in 
the background.
2. Secondly, a related problem was the lower labour productivity113 of the sewing 
plant compared to standards in the plants in the West. In 1993 an average of 105/108% of 
the standard was achieved, which was an improvement on previous years but which was 
still under the West's average of 125%.114 Management argued that this was not due to 
lower qualifications, but instead that it was a mental problem, i.e. missing "quality 
thinking". The (East German) director claimed in general, "these East Germans only want 
D-Marks and travel, but not to work. Here a strong man is necessary ("hier muB mal ein 
starker Mann her"). In West Germany there is too much democracy" (interview, 5/94). 
The West German manager agreeed that "workers are lazy here" and added that "they 
always stand together in groups and complain about something, whereas in West Germany 
people stand together and discuss positive things, for example their activities last 
weekend". He states that in former times the workers went to the BGL or Party and 
complained, now they have to approach the supervisor and this creates problems for them. 
However, he distinguished between two basic groups: one group has adapted well and
113_  worked minutes./, presence in h (Leistung = erarbeitete Minuten./. Anwesenheit in h)
114 The average norm in the old regime (e.g. 1989) was 140-150 % (also 160-180% was reached quite 
frequently, since piece rates/norms were easier, as mentioned above.
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likes the new flexibility, others do not like it, since it involves too much thought and too 
many changes for them. Management put a lot of effort into talking and threatening sewers 
that they will lose their jobs if they do not increase their productivity, and this has had an 
effect, according to them. The works council as stated above shared the concerns of 
management, but on the other hand emphasized the improvements already achieved. 
However, they did not oppose management's talks with employees.
3. Thirdly, another major event was the closure of the knitting plant, which was 
announced in the summer of 1993. From autumn 1993 onwards production and labour 
were to be gradually reduced to finally end altogether in spring 1995 (contracting-out has 
become cheaper). The knitters were informed at very short notice, and they had to decide 
within a few days whether or not to take up the offer of a job in the dyeing plant. This was 
the bargaining achievement of the works council: all knitters were to be offered a new job. 
Some knitters, who were selected by different criteria (living close to the dyeing plant, 
who were actually present at the time and not on holidays,...), were told to move right 
away. Others had to move in the months following. For the knitters, many of whom had 
worked in this plant for the last 20-30 years, this meant not only a change to completely 
new work but also less money (dyers get paid less than knitters). In addition, there were 
for example supervisors who now had to start all over again as unskilled workers. 
However, most people obeyed: "what can I do?? It's good to have a job at least" was the 
common response. And: "it was a shock, but what can I gain from running around like a 
'dog without a bone' all the time?" Another one: "I don't know why I was selected to 
move immediately. They decided."
4. Fourthly there was the constant problem of Saturday work in the sewing 
department. Saturday work was not unknown in the GDR, however it was voluntary and 
brought not only overtime pay but also a very high extra bonus just for turning up. In 1993 
when the topic arose at Bodywear again, most did not really understand the need for it and 
argued that it was the caused by the unadequate planning of the company. According to 
personnel management workers still did not seem to realize that in a market economy "the
firm cannot plan as will as it formerly did in the plan economy". A year (1994) later 
sewers, although not blaming the poor planning anymore, were still reluctant, largely 
because performance pressures during the week were perceived as being so high that they 
preferred their weekend for recreation. Under the labour law the company cannot introduce 
overtime or Saturday work without the works council's permission. The works council 
acknowledged the need for overtime in the current situation, yet wanted to agree to 
additional work on a few Saturdays only on the condition that workers work seven hours 
and get eight hours pay. However, the collective bargaining contract that year allowed that 
flexible working hours be worked without additional payments. Thus, as long as workers 
got a few days off in the following months to recompense the Saturdays, no overtime had 
to be paid. This resulted in a major conflict between works council and management. In the 
end the works council had to drop its objections and support management. They argued 
that workers should be happy to have additional work. For the winter temporary cuts in 
working hours (Kurzarbeit) had already been planned.
In sum, these examples of how workplace problems were handled at Bodywear contribute 
to the characterization of Bodywear's workplace practices. Overall, workplace problems 
were dealt with by management in a highly authoritative but also paternalistic way. For 
example, the chief executive found the time to talk to each of the sewers individually, 
whereas on the other hand the closure of the dyeing plant was carried out without 
informing the workforce in advance. In addition, the works council seemed to become 
active in issues where there are statutory (co-determination) rights for the works council 
(e.g. plant closure or Saturday work), and they tried hard to achieve a compromise which 
takes the social interests of the workforce into account. In issues however where they do 
not have formal rights (e.g. absenteeism, productivity, management interviewing workers) 
they remained in the background, supporting in principle management's rationale 
("survival of the firm"), and felt that they are powerless to react against the overwhelming 
power of the free market. This supports a previous suggestion of Kirschner (1991) (see 
chapter 3:3.2.3) that the works councils are highly dependent on their legal rights, thus 
favouring a juridical relationship with management.
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(v) Problems impeding effective interest representation115
Three problems of an effective interest representation were emphasized by the two 
councillors. Firstly, specific interests of the workforce often do not conform with the 
council's ideas. This is quite a strong and honest statement to make. Secondly, reference 
was made to the lack of interest and the indifferent attitude of the workforce, and lastly to 
the threats imposed by management on workers who consult the council. The two latter 
explanations were repeated in all the interviews the author had with them over the years. 
One might ask however whether the "passivity" of the workforce is really so dramatic and 
impedes works council's work or whether it is not instead part of repertoire a works 
councils to mock their passive co-fellows in order to underline their own importance and 
commitment. Or even to justify their own inactivity (see Mahnkopf 1991). On the other 
hand, different opinions within the works council, the heavy workload of the council, the 
possibility that the council has lost contact with the workforce, the divergent interests of 
the workforce, or individualistic employees who prefer to represent their interests alone, 
were not seen as impeding effective interest representation. This stands in contrast to 
several propositions of the literature (see chapter 3). For example, Jander and Lutz 
(1991,1993) stressed the fact that works councils are restricted in their functioning because 
they are overloaded, and because of the divergent interests of the workforce. Kirschner 
(1992) stated that the East German works councils have become too distant from the 
workforce (see chapter 3:3.2.3). Additionally, there is the widespread argument that 
workers prefer to represent their own interests (e.g. Gut et al. 1993, see chapter 3:3.2.3). 
However, the perceptions of the works council can only be a first source, workers' views 
are needed to further substantiate the claim and to challenge the statements in the literature.
115 The works council questionnaire included questions on possible problems impeding effective working 
of the works council (see appendix: A 1.2.3).
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Conclusion of Chapter 4
This chapter outlined the transformation of workplace relations in the East German textile 
industry. It can be characterized by desperate economic determinants, companies 
experiencing tremendous organisational changes, an employers' association struggling to 
keep its members and a union which is not dogmatic or militant, but cooperative although 
not necessarily "weak" with regard to the bargaining outcomes. The workplace climate, 
surveyed in 53 firms, was characterized as harmonious overall from the works councillors' 
point of view. Works councils seemed to cooperate with management as accepted partners, 
not as accomplices or arms of management. The chapter provided details about the extent 
of organisational change in the textile companies and there is some evidence that changes 
are similar to those reported in other industrial sectors (see chapter 3).
The case study Bodywear presented a company which successfully managed the 
transformation to market economy. Its employee relations were characterized by significant 
changes in working conditions, in particular increases in work pace and quality. It is 
therefore an interesting example for the study of workers' attitudes towards the 
organisational change. The company is a prototype of privatized East German companies 
organised in a strictly "Tayloristic" way, as characterised in the previous chapter, chapter
3. Yet, the "polarization" scenario of conflictual workplace relations which was suggested 
to result from the intensifying "Taylorisation" by some authors (e.g. Kern and Land 1991) 
(see chapter 3) cannot be supported. The case study presented a specific mixture of 
optimizing a "Tayloristic" work organisation, while introducing more flexibility and higher 
quality standards, practicing some "paternalistic" personnel policies, and bargaining with 
the relatively strong works council in a mostly cooperative way.
Thus, as with the works councils in the GTB survey and perhaps even to a slightly 
larger extent, the Bodywear works council could be characterized as being cooperative, but 
at the same time not an "extended arm of management". It was however concerned with 
keeping the interests of the workforce on the agenda. Yet, the works council saw the need 
for working together in order to achieve the most for both the firm and the workforce. 
Overall, the survey data provides more specific answers regarding the extent and quality of
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the cooperative relationship and contributes to previous studies such as by Ermischer and 
Preusche (1992) who achieved their finding of cooperative workplace relations on a rather 
weak methodology.
It should be noted that the data of the case study and the GTB survey did not intend to 
investigate the origins and reasons for this cooperation. In the case of Bodywear it could 
be traced back to the personal relationship among the actors on both sides.116 However, 
the retirement of the chief councillor (Autumn 1995) seemed not to have affected 
workplace relations in any significant way, at least not in the short-term, according to the 
vice councillor who took over the post (interview October 1995). In addition, it might be 
not so much the personality of the chief councillor and of the chief executive, but rather a 
legacy of the cooperative workplace climate of the socialist past which accounts for the 
current workplace relations. However, the case study does not provide data on the former 
socialist workplace relations and thus cannot contribute to the discussion in chapter 2, but 
it does provide some limited evidence that workplace relations did not become more 
conflictual after privatisation, as has been suggested in various studies (see chapter 3). 
This might indicate that workplace relations also were "cooperative" in former times. 
Finally, the cooperative relations at Bodywear could also be due to specific, favourable 
conditions. Thus, the original worker council at Bodywear was installed in 1989/90 in 
order to explicitly improve interest representation, thus neither to install self-management 
of the workers, nor to become a management consultant or administrator of the 
reorganisation. It could be argued that the specific circumstances in this company 
supported more independent interest representation. Thus, management did not really need 
the worker council to discipline the workforce in the beginning. The early replacement of 
the director secured management authority. Furthermore, the early connections with the 
western investor and an unproblematic relationship with the Treuhand prevented the works 
council from becoming a wholesale management accomplice. Consequently, the works 
council dealed and deals with far more favorable conditions than those of lots of other East 
German textile firms, and might have it easier in maintaining cooperative relations with
116 See Kotthoff (1994) who emphasized the importance of personalities in shaping workplace relations.
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management. Yet, as said above, it is difficult to pinpoint a single reason for this 
cooperation, a mixture of various factors might be the most likely explanation.
Finally, the case study cannot support many of the listed problems inhibiting works 
councils' effectiveness as outlined in chapter 3 (section 3.2.2). For example, the 
workforce is quite homogeneous (no part-timers, short-term workers, "ABMler") which 
makes the works councillors' work that bit easier. With regard to the problem of the lack 
of experience, the interview material did not provide any indicators to suggest that 
knowledge or "tacit" skills necessary for effective interest representation are lacking. Both 
councillors seemed very knowledgable with regard to the legal regulations (as also 
mentioned by Lippold et al. 1992 and others). Finally, the relationship between union and 
council has been stable and cooperative throughout the last few years, and also the 
disagreement over the token strike did not seem to have challenged the overall relationship 
(according to the works councillor and chief union official, interview, October 1995).
So, in this respect the works council should work effectively, the data does not 
however tell us anything about the workers' views yet. In addition the data provides some 
indicators for the successful institutionalisation of the works council at Bodywear (e.g. 
management accepts and cooperates with the works council; the existence of formal work 
agreements). Less data on these issues are available in the case of the works councils of the 
GTB survey. However, as said before "cooperation" does not necessarily imply that the 
works council is effective in representing workers' interests. And the data says nothing 
about workers' acceptance of the works councils. The institutional approach is thus not 
appropriate for addressing these issues. As argued in chapter 3 this can only be addressed 
by surveying workers' attitudes and behaviour, which will be done in Part 3 and 4.
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CONCLUSION OF PART 1 
"THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORKPLACE RELATIONS"
Part 1 introduced the socialist workplace relations as the starting point of the 
transformation focusing in particular on the workers' situation at that time. It then outlined 
the formal development of industrial relations institutions after unification, and the current 
workplace practices and problems of the interest institutions as seen in the literature. The 
final chapter of part 1 contributed to this literature review by outlining the transformation of 
the industrial relations actors of the textile industry, by analysing in depth the workplace 
transformation in one case study, and by examining management-works council relations 
through a survey of a sample of textile companies.
In short, part 1 implied two aims: firstly to present the current research issues and 
findings of the transformation of workplace relations based on the widespread institutional 
literature; and secondly to introduce the wider industrial and workplace relations context of 
the textile industry in general and of the case study in particular.
Some shortcomings of the institutional approach to workplace relations become 
evident. The approach neglects the workforce- works council and workforce- union 
relationship and their possible impact on the transformation of the interest institutions. 
According to this study these relationships have to be examined if one truely wants to 
understand the transformation process. For example, the finding that works councillors 
claim to have a harmonious work relationship with management does not tell us anything 
about the extent workers actually trust and accept the works council and also whether they 
perceive the works council as being effective in representing their interests. This might be a 
necessary precondition for the effective working of works councils. Thus, asking workers 
about these issues seems necessary in order to understand to what extent the union or 
works council has been institutionalised in practice. This is especially true in the face of the 
informal networks which existed on the socialist shopfloors and which might interfere 
today with the formalisation of interest representation (see chapter 2). In addition, 
workers' attitudes and behaviour can equally advance our understanding of the 
institutionalisation of West German unions in East Germany.
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Another task of workforce investigations is to had to what extent the "harmonious" 
workplace climate in the examined textile companies has had an impact on the workers' 
relationship to management. Thus, does the workforce reveal low "them-and-us" feelings 
towards management and emphasize instead a unitarist "we"? Analysing worker's 
perceptions might also tell us something about the general success of the organisational 
transformation in terms of workers' acceptance and commitment to the changes.
In sum, the workforce survey should address firstly workers' perceptions (attitudes) of the 
organisational changes in order to get a better understanding of the success of the 
transformation at workplace level; and secondly it should investigate workers' perceptions 
of and reactions to the new interest institutions in order to advance the understanding of the 
institutionalisation process, and to get some idea about the extent to which the informal 
workplace relations have been formalised.
This will be dealt with in Part 3 by analysing textile workers' perceptions towards 
the transformation of workplace relations, and in Part 4 by exploring their reactions with 
regard to participating in collective activities. The next part, Part 2 will outline the theories 
and methodology of the workforce studies.
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PART 2 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF STUDYING WORKERS' 
PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS TOWARDS THE TRANSFORMING 
WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Part 1 of the study was devoted to providing an analysis of the transformation of 
workplace relations by focusing on the institutional actors. Part 2 introduces an alternative 
way of exploring the changing workplace relations through examining the perceptions of 
the workforce. The first chapter reviews the literature on worker attitudes pre- and post- 
1989 and identifies a major hypothesis of the individualisation of the East German 
workforce. The next chapter, chapter 6 provides the analytical tools to investigate workers' 
perceptions and (re)actions towards the transforming workplace relations. It outlines four 
major theoretical approaches to workers' willingness to participate in collective activities. 
The theories provide the conceptual tools for discussing workers' perceptions of the 
transformation of the work organisation and of the interest institutions, and they also 
provide explanations for individual differences in people's willingness to participate in 
collective activities. Finally, chapter 7 introduces the operationalisation of the theories in 
this study, it explores the possible interrelations of the theories, and reports the 
methodology of the empirical studies.
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Chapter 5 Workplace relations from the viewpoint of the workforce: 
review of literature
This chapter commences by outlining the few existing studies on workforce attitudes in the 
GDR (5.1), and reviews the current literature on workers' attitudes towards the 
reorganisation of their workplaces, the works council and the unions (5.2). It then looks at 
the literature's explanations of workers' current reluctance to engage in collective activities 
(5.3). And finally, the increasing "individualisation" of the East German workers is 
characterized as one core hypothesis of this literature and further discussed (5.4).
5 .1  Workers' attitudes in the GDR
Only vert few formal studies on workers attitudes, conducted in the GDR or current 
(retrospective) studies, exist. The arguments of this literature can be broadly summarized 
into five categories: (i) work group solidarity, (ii) them-and-us feelings, (iii) job 
satisfaction, (iv) interest representation, and (v) general "attribution" mechanisms. The 
purpose of this section is to provide some preliminary understanding of workers' former 
working lives in order to facilitate the analysis of possible legacies in workers' current 
attitudes and behaviour.
(i) work group solidarity
It is well-known that work was a central reference point in the East German life, much 
more than in western countries, and this has consequently left an impact on workers' 
former and possibly current mentality (Diewald 1995:235; Gensior 1992:273; Senghaas- 
Knobloch 1992). This is for example supported by Voigt's GDR study (1973:82)117 
which found that only 30% of his surveyed workers wanted to stop working. This work
Study included participant observation, interviews and questionnaires, was done during the years 
1965/66 in several construction sites across the GDR, sample of 911 questionnaires (response rate not 
known).
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commitment can be still found today, as for example interviews with workers at Bodywear 
revealed. Whether asked whether they would want to continue to work if they had won in 
a lottery nearly all said yes, they could not imagine a life without work (see also chapter 8).
Diewald (1995) explained the importance of the working life by noting that the 
workplace is a prime social place (i.e. where you met your friends) with this in turn 
supported by the official social functions of the firm (e.g. company kindergarten, doctors). 
His data also revealed that the social relations of the workplace, i.e. informal networks (see 
chapter 2), were not only important for people's working lives, but also for their private 
lives.118 To what extent the former centrality of work evoked a strong "company identity" 
(e.g. Allen and Meyer 1990; Guest and Dewe 1991) was not the subject of research in the 
socialist era. However, some studies have been done on workers' identification with the 
work collective ("Arbeitskollektiv"). There is widespread evidence for this concept in 
retrospective studies (e.g. Alt et al. 1994: section 1.2; Diewald 1995: section 5; Gut et al. 
1993:33; Lungwitz 1994:307), but also in the "real-time" study of Voigt (1973:93pp.). 
Yet, there is a debate as to what extent this "workgroup solidarity" or "collectivism" was 
caused by official policies (e.g. socialist education119, specific personnel policies such as 
"brigades" or group bonuses) or by the informal networks (e.g. Alt et al. 1994:58; Fritze 
1993b: 189). Or to use the terms of Etzioni, whether it was a calculative or a moral 
solidarity (Durkheim 1893; Etzioni 1975:10). Rottenburg (1991:322) for example argues 
for the former, "it was more conformity and compliance than commitment, more a 
"mechanistic solidarity" than a real solidarity on the GDR shopfloor" (see also Senghaas- 
Knobloch 1992). He claims that shopfloor solidarity was a fiction, an "emergency 
solidarity" which vanished once people were not dependent on each other anymore, and 
once competition over money and social status started (i.e. after Unification). According to 
Swartz (1990) the perceived community and warmth was only "the deceptive community 
feeling which only a ghetto can evoke", thus a "ghetto-solidarity" out of pure survival
118 He distinguishes between three meanings of the networks for the individual, which he lables 
"Kollektiv" (collective, working community), "Vitamin B" (connections, contacts), and "Nische" (niche). 
Firstly the informal networks supported and fostered the formal "Kollektiv". Secondly, informal networks 
were also a source for "Vitamin B" which would better allow people to obtain for example goods on the 
black market. And lastly, informal networks were also creating specific niches of privacy and security.
119 The working group was seen in the socialist ideology as the essential core of the socialist state (like a 
family) (e.g. Autorenkollektiv 1983:77; Diewald 1995:258).
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instinct which inevitably breaks down after "liberation". In short, these writers are 
sceptical about the quality of the "emotional" character of the informal networks and argue 
that the solidarity of the work collective should be better described as a "cosiness within 
the cage or prison". However, none of these writers precisly defines concepts (e.g. 
solidarity) nor backs them up with more than impressionistic empirical data.
On the other side authors such as Gensior (1992:273) interpretes the informal 
networks as a real "work community" and stress the emotional importance of these 
collectives. The "Kollektiv" also stood for collegiality, warmth, friendship and solidarity 
(e.g. Alt et al. 1994:54; Gut et al. 1993:33; Schmidt 1995:5). Finally, Diewald (1995) 
provided evidence for the co-existence of various, calculative and emotional, roles of 
informal networks in people's personal lives. Supporting this view one might also suggest 
that the impact and value of informal networks differs according to the type of worker (e.g. 
"core" highly-skilled worker or "peripheral" worker).
(ii) them-and-us feelings
Some authors argue that them-and-us feelings (them= management, us= workforce) did 
exist in former times (e.g. Haraszti 1974:151, 1977; Kern and Land 1991; Voigt 
1973:109). According to the study of Kem and Land120 it was typical for East Germans at 
their work or in public to make a sharp distinction between "top" and "bottom": between 
the world above (of politicians, directors, and superiors — who make workers' lives more 
difficult) and their own world. Some writers (e.g. KreiBig 1992) argue that this orientation 
resembled the "them-us" feelings of workers in West Germany in the 50s (e.g. Popitz et 
al. 1957). However, no study has explicitly or in depth dealt with these feelings. Voigt for 
example based his analysis on just one question ("if there are problems on the building 
site, what are the causes?"; with the following answers to choose from: administration/ 
headquarters, brigade, supervision of the site, do not know"; result: 74% chose 
administration). In addition, one might ask whether this kind of question is an appropiate
120 Based on a case study and other unspecified empirical material of a major project o f the SOFI Institute 
Gottingen and Humboldt University Berlin.
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measurement of the concept one which does not instead measure "causal” attribution (see 
also chapter 7). Furthermore, it remains to be discussed whether these them-and-us 
feelings existed for the same reasons as in the West (see also chapter 8). Voigt (ibid.) for 
example argues that the dichotomy between top and bottom existed independently of 
property and class relations, yet again does not provide evidences.
(iii) job satisfaction
With regard to workers' job satisfaction in the socialist enterprises there were only very 
few reliable studies conducted in the GDR (e.g. Miethe et al. 1989; Voigt 1973). The 
overall finding is that most workers were dissatisfied with their working conditions.121 In 
Miethe's study 77% of the responding workers were "totally dissatisfied" with their 
working conditions in 1989. A national representative study of employees (IU88, 1988) 
was more detailed and showed that in 1988 68% of the respondents (1037 persons) were 
satisfied with the collegiality at their workplace, but only 43% with their participation 
rights122, 33% with their performance-related pay, and 23% with their working conditions 
(quoted in Gensickel992:17). Only 39% were satisfied or very satisfied with their work in 
general. This is in contrast to the more positive results of a previous survey conducted in 
1977 (IU77). Voigt (1973:75) found in his study in 1965 that more than 50% of the 
building workers were "more or less" satisfied with their work, however asked about their 
general associations if they hear the word "work" (positive, negative, half and half), most 
workers answered "half and half. Asked whether they would generally like to change 
their job 40% said no, 25% said yes and 35% were undecided. Voigt compared this with 
the results of that question in a survey of West German workers (Mannesmann AG, 1955) 
which resulted in 70% saying no. He concluded (p. 80) that the building workers (being
121 Similar findings are reported from other Eastern European countries (e.g. Blanchflower and Freeman 
1993).
122 There is evidence that employee participation, which was in theory quite extensive (see chapter 2), was 
in reality restricted (e.g. Party directives and economic plans limited the discretion and impact of 
participation) (Voigt 1985:478). Asked people whether they thought they could participate at their 
workplace, 3% answered yes, 47% no (Voigt 1973:126). On the other side, people expressed a strong wish 
for codetermination on pay, piece rates, job shift, working times, the distribution of tools and work, the 
distribution of flats and holiday places, and the selection of brigade leaders (ibid.: 126).
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the best paid workers in the GDR) had a lower job satisfaction than workers in West 
Germany. This seems to be a hasty conclusion, since the comparability of the surveys is 
not discussed.
Furthermore, Voigt argued that "socialist work commitment"123 was not 
established in reality and that workers had instead a highly instrumental approach to work 
(p.86). For example, more than 90% of his sample perceived their pay as too low (p.81). 
In addition, 71% gave the high pay as a reason for becoming builders, and for slightly 
more money they would consider changing their job (p. 121). However, dissatisfaction 
with pay does not exclude a commitment to work and so his conclusion seems again 
premature. Finally, Voigt (1985:470) explained the increasing job dissatisfaction during 
the 1980s by the fact that the qualifications of workers were increasing in the late 1970s 
and 1980s but not the standards of people's work (also Graf and Miethe 1990:1003). In 
addition, an increasing dissatisfaction with the political system and the economic stagnation 
during the 1980s was brought into the workplace. Voigt argued further that the protest 
manifested in a high inclination to escape, a retreat into privacy (and niches) and an internal 
withdrawal from work (1985:467). And Fritze proposes that after years of a planned 
economy the workforce lost their belief that the plants belonged to themselves, or that their 
contribution and effort mattered or paid off (e.g. Fritze 1993b). However, both lack direct 
evidence for their observations.
Overall, the methodology of these studies is not without problems. For example, the use of 
very few, broad questions to tackle the multi-dimensional concept of job satisfaction, the 
failure to examine causes for the job dissatisfaction, and the small empirical basis all of 
which prevents any generalising of the findings to the whole of the East German 
workforce. Nevertheless, they give an idea of the discrepancy between socialist ideology 
or official propaganda and the real situation on East German shopfloors. Voigt's study 
which although not readily generalisable to the whole East German workforce, provides an
123 Socialist work commitment (Sozialistische Arbeitsmoral) was the aim of the socialist education. 
People should work out of their commitment to the socialist community, not for money or individual 
ambition.
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especially interesting case, since construction workers were among the best paid workers 
in the GDR and had a key position in terms of work autonomy.
(iv) interest representation
Voigt's (1973) study is one of the only GDR studies which investigates the relationship of 
worker to union and Party. No current study deals with this issue. Again, his findings are 
not generalizable, but they nevertheless provide some interesting insights. To his question 
whether the FDGB or the SED represented workers' interests on the site: 74% answered 
no and only 7% yes. Most said "they are all in cahoots with each other". This is in line 
with an earlier made hypothesis that the socialist system lacked an effective institutional 
interest representation of workers. Furthermore, to the question about what would they say 
to a colleague who is not a union member, 56% said "it's his/her own business", 26% 
"good", only 2 out of 911 criticised the colleague. Thus, the fact that despite this 
devastating judgement union density in the GDR was extremely high (97% according to 
Glaesner 1989:211) supports the earlier argument that the main reasons for joining the 
FDGB lay elsewhere (i.e. its social functions).
(v) causal attribution
There is a large (retrospective) literature on the psychological attribution mechanism of East 
Germans. According to Stratemann (1993:16)124 people in socialist regimes tended to 
externalize the causes of their problems and circumstances and avoided internal 
attributions. Externalizing also means delegating responsibility to external authorities, 
another suggested East German characteristic (Alt et al. 1993:31). In other words the cause 
of a social phenomenon was seen to be largely outside of oneself. This often made sense. 
For example, decisions about one's career were very much in the hands of the directors 
and planning commitees. Even decisions about which profession one would like to pursue
*24 Based on an empirical study of the Institute for Economic Psychology (WIP) Dortmund, which is 
unfortunately not further described in this article.
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was not a purely personal decision. People learned that most important situations in their 
lives, as well as many day-to-day decisions, were more or less out of their control. Marz 
(1993a: 11) pointed out that people also tended to make external attributions for their own 
failings/failures. He argued that, knowing what a burden it was to take on individual 
responsibility in the system, without any incentives or normative pressures to do so, and 
with the possibility of avoiding this responsibility, people became reluctant to assume 
responsibility. For example, teachers were responsible for good marks, doctors for one's 
health, the work collective for one's day-to-day well-being, the union for holiday places, 
the state for social security and so on.
It seems likely that this habit had an impact on people's personal and social 
identities. Avoiding personal responsibility makes one dependent on the system, and on 
others, and hinders the establisshment of a realistic perception of oneself (Marz ibid.). It 
has been argued therefore that people often had a theoretical, unreal conception about 
themselves, "if I only could as I want, I would...". Peoples' self-esteem and social 
identity125, it was claimed, was mainly based on these hypothetical convictions (e.g. Alt et 
al. 1994:69; Belwe 1991; Marz 1993b). Besides, the permanent "double life" (Henrich 
1989: 109; Rottenburg 1992: 245) of the formal and informal/ private roles made it more 
difficult of establishing a "normal" social identity (Marz 1992:230). Marz added that 
identity and individuality certainly did exist in the GDR, but that they were more restricted 
to the private niches and could not effectively develop in the official work environment. 
The open question then is what implications that might have for the current attitudes and 
behaviour of the East German workers. Thus, it would be no surprise to see today a 
continuation of "external" attribution habits and the avoidance of individual responsibility.
In sum, the few studies of workers' attitudes contribute to the literature on former socialist 
workplace relations discussed in chapter 2 in that they provide some evidence that workers 
in the GDR were dissatisfied with certain working conditions, felt some sort of them-and-
125 Defined as a voluntary membership in a group with value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership (see chapter 6).
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us feelings towards management and a certain solidarity with their work colleagues. Most 
did not feel represented by the union, and attributed their work problems to external actors. 
The studies are not generalizable to the whole East German workforce, but nevertheless 
might help to interpret the attitudes of workers after Unification, which are discussed in the 
following.
5 .2  Workers’ attitudes towards the transforming workplace relations: 
review of current empirical studies
(i) Workers' attitudes towards organisational restructuring
There is a lack of research on workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the organisational 
transformation at their workplaces and towards the old or new management. The four 
empirical studies which are known to the author, will be briefly reviewed. Two of these 
are qualitative studies. Alt et al. (1991, 1992, 1994)126 focused on workers' attitudes to 
transformation of workplace relations and companies' social policies ("Sozialpolitik")127 
and investigated "individualism" amongst the workforce. Lungwitz (1994a)128 interviewed 
130 employees (including 70 blue collars) on a variety of issues (e.g. attitudes to the 
market economy or to the former work "collective"), but did not explicitly look at people's 
reactions to organisational changes. More useful for our research are the two quantitative 
studies, Andretta et al. (1994)129 and Heering and Schroeder (1992)130, which will be
12^ Based on three intensive case studies of companies of the metal and steel industry in Saxony 
comprising open interviews (single and group) of 44 people (managers, white and blue collar workers) 
during 1992/1993.
127 Referring to the socialist firms' duties regarding the social welfare o f their employees (e.g. 
kindergarden, holiday places, doctors, leisure facilities...).
128 The qualitative interviews took place in four companies of the automobile industry during 1991 and 
1993, and are part of Mickler et al.'s project (e.g. 1992). No more details about the type of interviews are 
published.
129 Semi-structured interviews with 84 employees in four companies in the metal and chemical industry 
(two green-field sites, one Treuhand owned, one privatised); this study is part of a large project at the SOFT 
institute, Gottingen, with a panel survey o f 600 white and blue collars in training workshops on their 
views of re-training activities and on their perception and handling of the transformation as such.
!30 Quantitative survey: seven companies of various industrial sectors (metal, electro, chemical) around 
Dresden with questionnaires to the management and workforce (273 people, return rate 47.9%) in 
1990/1991.
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briefly outlined here and further discussed when analysing the workforce questionnaires in 
chapter 8 and 9. Andretta et al. retrospectively examined general job satisfaction as 
compared to former times. They found that 44% of the sample (66% for the privatised 
firm) were more satisfied after Unification, 27% were less satisfied and that for 29% there 
was no difference. Dissatisfaction with the pay-performance relation was high in all 
investigated firms (p. 13). Andretta et al. further concluded that the majority of workers 
had great problems in adapting to the changing "organisational life" and especially to the 
new work requirements. This is partly because it is difficult to change old work habits and 
attitudes (e.g. they observed the continued extensive incidence of breaks), and partly 
because of the new requirements which are perceived as being too high and often 
contradictory: e.g. simultaneous demands for efficiency and quality.
Heering and Schroeder (1992) investigated perceptions of the working conditions, 
of company restructuring, of work motivation, and of general attitudes towards 
unification. They found a highly motivated workforce, whose relationship to management 
was however less clear. On the one side a majority (61%) stated a positive general attitude 
towards management, but only 40% were persuaded of management's capacity to 
modernize the firm (p. 75).
In sum, both studies - although investigating slightly different issues - come up 
with a mixed picture of positive and negative attitudes towards the organisational changes.
(ii) Workers' attitudes towards the works council
The major argument of the few studies investigating this issue is that workers are 
disillusioned about the effectiveness of the works council in representing their interests. An 
obvious example is that of mass redundancies, which the East German works councils 
typically did not resist. Lippold et al. (1992:88)131 argue that earlier on (1989/90) workers 
were easily mobilised into collective action, but that when job reductions started they 
became disappointed about the limited power of the works council and their increasingly
As mentioned before the empirical basis is that of interviews with union officials, works councillors 
and managers.
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subservient "co-management" role. There is also the widespread feeling of being 
increasingly excluded from management and works council decision-making, which makes 
the workforce retreat into individual survival strategies. Similarly, Andretta et al. (1994:13) 
observed in their sample that workers increasingly perceived their chances of realising their 
interests in the enterprise as low. Thus, only 12% of the sample totally agreed that "you 
can achieve your interests in the company quite well"; nearly the same amount (8%) agreed 
to the same question which related to the interest representation in the old socialist firm. 
They conclude that these new interest institutions have not yet achieved a significant 
change in these people's minds. Mahnkopf (1991:280pp) speculates that there is a general 
feeling that "co-management" resembles the old "triumvirat" negotiations — which evokes 
the perception that nothing has changed at all. That is, the works council often tries to be 
accepted by management as a reliable partner in difficult times instead of trying to gain trust 
and support among the workforce — without acknowledging that its power rests on this 
support, and that without it, management will not continue to accept them. The previously 
mentioned argument of the Berlin/Gottingen group (e.g. Jander and Lutz 1993) that works 
councils as an imported western institution have no legitimacy on the shopfloor, since they 
do not derive from any worker-led social movement at shopfloor level, is related to this.
Overall, the authors conclude that these problems result in a de-solidarisation 
within the workforce and a low commitment to the works council (e.g. Lippold et al. 
1992:92; Spangenberg 1993:20). However, other sources report different, more positive 
results. For example, Mickler et al. (1992:17) found that in their sample works councils 
got more trust from the workforce than the union did. And the above mentioned study of 
Heering and Schroeder (1992:80) found that 76% of their sample had a positive attitude 
towards their works council and 71% towards the union (the precise question is 
unfortunately not published). Furthermore the large-scale survey, DGB Trendbarometer 
(IFEP 1994) which surveys a representative sample of the working population (employed 
and unemployed) every other year (since 1992 in the East and West), on their attitudes 
towards unions, shows that a majority of East German employees value the works 
councils' work in 1994, slightly more than in 1992, although they were still more critical
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than in the West: in 1994 32% of East Germans valued the work (46% West Germans), 
30% marked it negatively (25%).
The different findings might be partly due to the methodology used, i.e. the use of 
often vague, too general questions. Andretta et ah for example asked only the above 
quoted question on interest representation, which only says something indirectly about the 
works council. Lippold et al. based their statements on interviews with the institutional 
actors only. And Heering and Schroeder asked vague questions (e.g. "positive attitude 
towards the works council"). Thus, it seems useful to examine workers' perceptions of 
works councils in more detail, thus for example to focus on possible differences between 
workers' attitudes and their behaviour towards the works council. They might evaluate the 
works council's work critically, but still support it.
(iii) Workers' attitudes towards the union
Similarly, the relationship between the western unions and their members in the East is 
perceived as problematic. East German union members are declining in numbers and are 
generally seen as passive, individualistic, apathetic and having little interest in the union 
(e.g. Gut et al. 1993:50; Eidam and Oswald 1993:167; Fichter 1996:16; Zech 1993:28). 
As mentioned in chapter 1, there are virtually no specific empirical or theoretical studies on 
union members' attitudes and behaviour in East Germany during the current 
transformation. However, there are some accounts in the literature which will be briefly 
reviewed: some theoretical notions as to why East Germans joined the new western unions 
in 1990; and a few large scale attitudinal surveys with some questions on participation and 
other issues of union membership.
Reasons for joining the West German unions
With regard to the reasons for "joining" the western unions in 1990 most academics argue 
that people demonstrated a highly instrumental decision-making approach. For example,
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Mahnkopf (1992:35) proposed132 that most members who joined the new unions after 
1989 did so because the western unions were seen as highly successful and professional 
and because of the (selective) incentives, such as strike pay and legal advice (also Fichter 
1994:56). Heidenreich (1991) adds that western unions were seen as belonging to the 
"successful" German model of industrial relations, and are even accepted by the successful 
western companies, which meant that the future economic prosperity might not be much at 
risk by having unions. Besides, they also symbolized successful interest representation 
(also Hildebrandt 1990:102). Thus, the East German workforce did not want any different 
development to West Germany but to take over that western "success" system. In addition, 
KreiBig (1990b: 2)133 argued that the major reason for workers to join the new unions was 
to achieve security against the arbitrariness of employers and the impending job losses. 
However, Zech (1993:28) gave an example of the GEW (Gewerkschaft fur Erziehung und 
Wissenschaft), union for teachers and academics, where West German union officials 
working in the East declared that East Germans just joined "out of habit" and now ask 
what the union is doing for them, thus prevailing a "consumption-oriented" attitude 
towards their membership.
Two points can be concluded: firstly, it seems that the overwhelming rejection of 
the FDGB had no bearing on people's acceptance of the new unions; and secondly, most 
members joined out of instrumental reasons. It has to be emphasized that none of these 
statements are backed up with direct evidence, if at all they are based on second-hand data 
(i.e. interviews with union officials rather than with the membership/workforce). 
Furthermore, even if joining was a conscious instrumental decision, and even if people 
were also instrumental in their decision to participate in collective action, it does not 
necessarily lead to "low participation" in further collective activities. Finally, the authors 
are not explicit as to what they mean by an "instrumental approach" and what the converse 
would be.
132 Based on her interviews with union officials, as mentioned before (chapter 3, footnote 48).
133 KreiBig belongs to the WISOC research group, his arguments here are based on a survey of employees 
in companies in the area of Chemnitz in early 1990. Unfortunately no further details are provided.
115
Various issues of union membership
There are various statements about union membership in discussion of the problems West 
German unions face in the East. The common argument is, as mentioned before, that union 
members are passive, individualistic and instrumental and thus reluctant to support 
collective activities. However, these statements have not been tested explicitly. There are 
only a few large-scale attitude surveys, comparing the West and East German population, 
which contain some measurement of union participation and attitudes towards unions. For 
example, a well-known large scale study134 on the East German population, "Sozialreport" 
(Winkler 1992:288) showed a decreasing willingness to participate in voluntary institutions 
such as political parties or unions (also Sozialreport 1993:27). However, they base this 
interpretation on declining union membership figures, rather than on any direct 
measurement of willingness to participate. There are four other surveys (WeBels, IPOS, 
Heering and Schroeder, and the DGB Trendbarometer) which incorporate some 
measurement and these will be briefly reported. WeBels (1992:16) used secondary panel 
data135 to compare peoples' attitudes towards public institutions (political parties, 
occupational associations, unions, churches, environmental movements etc.) in West and 
East Germany. There were two questions on participation in union activities and two 
broader ones:
table 5.1: people's attitudes towards public institutions: selected questions from WeBels (1992:7)
a) how often have you recently joined events (meetings etc.) of unions, religious groups, 
occupational-, industrial-, social associations?
% o f  participation in union activity: (sometimes or often)
East Germany: 34% (rank 5 out of 5) (East average of all organisations = 40%)
West Germany: 26% (rank 4 out of 5) (West average of all organisations = 32%)
__________________________________ (highest rank = 1., lowest rank = 5.)__________________________
134 This is based on yearly representative surveys of the East German population on their social situation, 
living and working conditions, and of people's way of thinking, attitudes and behaviour changes.
!35 Wahlpanel, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 1990: representative sample of adults in West and East 
Germany; Eurobarometer study no 34, WZB Berlin: representative sample of adults in West and East, 1990
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b) have you recently read publications of your own organisation (e.g. union)?
% o f  yes answers:
East Germany: 61% (rank 3 out of 5) (East average of all organisations = 58%)
West Germany:__________82% (rank 3 out of 5) (West average of all organisations = 82%)
c) do the following organisations (whether you are a member or not) represent your interests?
d) which of those organisations is the most important for you personally?
East Germany West Germany
(%) (%)
I feel represented most important I feel represented most important
organisation organisation
unions 68.4 35.1 (i) 48.1 14.0 (2)
environmental groups 80.1 12.8 (2) 75.1 27.5 (1)
protestant church 22.1 5.4 (3) 23.9 2.6 (6)
civil movement 64.1 4.9 (4) 59.2 4.8 (4)
womens groups 33.3 2.4 (5) 37.1 4.2 (5)
catholic church 8.1 1.8 (6) 26.3 9.1 (3)
employer associations 16.0 1.0 (7) 25.1 1.0 (7)
In sum, participation in union activities got the lowest rank in East Germany (the
participation rate was found in occupational organisations with 68%), but was slightly 
higher than in the West. Reading union journals was however a less appealing activity in 
the East than in the West (although this might perhaps be due to fewer publications being 
distributed in the East). On the other side, unions represented most people’s interests in 
East Germany (second only to the environmental groups), which is higher than in the 
West, and were also voted as the most important organisations. Obviously this is partly 
due to the devastating labour market situation136 being one of the most important issues 
which concerns the East German population (see population polls, WeBels 1992:8).
In short, the picture seems quite favourable for the unions. Other representative 
population surveys come up with similar findings. The Mannheimer Institute for Applied 
Social Science Research (IPOS) found that the East German population trusts unions (after 
the judiciary) more than they trust parliament, the police, the media, the government or 
political parties (Handelsblatt no 22, 2.2.1993, p.6). However, comparing the results of
136 See also chapter 4.
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1991 and 1992 the degree of trust is diminishing. Yet, trust in unions in the East was 
higher than in the West in both years (Gabriel 1993:9). The already mentioned study of 
Heering and Schroeder (1992) found an acceptance of the unions in their sample (71%). 
Unfortunately, the questionnaire design is not published.
The DGB Trendbarometer (IFEP 1994) is more negative. The overall conclusion is 
that union commitment (identity) and engagement is decreasing in both the West and East. 
Four examples are given. Firstly, regarding people's general expectations of unions in 
1992, a majority of East Germans did not see their expectations fulfilled; in 1994 the 
figures were more positive and there is a growing similarity between the East and the West 
(the majority is happy). Secondly, regarding the general evaluation of unions' 
achievements since the "Wende" (turn around) West and East Germans were more critical 
in 1994 than in 1992: 49% of the total German membership were critical, 28% were more 
positive (1992: 42% bad, 36% good).137 Thirdly, 54% of East Germans considered 
leaving their union in 1994, which was more than in the West (42%), but slightly less than 
two years previously, 59% (41%). Finally, there is the question as to whether people saw 
themselves as active union members: in 1994 20% of West and East Germans declared 
themselves active, in 1992 this figure was 27% (more East than West Germans then). This 
survey provides the most comprehensive data available, yet not all data is published, and 
questions are sometimes quite vague (e.g. with regard to general expectations of the 
unions).
Summing up this section (5.2) of current attitudes of the East German workforce the 
literature basically suggests that workers are dissatisfied with certain changes in their work 
environment, are disappointed about the works councils' effectiveness in representing 
successfully workers' interests, joined the unions out of instrumental reasons, regard the 
union as an important organisation and participate in certain collective activities more than 
their West German colleagues. However, there are methodological problems in some
137 No differentiated figures for West and East are available.
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studies, explanations for their findings are rare and in addition they do not provide a 
comprehensive picture of workers' views of all major aspects of workplace relations.
The membership surveys revealed two broad tendencies. Firstly, the East is 
adjusting to the West, and secondly the union is seen as a very important organisation 
especially in the East, even if perceptions of the unions' achievements are critical and 
participation with regard to the asked issues is low (but higher in East than in West). 
Unfortunately, these studies do not provide us with explanations for these findings. They 
have also not investigated the "institutionalisation" from a workers' viewpoint or the 
hypothesis of "the passive, individualistic union member" in detail. Only WeBels' survey 
provided a first indicator that workers accept and trust the new interest institutions, and his 
question about whether people went to union events and read union publications indicated 
the excessive simplicity of the proposition of "passive union members in East Germany" 
and the need for more detailed research.
Other authors however do propose significant passive behaviour with regard to 
collective activities on the part of workers and offer some theoretical explanation but with 
little empirical work or without referring to the above discussed studies. They will be 
briefly outlined in the next section.
5 .3  Explanations of workers' reluctance to participate in collective 
activities
The explanations which exist in the literature are of a theoretical nature only and can be 
summarized in five statements: (i) "there is a legacy of the former passivity of workers",
(ii) "collective action is not perceived as effective in pursuing workers' interests", (iii) 
"unions are not regarded as effective in representing workers' interests", (iv) "workers 
have no moral commitment to the union", and (v) "workers are becoming individualistic".
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(i) "there is a legacy of the former passivity of workers"
Most authors refer to socialist socialisation (and thus to a specific East German 
"mentality"138) and try to find psychological explanations for the supposed continuing 
passive behaviour (e.g. Belwe 1991, 1992; Hofmann and Rink 1993; Marz 1993; Pollack 
1991; Schobel 1993; Stratemann 1993; Woderich 1992). In essence this literature assumes 
specific characteristics of the East German personality in comparison to that of West 
Germans (e.g. East Germans put more emphasis on "order" and stick to their principles, 
they are more norm-oriented, more reliable, have their behaviour more under control, are 
less open, less flexible and autonomous, e.g. Becker 1993:24). The key thesis with regard 
to the unions is that the socialist system of paternalistic "caring and social security" ("from 
the cradle to the grave" or "custodial state", Henrich 1989), i.e. the bureaucratic 
paternalism of the enterprises (Deppe and HoB 1989) had psychological consequences 
which reduced individual activism and involvement in former times and today also (e.g. 
Marz 1993b:78). For example, Mahnkopf (1991:278) regards self-confidence, self­
responsibility, personal initiative, or pro-activity as virtues which the socialist system 
sanctioned negatively. She argues that the formerly common state/institution-oriented way 
of thinking ("staatsglaubig", i.e. "union is in charge...") has not yet vanished, but has 
expanded to include expectations about the government ("Kohl promised us...") and 
politics in general (also Heidenreich 1991). KreiBig (1990) adds that the common (and 
official) thinking in categories of the "community" ("Gemeinschaft") in former times, 
which prohibited the classical conflicts of distribution ("Verteilungskonflikt"), and the fact 
that the enterprises belonged to all and therefore nobody really felt responsible, is a legacy 
which now hinders union members' mobilization. Furthermore there is the observation that 
the East German workforce regards the market economic system as intrinsically "rational" 
and therefore one which takes their interests into account automatically, thus implying that 
individual activity is not necessary (Mahnkopf 1991:278; Kem and Lang 1991).
138 Others speak of a "socialist mentality", "captive mind" or "homo sovieticus" (Milosz 1953; Sztompka 
1993:245).
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Overall, a correlation between former socialisation and the assumed passive attitudes and 
behaviour of today might at first sight seem plausible. Convincing evidence however is 
more difficult to provide. Ideally it requires an examination of the impact of the former 
socialisation processes on people's current behaviour and attitudes. Thus, one would need 
to show that current behavioural patterns are due to the former socialisation (and thus due 
to specific East German mentalities), and not due to the possible structural constraints in 
today's environment.
(ii) ’’collective action is not perceived as effective in pursuing workers'
interests”
Some authors explain that workers' passivity is due to the current economic recession. 
This relates to the well-known, but ever-simple argument that collective action is lower in 
recession than in boom periods. For example, Augustin and Sprenger (1992:38) argue that 
people in general are afraid to make use of their "freedom of speech" at their workplace, 
because they fear being sacked (also Kurbjuhn and Fichter 1993:39; Lippold et al. 1992). 
Lippold et al. quote: "when one employer announced at the company assembly that out of 
the existing 94 employees only 30 will stay, there was a deathly silence — nobody stood 
up to say anything, everybody was sitting there hoping that by not attracting any attention 
he/she would be one of the 30" (p.36). Their perception of the instrumentality of collective 
action was similar: "striking only makes sense if you can refuse to work and damage the 
employer, but in our situation we don't damage the employer, because there is no work 
anyway" (p.37).
However, the instrumental approach to collective action is taken for granted and not 
further discussed. One might ask whether the authors regard this as an universal approach 
or do they see it as a specific legacy of the former instrumental attitudes to the FDGB. The 
latter argument is developed by Klinzing (1992:20)139 who proposes that workers had an 
entirely consumption-oriented, cost-benefit approach to the former trade union, which
Based on documentary and statistical material of the DGB unions, literature review, and personal 
interviews with union officials in the East.
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continues today. Thus, in the light of the current depressed labour market situation, the 
perceived costs of participation are just too high. There is unfortunately insufficient data on 
workers' former atttitudes to the FDGB (see section 5.1) to sustain this assumption.
Another "structural" argument, which is sometimes emphasized, is that of company 
size. Most East German industries now consist of small or medium firms, the workplace 
relations in which could be more paternalistic and company-focused than in large 
companies, and thus collective action is less dominant (Lippold et al. 1992:99).
(iii) "unions and works councils are not regarded as effective in
representing workers' interests"
It is suggested that East Germans still expect the trade union to fulfill the holistic caring 
role of former times and are now disappointed about the limited service which the West 
German unions provide (e.g. David 1992:133). For example, they are disappointed about 
the closure of the former "help lines" of the union which absorbed complaints and 
proposals, and in the event of legal difficulties or conflicts of interest, the union officials 
sprang more or less automatically into action with a phone call (Mahnkopf 1993:17). 
Mahnkopf argues (again on her rather limited empirical basis as outlined in chapter 3) that 
East Germans therefore have an even higher expectation of unions as pure service and 
insurance institutions than their western colleagues. Furthermore, because the (West) 
German unions provide fewer social services than the FDGB did, and also maintain a 
lower profile on the shop floor (e.g. no union stewards), wage agreements emerge as the 
primary and most tangible union "service" to the East German worker (Mahnkopf 
1993:14). As unions are currently not seen to be doing well in pay bargaining, there is a 
strong disappointment among their members.
A different argument is that people were highly disappointed by the former "farce 
of interest representation" of the socialist unions and so continue to have a sceptical, 
disillusioned image of the union (e.g. Bialas and Ettl 1993:72; Eidam and Oswald 
1993:167). For example, Klinzing (1992) proposes that today's union members often elect 
their union officials/ stewards in order to relieve themselves of any activity. She interprets
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this passivity and wait-and-see attitude of members as an alienation from the union which 
she believes will take a long time to overcome. Moreover, if all FDGB members were 
indeed highly dissappointed than they surely did not join the new unions. With the massive 
numbers of East Germans who joined the new unions in 1990 one has wonder how 
dissappointed these members have really been.
(iv) "workers have no moral commitment to the union"
Workers have no "moral" relationship to the union, they do not identify with union politics 
and are therefore not willing to become active (e.g. Fichter 1994:56). Fichter adds that 
examples of strong membership identification are only available where members have 
actively participated in conflict situations (e.g. mining strike in Bischofferode 1993 or the 
metal strike 1993). Three reasons for workers' lack of union identity are mentioned.
Firstly, there is the argument that due to the centrality of the workplace in socialist 
times (see 5.1) workers still identify strongly with their enterprise and management and 
therefore do not commit themselves to the union. Gensior (1992) for example found in her 
survey140 that employees had a strong emotional link to their company (also Dathe and 
Schreiber 1993:10; Ruppert 1994:284). According to Lippold et al. (1992:95) the high 
incidence of company identity (i.e. perception of "we are the owners", 
"EigentiimerbewuBtsein") is still observable today which fosters, in her opinion, company 
loyalty and lowers the conflict potential in the workforce. Yet, there are other authors who 
claim that company identity has not existed since the 1970s in the GDR (due to 
generational changes and the obvious official neglect of the factories' working conditions) 
(Hofmann and Rink 1993:33), and if at all is now decreasing as a response to the 
organisational changes, especially to the redundancies. However, these are assertions 
without evidence. For example, it would be necessary to investigate what kind of 
organisational identity or commitment did exist in former times (i.e. to the company as 
such, to the management, department, work collective, see Guest et al. 1993).
140 Postal questionnaire to female employees o f 115 companies o f 16 industrial sectors, 675 
questionnaires were returned (45%).
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Furthermore, it is not evident why company and union commitment cannot co-exist (see 
the literature on dual commitment, e.g. Guest and Dewe 1991).
The second argument is that union members were not morally affiliated to the 
FDGB and have insufficient experience of being a member of a truely voluntary 
organisation, i.e. a social movement. In former times the union functioned as a department 
of the state, today the union only functions and has power through the support of its 
members. Thus, the new union members are not prepared for "solidaristic actions, open 
conflicts or for thinking in legally defined rights, demands and duties in the dual system of 
industrial relations" (Mahnkopf 1991:279, 1993:16). They are not familiar with the role of 
unions and duties of their members in the West (e.g. Heidenreich 1991)141. Another 
author, Klinzing (1992:20) relates this to the prevalence of the old consumerist attitude 
towards the union. Thus, the West German unions might need some time to get members 
"morally" and emotionally involved with their organisation. However, the question is thhat 
of whether the existing instrumental attitudes and union identity can co-exist.
Thirdly, and related, is the proposition of the wider lack of democratic values and 
attitudes in the East German population (e.g. Jander et al. 1990, 1991). Heidenreich 
(1991:33) takes workers' passivity during the peaceful revolution in 1989 as an indicator 
of the East Germans' apathetic attitude towards the fate of the labour movement. Also after 
the turnaround there was little movement within the firms to establish more democratic 
work organisation in terms of self-management (see chapter 3). This attitude is well 
described in the following quote: "better to earn 3000 DM per month and be exploited than 
800 East Mark and participate (mitregieren)" (worker quoted in Hamburger Abendblatt, 
5.2.1990). The suggestion is that there is no identification with the ideas of the labour 
movement or with industrial democracy and therefore no interest in collective action. 
However, it is debatable as to whether a general belief in the goals of the labour movement 
is really a necessary precondition for identification with the union or for collective 
participation.
On the basis o f his empirical study, see chapter 3.
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(v) "workers are becoming individualistic"
Lastly, the argument is that workers became (more) individualistic during the 
transformation process, which also diminished their commitment to the unions (e.g. 
Pollock 1991:280). For example, they might now prefer individualistic to collective 
actions. A representative opinion poll of the East German population (Allenbach-Umfrage, 
FAZ 13.4.1994) shows that "the solidarity among people" is perceived by 87% of their 
sample as decreasing. This for many authors also seems visible at workplace level: East 
Germans have experienced an individualisation and de-solidarisation process in their 
working lives (e.g. Alt et al. e.g. 1994; Holst 1991; Hofmann and Rink 1993).
With regard to the explanation of the individualisation process in East Germany 
some authors argue that the people experienced the Unification and its consequences as a 
colonisation by West Germany and a forced intervention into their lives rather than 
something which resulted from their own initiative (Senghaas-Knobloch 1992:195). There 
is also the more abstract thesis that individualism is an inevitable consequence of the 
modernization processes in post-socialist societies (e.g. Pollock 1991:280; Zapf 1992). 
This argument is not without critics. Some authors indicate that the GDR as well as other 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe experienced a modernization and individualisation 
process in the last decade, which was sometimes even more dramatic than that in the West 
(e.g. Engler 1993:195).
Another argument, which puts the blame neither on the Unification process as such 
nor on general modernization processes, states that the rapid transformation resulted 
(inevitably) in high disorientation and insecurity in dealing with the new situation, a 
sudden and complete loss of formerly secure and stable personal and professional identities 
(i.e. who they were before, who they are now), material and social positions, and 
ideological beliefs (see Drawert 1993; Ehses 1993:132; Kurbjuhn and Fichter 1993:40; 
Marz 1992; Maaz 1991; Rottenburg 1992). There is a vast literature on the socio- 
psychological problems that people in general, and employees in particular, face during the 
turbulent times of societal transformation with regard to their norms, values, convictions, 
mentalities, identities, traditional behavioural patterns etc. (especially Marz 1993; also
Becker 1992; Brahler and Geyer 1995; Brahler and Richter 1995; Gensior 1992; Hofmann 
and Rink 1993; Holst 1991; Maaz 1990; Marz 1992; Rottenburg 1992; Senghaas- 
Knobloch 1992; Trommsdorff 1994; Woderich 1992). Some authors emphasize a 
widespread "identity crisis" (e.g. Belwe 1992; Maaz 1991; Rottenburg 1992). For 
example, Andretta et al. (1994:1) emphasize that workers have experienced a decline in 
their status in society: "I am a worker - who is less?" is the now more appropriate version 
of the socialist slogan "I am a worker - who is more?" (Nethofel 1993:190; see also Berger 
1993). Alt et al. (1994) who present what is currently the most comprehensive study in 
this area, propose that this process of individualisation has different characteristics from 
those in the advanced capitalist societies. They argue that the liberation of the repressive 
patronizing of the state in all spheres of life goes hand in hand with the dissolution of 
paternalistic caring and social safety nets and leads therefore to a state of extremely high 
uncertainty and insecurity. A general de-solidarisation is seen as a common individual 
reaction (also Andretta et al. 1994:110). Unfortunately, it is not specified whether workers 
de-solidarize for example with their colleagues, and/or with their company, and/or with 
their union. There is some evidence that for example the old solidarity within the work 
groups has broken down (Senghaas-Knobloch 92:298; Spangenberg 1993:20; Rottenburg 
1991).
When evaluating research on "individualisation" one should keep in mind that this 
is work in progress. After a period of six years of unification final results cannot yet be 
expected (also Dathe and Schreiber 1993:3). However, the literature would benefit from a 
more precise definition of individualisation, in terms of workers' attitudes and behaviour. 
In addition, it is still not evident why the supposed "identity crisis" necessarily leads to 
individualisation. Another unclear point is whether this individualisation of East Germans 
is synonymous with the adaptation of West German "mentalities".
Overall, this section presented a variety of different propositions which tried to explain 
current workers and union members' supposed passive behaviour regarding the new West 
German unions. However, "passivity" is never properly defined in this literature (with 
regard to decisions to join, to participate in collective activities, or to act individually), nor
126
do these studies explain the link between certain attitudes (such as instrumentality) and the 
passive behaviour. Furthermore, they do not examine any possible interrelations between 
the explanations. Thus, is there any relationship, and if so of what sort, between 
"individualisation" and "instrumentality", and "union identity"? For example, are 
individualistic workers necessarily instrumental with regard to the union?
This study attempts to address these issues in a more structured way by utilizing a 
theoretical framework and by testing the propositions empirically. "Individualisation" is 
seen as the generic hypothesis in this discussion and thus should be defined in more detail. 
The following paragraph will briefly describe its meaning in the German sociological 
literature.142
5 .4  Individualisation
Beck, one of the leading German academics of the sociology of modernism, defines 
individualisation as "specific biographical aspects of the civilisation process" (1986:206). 
He analyses three dimensions. The first dimension refers to the release of historically given 
social living forms and relations (e.g. the dissolution of traditional power/control systems) 
which leads to increasing responsibilities and competences for the individual and to 
"emancipation" ("Freisetzungsdimension"). Beck gives three examples: the disolution or 
pluralisation of social classes ("the disolution of the proletarian milieu", Mooser 1983), 
especially with regard to their re-production habits; the changing social and economic 
position of women; and the flexibilisation of working time and the decentralisation of 
working location (e.g. mobility). The second dimension refers to the loss of traditional 
securities, unquestioned norms and beliefs, thus "loss of stability" ("Entzauberungs- 
dimension"). The third dimension refers to the new control mechanisms as a form of social 
re-integration ("Kontroll-bzw. Reintegrationsdimension"). For example, the individual 
looses its traditional social bindings (e.g. social class or traditional family) but at the same
142 x iiiS literature is different to the more empirically oriented, psychological literature of 
individualism/collectivism which provides highly developed, complex measures of the two constructs (e.g. 
Hofstede 1980; Triandis 1994; Triandis et al. 1988).
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time is forced into new controls and norms by new intermediary institutions (e.g. labour 
market requirements, standardisations of the "consumer society").
In addition to these three (horizontal) dimensions Beck outlines two (vertical) 
dimensions: the objective living situation ("objektive Lebenslage") and the subjective 
consciousness/identity ("subjektives BewuBtsein: Identitat/Personwerdung"). The result is 
an a-historical model of "individualisation" which is presented in the six-field grid (see 
table 5.2), incorporating all different dimensions of individualisation. According to Beck 
one frequent misunderstanding is that individualism is equated with the top right field only.
table 5.2: Beck's dimensions of individualisation (source: Beck 1986: 207)
Individualisation
Living conditions 
(objective)
Consciousness/ self- 
identity (subjective)
Emancipation
Loss of stability
Form of control
How could this concept be applied to the East German situation? Firstly, one could argue 
that with regard to the horizontal dimensions the third dimension, control and reintegration, 
has not yet been established in East Germany and therefore one could speak more of an 
alienation than of an individualisation process. Thus, we might have observed an 
"emancipation" of the East German population from their socialist, dictatorial regime, and 
we have also seen the tremendous "loss of stability" is all parts of peoples lives. In 
addition, new control mechanisms and regulations have been introduced (transferred from 
the West), but one might argue that they have not yet managed to re-integrate people into 
the new society.
Furthermore, the vertical division allows us to propose that an individualisation of 
the "objective situation" of the workforce (e.g. job insecurity) has happened, but that this 
is not necessarily accompanied by an individualisation of their "identities" (e.g. 
identification with the union). Thus, the table suggests that the process of individualisation
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has not yet finished, indeed it questions whether at this stage one can speak of an 
individualisation at all. For example, is it not necessary to observe decreasing social 
"identities" in order to talk of individualisation? Beck unfortunately does not outline the 
possible dependencies and interrelations of the variables. Implicitly however he argues that 
only if the two bottom fields are realized can one speak of an "individualised" social entity.
To conclude, the complexity of Beck's definition sheds doubts on the widespread and 
simplified use of this concept in the debate on the transforming East German workforce. 
Going a step further one can elaborate on Beck's "consciousness" dimension and create 
two sub-categories, attitudes and behaviour. Thus, we may observe an increasing 
individualisation of behavioural patterns, but not necessarily of attitudes. Both categories 
should be therefore kept theoretically and empirically separate. The literature on 
"individualisation" in East Germany discussed above does not distinguish between these 
concepts. In contrast, the argument of this study would be that as long as one can observe 
only individualised behaviours the thesis of the complete individualisation of the East 
German workforce cannot be sustained.
It is proposed that one way of analysing workers' possible individualisation tendencies is 
to focus on their attitudes and behaviour towards their interest institutions, in particular 
with regard to their participation in collective activities. Thus, individualisation will be 
conceptualised as a generic term and divided into "individualistic" attitudes and 
"individualistic" behaviour.
As presented in table 5.3 "individualistic" attitudes of workers will be characterized 
by a number of dimensions, without determining which might be necessary or sufficient 
dimensions. It is rather a preliminary list of various attitudes which will be further 
discussed in the following chapters. The dimensions characterize the variables of the 
workforce surveys which are introduced in the next chapter. Possible interrelations 
between the variables will be investigated in Part 4. "Individualistic behaviour" of workers 
will be characterized by a low willingness to participate in collective activities.
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In sum, this differentiation enables us to transcend the very general debate about the rise of 
individualism and to think much more precisely about different facets of collectivism and 
individualism. It also enables us to recognize that there may be disjunctures between the 
different facets of collectivism, so that, for example, the absense of collective activities in a 
particular workplace in and of itself tells us nothing about the degree of collectivist attitudes 
or of group identity amongst the workforce (see also Kelly 1996, chp.5:4). In other 
words, people might not show strong willingness to participate in collective activities, but 
might still have strong collectivist attitudes. The latter might be seen as partially leading to 
the former in the future if conditions change.
table 5.3: dimensions of "collectivism" and "individualism"
dimensions "collectivism" "individualism"
behaviour active behaviour: strong willingness 
to participate in collective activities
passive behaviour: low willingness to 
participate in collective activities
attitudes perceived strong instrumentality of 
interest institutions + coll. activities
perceived low instrumentality of 
interest institutions + coll. activities
union identity no union identity
workgroup identity no workgroup identity
them-and-us feelings no them-and-us feelings
interest in collective issues no interest in collective issues
general collectivist attitudes general individualistic attitudes
"collective" approach to collective 
participation: union identity = major 
antecedent
instrumental approach to collective 
participation: instrumentality of 
institutions/collective activities = 
major antecedents
Conclusion of Chapter 5
In sum, this chapter provided an overview of the existing accounts of workers' attitudes 
and behaviour towards the transformation of industrial and workplace relations. It revealed
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various shortcomings in the literature and in particular a lack of empirical evidence and 
theoretical underpinnings. The major hypothesis which evolved is that of the 
individualisation of the East German workforce, which has to be tested in terms of the 
various attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of individualisation.
Including Part 1 of this study, our debate has now identified the two main themes 
which have to be examined in more detail in the workforce surveys to follow: The first 
topic is works council/union - workforce relations from the viewpoint of the workforce 
and hereby as one major theme the institutionalisation of the interest institutions (see Part 
1): thus are unions and works councils becoming institutionalised from the workers' point 
of view (i.e. regarding the attitudes and behaviour which indicate workers' acceptance and 
support of the new institutions)?
The second topic is the individualisation of workers (regarding the above 
mentioned dimensions), and one major question will be whether East Germans workers 
become passive and instrumental regarding collective activities. The two topics are 
interrelated, in that individualism might have an impact on the institutionalisation and 
functioning of the interest representation. Thus, one could argue that individualistic 
workers will be less likely to accept the works council and the union as their 
representatives. The next chapter will provide us with the analytical categories to approach 
these issues in a more systematic way.
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Chapter 6 Explaining participation in collective activities
This chapter reviews the literature on workers' participation in a variety of forms of 
collective activities. It focuses on four social psychological theories, which will be tested in 
this study: the more traditional frustration-aggression theory and the theories of rational 
choice, social identity, and "micro-mobilization".
The chapter has two purposes. It provides firstly the analytical tools to examine 
workers’ perceptions and reactions of the transforming workplaces and interest institutions 
(see Part 3). Placing the discussion of workers' attitudes and behaviour in a theoretical 
framework is especially welcomed given the absence of theoretical concepts in most 
existing discussions of the workplace transformation in East Germany (see chapter 5).
Secondly, the reviewed theories provide alternative explanations for people's 
behaviour towards collective activities, thus who participates and why. Investigating 
people's inclination to collective participation contributes to the question whether East 
German workers are becoming "individualistic" (is the supposed passivity of workers 
reflected in a highly instrumental decision-making process?). Moreover, the theories' 
cross-cultural applicability is tested (the theories have been primarily developed and tested 
in an anglo-saxon setting). Thus, one may investigate which theories are significant 
predictors of participation, and whether East German workers show significantly different 
participation patterns than those known in western studies.
The chapter starts with defining "participation" and provides an overview of the 
variety of existing theories of participation (6.1). It briefly reviews some traditional 
theories (6.2), and then focuses on the three recent social psychological theories (6.3). The 
chapter finishes with some remarks concerning the applicability of these theories.
6.1  Theories of participation: overview
There is no common definition or measure of participation in collective activities. Most 
studies tend to focus on a number of quantifiable indices of union member participation,
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such as attending meetings, voting in a union election, filing grievances, reading union 
literature, holding union office and participating in industrial action. Unions are defined 
with regard to their nature as social movements (i.e. labour movement). Thus they are seen 
as membership organisations which generate particular sets of beliefs and to which 
members feel an attachment (see Tilly 1978:9).
There is no substantial literature on the participation in works council activities 
(which is not a research topic either in the German or Anglo-saxon literature). It shall be 
presumed, however, that the theories of union participation can also be applied, perhaps 
with certain amendments, to other collective activities such as those initiated by the works 
council. It should be remembered that works councils and unions are not competing 
institutions with regard to workers' commitment, but have their clearly defined and 
complementary areas of activities. In addition, most works councillors are also active 
union members.
There is also no agreement on the differences between union action, industrial 
action, collective action or collective activities. "Collective activities" will be used as the 
generic term to describe all activities initiated by a group of workers, a union or a works 
council. Collective or industrial action is then just one specific form of activity, which 
typically takes a more militant form.
Participation in union activities emerged first as a major research topic in the U.S. 
in the 1960s (e.g. Spinrad 1960; Tannenbaum 1965; Anderson 1978), and later in the UK 
(e.g. Nicholson et al. 1981), but has never done so in Germany, where union research is 
traditionally biased towards the analysis of institutions.143 The following sections will 
outline the major approaches in the mainly Anglo-Saxon literature to individual willingness 
to participate in collective activities which seek to account for variations in this
143 In Germany there was a stream of work in the 1960s examining union democracy (e.g. Bayer 1979) 
and workers' (class) consciousness in sociological and political terms (e.g. Kern and Schumann 1985; 
Popitz et al. 1957), but membership behaviour or the micro structures of the unionisation process were not 
frequent topics of interest at that time and are still not today. An exception is Nickel's (1972) study of the 
relationship between blue collar workers and union, which comprised several surveys on motives to join or 
leave the union. Even there, the underlying causes of people's decisions were not analysed. There are also a 
few studies in the 1980s on workers' attitudes towards collective interest representation, with particular 
emphasis on the effects of the recession (e.g. INFAS study: Bertl et al. 1989, Feist et al. 1989 and Krieger 
et al. 1989; Prott 1993; Wiedenhofer et al. 1979; Research group "metal strike": Zoll 1979, 1981, 1984) 
and the annual DGB Trendbarometer and its interpretations (e.g. Schreiber 1995 on the IG Metall survey). 
However none of these studies investigate the reasons for peoples' willingness to become active. According 
to Weischer (1993) there exists no other, more recent major studies on union membership in Germany.
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participation. In other words, we will not be concerned with the process of participation or 
on mobilization itself (e.g. Kelly and Nicholson 1980 on the social process of strikes; 
Zurcher and Snow 1981). The literature is similar to the mainly US literature on 
unionisation (voting) and joining decisions (e.g. Barling et al. 1992: chp.3; Block and 
Premarck 1983; Cregan and Johnston 1990; DeCotiis and LeLouam 1981; Hartley 1992; 
Heneman and Sandver 1983; Hills 1985; Premarck and Hunter 1988; Schriesheim 1978; 
van de Vail 1970: chp.4; Zalesny 1985).
Theories of antecedents (or predictors144) of individual participation have been classified 
and discussed in various ways. Barling et al. (1992), in a comprehensive review of 
participation, distinguish between demographic, personality, work-related, union-related, 
non-work related, and structural predictors. Kelly and Nicholson (1980) in a study on 
strikes differentiate between environmental, institutional, sociological and psychological 
factors. Guest and Dewe's (1988) study on why people stay in the union, distinguishes 
between structural factors, job dissatisfaction, frustration, rational choice theory and 
solidarity.
Another group of authors focuses more specifically on social psychological 
theories. Hartley (1992) differentiates between personal and occupational characteristics, 
job attitudes, social and instrumental beliefs (class consciousness and instrumentality of 
unions), and social networks (socialisation). Klandermans (1986b) focuses on 
psychological factors only and deals with frustration-aggression theory, rational choice 
theory and social interaction theory. Finally, Kelly and Kelly (1992) separate individual 
attributes (demographic factors and worker attitudes) and individual decision-making 
(based on expectancy-value theory and social cognition theory).
A broad classification between "traditional" and more recent approaches might be 
useful. The first category comprises macro/ structural explanations, demographic accounts, 
psychological characteristics and workers' attitudes, which will only be briefly reviewed
144 Antecedents are not predictors in a strict sense, i.e. assuming causal inferences, but are only able to 
support diagnostic (attributional) inferences. Strict causal inferences cannot be produced with the type of 
empirical data normally available (e.g. cross-sectional rather than longitudinal).
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(they have been extensively reviewed elsewhere145). The second category focuses on 
social psychological theories dealing with the individual decision-making process. It is this 
second category of theories that this study will mainly focus on.
6 .2  Traditional theories of participation
6.2 .1  Structural approach to participation
This approach emphasizes four external or structural conditions which are said to influence 
the individuals' inclination to collective action: (i) the economic situation, (ii) the size of the 
company, (iii) technology, and (iv) the industrial relations context. The common 
proposition is that people participate in collective activities not because they are 
demographically, psychologically or attitudinally compelled to, but because their structural 
location in the world makes it easier for them to do so (see McAdam et al. 1988:707). In 
other words, it matters little if one is demographically or psychologically disposed towards 
participation if one lacks the structural vehicle to pull one into activity.
The standard argument is that the economic (as indexed by the state of the labour 
market) situation determines union members' behaviour. Thus, in times of economic crisis 
industrial action (e.g. strike rate) is low, whereas in prosperous times it is high (this could 
refer to short-term business cycles or long wave theories) (e.g. Ingham 1974; Kelly 1996a: 
chp. 8; Knowles 1952; Shalev 1983; Shorter and Tilly 1974).
Other authors refer to company size: an increasing size reinforces pro-union 
attitudes since it fragments the work community. For example the emerging social isolation 
in large plants leads to polarisation (the "size-leftism" hypothesis) (see Barling et al. 
1992:116; Dewey et al. 1978:126; George et al. 1977; Ingham 1970; Parkin 1967; Prais 
1977; Revans 1956).
A related argument refers to the organization of technology (e.g. division of labour, 
job interdependencies, work layout) as a crucial determinant of collective action (e.g.
145 See for example Barling et al. (1992); Kelly and Kelly (1992); Klandermans (1986b).
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Sayles 1958; Kuhn 1961). For example, Sayles relates the organisation of technology to 
personal interaction, group cohesion and power resources. One hypothesis is that team­
work organisations are supportive of collective action, whereas individual piece-rate 
systems hinder the creation of collective interests and action.
Finally, there is a vast amount of literature on various industrial relations factors 
and their impact on collective action. Thus, Clegg (1976) argues that whether industrial 
conflict is manifested in the form of strikes will depend upon the existence and quality of 
joint regulatory mechanisms at the workplace. In addition, there are factors such as state 
intervention, trade union unity, growth of collective bargaining, changing union and 
management policies which are invoked to account for the alleged trends in collective 
activities (see Ross and Hartman 1960; Kochan 1980). A related type of theory deals with 
the industrial relations climate, i.e. the perceived nature of the relationship between labour 
and management (e.g. Anderson 1979; Brett 1980; Strauss 1977). The argument is that the 
climate will influence participation such that under conditions of a more hostile, non- 
cooperative relationship between management and labour, union participation will be 
greater (e.g. Bluen and Donald 1991; Kelly and Nicholson 1980; Stagner and Eflal 1982). 
A group of theories also suggests that characteristics in union officers such as the ability to 
communicate, accessibility and leadership in times of industrial conflict, enhance members' 
participation (e.g. Fantasia 1988; Fullagar et al. 1992; Hartley 1989; Kotthoff 1994; 
Nicholson et al. 1981). And finally, there is the hypothesis that the power of the union is a 
pivotal factor in strike causation and also in other forms of participation (Nicholson and 
Kelly 1980). For example, Dubin (1960) argues that conflict is a curvilinear function of the 
relative power of the parties, being lowest under conditions of mild disparity.
In sum, structural theories explain broad trends rather than variations in individual 
participation patterns. For example, although the labour market situation in East Germany 
and the predominance of small companies would suggest a low degree of participation, 
these theories do not explain why some people are nevertheless active. The theories also 
neglect to take other possible predictors and their interrelations into account (e.g. between 
the economic situation and industrial relations system and political situation or between
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size, industrial sector and technology). Finally, some empirical studies found contradictory 
evidence146, and some concepts such as the leadership of union officials also lack an 
underlying theory.147
To conclude, these theories will not be tested in this study since they require cross­
national or -sectional data. However, they might provide some suggestions for interpreting 
the levels of participation (rather than the determinants) in our sample. One could argue that 
these theories would predict a low level of participation in the East German (textile) 
industry with it being characterized by a devastated labour market, small company size, 
traditional work organisation with piece rate systems, and the existence of West German 
industrial relations institutions.
6 .2 .2  Demographic variables
Another stream of research has sought to answer the question as to why some people are 
more engaged than others on the basis of the individual characteristics of movement 
activists (McAdam et al. 1988:706). Particularly in the 1960s much research was aimed at 
establishing whether an active "trade unionist type" existed. Thus, analysts tried to 
discover the social and personal characteristics of union activists, such as age, gender, 
personality, occupation, seniority and wage level. Studies declared that union activists are 
better educated (McShane 1986; Oliver 1984), have a greater occupational status 
(Nicholson et al. 1981; Spinrad 1960), have been socialized in families whose members 
were unionized and actively involved (Purcell 1953)148, enjoy higher salaries (Farber and 
Saks 1980; Kolchin and Hyclak 1984; Oliver 1984; Spinrad 1960; Strauss 1977) and are 
full-timers rather than part-timers (Geare et al. 1979) and blue collars more than white
146 For example there is evidence that smaller rather than larger plant size facilitates collective 
participation (e.g. Lipset et al. 1956; Seidman 1953; Seidman et al. 1958; Spinrad 1960) and more recent 
studies do not find robust support for either interpretation (e.g. Allen and Stephenson 1983; Dewey et al. 
1978; Gallie 1989:10). Furthermore, concepts such as technology or union characteristics have not been 
tested sufficiently (see Nicholson and Kelly 1980).
For a more detailed critique see Barling et al. (1992), Kelly and Nicholson (1980) and Klandermans 
(1984b).
148 Socialisation is used in this case as a demographic variable.
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collars (Gallie 1989:9). The two most popular demographic variables however were age 
and gender.
With regard to age most research focuses on the relationship between age and 
joining the union rather than participation. There are three different hypotheses: younger 
workers are more likely to join the union than older colleagues149, they are less likely150, 
and that younger and older workers are both more likely to join than the middle age 
group151.
It is not clear whether all three interpretations can be easily applied to union 
activity, and which of the hypotheses is right. However, Kelly and Kelly (1992:247) note 
with regard to a largely empiricist literature on age and union militancy that it has produced
1 S9conflicting results, shows dubious associations and has no body of theory.
With regard to the gender impact on participation there is widespread evidence that 
female employees are less likely to be union members than their male counterparts (e.g. 
Bain and Elias 1985; Bain and Price 1983:8), are less commited to the union and are less 
active (Gallie 1989:15; Gordon 1990; Lawrence 1994; Purcell 1979). Several studies trace 
it back to general gender differences in personality, perceptions and attitudes (e.g. Sydner 
et al. 1986) or to women's lower commitment to their employment (see Lawrence 1994). 
However, if one controls factors such as employment conditions (part-time/ full-time 
work), occupational mix (e.g. less female employment in male-dominated and traditionally 
unionized industries) and the degree of concern of unions to recruit such workers, studies 
find no gender difference in the willingness to join and stay in the union and with regard to 
their perceptions of union instrumentality (e.g. Bain and Elias 1985; Booth 1986; Fiorito 
and Greer 1986:161; Gallie 1989:17; Kochan 1979; Richardson and Catlin 1979:379).
149 Because in comparison with older workers they are less loyal to the employer, less threatened by costly 
victimisation, more resentful of arbitrary treatment by management and more attuned to union ideology 
(e.g. Shister 1956)
150 por example younger workers have higher turnover rates, which suggests a great reduction in the value 
of those union benefits associated with seniority, and are less ideologically bound to union values (e.g. 
Perline and Lorenz 1970; Richardson and Catlin 1979). They are also likely to be with the union longer 
(Glick et al. 1977; McShane 1986; Perline and Lorenz 1970; Strauss 1977).
In other words a curvilinear relationship according to Guest and Dewe (1988:183).
152 For example younger workers are militant because of the absense of financial commitments vs 
younger workers are less militant because of their weaker attachments to the firm and thus can resolve job 
dissatisfaction more easily through quitting. Some studies however found no relationship at all (see 
Klandermans 1986b).
138
However, no studies were found which specifically dealt with gender differences in 
participation.
Overall, most of the demographic studies and their call for a stereotypical union member 
have either very weak or inconsistent associations with measures of participation, and lack 
a clear body of theory, thus they justify their discussions on any grounds other than that 
they are proxies for more fundamental arguments (e.g. Barling et al. 1992:195; Gallagher 
and Strauss 1991; Kelly and Kelly 1992:247; Klandermans 1986b; Kolchin and Hyclak 
1984; Nicholson et al. 1981).153 However, since some variables such as gender and age 
are still commonly in use in most studies, they have also been included in this study. In 
addition, age is particularly interesting to test the generational effect between the older East 
German workers (having been socialised longer under socialism) and the younger 
generation. It could be argued that younger workers have become more individualistic than 
their older colleagues and are therefore more passive. The gender variable is interesting in 
this context because of the supposed equalizing gender politics of the socialist GDR state 
(see Feminist Review special issue, 1991). Thus, gender should then be a less significant 
determinant of participation than it is in western societies.
6 .2 .3  Workers' attitudes: job dissatisfaction
There is a large literature on workers' attitudes and union membership, of which only the 
most important concept of job dissatisfaction will be reviewed and tested.154
153 if  the authors of demographic variables give an explanation for their findings they commonly refer to 
theories such as rational choice theory. For example, Oliver (1984) argues that the restricted engagement of 
"poor" workers in union activity is not due to apathy but to an acute free-rider problem in which costs of 
participation outweigh the individuals' share of the collective good (see also Bain and Price 1980 or Fiorito 
and Greer 1982 for explanations of union growth and decline and Shalev 1983 for the analysis o f strike 
statistics).
154 Due to space constraints the concepts of "alienation", "ideology" and "psychological characteristics" 
can only be briefly reviewed. Regarding "alienation ", authors argue that activists are drawn disproportionally 
from among the marginal, alienated members of society (e.g. Komhauser 1959). The idea is that it is the 
individuals' desire to overcome their feelings of alienation (both from the job and society) and achieve the 
sense of community they lack in their life that prompts them to participate in collective action (e.g. 
Tannenbaum 1952).
The concept of "ideology" differs in that it looks at specific non-work related propensities, i.e. 
arguing that causes of individuals' union-related behaviour lie outside the work context (e.g. Barling et al. 
1992:110). Thus, close-knit working communities facilitate participation (e.g. Lipset et al. 1956;
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Drawing on theories of cognitive consistency (Rokeach 1969), of cognitive balance (Bern 
1967:128), of relative deprivation (e.g. Geschwender 1964; Gurney et al. 1982; Walker 
and Pettigrew 1984), of frustration-aggression (e.g. Dollard et al. 1939; Gurr 1970), or 
dissatisfaction-withdrawal (e.g. Birchall 1975; Hackman and Lawler 1971), the general 
approach is based on the idea that when people become conscious of a social 
inconsistency, it is in their psychological self-interest to change the situation.
The most popular version with regard to the union context is the theory of relative 
deprivation linked with the frustration-aggression hypothesis. This theory holds that it is 
an unfavourable gap between what people feel entitled to and what, in fact, they are 
receiving that leads to expressions of discontent in terms of joining the union or becoming 
actively involved in union activities. In other words, frustration (dissatisfaction) at work 
encourages activism by the psychological mechanism of tension reduction (Klandermans 
1986b: 199).155
The empirical nature of the relationship between dissatisfaction and participation is 
equivocal. Several reviews of the earlier literature conclude that job satisfaction rather than 
dissatisfaction is positively correlated with union participation (e.g. Perline and Lorenz 
1970; Strauss 1977). Compared to their non-active counterparts, active members appear to 
be more satisfied with their jobs, have a greater interest in work (Tannenbaum and Kahn 
1958), and have higher job status (Blyton et al. 1981; Sayles and Strauss 1953; van de 
Vail 1970). Spinrad (1960) explains these relationships by arguing that union participation
Seidmann 1953; Seidman et al. 1958; Spinrad 1960; Strauss 1977), as do ideological values which are 
rooted in the social context (e.g. family socialisation, political ideology, social class) (e.g. Blumer 1975; 
Klandermans et al. 1976). In particular there is an extensive literature on whether active union members are 
more "class-conscious" than non members (Deppe 1971; Goldthorpe et al. 1969; Kern and Schumann 
1974; Mallet 1963; Mann 1973; Perline and Lorenz 1970; Popitz et al. 1957; Purcell 1953; Sayles and 
Strauss 1953).
Finally, the psychological literature refers to the assumed specific needs of union activists (Gurney 
and Tierney 1982:36). For example Barling (1992:96) argues that union members with a high need for 
affiliation tend to engage in such social union activities as attending meetings (also Nicholson et al. 1981). 
Or see van de Vail (1970) on the need for self-esteem, growth, and to belong; Purcell (1953) on the need 
for social interaction, or Seidman et al. (1950) on the need for power and recognition etc. However, this 
literature can be criticized for avoiding the issue why some people have this need and not others.
The first two concepts have not been tested in this study because the East German textile 
workforce is strongly homogeneous in terms of its social background and socialisation, and also does not 
come from a specific "occupational community". The third concept was not tested because of its theoretical 
deficiencies.
155 An important distinction for some is made between "individual" relative deprivation (where the 
individual feels personally deprived compared to other individuals) and "collective" relative deprivation 
(where the individual feels that his/her group is deprived relative to other groups). Some evidence suggests 
that it is the perception of collective relative deprivation which has most impact on participation in 
collective action (Kelly and Kelly 1992b:6).
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enriches the individual's overall job satisfaction and provides a means for greater 
interpersonal influence, status and meaning. However, the causality remains unclear, job 
satisfaction might be a cause of union participation as well as a consequence. In addition, 
according to Brett and Hammer (1982:245) there is no research that either confirms or 
refutes the proposed causal direction.
On the other hand there are recent studies which support the outlined theoretical 
hypothesis. Job dissatisfaction is in this instance positively correlated with joining or 
voting decisions and also with participation in union activities (Guest and Dewe 1988; 
Hamner and Smith 1978; Hills 1982:245; Kochan 1979; Kolchin and Hyclak 1984; Olson 
et al. 1986). The studies refer accordingly to different facets of job satisfaction and come 
up with different results. Some studies conclude that dissatisfaction with economic factors 
is more influential than dissatisfaction with the job content (Brett 1980; DeCotiis and 
LeLouarn 1981; Kochan 1979; Schriesheim 1978). Other work has indicated that 
dissatisfaction with more intrinsic factors, i.e. job content and status, is important as well 
(e.g. Huszczo 1983; Nicholson et al. 1981). Additionally McShane (1986) found a 
mixture of both types of dissatisfaction to be significant (dissatisfaction with wage, 
promotional decisions and supervision) regarding attendance at union meetings and voting 
behaviour.
Finally, there are empirical studies which show only a small positive correlation 
between job dissatisfaction and union activity (e.g. Flanagan et al. 1974; Scott et al. 1963). 
McAdam (1986:705) even concludes that for all the apparent theoretical sophistication, 
empirical support for the theories behind this account, has generally proved elusive. He 
claims that although the frustration-aggression hypothesis works in animal studies its 
application to human studies has been significantly discredited and its spelling power 
regarding union participation or strike causation is questionable at best (Hartley 1984), and 
has not been empirically supported. Also Kelly and Nicholson (1980:865) argue that the 
empirical relationship between job dissatisfaction and propensity to strike is neither 
consistent nor substantial.
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In addition to the empirical lack of clarity, there are several theoretical objections. For 
example, Klandermans (1986b: 199) states that the frustration-aggression paradigm seems 
of limited significance, since dissatisfaction is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for participation. Moreover, the relationship between tension reduction and participation is 
weak (see Kelly and Nicholson, 1980:865, for a similar argument with regard to 
aggression and militancy). The theory does not explain how dissatisfied individuals are 
activated and why they prefer one form of participation to another. Thus, Kelly and Kelly 
(1992:249) argue that workers who experience dissatisfaction in their job have a series of 
options - to raise an individual grievance, to retrain, to press for promotion, to work 
harder, to quit - of which collective industrial action is but one (also Klandermans ibid.; 
Zurcher and Snow 1981:451). Moreover, there may be circumstances where 
dissatisfaction is not necessary for collective action at all, such as in sympathy strikes.
Finally, Guest and Dewe (1988) highlight a conceptual problem in using job 
dissatisfaction to explain continued union membership, i.e. ongoing participation as 
opposed to joining the union. A persistent dissatisfaction presumably means that union 
membership does not help to eliminate the sources of dissatisfaction, so it is then hard to 
see why membership is continued. However, studies confirm that union members are not 
more likely to consider leaving the firm, despite greater dissatisfaction, which gives some 
support to the argument that the union provides a "voice" for the expression of discontent 
(ibid.: 185).
To conclude, despite the empirical and theoretical problems frustration-aggression theory is 
still widely in use (also by its critics, such as Klandermans, 1995). It was included in this 
study, because workers in East Germany have experienced tremendous changes in their 
work organisation (see chapter 5) and there may be considerable scope for feelings of 
frustration or dissatisfaction. It was thought worthwhile to examine whether in these 
circumstances dissatisfaction would be associated with, or help to determine, collective 
activity.
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Summing up the "traditional" approaches to collective activities, although some variables 
have explanatory power they do not offer a satisfactory account of union participation. For 
example, the structural theories tend to assume that union participation is an 
unconventional, irrational type of behaviour (e.g. Klandermans 1984b; Schwartz 1976). 
Moreover, there has been an increasing awareness in the last few years that dichotomous 
foci on either micro or macro factors are not helpful and that an integrative model is 
necessary. The question is then how the approaches can be linked in a theoretically 
informed and empirically grounded way (Snow et al. 1986:464). There are three distinct 
recent attempts trying to address this issue by focusing on the individual decision-making 
process: the social psychological theories of rational choice, social identity and "micro­
mobilization".
6 .3  Recent social psychological theories of participation
6.3 .1  Theories of rational choice
1 . Outline of the theory
Rational choice or cost/benefit theory156 analyses the process by which prospective 
participants approach the decision to participate in a rational manner: The individual 
decision-makers approach a choice (of action) by searching the environment for 
information about outcomes, alternative choices and their personal value. They then select 
the choice that maximizes the probability of favourable outcomes by weighting the 
anticipated costs and benefits so as to opt for the one which has the greatest ratio of benefit 
to cost (see Brett and Hammer 1982:251; Friedman 1983; Kelly 1996a, chp.4:l; 
Oberschall 1973:116).
156 The study acknowledges the existence of different definitions and theories of rational choice. The 
utilized definition and theoretical model is that of psychology or sociology and might differ from some 
models used in economics.
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Rational choice theory can be seen as evolving out of a "paradigm” shift in the research on 
participation away from psychological discussions on the attitudinal and perceptual 
differences of members and non-members and structural theories of social movements 
towards "resource mobilization theories" (Zurcher and Snow 1981). Resource mobilization 
theories, which are structural models of collective action, emphasize the importance and 
direct influence of the availability of various resources (e.g. material, organisational) to a 
collectivity and stress the rationality of participation in social movements (Gamson 1990; 
McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973; Snow et al. 1980; Tilly 1978). They 
emphasize the variability of resources in accounting for the emergence and development of 
collective action, but neglect the underlying decision making processes of the actors 
involved (e.g. McAdam 1988:126; Klandermans 1984b:584).
In contrast to the approach of resource mobilization, advocates of rational choice 
theory identify the interaction between individuals as the appropriate level of analysis (e.g. 
Gamson et al. 1982; Klandermans e.g. 1984b; Oberschall 1980). The basic assumption is 
that people behave in a perceived reality (a psychological truism), thus that individual 
decisions to participate in a social movement are based on the perceived costs and benefits 
of participation.
Unions for example are seen as feasible means for social actors to pursue their 
interests, and the decision to join a social movement is treated as just that — a rationally 
calculated decision distinguishing risks and rewards.
One specific development of rational choice theory is Klandermans' "value-expectancy" 
theory, which will be briefly outlined.157 Kelly and Kelly (1992:249) even state that this 
theoretical refinement represents "the most comprehensive attempt by any psychologist to 
sharpen our understanding of industrial action".
157 His general theory of participation in social movements has two components, a theory of consensus 
mobilization (esp. Klandermans 1988) and a theory of action mobilization (e.g. 1984b) which integrates 
the expectancy-value theory. Consensus mobilization means the process by which a union familiarizes its 
members with the objectives of intended action and tries to win their support for those objectives. The 
perceived reality of the individual is capable of being influenced and social movement leaders try to do so. 
This process is necessary but not sufficient for participation to occur because rational workers will think 
not only about the desirability of a given objective but also about the costs of achieving it. Hence the need 
for action mobilization, in which the union tries to persuade its members that the benefits o f action will 
outweigh the costs and that they should participate (Kelly and Kelly 1992:250).
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In general, expectancy-value theories consider the individual's action to be related to the 
person's expectations and the subjective value of the consequences that are perceived to 
follow the action (Feather, 1982). According to Klandermans (1984a, 1986b), collective 
action is contingent on anticipated outcomes. Optimism about the outcome of collective 
action will enhance the probability of participation: when the benefits of union activity are 
perceived as high, and the costs low, then willingness to participate will be high. 
Klandermans distinguishes the costs and benefits under three headings: goal, social, and 
reward motives.
The goal motives express the expectation that the action will lead to the achievement 
of the goal (collective good), that other workers will participate as well, and that a high 
turnout is necessary for success, multiplied with the value of this goal.158
The social motives refer to the expected reactions of "significant others", multiplied 
by the value assigned to those reactions (e.g. what do family, friends or colleagues think 
about the person's desire to participate in a strike?);
The reward motives indicate the individuals' assessment of the personal costs and 
benefits of action (e.g. lost wages, victimization, lost time for family), multiplied by the 
value placed on these consequences.
The individual’s willingness to participate is then the weighted sum of these 
motives (weighted because the three motives can take different weights for different 
individuals and can also compensate for one another). Thus, one individual may have 
strong social motives but weak goal and reward motives, whilst another may have strong 
goal motives but weak social and reward motives (Kelly and Kelly 1992:251). In general, 
Klandermans' expectancy-value theory allows considerable flexibility in that it accounts for
158 Klandermans tries to overcome the "free-rider problem" which has been outlined by Olson (1965) and 
which underlies rational choice theory. Thus, if the costs of participation are seen as extremely high, then 
many potential recruits are expected to choose another course of action. Olson's contention is that rational 
calculation would lead few actors to choose collective action as a means of obtaining public goods, since 
they could expect to obtain those goods whether they were active or not. He believed that he thereby refuted 
the popular view that individuals with a common interest would act together so as to achieve that interest 
(except in cases with selective incentives or possible sanctions on nonparticipants in small groups). 
However, Klandermans and others (e.g. Gamson 1975; Schwartz 1976) argue that people will participate in 
activities to produce a collective good precisely because they are aware that the good would never be 
produced if everyone sat back and waited for someone else to do something. Klandermans argues further that 
the value of a collective good is a function of its instrumentality for social changes which the movement 
hopes to achieve and of the value of changes (Klandermans 1984b:585). For a detailed critique of Olson's 
rational choice theory see Kelly (1996, chp. 4).
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differing perceptions and expectations across different types of membership, union, and 
situation. It acknowledges the dynamic character of participation (i.e. varying over time 
and situation), which is not accounted for in the "traditional" theories (e.g. demographic 
variables).
2 . Problems of the theory
Four major objections to the social psychological theories of rational choice will be 
outlined: (i) the basic assumption of rational choice, (ii) the neglect of the social character 
of the decision-making process, (iii) the neglect of the processual character of decision­
making, and (iv) the causality between rational choice and participation.
(i) Rational choice theory in its basic form assumes that individuals act rationally and 
have complete information over their situation (i.e. over all possible costs and rewards).159 
Yet, Zurcher and Snow (1981:468) argue that the most obvious shortcoming is this 
tautological character of the rationality assumption. People are supposed to participate in 
social movements because it is rewarding to them. Defining participation, rewards, and 
rationality in terms of each other precludes finding negative cases. Thus, the circularity of 
the argument renders a central component of the rational choice theory unfalsifiable.
Another major problem of all rational choice theories (incl. value-expectancy 
theory) is that it is basically an "optimal" theory. It postulates how people might behave if 
they had complete information and the ability to process that information in a maximally 
rational manner. Which is not realistic, and even if all conditions would be existent, people 
would not always behave in a purely rational manner.
(ii) Most rational choice theories, including Klandermans' value-expectancy theory, 
try to explain the emergence of a collective phenomenon out of individual decisions, but 
without specifying the social context and processes in which the decisions are made (Kelly 
1996a, chp. 5:20; McAdam 1988:137). It ignores the generation of expectations on which 
choice depends and which is a profoundly social process, i.e. shaped by the interaction
See Kelly (1996a,chp. 4) for a more fundamental analysis.
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with other social actors. For example, it does not explain the nature of rewards. How do 
they come to have a subjective meaning as rewards? Do they vary from situation to 
situation? And is it possible to assess the rationality of strategies without assuming that 
goals of action are well-defined, consensual, and relatively stable? Moreover, the theory 
takes interests or preferences as given and although it assumes that people operate under 
constraints it does not offer an explanation of the origins and durability of those constraints 
on preferences and does not explain where different interests and preferences come from 
(see Kelly 1996a, chp.4:9). As Schrager (1986:859) notes collective activity might be 
more than the sum of individual economistic calculations: "social and ideological factors 
figure powerfully in people’s willingess to act". In addition, the importance of people's 
interpretation of events and grievances relevant to participation is also not acknowledged 
(Snow et al. ibid.:465).160
A related point is that the theory assumes that people are mobilized solely on the 
basis of instrumental calculations of individual self-interest (a point now acknowledged by 
Klandermans, e.g. 1989b, 1995). As Kelly (1996a, chp. 5:20) points out individuals with 
a strong sense of social identity (see section below) may think in terms of group interests 
and group gains and losses (also Fireman and Gamson 1979), or might be mobilized 
without thinking through costs and benefits at all (also Jenkins 1983). For example, Kelly 
and Kelly (1992:253) illustrate that especially long strikes, where workers often suffer 
acute financial hardship (e.g. UK miners' strike in 1984/5) cannot be explained by an 
instrumental motive alone. What is necessary is a consideration of the underlying social 
processes, i.e. the relationship between management and workers, and hence an awareness 
that the industrial conflict is an instance of "intergroup relations" (Kelly and Kelly 1992: 
256). "What is critical is that individuals identify with the union as an organization" 
(1993:19). In short, it is the individuals' identification with various groups (e.g.
For example, regarding grievances, too much attention is focused on grievances per se, and on their 
socio-psychological manifestations (e.g. relative deprivation, alienation), to the neglect of the fact that 
grievances or discontents are subject to differential interpretation, and of the fact that variations in 
interpretation among individuals can affect participation. Thus, the theory neglects this by assuming an 
almost automatic linkage between intensely felt grievances and susceptibility to movement participation 
(e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977:1214-15; Turner and Killian 1972:365).
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workforce, company) which will affect his/her perception of intergroup relations and also 
of the costs and benefits of participation.
In sum, the underlying critique is the theory's profound individualism. 
Klandermans, for example, acknowledges this point and increasingly emphasizes the 
importance of social interaction theory161 (social motives) in his recent work. He writes 
that the costs of participation are all socially constructed, "which is to say defined in social 
interaction with one's social environment" (1995:5). However, he still refers to rational 
choice theory as the leading antecedent of union participation. Moreover, Klandermans' 
social motives do not take the social identities of the workers into account. Thus, the social 
environment becomes a factor only in terms of social pressures of friends, but not in terms 
of the persons' identification with social groups (as will be outlined below).
(iii) Another problem concerns the decision-making process. Most rational choice 
theories see the decision-making rather mechanically and non-processually, thus treating 
participation (or willingness to participate) as quite a static dependent variable, based on a 
single, time-bound, rational decision (Snow et al. 1986:465). This overlooks the 
contextual and activity-based nature of much movement participation. One can argue that 
just as social movements change over time, there is variation in the individual's stake in 
participating in new activities. Decisions to participate over time are thus subject to frequent 
reassessment and renegotiation. For example, with regard to Klandermans' work, beliefs 
of expectancies are temporally variable and can be modified during the course of actual 
participation (Snow et al. 1986:471). To conclude, it is argued that rationales for 
participation are both collective and ongoing phenomena, and have therefore to be 
conceptualized and studied as a processual phenomena.
(iv) Finally, it has been orgued that the theory does not really investigate the causes of 
behaviour, but instead looks for rationalizations of it. Kelly and Kelly (1992:254) for
161 He defined social interaction theory as "relating participation to social interaction in networks and 
groups inside and outside the company" (1995:2). This definition is quite vague in view of the theories' 
development since the 1960s (originally constructed by Sherif,1967, and others) (see Tajfel et al. 1978; 
Turner etal. 1987).
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example state that workers' strike calculations may be rationalizations which are designed 
to justify their decision ("post hoc justifications"), just as much as rational reflections 
which precede their decisions as rational choice theorists sustain. Thus, the causal link 
between cost/benefit calculations and the willingness to participate is not clarified in this 
theory (Kelly and Kelly 1992:254). However, according to Bern (1972) this is true for 
attitudes in general: attitudes are a justification for, rather than a cause of, behaviour (also 
Weick 1969).
3 . Empirical evidence
There are several case studies and surveys showing that workers make cost-benefit 
calculations about industrial action in certain circumstances (e.g. Batstone et al. 1978; Cole 
1969; Martin 1986; Woolfson and Foster 1988). However, Newton and Shore (1992:279) 
claim that union instrumentality has been mostly studied in relation to union certification 
voting (e.g. DeCotiis and LeLouam 1982; Fiorito and Greer 1982; Heneman and Sandver 
1983; Klandermans 1986b; Premack and Hunter 1988; Zalesny 1985), and there has been 
little investigation of the role of instrumentality after voting decisions.
More specifically with regard to Klandermans' model, Kelly and Kelly (1993) note that 
relatively few studies have tested the validity of the model. Klandermans conducted three 
studies (e.g. 1984a) with regard to specific forms of participation (union demonstrations, 
rallies, industrial action) organized by Dutch unions, and reports that his model could 
explain 40-60% of the variance in participation between plants and over time (Klandermans 
1984a: 112). Kelly (1996a, chp.5:20) points out however, that it is hard to say whether 
these were the reasons that informed workers decisions or post-hoc justifications prompted 
by the arrival of a questionnaire (also Kelly and Kelly 1990).
Evidence from several studies contradicts various propositions of Klandermans. 
For example, Oliver (1984) found that activists were more pessimistic about the 
participation of others and therefore participated ("if I don't participate, nobody will") 
rather than Klandermans' motive ("I participate because the others do so also"). Kelly and
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Kelly (1993)162 tested Klandermans' model and concluded that individual calculation is 
not sufficient to induce willingness to participate. "What is critical is that individuals 
identify with the union as an organisation" (1993:18). And finally, other studies came up 
with evidence that different people respond to different incentives. Oliver (1982) found that 
full-time union activists were more ideologically committed, while transitory activists were 
more concerned about personal benefits. Wilson (1973:72) found that social classes appear 
to respond to different incentives. And Hartley (1992:171) indicated that those who 
perceive themselves as unable to influence their work environment on their own are more 
likely to unionize than others.
One might conclude that the major potential weaknesses of rational choice theory lies in the 
neglect of the social processes of mobilization. This is the focus of social identity theory, 
and it seems therefore a good idea to test both theories together in order to study their 
compatibility.
Rational choice theory was tested in this study because it might provide a powerful 
explanation of the behaviour of East German workers. As will be remembered from the 
discussion in chapter 5 there are widespread hypotheses in the East German literature that 
workers perceive the costs of collective activities as too high (in the face of the devastating 
labour market situation), and/ or do not perceive the new interest institutions as effective 
and therefore remain passive. Yet, rational choice theory could also be applied differently. 
One could argue that due to their collectivistic past people might value collective activities 
as more effective than individual ones, and they might also perceive the new interest 
institutions as more instrumental than the old union.
162 Based on 350 returned questionnaires (39.15%) of members of a white collar union in UK.
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6 .3 .2  Social identity theory
1 . Outline
Social identity theory has emerged as one of the major critiques of individualism in social 
psychology (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Tajfel 1982a), and it is thus also a reaction to the 
individualistic approach of the rational choice model. Authors of social identity theory 
focus instead on the social processes between individuals within a social movement.
The basic idea is that people are always members of social groups and thus 
individual action has to be seen in its social context. A social group is defined as "one that 
is psychologically significant for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively 
for social comparison (i.e. with which they compare and evaluate themselves) and for the 
acquisition of norms and values, that they privately accept membership in, and which 
influences their attitudes and behaviour" (Turner et al. 1987, chp. 1:1). Thus, the members 
perceive and define themselves as a group and share some common identity (Tajfel and 
Turner 1985). Social identity is then defined as "that part of an individuals' self-concept 
which derives from his/her knowledge of his/her membership of a social group(s) together 
with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel 
1978a:63).163 Thus, this group is a (positive) "reference group" and not merely a 
"membership group" as defined by outsiders, i.e. it is not simply a group which one is 
objectively in, but one which is subjectively important in determining one's actions.
A basic assumption of the theory is that people desire to have a positive social identity, 
since this contributes to a positive self-esteem (e.g. Hogg and Abrams 1990:28), and that 
this is achieved by demonstrating "positive in-group distinctiveness" by engaging in social 
comparisons with outgroups (Kelly and Kelly 1993:60). Thus, the value attached to any 
particular social identity is determined by comparisons between an individual's own group 
and other groups in his/her environment (Kelly and Kelly 1992:258). Social comparison or
163 The concept of social identity is used to describe (i) limited aspects of the concept of self which are (ii) 
relevant to certain limited aspects of social behaviour (Tajfel ibid.). Thus, an individual's self-concept 
comprises both personal identity (i.e. personality) and social identity (membership of a group) (see Harr€ 
1983,1993).
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categorization can be defined as the ordering of the social environment into manageable 
social units, thus in terms of groupings of people in a manner that makes sense to the 
individual (Tajfel 1978:61), e.g. men/women, workers/managers.
A further step is to argue that there is a positive relationship between levels of 
ingroup identification and intergroup differentiation, which is, according to Kelly 
(1993:60), one of the fundamental tenets of social identity theory. Thus, the social 
categorization may lead to perceptions of the outgroup in a stereotypical manner ("them- 
us") (e.g Allport 1954). Social identity theory proposes that individuals who identify 
strongly with a social group (and whose self-esteem is therefore highly dependent on it) 
will be more likely than weak identifiers to differentiate between fellow ingroup members 
and members of alternative social groups (them-us).164 To conclude, the concepts of social 
identity, social categorization and differentiation (them-us) are seen as strongly interrelated 
(see Condor 1990; Hogg and Abrams 1990; Tajfel 1978, 1981).165
Empirical evidence of a positive association between the strength of group 
identification and the extent of positive intergroup differentiation is sometimes inconsistent 
(Brown et al. 1984, 1986; Condor et al. 1987). Brown et al. tested this central hypothesis 
of social identity theory and found only a weak positive correlation. Attempting to explain 
this finding, Hinkle and Brown (1990) suggested that social identity processes may not 
apply equally in different group contexts. They proposed a typology of group contexts 
using the two dimensions of individualism-collectivism and autonomous-relational 
orientation (see also Brown et al. 1992). Their hypothesis is that the impact of group 
identification on intergroup differentiation will be greatest amongst groups which are 
characterized by a collectivist oriemation (i.e. stressing intragroup cooperation, collective 
achievement, and interdependence amongst fellow ingroup members) and/or a relational 
orientation (i.e. where ingroup evaluation is achieved by social comparison with other 
groups) (Kelly and Kelly 1994:5). In addition they recognized that for some groups social 
identities are formed and maintained through processes other than intergroup comparison
164 In an industrial relations context them-and-us feelings are commonly defined as combining (i) the 
perception of a clear division between managers and workers, and (ii) a feeling of identification with one of 
these groups (Kelly and Kelly 1991:26).
*65 Other authors have thought to combine the concept of social identity with concepts o f relative 
deprivation, perceived intergroup conflict or political efficacy (see Kelly and Kelly 1994).
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(e.g. families, therapy groups). Empirical support for the typology was found in studies 
by Hinkle et al. (1990) and Kelly (1990a). This discussion leads to three hypotheses:
Firstly, as Kelly and Kelly (1994:6) conclude, strong group identification may be 
linked not only to conflictual intergroup attitudes, but also to conflictual intergroup 
behaviour. Applied to the union context the theory argues that people who strongly identify 
with their union and/or with their workgroup will be more willing to participate in union 
activities (e.g. Triandis et al. 1988), especially if they possess strong collectivist attitudes. 
Thus, people do not participate merely because of perceived benefits, but also because they 
seek social recognition and affirmation of their identity. On the other side individuals who 
identify only weakly with their group might be more likely to engage in individual action in 
trying to improve their personal status.
Secondly, individuals who have a clear distinction between "them" (management) 
and "us" (workers) are more likely in the case of perceived inequality to pursue conflictual 
behaviour, i.e. participation in industrial action, in order to challenge the status quo (Kelly 
1993:97; Wetherell 1987). For example, strikes might be seen not only as instrumental 
actions achieving specific goals but also as expressions of particular social identities (Kelly 
and Kelly 1992:259). In addition, social identity (e.g. union identity, workgroup identity) 
might also play a moderating role between them-and-us feelings and participation (Kelly 
and Kelly 1994:12).
Thirdly, as Kelly and Kelly (1994:5) outline, research on differences in individual 
orientation (collectivist or individualist) suggests that this factor might also have a direct 
impact on the willingness to participate in collective action. Thus, individuals with a 
collectivist orientation are more likely to get involved in collective activities (e.g. Triandis 
et al. 1988; Wheeler et al. 1989). This resembles a long-standing argument in industrial 
relations that collectivist attitudes are related to union activism.166 For example, Fosh 
(1981) examined the consequences of strong class consciousness (i.e. collectivist attitudes) 
and concluded that active members manifest a strong commitment to collectivism in that 
they have a firm belief in the political, social, as well as economic goals of the union rather 
than an instrumental belief in trade unionism as a means for acquiring individual ends
166 §ee footnote 154: the concept "ideology".
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extrinsic to trade unionism (also Huszczo 1983). Finally, collectivist attitudes might be a 
moderator for the relationship between social identity and participation (Kelly and Kelly 
1994:12).
The three variables (union identity, them-and-us feelings, collectivism) have been 
tested in the study of Kelly and Kelly (1994)167 and emerged as significant predictors of 
participation.
2 . Problems of social identity theory
One can distinguish four major problems. The first three refer to the associations between 
the three variables (union identity, them-and-us feelings and work group identity) which 
are not sufficiently explored in the theory. The fourth objection refers to the intra group 
mechanisms and the failure to recognize individual differences among group members.
Firstly, social identity theory assumes a correlation between them-and-us feelings 
(e.g. social identity with the workforce), and identification with the union, which need not 
always be the case. Workers with strong them-us attitudes need not necessarily have a 
strong union commitment. They may not even be a union member (e.g. they can think that 
the union is too weak or not appropriate for representing their interests), which means that 
them-us attitudes and union identity can exist without each other, that they are independent 
although they share a conceptual affinity. One could argue that them-and-us feelings are, 
though not a sufficient precondition, still a necessary condition for union identity.
Secondly and related, in a favourable group context in the terms of Brown and 
Hinkle (i.e. with a strong degree of collectivism) and where strong group identity and 
them-us feelings exist, the relationship towards collective action is not entirely clear. Are 
both factors each independently correlated with participation or are they highly interrelated? 
And if they are related, has union identity a moderating role between them-us and 
participation (as Kelly and Kelly suggested) or can them-us also have a moderating role 
between union identity and participation?
Thirdly, social identity theory also does not explore the relationship between 
workgroup identity and union identity. And besides it does not investigate the possible
167 study based on 350 returned questionnaires (39.15%) of a British trade union.
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problem of various social identities, i.e. the problem of dual commitment (e.g. Guest and 
Dewe 1988).168 Kelly and Kelly (1992:260) suggest that studies focusing on the impact of 
group identity have to examine not only the strength but also the meaning of that identity to 
the individual. However, Brown and Williams (1984) advanced the theory in this direction 
by arguing that it is necessary to examine the ideological meaning of group identification, 
as well as to recognize the existence and consequences of different group memberships and 
identities of one person.169
Fourthly, another group of critics refer to the intra group mechanisms which have 
been insufficiently dealt with in social identity theory.170 Thus, the theory is not explicit 
about how individual group members will behave in a "disadvantageous" group situation 
where the group wants to adopt collective strategies to change its situation. There are 
propositions that relate member' choices (to behave collectively or individually [e.g. 
leaving the group]) to the presence or absence of cognitive alternatives to the existing 
situation, and whether the present situation is perceived as legitimate and stable or 
illegitimate. For example, if a member sees the present situation as legitimate and stable, 
then that member is unlikely to try to change it through intergroup confrontation or any 
other means (Taylor et al. 1987:82). Yet, it is not clear where the individual gets his/her 
perception of legitimacy and stability from, and how one accounts for individual 
preferences of collective or individualistic strategies. The theory only argues that when 
one's self-image as a group member is salient, one will behave as a group member (thus 
collectively). And when personal identity is salient, individual group members are likely to 
resist group pressure and take individualistic strategies. However, this explanation is 
potentially tautological and runs the risk of constructing individuals as "cognitive 
automatons" (Abrams 1989a), entirely constrained by their perceptions of the social field.
168 Quest et al. (1993:197) found evidence for different categories of identities: traditional pluralist 
identity, local unitarist identity, and managerial identity.
169 In their study they suggest that in certain groups (e.g. those with little history of trade unionism and 
high degree of contact with management) a strong sense of identification with the departmental group was 
synonymous with a sense of company loyalty which, in turn, did not encourage clear differentiations 
between company sub-groups. In addition groups were characterized by varying degrees of individualism and 
collectivism.
170 There are however developments such as Taylor et al.'s (1987) concept of "cognitive availability" 
which attempt to account for variations in group behaviour.
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It leaves no room for variation within individuals once the social identity is salient, thus it 
overestimates homogeneity in groups (also Klandermans 1986b:200).
In sum, these criticism point to the insufficient empirical work on the associations between 
the variables, and to the inadequate explanations of intra group mechanisms. With regard 
to the latter one could imagine rational choice theory contributing to our understanding of 
why group members might choose different strategies (e.g. individual or collective action), 
which gives another reason for testing the theories together.
This study is not primarily interested in the determinants of social identity, but tests 
social identity theory because of its potential explanatory power of participation in the East 
German context. It will be remembered that chapter 5 discussed two hypotheses which 
could be based on social identity theory: "workers have no moral commitment to the 
union" and "workers are becoming individualistic". Thus, people have not yet identified 
enough with their new union and are therefore less willing to become active, and/or 
generally they prefer individualistic strategies which overshadow their group identities. 
However, social identity theory could also argue that people had strong group identities 
and collectivist attitudes in former times which might continue today and therefore should 
lead to strong activity.
6 .3 .3  Micro-mobilization theories
Two theories, attribution theory and the concept of "collective interests", will be discussed 
under this generic term.
Attribution theory (e.g. Heider 1958; Hewstone 1989; Jaspars et al. 1993; Kelley 
and Michela 1980; Weiner 1985) is a long standing theory in social psychology which has 
been rarely applied in industrial relations research so far (see as an exception Hartley et al. 
1991). It is concerned with the ways try to explain the behaviour of individuals and, more 
generally, events in their own social environment (Klandermans et al. 1991:52). 
Attribution is defined as an explanation for an event or action in terms of reason, causes or
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both (Kelly 1996a, chp. 5:9). A basic assumption is that in order to make sense of the 
world people will make judgements about the causes of behaviour or events. It is 
conventional to classify attributions along three dimensions: personal (internal) versus 
situational (external) causes, stable versus unstable factors and controllable versus 
uncontrollable factors (Hewstone 1988, chp.3). The theory then argues that each 
attribution has different consequences for future behaviour. For example, external and 
controllable attribution of workplace problems leads to mobilization, i.e. collective action 
(e.g. Feree and Miller 1985; McAdam 1988), whereas internal attribution could lead to 
fatalism or individual action (Kelly 1996a, chp.5:9; Klandermans et al. 1991:55).
The concept of "collective interests" basically argues that a major pre-condition of 
participation in collective activities is that people achieve a mutual understanding of a 
collective interest which derives from a common interpretation of a situation (see Kelly 
1996a, chp. 5:8). For example workers have to perceive that their work problems are 
shared by others too.171
Both concepts are part of theoretical attempts, so-called micro-mobilization theories, which 
present the most recent reaction to purely structural explanations of participation in 
focusing on the cognitive processes of individual decision making within its social context 
(e.g. Donati 1992; McAdam 1988; Melucci 1980,1984,1989; Snow et al. 1986; Tilly 
1978). They are interested in the cognitive processes through which grievances are 
'interpreted' and by which 'consensus' around the collective goals of a movement is 
constructed and mobilized (Donati 1992:137). The aim is to consider the various interactive 
and communicative processes within social groups that affect people's understandings and 
the subjective meanings they attach to their situations.
Micro mobilization theories cover an extremely wide range of approaches and 
methods. Some theories have even included concepts such as social identity, them-and-us 
feelings, relative deprivation and rational choice (e.g. McAdam 1988; Kelly 1996a, chp.
171 McAdam (1988) highlights the role of perceived illegitimacy in stimulating a sense o f (collective) 
grievance, provided it coexists with personal notions of rights and a sense of efficacy (see Kelly 1996a, 
chp. 5:29).
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5:7). However, the original core of most theories are three (necessary) conditions for 
collective action:
(i) a mutual understanding amongst the actors of a collective interest deriving from 
a common interpretation of a situation (e.g. Kelly ibid.:3);
(ii) the attribution of workplace problems to the management rather than to the 
workers themselves (see Feree and Miller 1985; Hewstone 1989; Jaspars et al. 1993; 
Klandermans 1988; Snow et al. 1986);
(iii) the legitimation of the grievances and the action itself (see Fantasia 1988; 
McAdam 1988; Piven and Cloward 1979:3-4).
One common assumption of these conditions or cognitive processes is that 
successful collective activities proceed from a significant transformation in the "collective 
consciousness" of the actors involved (Gamson et al. 1982). Thus, collective activities are 
viewed as being closely connected to the capacity of the actors to influence each other, to 
negotiate the meaning of their experiences, and to construct a common understanding or 
reality (e.g. Abelson 1981; Eiser 1980). Consequently, seeking to link collective behaviour 
(e.g. union participation) to role requirements, expectations, attitudes or rules is seen as 
inconsistent with recognizing that people, social actions and the environment are fluid, and 
continuously constructed and reconstructed through defining and interpreting processes 
(which is a basic assumption of the theories of symbolic interactionism, see Berger and 
Luckmann 1967; Blumer 1969; Goffman 1974).
The tools to uncover these cognitive processes are concepts such as "cognitive 
mobilization" (Klandermans 1988), "cognitive liberation" (McAdam 1988), "framing" 
(Goffmann 1974), "frame alignment" (Snow et al. 1986), or "political discourse" (Donati 
1992; Foucault 1991; Gamson 1988). They describe the processes by which people shift 
from one meaningful definition of reality to a new one, thus "making sense" of the 
situation, of facts or events in new terms. The basic idea is that they do so by using a new 
"frame", and a process of frame alignment.172 Thus, much emphasis is put into
172 a  frame (or script) is defined as "a general, standardized, predefined structure which allows re-cognition 
and guides perception" (Minsky 1981). Frame alignment is defined as "the linkage of individual and
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understanding how people with a sense of grievance coalesce into a social group with a 
collective interest, thus how individuals acquire a sense of collective, as opposed to 
individual, grievance.
The three concepts have rarely been tested in relation to union participation. An exception 
is the study by van Vuuren et al. (1991) who found external attribution to be significant in 
determining participation (see also chapter 7 below). In addition, theoretical interest in 
these concepts in industrial relations has just emerged recently (e.g. Kelly 1996a, b) and 
thus it is too early for criticism. Moreover, this study is not primarily interested in why 
people come to define interests to be collective ones, to externally attribute their problems 
and to perceive their actions as legitimate. It wants to examine the concepts' explanatory 
power with regard to participation.
With regard to the East German context the first two concepts, collective interests 
and attribution were tested. Attribution theory raises the question as to whether workers 
attribute their problems to themselves (e.g. "I do not work hard enough therefore I will be 
dismissed") or to external factors (e.g. controllable ones such as "the current economic 
crisis" or uncontrollable ones such as "unqualified management"). As was outlined in 
chapter 5 there is some evidence (e.g. Stratemann 1993:16) that external, situational 
attribution has been the prevalent form of attribution in the GDR ("the System" is to be 
blamed), and it is therefore likely that this will continue to be so for some time. According 
to attribution theory one would expect this to lead to a high level of collective action, if 
people transfer the attribution of their current work problems to management (instead of the 
[uncontrollable] System). With regard to the definition and perception of "collective 
interests", it could be argued that in such a situation of uncertainty and insecurity people 
might be less inclined to think in terms of common interests. On the other hand one can 
also argue that due to their strong collectivist socialisation they are likely to continue to 
define their interests collectively.
group/movement interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, values, and beliefs and 
movement activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary" (Snow et al. 1986:464).
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Conclusion of Chapter 6
This chapter has focused on the four social psychological theories (frustration-aggression, 
rational choice, social identity, micro-mobilization) which are tested in this study. Most 
criticism of these theories refer to the insufficient explanations of the determinants of the 
concepts and to the fact that most empirical and theoretical work has been confined to 
developing and testing any one theory while failing to test competing models (also Kelly 
and Kelly 1993:19). Furthermore, it should be noted that all these theories assume a causal 
relationship between their variables (e.g. attitudes) and participation. However, the 
reservation mentioned with regard to rational choice theory is true for all theories testing 
attitudes: attitudes might well be justifications for or consequences of behaviour rather than 
a cause of behaviour (Bern 1972). This is discussed in more detail in chapter 11. This 
study will continue to assume that attitudes preceed behaviour.
The studies' contribution to the literature is to test these theories together, and to test them 
in a new cultural context. Thus, it deals with the applicability of the theories in a post­
socialist context. An underlying fundamental question is whether industrial relations 
knowledge is generalizable across national boundaries, or whether cultures are so different 
that any industrial relations theory must be considered culture-specific (see Kuruvilla et al. 
1990:374). This becomes interesting especially in the case of post-socialist societies. With 
regard to East Germany the question is the extent to which forty years of socialism has had 
a significant impact on workers' attitudes and behaviour towards their union/collective 
activities. However, the applicability of theories is difficult to prove and also depends on 
the scientific methodology used173. Firstly, the study can only test each theory's 
applicability with regard to its sample or population (e.g. East German textile workers), 
but might not be generalizable to whole of East Germany. Moreover, what are the criteria 
to judge a theory's applicability? A pragmatic approach could be to argue that a theory is 
applicable if it results in significant determinants of participation. However, since some 
theories have had varying results in western studies (e.g. frustration-aggression), and
173 This study is based on a positivist conception of science (see Kromrey 1986).
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others have not yet a standardized set of variables, it seems unwise to refute a theory 
merely on the grounds of two empirical tests (Bodywear and GTB). A more feasible task, 
which is pursued in this study, is to examine whether the East German sample yields 
significantly different results compared to existing western studies (obviously without 
having matching comparative data), and whether the variance explained is similar to other 
studies. An additional criteria is whether people understand the meaning of the questions 
(e.g. problems which occur when piloting the questionnaire such as a large amount of "no 
view" in the questionnaires).
The next and last chapter of Part 2 will introduce the concepts and methodology of 
the empirical studies.
Chapter 7 Concepts and methodology of the workforce surveys
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This chapter discusses various aspects of the methodology of the workforce surveys. It 
commences by outlining how the discussed theories of participation have been 
operationalised in the two surveys (7.1). It then discusses the possible interrelations of the 
theories (7.2), and finally introduces the methodology of the empirical studies and the 
demographic characteristics of the samples (7.3).
7 .1  Operationalising the theories in the two surveys
7 .1 .1  Operationalising participation: the dependent variable
Two issues are discussed: the attitudinal and behavioural definition of participation and the 
proposed multi-dimensionality of the concept.
(i) As mentioned in chapter 6, the study investigates the willingness or intention to 
participate in collective activities, not the actual participation. There are a few studies which 
have used the actual behaviour, but the large majority focus on the intention assuming that 
it will predict behavioural outcomes. This has been subject to considerable critique and 
debate (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Eiser 1986; Fullagar and Barling 1987:64; 
Kelloway et al. 1992:208; Kelly and Kelly 1992:249; McPhail 1971; Schrager 1986:858; 
Wicker 1969:75). For example, Barling et al. (1992:99) claim that more objective 
measures of participation (e.g. official records) are needed, so as not to rely completely on 
subjective self-reports. However, several studies have investigated the relationship 
between "attitudes" and "behaviour", and found a robust correlation, in particular if the 
attitudes were measured on a more specific level (i.e. not just the attitude to industrial 
action in general but refering to a specific incident) (e.g. Ajzen and Fishbein 1980;
162
Fishbein 1967; and more specifically for union membership: Fullagar 1986; McShane 
1986; Premack and Hunter 1988174).
This study is more interested in the determinants of intention rather than the extent 
of actual participation. In the following the term "participation" refers to willingness to 
participate, and the term "behaviour" refers to attitudes towards behaviour.
(ii) Early research defined "participation in union activities" relatively narrowly as a 
holding of office (Kolchin and Hyclak 1984) and treated it as a static and dichotomous 
phenomenon, i.e. individuals were classified as either active or inactive. Barling et al. 
(1992:26) describe this early research as having an "inconsistent conceptualization of 
participation, and either poor quality or inadequate accounts of empirical evidence, and 
simplistic and bivariate analyses". In recent years however, there is an increasing 
awareness of the inherent dynamics and multi-dimensionality of the concept. In other 
words it is realized that union participation varies over time and in degree: most of the time 
little participation is required, and most members most of the time do not participate 
actively. For example, van de Vail found that "just over half of all union members in 
various countries are completely apathetic, while the rest are occasional participants, 
members who regularly participate and voluntary officials" (1970:154). Thus, periods of 
high activity (e.g. during elections, strikes) are followed by dormant stretches and 
stability.
In addition, recent research has extended the definition towards a more continuous 
concept which includes a wider variety of union activities (e.g. Fosh 1981; Hartley 1989; 
McShane 1986, Nicholson et al. 1981; Strauss 1977). Several authors have suggested that 
different kinds of union activity have different determinants.
For example McShane (1986) tried to demonstrate empirically the multi­
dimensionality of union participation by factor analysis and by showing that different kinds 
of union activity have different predictors. He identified three major types of union 
participation: (i) involvement in the administration of the union branch, (ii) union voting 
participation, and (iii) union meeting attendance (p. 180). Gallagher et al. (1987)
I74 They found a correlation of 0.79 between voting intent and actual voting for the union.
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distinguish between administrative, intermittent and supportive activities, as well as 
participation in industrial action. Industrial action refers to the participation in organized 
conflict with management (including not only strikes but all collective grievance 
procedures, such as stoppages, go-slows, interpersonal conflict with management) (see 
Fullagar and Barling 1987:67). Klandermans (1986) defines union participation for 
example as being a member, attending meetings, holding positions, taking part in strikes, 
and voting for a union list in works council elections. A later specification distinguished 
between (i) membership — without engagement in organizational activities; (ii) active 
membership — participation in day-to-day activities; and (iii) participation in collective 
action initiated by the union (Van der Veen and Klandermans 1989). Klandermans's study 
(1984a) found evidence which justified distinguishing between the willingness to 
participate in strikes and the willingness to participate in moderate action. More recently he 
proposed a more complex typology of four forms of participation combining effort and 
time dimensions (low/high effort vs limited/unlimited duration) (1995:11). For example, 
attending union meetings is a form which is limited in time and requires little effort or cost, 
whereas joining a strike is limited in time but involves considerable efforts. Joining a union 
on the other hand is an undemanding but indefinite form of participation.
Kelly and Kelly (1993,1994) found empirical support for their distinction between 
"easy" forms of activity (discussing union affairs, taking part in industrial action, attending 
union meeting, etc.) and "more difficult" ones (e.g. standing as an elected union official, 
being a union delegate). And finally, Fullagar and Barling (1989) differentiated between 
formal and informal activities: formal ones are activities which are necessary for the union 
to operate effectively and democratically (which are related to Kelly and Kelly's difficult 
ones), and informal activities reflect support for the union but are not necessary for its 
survival.
Concluding, although the concept of multi-dimensionality seems logical, the 
question as to whether the different forms are really statistically independent and have 
different antecedents has not yet been sufficiently tested. There are also criticisms of 
conceptual and statistical grounds. For example Barling et al. (1992:96) argue that the 
orthogonal solution McShane imposes on his data (i.e. that the McShane's participation
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items are unrelated to each other) is unrealistic. In addition, the dichotomous nature of 
McShane's data is said to inhibit the interpretation of factor analysis except for a purely 
heuristic set of criteria. It is difficult if not impossible, according to Barling et al., to 
express dichotomous variables within the factor analytic model. They also emphasize that a 
far greater proportion of the research on union participation has reported unidimensional 
scales (e.g. Fullagar and Barling 1989; Huszczo 1984; Kelloway et al. 1990). The authors 
might be right in arguing that the different forms of participation could be highly 
interrelated, which highlights the need for more research on the facets of participation and 
their possible interrelations (see Fullagar and Barling 1987:68). Furthermore, different 
antecedents for different forms of participation can also provide evidence for the multi­
dimensional nature. For example, it might be that participation in works council rather than 
union activities has different predictors. One explanation could be that a person who 
participates in works council activities might do so because he or she feels committed to the 
well-being of the company, without being attracted to the union.
This study uses participation as an indicator of membership involvement in union and 
works council activities. The possible multi-dimensionality is tested by factor analysis, as 
well as by the possible different antecedents for the different types of participation (see 
McShane 1986:185). The items include participating in strikes and demonstrations, as well 
as standing for works council elections or becoming a union official. The Bodywear 
questionnaire utilized five items adopted from Kelly and Kelly (1993,1994). Three relate to 
works council activities and two to union activities. The GTB questionnaire elaborated on 
the measurement of participation by including more examples of Kelly and Kelly's 
"difficult" activities. Out of the seven items only three were taken from the case study. 
Four dealt with the union and three with the works council.
In addition, the questionnaires included two other variables which provide 
additional information but were not used as dependent variables. Firstly, joining the union 
at Bodywear was investigated with two alternative ranking questions on joining and non­
joining reasons which were adapted from Whitston and Waddington (1994). The variable 
can contribute some additional information about whether people had a more instrumental
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or "collective" attitude towards their membership. Secondly, individual reactions to 
workplace problems was measured in both surveys. The Bodywear survey investigated 
various responses (avoidance, individualistic, collective) to job insecurity at company and 
workplace level. The GTB survey examined various reactions to three workplace problems 
(job insecurity, work pace, unequal pay). The questions were selected from van Vurren et 
al. (1991).
7 .1 .2  Operationalising selected theories of collective activities: the 
independent variables
As noted in the previous chapter, this study focused primarily on the four theories of 
rational choice, social identity, "micro-mobilization" and frustration-aggression. In 
addition, some demographic characteristics were examined. The social psychological 
theories refer to people's attitudes. Attitudes are defined as a "wider compound of values, 
beliefs and feelings and are themselves made up of several components..." (Oppenheim 
1992:175). Thus, the variables of the theories are commonly operationalised by a pool of 
questions (items), i.e. a broad set of attitudes towards the research concept.
Collective instrumentality. Rational choice theory has seldom been systematically 
used in this context. As Newton and Shore (1992) state, there is a lack of adequate 
research on the determinants of instrumentality and its construct validity. Thus, the 
instrumentality or cost-benefit concept is diversely defined and operationalised in various 
studies. Some authors refer to the "instrumentality of trade unions" (DeCotiis and 
LeLouam 1981), or to the "functionality of union activities" (Spinrad 1980), some use the 
"perceived influence of unions" (Glick et al. 1977), or the "perceived value and 
effectiveness of unions" (Anderson 1979; Kolchin and Hyclak 1984; McShane 1986). A 
broader concept is that of "union satisfaction" (Glick et al. 1977; Fiorito et al. 1988). Most 
research refers to union instrumentality only, although Klandermans (1984) focuses on the 
instrumentality of collective action rather than of the institutions and also includes the
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personal costs/benefits of participation and the expectations of the behaviour of the other 
workers.
In addition, the German literature provides no recent quantitiative studies on works 
council instrumentality. Furthermore, most research is US based and examines mainly 
unionisation/joining rather than more diverse participation decisions, which might require a 
different measure of instrumentality.
This study measures collective instrumentality as a multi-dimensional concept. 
Both surveys distinguish between people's perceptions of the instrumentality of the works 
council, of the union and of collective action itself. It is assumed that these variables will 
be strongly correlated. Klandermans' value-expectancy theory is not tested here in detail 
(e.g. this study did not include his "social" and "reward" motives, but included the 
instrumentality of interest institutions which was not tested by Klandermans) (see chapter 
6). However, by including the perceived instrumentality of collective action the study tests 
Klandermans' goal motive variable which has been found to be the most important of his 
model in the study of Kelly and Kelly (1993).
In addition, this study does not differentiate between costs/benefits in terms of the 
individual and the group (which might in certain circumstances differ) (see Elster 1989; 
Kelly and Kelly 1993:5) and utilizes only questions refering to perceived "group" 
instrumentality.
The questions are adapted from Deshpande and Fiorito (1989), Fiorito (1988) and 
Hartley et al. (1991) and are applied to the specific context (e.g. works council). The 
Bodywear survey asked eight questions on works councils, five on the union, and four on 
collective action. The GTB survey included five on works councils, two on the union and 
two on collective action. Only three questions from the case study were kept. The GTB 
survey put more emphasis on the distinction between general perceptions of the works 
council and the union (e.g. "do we need works councils at all?") and on the evaluation of 
the institutions' success with regard to specific issues, such as job security, work load and 
pay (e.g. works council policies concerning overtime pay). This conceptual distinction 
between the general and specific perceptions of collective institutions was introduced by 
Deshpande and Fiorito (1989). They found specific beliefs of union instrumentality to be
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more salient determinants of voting intentions for unionisation in their US sample than 
general beliefs about the union (p. 894) (also Glick et al. 1977:149).175
An additional variable, comparing interest representation in pre- and post-1989, 
was asked in the Bodywear survey with regard to eight workplace issues (adapted from 
Guest and Dewe 1991) in order to provide some additional information, and the variable 
was not used as an independent variable in the statistical analysis.
Social identity. Both surveys distinguish between union and work group identity. 
Bodywear asked seven questions and the GTB survey five different questions on union 
identity, based on Kelly and Kelly (1993) and Kelloway et al. (1992). Union identity is 
commonly operationalized as an affective attachment to the union and is denoted by (i) 
positive attitudes toward the union and its values and goals, (ii) a sense of pride in being a 
member of the union, and (iii) a desire to maintain one's membership (Guest and Dewe 
1991:213).176
Bodywear utilized 12 questions on workgroup identity from Brown et al. (1986) 
and Kelly and Kelly (1993). In contrast the GTB survey kept only one question from the 
case study questionnaire and instead emphasized items of "collectivism". The items were 
modified from Agho et al. (1992), Earley (1993), and Kelly and Kelly (1994, 1993).
175 This goes back to an idea of Fishbein (1967), who suggested that attitudes toward a specific 
behavioural object should be more highly related to behaviours encompassing that object than attitudes 
toward the class of behavioural objects into which the specific object falls.
176 The concept of union identity is similar to that of "union commitment", which is a recent construct in 
social psychology (e.g. Fullagar and Barling 1987; Fukami and Larson 1984; Gordon et al. 
1980,1984,1990), deriving from the concept of organizational commitment (Mowday et al. 1982). The 
original definition by Gordon et al. (1980) consists o f (i) a strong loyalty to the union and a desire to 
remain a member of the union, (ii) a feeling of responsibility towards the union, (iii) a willingness to 
exercise a strong effort on behalf of the union, and (iv) a belief in and acceptance of the values and goals of 
both the individual union and labour movement as a whole.
Thus, union commitment is assumed to be a multi-dimensional concept with an in-built 
behavioural component. The major component in this attitudinal definition is the belief in union values, 
which can be compared with the construct of them/us attitudes or social identity (Kelly and Kelly 1993:4). 
Thus, union commitment is viewed as an affective attachment to the union, thus as a normative or moral 
commitment (Allen and Meyer 1990; Etzioni 1975), as opposed to an instrumental or calculative 
"commitment". With calculative commitment members adjust their level of involvement to match 
inducements, whereas moral involvement is relatively unaffected by changes in rewards.
However, the multi-dimensionality of this definition makes operationalisation difficult and also 
problematic, since it contains both process and outcome dimensions. The desire to maintain membership of 
an organization and also to participate should be a consequence of identifying with the organization (Guest 
and Dewe 1991:78). Union identity therefore refers to a reduced definition of union commitment (Guest and 
Dewe describe it as the core of commitment), and bypasses the confusing relations of union identity, 
commitment and the willingness to participate within the same concept.
1 6 8
There are no questions on identification with the works council, because this concept is not 
appropriate here (the works council is not a membership organisation).
Them-and-us feelings were investigated in both surveys, adapting questions from 
Grant (1992) and Kelly and Kelly (1992b). The GTB survey focused on a comparison 
between former and current them-and-us feelings.
Micro-mobilization. This was differently measured in the two surveys. There are five 
questions in the Bodywear survey dealing with the information flow between collective 
institutions and the workforce. The idea was firstly to capture the extent of information/ 
communication flowing from the interest institutions to the workforce. This was not 
regarded as a significant antecedent, but instead used as an independent piece of 
information, which might also reveal some influence on other antecedents such as 
instrumentality. For example, a weak information flow might inhibit perceptions of the 
collective institutions as instrumental. In addition, three questions dealt with the 
information flow from the workforce to the institutions including the degree of 
involvement of the workforce in discussing union/works council issues amongst each 
other. The argument is that these items (workers' effort to communicate) could be used as 
a proxy for the concept of "collective interests".
Attribution was addressed only in the GTB survey. The study used the three 
workplace grievances, work load, pay and job security, and asked about internal 
controllable and external controllable attributions for these problems.177 Questions are 
based on Klandermans et al. (1991) and also on Zoll et al. (1981:198pp).
Job dissatisfaction and related issues. The Bodywear questionnaire contained eight 
questions on the perceived changes in the work organisation, and these were essentially 
used to check the information given by management and the works council. There were six 
further questions on job satisfaction (with work load, job insecurity and pay). They 
include intrinsic and extrinsic items reflecting the differing results in the literature (see 
chapter 6).
177 It used a simplified version of the conventional, more complicated classification (see chapter 6).
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The GTB survey asked only four questions, two general ones which compare the old times 
with today and two specific ones dealing with work pace and job insecurity (pay is dealt 
with in another section on them-and-us feelings). The questions were selected from the 
Overall Job Satisfaction scale of Warr et al. (1980), developed specifically for use on blue- 
collar workers. They were adapted to the work situation in these textile firms.178
In addition, the Bodywear questionnaire asked also three questions on general 
feelings towards Unification, which were not used in the further analysis.
Demographic variables. The Bodywear survey included eight variables. Four were 
used in further statistical analysis: union membership, age, gender and qualification. 
"Gender" was analysed with great care (due to the small numbers of males, see below) but 
did not show any strange or incoherent results and was therefore kept. The four age 
categories of the questionnaire were also used in the later statistical analysis. The other 
variables were excluded because they displayed no significant variation in the sample: 
department, household earner, position as works councillor or union official, and 
resignation from the FDGB.
The GTB survey included six variables, and used four in further analysis: age, 
gender, works council membership and blue/white collar. A dummy variable was created 
for blue/white collar workers. The other variables were excluded (seniority because it was 
similar to age, and former union activists because the sample was too small).
To conclude, it should be noted that the discussion of the operationalisation of the theories 
revealed a young research area which has not yet developed standardized, long established 
catalogues of questions. Rather, different studies use often different operationalisations of 
the same theories which renders comparisons difficult and which hinders an easy 
adaptation to a new cultural context.
The following table (7.1) provides an overview of the utilization of the discussed 
variables in the further empirical analysis.
178 Based on the information obtained by the pilot study and the interviews at Bodywear.
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table 7.1: overview of the utilization of the variables in the study
variables
PERCEPT
of the
transforming
workplace
TOPICS
IONS 
of the interest 
institutions
REACTIONS 
participation 
in collective 
activities and its 
determinants
HYPO'
individualistic 
attitudes and 
behaviour 
(see chapter 5)
THESES ..........
lion* of'interesf" 
institutions 
(see chapter 3)
instrumentality 
of unions
X X X X
instrumentality 
of w. council
X X X X
instrumentality
of
coll.activities
X X X X
group identity/ 
collectivism
X X X
union identity X X X X
them-us X X X
attribution X X
satisfaction in 
receiving union 
information
X
interest in 
union inform./ 
coll. interests
X X X X
job
dissatisfaction
X X
willingness to 
participate
X X X
PART 3 PART 4 PART 3 and 4
chapter 8 chapter 9 chapter 10, 11
The variables serve the two major topics of the study, the perceptions and the reactions 
towards the transformation of workplace relations. The table also identifies which variables 
examine the two underlying hypotheses, the individualisation of the workforce and the 
institutionalisation of interest representation (see also table 5.3, chapter 5). The following 
discussion of the empirical findings is divided into two parts. Part 3 deals with the 
perceptions of the workers and Part 4 deals with their reaction and its explanations. The
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two underlying hypotheses will be discussed throughout and summarized in the final 
conclusion (chapter 12).
7 .2  Interrelations of the four theories of collective activities: previous 
empirical findings and theoretical propositions
(i) Previous empirical findings
As mentioned in chapter 1 and 6 it is rare for "alternative" theories to be tested together (see 
also Kelly and Kelly 1993:7). The author is not aware of any recent study testing the four 
social psychological theories together. This adds to the above mentioned difficulty of 
comparing the results of this study with those of other studies. Besides, as mentioned 
before, there are no comparable East or West German studies.
Most recent studies concentrate on either union identity (e.g. Kelly and Kelly 1994) 
or instrumentality (e.g. Klandermans 1984b). A few studies however have tested a 
selection of antecedents and come up with mixed results (e.g. Fullagar and Barling 1989; 
Glick et al. 1977; Guest and Dewe 1988; Kelly and Kelly 1993; Klandermans 1986b; 
Kuruvilla et al. 1990; Martin 1986; McShane 1986; van Vuuren et al. 1991). Their results 
will be briefly discussed.
Glick et al.179 examined predictors of three variables, overall satisfaction with the 
union, and two items on participation (willingness to attend union meetings, and 
willingness to represent the union). Six antecedents were used: demographic variables, 
general beliefs about unionism, perceptions of activities in the union (members' influence, 
leadership's effectiveness, sense of harmony among union members etc.), assessments of 
support to participation given by union leaders and by management, job-related factors (job 
tenure, job satisfaction, commitment), and individual need patterns. The result was that 
there were strong positive correlations between measures of individual needs and job
179 Study is based on 185 returned questionnaires of members of a professional engineering union in the 
US.
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related factors and the two items of participation, and with some measures of "perceptions 
of union activities" (e.g. "members' integration and member influence") and general beliefs 
about unionism also achieved significance.
Martin180 tested the propensity to strike against three categories of antecedents: 
demographic, economic (pay), and political variables (support from significant others, 
attitudes towards the union and its union officials181). He found that political variables 
were more important than the others. Yet, these variables were general perceptions and did 
not measure either instrumentality or identity specifically.
McShane182 tested three forms of participation (so-called "administrative" 
participation, attendance at meetings, voting participation) and nine antecedents: education, 
seniority, employment status, salary, distance to the union (kilometres between home and 
union hall), social integration (social attachment to the union branch), value of unions 
(general attitude towards unionism), interest in union business (interest in day-to-day 
union affairs), extrinsic job satisfaction, and job involvement. Education, seniority and 
interest in union business had the most significant positive regression coefficients with 
administrative participation; salary, distance to the union and extrinsic satisfaction had the 
most significant regression coefficients with regard to meeting attendance; and employment 
status was the only significant antecedent with regard to voting participation.
Fullagar and Barling183 measured ten antecedents (race, union socialisation, 
extrinsic and intrinsic job satisfaction, job involvement, life satisfaction, marxist-related 
beliefs, and work ethic beliefs) with regard to union loyalty and union instrumentality, and 
then union loyalty and instrumentality with regard to participation. They argued that both 
union loyalty (identity) and instrumentality had a significant impact on participation, yet 
instrumentality moderated the impact of identity.184 Klandermans (1992) claimed, refering
180 Study is based on 141 returned questionnaires (33%) of the Service Employees International Union in 
the US.
181 E.g. "union officers are interested in the welfare of the rank-and-file workers". Do you agree?
182 Study is based on 297 returned questionnaires (62%) of members of a Canadian Union.
183 study is based on 453 returned questionnaires (38%) of black and white union members in two South 
African factories.
184 They found that both variables were equally important predictors of union participation for white 
manual workers, but found union loyalty was more important than instrumentality for black manual 
workers (due to limited "voice" possibilities).
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to this study and his own research185, that instrumentality, commitment and social 
integration (interaction with others) in the union have a "mutually reinforcing effect on 
sustained participation" if participation is regarded positively (p. 190). However he did not 
investigate this further.
Guest and Dewe186 argued that instrumentality is the main correlate for remaining 
in membership, yet this study suffers from deficient measurements of the two concepts 
(e.g. union identity is for example operationalised with "father's occupation", "vocational 
education" and "perceptions of social inequalities in UK"), and its dependent variable is 
not "participation" but staying in the union.
Kelly and Kelly187 tested Klandermans' expectancy-value theory and contrasted it 
to social identity theory and showed convincingly that union identity is the crucial 
determinant for participation. They also found some moderating effect of union identity for 
the goal motive only.
Kuruvilla et al.188 examined predictors of union participation in Japan measuring 
demographic variables, job-related variables, union attitudes (attitudes toward union 
leader, identification with local union, perceived value of unionism), social integration in 
the workplace (similar to group identity), and perception of union-management relations. 
They found that in general union attitudes variables are better predictors of participation 
than demographic or job-related variables, and that the union identity variables scored 
higher than union instrumentality variables.
1 fiQFinally, van Vuuren et al. examined variables of attribution of job insecurity, 
and cost/benefit perceptions of collective action in a sample of employees who perceive a 
high level of job insecurity. Cost/benefit perceptions were stronger predictors than causal 
attributions but both were significant and accounted for 43% of the variance in collective 
action.
185 Longitudinal study (1984) based on interviews/questionnaires (66-80% response rate) of members o f a 
Dutch union.
186 Study is based on 716 returned questionnaires of union members and non members of three UK based 
plants.
187 Study based on 350 returned questionnaires (39.15%) of a British trade union.
188 Study based on over 6600 returned questionnaires (78%) of Japanese union members from 18 
companies (in 32 sites).
189 Study based on 311 structured interviews (72%) of employees of three Dutch companies.
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Overall, these studies came up with mixed results and are difficult to compare because they 
use different variables and sometimes operationalize the same variable differently. This is 
also pointed out by Kuruvilla et al. (1990:375) who argue that diverse orientations coupled 
with alternative disciplinary orientations have resulted in studies that differ in the 
participation measures and antecedent or correlate measures used. For example, only the 
studies by Fullagar and Barling, Kelly and Kelly and Kuruvilla et al. have tested two major 
concepts proposed, rational choice and social identity, together. Both concepts were found 
to be significant in these three studies. Instrumentality was more significant than identity as 
an antecedent in Fullagar and Barling, but it was less significant than identity in Kelly and 
Kelly and Kuruvilla et al..
Furthermore, most of the above studies did not investigate possible interrelations of 
these theories (e.g. Kuruvilla et al. ibid.). Exceptions are Kelly and Kelly (1993) who 
propose that the link between value-expectancy calculations and participation might be 
moderated by social identity, and Fullagar and Barling (ibid.) who suggest that 
instrumentality moderates the influence of union loyalty (identity) on participation. Thus, 
union identity may not exist in the absence of positive outcomes or rewards from the 
union. Both studies found some evidence for their hypotheses. Yet, both studies tested 
only their a priori assumptions, not whether the moderating effect was also possible the 
other way around. For example, Kelly and Kelly did not investigate whether the perception 
of instrumentality had any effect on union identity, and Fullagar and Barling did not 
investigate whether identity had a different effect on instrumentality. However, Fullagar 
and Barling admitted that despite their longitudinal data a competing causal model could be 
consistent with their data (p.224).190
One might however question the longitudinal character of their study. It consisted o f a survey 
conducted twice with 8 months in between, a period which might be criticized as being too short for 
signficiant changes in attitudes (especially if there was no major event such as a strike occuring during that 
time).
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(ii) Theoretical propositions
The literature's conceptual treatment of the theories' interrelations is not yet well advanced. 
There are a few recent attempts to create models of collective action in the "mobilization" 
literature (e.g. McAdam 1988; Snow et al. 1986; Tilly 1978). For example, Snow et al. 
(1986:476) propose five basic collective beliefs people must have in order to become 
active: (i) common beliefs about the seriousness of the problem/grievance (also Gamson et 
al. 1982; McAdam 1982; Piven and Cloward 1977); (ii) beliefs about the locus of causality 
or blame (also Ferree and Miller 1985; Piven and Cloward 1977; Zurcher and Snow 1981);
(iii) stereotypical beliefs about antagonists or targets of influence (also Turner and Killian 
1957); (iv) beliefs about the probability of change and the efficacy of collective action (also 
Klandermans 1983; Oberschall 1980; Olson 1965; Piven and Cloward 1977); and (v) 
beliefs about the necessity and propriety of "standing up" (also Oliver 1984; Piven and 
Cloward 1977). Furthermore, Kelly (1996, chp. 5:7) interprets McAdam as proposing a 
path from "perceived illegitimacy" to "social identity" to "social attribution" to "cost/benefit 
calculations" to "collective action". Yet, these attempts remain in most cases merely lists of 
variables without explanations for their interrelations.
Moreover, there is some interest in the association between the two variables, 
identity and instrumentality, but most accounts remain rather vague. For example Etzioni 
(1975) suggests that "moral and calculative involvements" may interact with each other, 
but does not outline how. More specifically, Guest and Dewe (1988:179) note that cost- 
benefit calculations, union identity and also job dissatisfaction are "competing 
explanations, but not necessarily mutually exclusive". Others suggest that instrumentality 
and "normative attachments" may arise or exist concurrently (Summers et al. 1986; 
Zalesny 1985).
Some authors outline more detailed theoretical assumptions. For example, Newton 
and McFarlane Shore (1992:280) suggest a causal arrow from "instrumentality based" 
membership to "ideologically based" membership. Thus, they argue that it is unlikely for a 
strong ideologically based membership to develop unless the newcomer also has strong 
instrumentality beliefs (p. 293). Instrumental beliefs are a precursor to the development of
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identity/ideological beliefs but do not ensure this development. Their model however has 
not been empirically tested.
Klandermans (e.g. 1989, 1992,1995) proposes "a comprehensive approach" to be 
necessary for the study of theories of participation. As will be remembered, he uses 
rational choice theory, interactionist theory ("social motives") and frustration-aggression 
theory which "each make their own contribution to the social psychology of union 
participation" (1995:4). He claims that the empirical data in union studies show that either 
the "cost/benefit theory" or the "commitment theory" are able to explain membership 
behaviour (e.g. leaving the union in the study by Van der Veen and Klandermans, 
1989:192). Yet, in explaining the link between the two concepts he applies Fishbein and 
Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action as his master frame (1995:4). He argues that the 
two theories are not in conflict, but that the concept of commitment (and the theory of 
frustration-aggression) can be used to complement to the cost/benefit theory, i.e. both 
influence the motivation to participate but the cost/benefit calculation is the most influential 
factor (1995:ibid.). He also acknowledges (which shows a significant extension of his 
earlier work) that the social environment determines the value of the costs and benefits 
(being socially constructed) (p.5).
In sum, it seems safe to say that the studies either do not deal with possible empirical 
interrelations at all (e.g. Kuruvilla et al.) or the superiority of "instrumentality" is assumed 
but not further tested. This study in contrast tests the possible interrelations between 
instrumentality and identity and other independent variables.
The study predicts that instrumentality and identity are interrelated and mutually 
reinforce the willingness to participate, and thus does not provide a priori assumption that 
one variable leads over the other. In other words, it is assumed that workers' perceptions 
of collective instrumentality are influenced by the degree of their social identities (e.g. 
union identity), and union identity is influenced by their perceptions of the interest 
institutions and of collective action. Thus, with regard to the East German context, 
workers who identify with their new unions (perhaps because they have already identified 
with the union movement in former times or because they have established in the last five
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years an increasing loyalty and identification with the union as a new social group) might 
be seeing the effectiveness of the union and the works council in a more positive light than 
their colleagues who are not in the union or who are union members out of calculative 
reasons only. At the same time, workers who have good experiences of the interest 
institutions might increase their emotional affiliation to the union.
Furthermore, the study also examines possible interrelations between the other 
independent variables, which are sometimes mentioned in the literature but not really 
tested. The following intercorrelations seem possible:
As mentioned in the previous literature review union identity, work group identity 
and them-and-us feelings should interrelate (see also Kelly and Kelly 1994). Them-and-us 
feelings should also be related to job dissatisfaction (see ibid.:6), thus workers with a high 
degree of job dissatisfaction should also have strong them-and-us feelings. Them-and-us 
feelings might also relate to the attribution variables. Thus, stronger them-and-us feelings 
should correlate with external attributions of work problems (see Hewstone 1988:173; 
Kelly 1996, chp.5:14; Waddington 1987 for the application of this in a case study). 
Furthermore, attribution and union/workgroup identity might be interrelated. McAdam 
(1988:137) argues that the tendency of people to explain their situation as a function of 
individual rather than situational factors is more likely to occur under conditions of 
personal isolation than of integration.191 Finally, collective interests might be linked to 
social identity. McAdam (1988) argues that the recognition of collective interests is more 
likely to occur in groups with strong group identity. In the absence of strong interpersonal 
links to others, people are likely to feel powerless to change conditions even if they 
perceive present conditions to be favourable to such efforts (also Ferree and Miller 
1985:46). In other words, even if cognitive alternatives are seen, a strong group identity 
seems still necessary in order to make people active.
Before introducing the methodology of the two surveys, it might be useful to briefly sum 
up the last two sections (7.1 and 7.2). There are two main conclusions. Firstly
1^1 The practical significance of this relationship comes from the fact that only external attribution affords 
the necessary rationale for movement activity. Thus, changes of external attribution are greatest in groups 
with a strong group identity (Ferree and Miller 1977:34).
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operationalising the social psychological theories requires a rather inventive adaptation of 
previous sets of items, which is partly due to the lack of well-established sets of items and 
partly due to the fact that these theories have not yet been tested in the East German 
context. Secondly, testing the four theories together in this post-socialist context and 
examining their possible interrelations should contribute to the general literature on 
collective participation. Finally, examining the determinants of peoples' willingness to 
become active also serves the understanding whether East German workers are becoming 
individualistic. This will be further discussed in chapter 11.
7 .3  Methodology of the two workforce surveys
7 .3 .1  Methodology of the Bodywear survey
The case study consisted of a questionnaire of a sample of blue collar workers, conducted 
in summer 1993 and which was piloted in spring 1993 (with 60 workers), and interviews 
of a selected group of blue collar workers, conducted in 1993 and 1994. The two 
methodologies used were complementary, however the quantitative data was given the 
primary reference. A copy of the questionnaire, of the pilot questionnaire, and the 
interview guidelines can be found in the appendix (A 2).
Bodywear questionnaire. 400 questionaires were distributed by the author during 
working time to all blue-collar workers (union and non-union members) present, i.e. in all 
major departments and in all of the working shifts. The author collected 305 questionnaires 
the next day, out of which 291 were suitable to be used for further analysis. This gives a 
return rate of 72.80 % of the distributed questionnaires and 59.40 % of the total population 
(blue collar workforce of Bodywear in March 1993: 490 blue collar workers). This return 
rate is very high (e.g. 26% in Fullagar and Barling 1989; 39.15% in Kelly and Kelly 
1994).
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The survey contains mostly Likert scale attitudinal questions192, but also several ranking, 
rating and yes/no questions193. It is important to note that such scales yield information 
about individuals relative to each other, not in absolute terms.
There were 109 questions altogether. The sections of the questionnaire were 
structured according to the variables of the four social psychological theories 
(instrumentality, identity, attribution, information, job dissatisfaction). As also mentioned 
earlier, five additional topics were included: "individual reactions to workplace problems", 
"joining the union", "interest representation", and "general attitudes towards the political 
Unification". There was a mixture of positive and negative questions. The latter were 
sometimes changed back in the later analysis (e.g. factor analysis).
Bodywear interviews. The qualitative research consisted of several informal 
discussions with blue-collar workers during work, loosely-structured, open-ended 
interviews with a selection of 15 workers (dyers, sewers and knitters) (in a separate room 
during work time) in 1993, and structured in-depth, one/two hour interviews with ten 
sewers in a separate room during work time in 1994, all of which were taped.194 
Interviewees were asked to volunteer by both the supervisors and the author. The aim was 
to speak to those who had been working before 1989, both troublemakers as well as more 
malleable workers. Obviously, this small sample of interviews cannot claim
192 Scales of attitudes are widely seen as the best way to ensure the validity and reliablity requirements of 
attitudinal research (e.g. Oppenheim 1992). The most frequently used technique is Likert scaling, in which 
the subjects place themselves on an attitude scale. This has the advantage of not requiring researchers to 
position attitudes, and can also be used in additional scaling techniques such as factor analysis.
193 Ranking simply means arranging responses in order with regard to some common issue, without 
actually putting a value on that order, whereas rating gives a numerical value to some kind of judgement 
(see in more detail Bailey 1994:78-79).
194 It should be noted that the quality of the interviews could have been improved. Interviews conducted 
after work at workers' homes might have provided better access to what really goes on in people's minds 
than the interviews conducted at work. Furthermore, there is also a general problem with interviews in East 
Germany in that it is difficult to judge how far people's views really express their beliefs. This is a general 
problem of qualitative studies. Yet, one got the feeling that these workers were especially keen to please 
the interviewers and thus tried to anticipate what the interviewer wanted them to say. For example, it was 
often difficult to convince sewers to agree to an interview, even though the author was not a total stranger 
to them by 1994 and it was an entirely voluntary decision with time given for the interview and no 
disadvantage for the balancing of their day pieces. Asking the ones who agreed about this reluctance, it 
became clear that many were just frightened that this would be an examination, and they were not sure what 
kind of questions they would be asked and whether they would be able to answer. The fear that this would 
be reported back to the management was hard to overcome.
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representativeness for the whole workforce, yet provided sufficient insights for the 
purpose of this study.
The main purpose of the preliminary interviews (spring 1993) was to get a 
preliminary feel of "what is going on" at workplace level and the material gathered was 
used in designing the questionnaire. Thus, it clarified the core questions to be asked 
regarding the variables which were to be tested. The results of these interviews along with 
the pilot questionnaire suggested that the above outlined attitudinal questions were required 
in the questionnaire.
The later interviews (Summer 1993, 1994) were intended to explore further 
questions the survey had left open or actually raised in order to facilitate the interpretation 
of the quantitative data. These topics were: (i) workplace relations in the former times, 
especially with regard to workgroup solidarity; (ii) expectations and hopes during the 
turnaround (Autumn/Winter 1989) with regard to desired changes at the workplace; (iii) 
current workgroup relations (supporting/correcting the results of the survey); (iv) current 
workplace problems and individual reactions; and (v) general perceptions of changes in 
their lives after Unification.
In addition, they were used as an indicator of the reliablity, i.e. coherence of 
people’s attitudes after one year. The interview data of both years did not show significant 
differences and this indicates a certain continuity of the attitudes and behavioural patterns 
of the sample. It also supports a comparison of the quantitative data between the Bodywear 
study and the GTB survey which was conducted a year later. The interview data of both 
years are integrated in the discussion of the questionnaires in chapters 8 and 9.
7 .3 .2  Methodology of GTB survey
The GTB questionnaire was designed after a preliminary analysis of the Bodywear results. 
The questionnaire was developed to expand on issues not covered sufficiently in the case 
study survey (e.g. section on "attribution"). It left out issues not directly linked to the 
approaches on collective activities to be tested (e.g. reasons for joining), and overall tried
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to improve the measures of all concepts (e.g. participation). The consequence is a 
diminished comparability of the two surveys. However, both surveys emphasized slightly 
different issues. The GTB survey concentrated on measuring the proposed antecedents of 
participation, whereas the case study questionnaire focused on describing workers' 
perceptions of workplace relations.
Yet, although an improvement compared to the Bodywear survey this questionnaire 
can only be seen as a first attempt to survey participation patterns in a German/post­
socialist context (having in mind the lack of previous studies in Germany and the general 
lack of standardized sets of questions).
The questionnaire was distributed through the union machinery and works councils to 
union members in 53 randomly selected textile (including clothing) firms of the South-East 
district of the GTB in East Germany in early summer 1994.433 completed questionnaires 
were returned. With regard to the entire membership at that time (14,425 employed union 
members of the district) this makes 3% of the population. The exact return rate is unknown 
since it was beyond the authors' control to monitor how many questionnaires were actually 
copied and distributed in these firms. The chief union official estimated that around 1000 
questionnaires were distributed, which would result in a return rate of 43%. Etzel and 
Walker (1974) claimed that a "normal" return rate for mailed surveys of union members is 
between 10-30%.
It should be emphasized that the study cannot claim representativeness for the 
whole workforce of the East German textile sector. However, by using various 
methodologies of a qualitative and quantitative nature (e.g. expert interviews, cross-firm 
survey and case study) it was assured that the survey succeeded in providing a valid 
characterisation of the workforce, and in particular of the union membership in that 
industry. A further possible weak point is that only loyal union members (and/or to the 
works council) might have responded to the GTB survey, as happened in Gordon et al.'s 
(1980) study. Yet, the substantial variance in the responses makes this possibility unlikely.
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Virtually all questions were answered on 5-point Likert scales. Thus, the ranking and 
rating questions were excluded since it transpired that they were difficult to use in testing 
the antecedents of some concepts. The GTB questionnaire comprised 71 questions, which 
is around a third less than that in the case study. This seemed to be a necessary measure 
since the questionnaire was not distributed personally. The questionnaire covered the four 
antecedents, collective instrumentality, social identity, "micro-mobilization" and job 
dissatisfaction. Furthermore, an additional issue "individual reactions to workplace 
problems" (pace of work, job security, pay level)195 was explored.
7 .3 .3  Demographic characteristics of the two samples
The Bodywear sample consisted of 93.4% females and 6.6% males (N=286). This was 
overrepresentative with regard to the female rate of 84% of the total workforce (blue and 
white collar in all departments), but in line with the female ratio in the largest department, 
sewing, of 96%. The departmental and age distributions (table 7.2) indicated that the 
sample was roughly representative. Seniority was only asked for in the pilot study 
(appendix A 2.1), since its distribution was equivalent to the age distribution. The 
workforce was highly skilled which is typical for East Germany (see Blaschke et al. 
1990:23). The questionnaire did not subdivide occupational training in different 
professions and job specific training.
table 7.2: levels of departments, age, qualification of the Bodywear survey
departments
(N=291)
1993
sample population (blue 
collar workforce)
sewing 81.1 % 77 %
dyeing 4.8 % 6 %
knitting 2.7 % 3 %
rest196 11.4 % 13 %
195 These grievances were most frequently mentioned by the interviewed workers at Bodywear and present 
three o f the classical workplace grievances (the fourth one is "control over work" which was not a prime 
issue) (see also Hartley et al. 1991).
19  ^Goods reception, stocking, quality/packing control, trimmings/ tayloring
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age (N=248) 
1993
sample population (blue 
collar)
1- 30 years 21.8 % 25 %
31 -4 0  years 35.1 % 28 %
4 1 -5 0  years 29.4 % 32%
51- years 13.7 % 15%
qualifications
(N=254)
1993
sample sewing (population)
.
total population (blue 
collar)
unskilled/ on 
the job training
30.3 % 11 % 11 %
skilled
(apprenticeship
university)
69.7 % 67 % in sewing 
22 % other 
profession
65 % job related 
24 % other 
profession
Furthermore, the majority of the workers (59.5%) lived in two eamer-households, 31% in 
one eamer-households (N=252). 1.7% currently held a works council or union post (past 
positions were not asked for) (N=290), which was representative (13 blue collar council 
members out of 490 blue collars). 45.2% were union members (GTB), 54.4% were not 
members (N= 270). The union members were overrepresented because the union density 
of Bodywear was around 32% according to the works council. 48.2% said that they had 
resigned from the former FDGB, 43.5% said they had not (N= 253). There is 
unfortunately no data available on how many people did voluntarily resign from the FDGB 
in 1989/1990. T-tests (see appendix A 2.6) revealed that non-union members were more 
likely to have resigned from the FDGB, that union members were older, and that older 
workers were more likely to be union members.
The GTB sample consisted of 75.4% females and 24.6% males (N=403), which was 
somewhat non-representative of the population (the official female rate of the GTB East in 
1992 was 77%). The author had no information on the representativeness of the age 
distribution of textile companies in this area, but it was similar to the case study 
distribution: 12.4% were under 30 years, 39.6% were between 30-40 years, 27% between 
41-50 years and 21% were more than 51 years old (N=404). Seniority was similar: 11%
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had worked in their current company for 5 years or less, 14.1% have worked 5-10 years, 
35.9% 10-20 years and 39% worked 20 years or more (N= 326). There were no questions 
on qualification, department, and the number of household members. Qualification levels 
were generally high, and did not show any significant impact in the regression analysis of 
the case study (see chapter 11). Similarly, the number of household members and 
department did not show any impact. Instead of department this survey asked for 
employees' professional classification: 80% were blue collar workers, 5.4% supervisors 
and 14.1% administrative officers ("Verwaltungsangestellter", white collar) (N= 405). 
26.5% were present or past works council members, which represents an 
overrepresentation (there were around 6% works councillors of total employed union 
membership of the GTB district) (N=404), 9% were union officials (overrepresentative) 
(N=402), and 17.6% were former active union members (BGL) (N= 408). These figures 
were also higher compared to the Bodywear sample. Virtually no respondent filled out the 
companys' name, which prevented a correlation of workers' and works councillors' 
questionnaires of the same company (see chapter 4). Finally, t-tests (see appendix A 2.6) 
revealed that males were more often works council members and were slightly older than 
females. Older employees had been more active in the BGL, and they were more often 
supervisors than younger employees. Works council members were more often union 
officials, and had been also more active in the BGL than non works council members. 
Consequently, former BGL activists were more often union officials and more often works 
council members than non activists.
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CONCLUSION OF PART 2 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STUDYING 
WORKERS’ PERCEPTIONS AND REACTIONS TOWARDS THE 
TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Part 2 has dealt with the conceptual and operational issues of examining workers' 
perceptions and reactions toward the transformation of workplace relations. Chapter 5 
summarized the existing findings and hypotheses of East German workers' attitudes and 
behaviour and characterized the individualisation of the workforce as one major hypothesis 
in the literature. Chapter 6 outlined the four social psychological theories of collective 
participation, which will be used to structure the discussion of workers' perceptions and to 
explain the variation in workers' willingness to participate. And finally chapter 7 focused 
on the operationalisation of the theories in the East German context and formulated some 
hypotheses regarding the interrelations of the variables. The major hypothesis is that the 
variables, social identity and collective instrumentality, are strongly interrelated and might 
mutually reinforce people's willingness to participate in collective activities. Testing the 
theories of participation contributes to the question whether East German workers are 
becoming individualistic (e.g. their willingess to participate is determined by instrumental 
factors only) and examines their cross-applicability in a new cultural context. Finally, the 
chapter introduced the methodology and demographic characteristics of the two surveys.
The next two parts will deal with the surveys' data sets. Part 3 discusses the textile 
workers' perceptions of the transformation, and part 4 investigates their reactions (i.e. 
willingness to participate in collective activities) and the determinants of collective 
participation.
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PART 3 
WORKERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF 
THE TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE RELATIONS
Part 3 discusses the two data sets with regard to workers' perceptions of the organisational 
transformation (chapter 8) and of the new interest representation (chapter 9). Thus, it looks 
at the organisational transformation from the viewpoint of the workforce, and analyses the 
relationships between workforce and works council and union from a workers' 
perspective. The two major hypotheses which this study investigates are discussed 
throughout: the "individualisation" of the workforce and the "institutionalisation", i.e. 
acceptance of the new interest organisations. However as will be remembered from table 
7.1, the variables cannot be divided neatly according to the two hypotheses because most 
variables serve both hypotheses. We will therefore discuss the questionnaires variable by 
variable rather than hypothesis by hypothesis. The final chapter of Part 4 will summarize 
the findings related to the two hypotheses.
Both questionnaires, Bodywear and GTB, are separately discussed for each 
variable (the discussion of the Bodywear questionnaire incorporates also the data of the 
interviews with the selected workers). The statistical tools are simple frequencies and also 
t-tests which are presented in more detail in the appendix (A 2.6).
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Chapter 8 Transformation of the work organisation from the point of 
view of the workforce: the case study and the GTB survey
Workers' attitudes towards the transformation of the work organisation includes workers' 
relationship with management, their relationship with other colleagues and their attitudes 
towards their work. The data contributes to the discussion of the mainly institutional 
literature of the organisational transformation (which was briefly reviewed in chapter 3), 
and also to the few empirical studies of workers' attitudes after Unification outlined in 
chapter 5.
The frequencies of five variables of the Bodywear and GTB questionnaire are 
discussed: job dissatisfaction (8.1), them-and-us feelings (8.2), general attitudes toward 
Unification (8.3), workgroup identity and related issues (8.4), and causal attributions of 
workplace problems (8.5).
8.1 Job dissatisfaction and other job-related issues
(i) Bodywear survey
There are two sections, one dealing with workers' perceptions of the organisational 
changes at their workplaces (table 8.1.1) in order to confirm the information given by the 
management at Bodywear (chapter 4), and the other with workers' feelings towards those 
changes (table 8.1.2).
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table 8.1.1: level of items of perceived changes in the work organisation of B o d y w e a r  197
./.
strongly
disagree
disagree no vtew agree strongly
agree
N ....
B The quality of work has become more 
important than before.
5.6 7.3 1.0 24 .0 6 2 .0 287
D We have to be more flexible today. 3.2 3.5 2.8 14.1 76.3 283
X You have to concentrate so much on your 
work, that there is hardly time to have a chat.
2.1 3.9 1.1 21.8 7 1 .2 285
E If you do not work hard, you get fired. 2.1 5.6 8.4 32.9 5 1 .0 286
AD Most people do not work anymore with 
their former workfellows.
7.4 5.3 13.7 16.1 57.5 285
H There is more emphasis on health and safety 
issues today.
31.6 26.7 12.3 23.2 6.3 285
G Formerly we had more control about when 
and how we work.
19.4 16.9 8.5 33.1 22 .2 284
C Supervisors and managers are more strict 
than before.
6.4 11.0 6.4 33.8 42 .3 281
There is strong evidence that from the viewpoint of the workforce working conditions at 
Bodywear have changed dramatically over the last years. The questionnaire did not ask 
about the "material" changes such as new premises, machines, better materials, tools etc. 
(the interviews revealed that these were welcomed by the workforce), but dealt with the 
more "intrinsic" changes of working conditions.
Most workers were working with new colleagues, which confirms management's 
statements of a reshuffling of the workforce (see chapter 4). In terms of work content there 
were increasing pressures for better quality, quantity and flexibility, all leading to a higher 
work pace. A majority feared that they were at risk of being dismissed if they did not 
comply. Yet, health and safety issues were not seen to be more of a priority of 
management today. These changes of working conditions have also been confirmed in the 
interviews (e.g. knitter no 1 1993; sewer no 3 1993). However everybody put great 
emphasis on the fact that they also worked hard in former times, "we had to work before 
as well!" Yet, the workers agreed that the pace of work before was nevertheless more
197 All following tables show frequencies in percentage, the single letters mark the question (see 
questionnaires in appendix A 2.2, 2.3), N = number of valid cases (Bodywear sample = 291, GTB sample =  
433). Figures mentioned in the text are the cumulated sums of the positive (strongly agree and agree) or 
negative answers.
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"easy going", more "human". This conviction has been also found in other studies (e.g. 
Altetal. 1994:33).
Furthermore, over a half argued that they had more control over their work before 
than today. An obvious example are the workers who are no longer allowed to sew as they 
like, but must instead apply "scientifically" approved sewing methods (see chapter 
4:4.3.27). This is also reported in the study of Diewald et al. (1995:312)198 who found 
48% of their sample workers claimed that external control had increased considerably.
Finally, supervisors were perceived to be more strict, which corresponds with the 
supervisors' own views (see chapter 4:4.4). In general, changes in management style were 
perceived as one of the major consequences of the transformation from a "socialist" to a 
"capitalist" workplace: "they behave differently, have a different tone now". Supervisors 
agreed: "You have now more respect of them [managers]" (supervisor 2 in dyeing 1993). 
However, this does not necessarily indicate that the former socialist workplace relations 
were characterized by a "passive strength" of workers and weak supervisors, as outlined 
in chapter 2 (e.g. Heidenreich 1991c). In contrast, the interviews suggested that most 
supervisors of Bodywear were accepted authorities also in former days. Supervisors 
distributed for example the work also in former times without consulting workers (see 
chapter 4:4.4), see also question on employee involvement below). Thus, it seems safe to 
conclude that "informal power" of workers existed - if at all - in extending the breaks, 
having chats during work and having a more relaxed attitude towards work.
In sum, this data confirmed the information given by management and works 
councillors (see chapter 4) in terms of intensified work pace and tighter control by 
supervisors and management and indicated the scope and direction of the organisational 
changes at Bodywear. The work organisation has become more efficient due to 
rationalisation and intensification of work, better quality of production and tighter control 
by management.
The next section (table 8.1.2) deals with workers' subjective feelings towards the 
changing organisation of their work.
Sample of 1254 employees, the study has been discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
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table 8.1.2: level of items of job dissatisfaction and other job-related issues at Bodywear
J.
strongly
disagree
disagree no view agree strongly N
A Work load is heavier than in former times 
and there is more pressure to perform.
2.1 4.2 2.4 25.5 65.7 286
I Formerly you also had fun while working, 
today you only work for the money.
6.3 9.8 1.0 33.4 49.5 287
J You have the constant fear of getting sacked. 3.8 7.0 1.4 27.2 60.6 287
CF "My current pay level is justified". 41.2 16.8 3.4 21.0 4.8 254
CG What is your index/comparison, if you want to show the justice/injustice 
of your pay level? (only one number p l e a s e )  199
236
1 my former pay level in the GDR = 2.1 %
2 the other pay groups at Bodywear and their 
work requirements/ performance = 5.5 %
3 the other workers in my group who conduct 
less machines/ have easier jobs = 5.5 %
4 the pay I would earn in (West German 
headquarters) for the same job = 70.3%
5 different (specifv) = 1.7%
L I prefer a free Saturday to additional income. 4.9 5.6 3.5 26.0 56.1 285
The changes at their workplaces (see above) made a large majority feel more pressure at 
work and a loss of "happiness", and that they had become more "materialistic" in terms of 
their work motivation (in contrast to their supervisors who perceived no changes in their 
motivation to work, chapter 4:4.4). Also Diewald et al. (1995:313) found that their 
workers have less "fun" coming from work.
The Bodywear survey did not ask specifically if people were content with the 
changing work pace and job requirements. Interviews were seen as more appropriate in 
dealing with this issue. In summer 1994 the major topic in the sewing plant was the 
constantly increasing pressures to work better and achieve higher output norms. The 
interviewed sewers were uniformly frustrated: "We are only machines anymore"; "it's so 
stressful, it is not fun anymore" (sewer no 2,3). A few even admitted that they sometimes 
cried at work. Asked whether they like working for Bodywear, most denied that they did: 
"You have learned here that human beings are exchangeable. In the GDR it always was the
199 The results reported are of the 85.2% who chose correctly one number only, 14.8% chose two or three 
numbers, which are not reported here (% of 236 people answered).
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saying that nobody is exchangeable." (sewer no 6 1994); "It is a sad feeling. You are just a 
production factor. Not a human being. Something is missing." (sewer no 3 1994). "I 
came, I earn my money, I leave" (sewer no 4 1994). Most of those interviewed agreed that 
they would work for another company for more money, but many made this conditional 
on working conditions (shift work, transport to work, work atmosphere) and most 
importantly job security. If they had enough money some would also stop working (sewer 
no 4, 7 1994), but most said they would continue at least for a few hours, since "we are 
used to work". "Formerly 'not working' was regarded as an 'anti-social' behaviour" 
(sewer no 3 1994).
Summing up, the work pace was perceived as inhuman and the interviewees often 
appeared to be losing any hope of coping with the increasing pressure. Diewald et al. 
(ibid.) found their sample similarly suffering under the increasing work pressure (63% of 
skilled workers).
The remaining questions concerned job security and pay. Nearly 90% perceived a constant 
fear of losing their job. This is a surprising figure, since by the summer of 1993 
Bodywear had had nearly no redundancies in the previous two years (especially compared 
with most other companies in the area or in the overall textile sector). Those interviewed 
however tended to compare their job security with the old socialist conditions of complete 
job security instead of comparing their situation with other companies.
Most workers were also discontented with the pay, which is in line with other 
studies (see chapter 5, e.g. Andretta et al. 1994). This was also evident in the interviews, 
especially in 1993. Pay was considerably lower than in company's main plant in West 
Germany which was used as a benchmark by most of the workers. The comparison with 
the West is a common finding in East Germany (e.g. Andretta et al. 1994; Lungwitz 
1994:302). Workers argued that although they have the same qualifications and do the 
same job they are not equally paid, despite the fact that their living costs are rising 
disproportionally to their wages. Interestingly, almost nobody compared his/her current 
pay with their former pay level. Surely, this comparison is difficult to make. For example, 
even if people earn more now than before, the disproportionate increase of the living costs
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means that their net income might not have increased at all. On the other hand people can 
buy more and "better" consumer goods, but their consumer demands might have increased 
as well. Thus, the question "are you better off today?" is difficult to answer and depends 
on people's subjective evaluations (see also Freeman 1993).
However, perceiving your wage level as unjustified is a relative evaluation and 
does not say anything about the absolute amount. Asked how far they were prepared to 
work Saturdays for additional pay (an important topic at that time), the majority of them 
preferred a free Saturday, and wanted to have Saturday working as a voluntary option. 
This might be interpreted as an indicator that they did earn enough money. Yet, it could 
also mean that the work load during the week was heavy enough, and people wanted the 
weekend to recover.
Furthermore, the interviews revealed that workers did not seem to have problems 
with the fact that administration and white collar staff earn more money than production 
workers, which is the reverse of the situation in the old GDR (see chapter 2). However, 
Alt et al. (1994:170) explained that blue collar workers do not see the increasing 
differentiation between staff as something new, but rather as a continuation of former 
times: the status difference was always there, and the pay difference now adds to it. Thus, 
the blue collar workers of their study did not see themselves as having been the privileged 
employee group in former times, but rather as the breadwinners of the administrative staff. 
The interviews at Bodywear supported this observation. For example, one sewer declared, 
"we always had to pay for the administrative overhead" (sewer no 4 1994).
In addition, sewers did not grumble about their pay being lower than that of the 
other occupations in the same company (e.g. dyer, knitter), although in the "private" 
opinion of some management, they ought to earn the same. However, this discriminatory 
job evaluation (sewer= females, dyer= predominantly males) existed already in the GDR, 
and is the norm in West Germany as well. Moreover, the plants are geographically too far 
away for contact and comparison to be done easily.
One should note a difference between the interviews in 1993 and 1994. In 1993 the 
most important grievance was pay, in 1994 it was the increasing work pace. Whereas in 
1993 workers were more or less content with their work, in 1994 all the sewers were
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complaining. A reason could be the increasing efforts of management to foster productivity 
during 1994 (e.g. by having individual talks with bad performers, see chapter 4) as a 
response to the more competitive external and internal (within the holding companies) 
economic situation. However, in both years people displayed strong grievances with 
regard to the three classical areas: work pace, pay and job security.200
Finally, a topic, which was not asked in the questionnaire, but touched on in the 
interviews was how far worker were dissatisfied with the degree to which they were 
involved in the organisational changes and indeed whether "employee involvement" was 
generally practiced. The interviewees in overall did not feel that they had been involved in 
the company decision-making in former times nor were they involved now. However, 
they did not seem to be interested in this topic. One sewer even argued, "there should not 
be workers deciding, since a bit of order is necessary." (sewer nol 1994). Yet, in the 
survey a third saw employee involvement as a precondition to make the firm competitive 
(see question BW, chapter 10). This is in line of Jander et al.'s (1992:4) proposition that if 
East German employees are given the chance to participate in the restructuring of the firms 
they are very happy to do so.
(ii) GTB survey
table 8.1.3: level of items of job dissatisfaction in the GTB firms
./ .
strongly
disagree
disagree no view agree S g,y N
A All in all our work situation is better today 
than in the former socialist enterprise.
31.4 34.0 4 .7 26.7 3.3 424
B "Capitalist" enterprises treat their 
employees more fairly than did former 
"socialist" enterprises.
39.8 36.1 9 .4 12.4 2.3 427
G I am dissatisfied with how hard I have to 
work now.
14.2 18.0 5.2 32.5 30.1 422
I I am constantly worried about losing my job. 7 .0 7.7 3.3 22.1 60 .0 430
H I am paid a fair wage. 65.7 19.2 3.5 8.4 3.3 428
200 'j’his result is congruent with the results of the pilot study (May 1993), which predominantly examined 
working conditions and job satisfaction.
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This survey was not concerned with the perceived changes in the organisation of work, 
but with attitudinal reactions only. It distinguished between general job satisfaction in 
comparison to former times and satisfaction of specific issues. Most felt that the overall 
work situation is worse today than before, and 76% thought that they were better treated in 
the socialist firm than in the capitalist firm today. This supports the impression which the 
interviews at Bodywear provided. Similar negative data, although not to such an extreme, 
were reported by Andretta et al. (1994). With regard to the specific job issues, an 
overwhelming majority of the GTB sample was dissatisfied. One person remarked on 
his/her questionnaire: "the working life under the capitalists resembles slavery. Working 
without pay and frequent threats." Overall, these findings correspond with the case study 
results. Yet pay dissatisfaction was higher than at Bodywear, which might be due to the 
fact that Bodywear paid the agreed wage which was not the rule among textile companies 
(as explained in chapter 4).
Summing up, a strong majority of both data sets displayed strong dissatisfaction 
regarding general or specific workplace issues. It seems safe to say that dissatisfaction was 
a widespread result of the organisational restructuring in East German (textile) companies 
after Unification. This is in line with the few empirical studies of other industrial sectors 
outlined in chapter 5 (e.g. Andretta et al. 1994). Frustration about work pace, stricter 
control and supervision overshadowed the improvements of the material working 
conditions (better machines, working environment/ buildings).
However, the occurrence of job dissatisfaction is not specifically East German. Job 
dissatisfaction is a common reaction to organisational changes also in western societies. 
Job dissatisfaction might be due to the procedure of how the organisational changes were 
introduced, i.e. with or without involving the workforce (in the case of Bodywear 
without), and/or due to the content of these changes (i.e. intensification of work). On the 
other hand, one might object that dissatisfaction is not a result of the restructuring at all, 
but a continuation of former job dissatisfaction (see chapter 5:5.1). Yet, the comparative 
questions of workers' job satisfaction in pre- and post- 1989 in the GTB survey suggest 
that people were more satisfied with their jobs in former times.
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8.2 "Them-and-us" feelings
(i) Bodywear survey
table 8.2.1: level of items of them-and-us feelings at Bodywear
./. stronglydisagree
disagree! no view agree strongly
agree N
Q You can never really trust your supervisor. 9 .0 12.3 19.9 32.9 2 6 .0 277
R The workers here are exploited. 7.2 11.9 11.9 33 .6 35 .4 277
U Management takes full advantage of the 
current labour market situation.
6.1 7.2 19.4 20.8 46 .6 279
P Real partnership between management 
and workforce is not possible, because 
we have too different interests.
7.7 12.5 21.4 33.2 25.1 271
S Formerly the supervisors were on the 
side of the workers, today they are on 
management's side.
7.5 12.5 13.9 36.7 29.5 281
T In former times we were all working 
together to fulfill the quota, today there is 
much more a "them-and-us" atmosphere.
6.1 11.5 12.5 24 .4 45 .5 279
0 I am proud to work for Bodywear. 12.5 16.1 13.6 36 .4 21 .4 280
V I am pretty sure that Bodywear will always 
try to treat its workers in a fair way.
9 .6 16.4 19.6 38.1 16.4 281
K A capitalist firm treats its employees in a 
fairer way, because only performance criteria 
count and not personal or partial ones.
13.8 16.3 13.8 31.8 24 .4 283
AJ In general: an "individualistic" social system 
where everybody has the chance to lead a 
better life than others, but also has the risk 
of failing, is better than a "collectivist" 
social system, where all have equally 
mediocre life chances.
10.5 12.5 32.0 29.3 15.6 256
This section examines workers' attitudes towards the management, i.e. top, middle, lower 
and supervisory management levels. As mentioned before, top management and most 
middle/lower managers were East Germans, but mostly new appointed after the 
Unification. Supervisors (Meister) remained the old ones, or are newly appointed East 
Germans. Thus, the possible problem of a division between "Wessies" (West Germans) 
being managers and "Ossies" (East Germans) being the labourforce, is here less severe 
(nevertheless, since the company headquarters is in West Germany, the top manager of 
Bodywear is often seen as being "directed" by the West).
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Overall, the data revealed strong them-and-us feelings. Well over a half did not trust their 
supervisors at all, and felt exploited (a word which is still common language in East 
Germany). Irreconcilable interests between capital and labour did exist in the view of most 
of the respondents. This is in line with the works councillors' opinion (chapter 4). 
Furthermore, nearly 70% argued that supervisors are changing sides to management, and 
strongly perceived a them-and-us atmosphere today compared to former times.
However, the following, more general questions complicate the picture. Over 50% 
were proud to work for Bodywear, and they also believe that capitalist firms in general 
(and Bodywear in particular) treated its workforce in a fairer way than socialist firms. This 
is in line with the supervisors' view (see chapter 4). With regard to the first statement, one 
could explain this apparent contradiction between being proud and having them-and-us 
feelings by referring to the possible co-existence of different types of identities and 
commitment in a firm (as outlined in chapter 7, e.g. Guest et al. 1993). Thus, one can be 
proud to work for Bodywear, because it has a high prestige to work for them, but on the 
other hand one does not like its management style and culture201. With regard to the 
second statement on fairness, one wonders how employees can perceive managers as fair, 
but not trust them.
One explanation could be the slightly misleading questions. The first question 
might be slightly misleading in that it postulates that in a capitalist firm only performance 
criteria are used, and in a socialist firm only personal or partial ones. This is certainly an 
oversimplification (especially in this company where most departments worked with piece 
rate systems before). The other question assumed that a collectivist social system has only 
mediocre life chances - without defining what are "better" life chances. Actually, one 
person even remarked in the questionnaire that this question could not be properly 
answered, "since both systems have tremendous advantages and disadvantages. The major 
disadvantage of both systems is that they are so extreme, and mutually exclusive, i.e. 
cannot be combined."
But see Heering and Schroeder (1992:98) for the opposite case, where a high identification of East 
German workers with their company correlates with their positive judgement about management and also 
works councils.
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Another explanation could be the still widespread (especially in this highly selected 
workforce) acceptance and support of the new capitalist, free-market values, which were 
perhaps surprisingly associated especially in the beginning with intrinsic fairness and 
equality. Also Mickler and Walker (1992:41) found that their investigated workforce 
accepted the more severe leadership and discipline, since it conformed with workforce's 
expectations of introducing market economy performance principles.
In addition, the very last question showed a majority of 45% preferring an 
individualistic to a collective societal system. However, this has to be seen in contrast to 
over three quarters of West Germans who preferred the individualistic system (the same 
question was asked in representative survey of East and West Germans by the Emnid 
Institute, 1993:table 47).
Concluding, the data shows that people were proud to work for their company, they 
appreciated the new capitalist system as being fairer, yet did not prefer an individualistic 
societal system as much as their West German counterparts and revealed strong them-and- 
us feelings. This presents a complex mixture of attitudes which might be a normal state of 
affairs, or might be due to the transformation and its attendant confusions.
With regard to the strong them-and-us feelings one might ask whether they are a 
continuation of former times or a new development. Although the questionnaire did not 
explicitly ask for them-and-us feelings in former times, question T suggests that them-and- 
us feelings were emerging or increasing after the Unification (whether through 
privatisation, i.e. "expropriation" of workers' ownership of the production means in 
socialist firms, or through the interplay of structural factors and management strategies). In 
line, the interviews suggested, as does some literature (see chapter 5:5.1, e.g. Kern and 
Land 1991; Voigt 1973), that if them-and-us feelings existed in the old GDR they had a 
different form to the western concept. Thus, they were without the conflictual connotations 
which typically mark them-and-us feelings in western capitalist firms. For example, the 
interviewees normally accepted the people "on the top" as persons who got their 
instructions and "had to do their jobs as well" (knitter no 3, 1994). In addition, there was 
rarely any personal, close contact between them and the workforce. It was a "live and let
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live" attitude. They were seen indifferently, because it was the System that was to be 
blamed. "They didn't interest me a lot. What could they do against us? They had their job, 
we had our jobs. You were safe." (sewer no 3 1994). Thus, it was a them-and-us 
differentiation between people here and people "above" ("die da oben") but without 
conflictual or ideological connotations (see also Alt et al. 1994). In the end, workers felt 
that they were in the same boat as the directors. This contrasts interpretations by authors 
such as KreiBig (1992) who argue that "ideological", class-based them-and-us feelings 
also existed in former times (see chapter 5).
Today, this is changing. The division between management and workforce 
becomes more evident. For example, "they are managers" (sewer no 9 1994); "you see 
them driving their big BMWs while you are sitting in your small Trabi" (sewer no 3, 
1994). Asked about them-and-us today, managers seem to become for the workforce what 
the System was before: the anonymous power which determines your fate and which you 
cannot influence. The sentiments expressed against management might also be biased by 
people's increasing frustration with the transformation itself: "the small man of the street 
always loses out in each system. This was before and is also now the case. However, in 
former times the little man could sometimes open his mouth and complain" (sewer no 3, 
1994).
(ii) GTB survey
table 8.2.2: level of items of them-and-us feelings in the GTB firms
T strongly
disagree
disagree no view agree strongly
aeree
N
F Today I don't have any trust in my 
supervisors.
7 .0 12.0 10.8 43 .7 26.5 426
D Today workers are exploited here. 6.8 5 .6 5 .4 27.9 54.3 427
E In the old times you could still trust your 
supervisors.
14.8 22.2 9.8 42 .4 10.8 427
C In the socialist enterprise workers were not 
exploited.
10.9 20.6 5.9 4 0 .4 22.2 423
With regard to current them-and-us feelings the data yielded slightly stronger results than 
Bodywear. Furthermore, this survey inquired about former them-and-us feelings more
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explicitly. A majority argued that workers were not exploited in former times and could 
trust the supervisor. This supports the conjecture of the Bodywear data that them-and-us 
feelings were emerging after the Unification.
To conclude, both data sets yielded a strong degree of them-and-us feelings, which 
seem to have developed or increased after the turnaround. This finding contributes to the 
literature on workers' attitudes towards the transformation since no empirical study has so 
far investigated them-and-us feelings in this context (see chapter 5).202 A large-scale 
opinion poll of West and East Germans (Mollner sample institute, FAZ 21.6.95) gives 
further support to these findings. It indicates that the reputation of entrepreneurs/managers 
in East Germany has decreased since 1990. For example the statement, "the image of 
entrepreneur as an exploiter belongs to the past", was believed by only 27% of East 
Germans in 1995, whereas over 50% agreed to this statement in 1990 (and 40% of West 
Germans in both years). And only 31% attributed "social responsibility" to managers (in 
1990: 58%). WeBels (1992:23) reported that in 1990 only 40% of East Germans believed 
there was an opposition between capital and labour, which was slightly less than the 43% 
of West Germans.203
One should note however, that the data of this study and also of the quoted studies 
present retrospective views and it might be that the old GDR is seen in a happier than in a 
realistic light today ("golden age"). In addition, the Bodywear survey revealed the complex 
attitudes of workers towards the company, management and the transformation to a 
capitalist firm — an issue which will re-emerge throughout the discussion of workers' 
perceptions.
202 E g Heering and Schroeder's (1992) study found that their sample had a positive "relationship" to 
management and a positive "identification" with the company, but they did not explicitly measure them- 
and-us feelings.
203 WeBels' study was discussed before, these figures are from the large-scale Eurobarometer survey of the 
WZB Berlin. More recent data is not provided.
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8.3  General attitudes towards Unification at Bodywear
table 8.3: level of items of general attitudes at Bodywear
stronelv
disagree
degree no view agree
r r N
CO In general, I have a positive view on the 
future.
8.8 15.3 10.3 41 .8 23.8 261
CY In general: "it is frequently argued that 
the East Germans will remain second class 
citizens for quite a while."
4 .0 2 .0 2.0 19.4 72 .6 248
The two questions were not used as potential explanations of participation but to get a 
more general idea of peoples' responses to the societal transformation, and were 
complemented by some interview questions.
A large majority (66%) looked positively into the future despite all troubles and 
fears despite the fact that nearly all felt as second class citizens. This is supported by 
several polls (e.g. SOEP panel WZB, Landua 1993:21: 59% of the East German sample 
were confident about the future in 1992; Emnid Institute 1993, table 2: 77% felt as second 
class citizens in November 1992). As has been outlined above most workers accepted and 
supported the introduction of the capitalist market economy (see questions AJ, K). Thus, 
despite the grievances nobody wanted the old conditions back. "If there is anything at all I 
want back from the old days then it's the cheap lunch" (sewer no 3, 1993). On the other 
side, asked in the interviews how they saw their future at work, most could not answer or 
provided a pretty pessimistic (sewer no 9 1994) or a disillusioned view: "it cannot become 
worse" (sewer no 4, 6 1994). But the emphasis was on keeping their jobs: "if I keep my 
job, it will be o.k.." (no 5). Thus, it seems that people differentiate between working and 
private life: the pessimistic perspectives of their working life did not seem to overshadow 
their more optimistic hopes regarding their private lives. Similarly, Koch (1993:177) 
found a mixture of gains and losses in different life spheres of most East Germans (e.g. 
Koch 1993:177).
In addition, despite their general acceptance of the market economy, the attitudes 
towards the societal and economic transformation are quite complex. For example, the 
interviews indicated that it is never a clear-cut judgement whether or not workers at
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Bodywear prefer the current work situation to former times or not, or even their current 
life to that of former times. Too many factors interrelate. And too many comparisons are 
available: comparison with West Germans, with their life before, or with people who are 
now worse off (e.g. the unemployed).
One can also observe a change of perceptions over time: In the beginning (1989) 
workers obeyed and accepted the changes at their workplaces as an inevitable consequence 
of the new market system. Asked in the interviews about their hopes in 1989, most had no 
hopes or expectations about improvements at their workplace, they just hoped to keep their 
jobs (e.g. sewer no 5 1994). However, they soon became disappointed, disillusioned and 
even sometimes sarcastic about the "true face of capitalism", after having woken up from 
the illusion during the turnaround of capitalism as the panacea. In addition, some 
interviews gave the impression of a fatalistic attitude in the face of a perceived all-powerful 
market. This is supported by Lungwitz (1994:299) who found a distinctly fatalistic attitude 
which reminded him of the findings in West German studies in the 1950s on workers' 
lifes (e.g. Popitz et al. 1957).
A revival of a more positive image of the past started to become popular in East 
Germany around the time of research (1993/4). It did express a new pride "to come from 
the East" rather than the desire to turn back the clock (e.g. the reversing trend in 
consuming traditional East German products again [see Spiegel edition June 1995; 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 4.10.1995, article by H.J. Heims] or possibly also the success of 
the former socialist party, PDS, in the general election in autumn 1994). On the other side 
there was still a widespread agreement that it was necessary to "tidy up the socialist mire". 
For example one dyer answered when asked about the bonus workers got in former times 
for working on Saturdays: "the bonus wasn't healthy as with plenty of other things here". 
Question: "healthy for whom?" Reply: "for the economy. The money must come from 
somewhere, it has to be earned for and at the moment there stands no profit behind" (dyer 
no 3 1993). However, several argued that it would have been best to take the good things 
of socialism and the good sides of capitalism together. "But the people 'up there' do not 
want this" (sewer no 4, 1994).
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8.4 Workgroup identity and related issues
(i) Bodywear survey
table 8.4.1: level of items of workgroup identity and related items at. Bodywear
strongly
disagree
disagree no view agree strongly
agree N
AA I would rather like to work in another group. 65.4 9 .2 14.1 4 .9 6 .4 283
Z I am not very interested in my colleagues. 36.0 30 .4 4 .6 25.8 3 .2 283
w I can rely on my colleagues, they 
help me where they can.
5 .6 15.1 8.8 46.3 24.2 285
AF Nowadays I hardly meet my workfellows 
after work.
3.5 3.9 2.1 15.1 75 .4 285
AG I have nearly no contact to the 
workers of other workgroups.
5.9 8 .0 0.7 23.8 61.5 286
F The solidarity among workfellows decreases. 7.3 11.5 3.8 45 .8 31.5 286
AE In former times the group solidarity was 
much better.
6.7 8.1 8.1 22.1 55.1 285
AH Formerly the solidarity of the 
whole workforce was much better.
6.3 7.7 13.6 21.3 51.0 286
Al Because of the job unsecurity people become 
egoistic and just think of their advantage.
2.8 3.1 5.6 29.2 59.4 288
AC I rather fight for my interests alone 
than rely on my colleagues' support.
9.9 10.2 4 .2 34.6 41.0 283
Y You often feel quite alone and isolated. 17.4 22.4 4.6 33.5 22.1 281
AB I would rather sacrify 100 DM of my pay 
than see some of my workfellows of my 
group getting sacked.
28.0 16.0 23.0 20.6 12.4 282
This section covers items on workgroup identity, and on solidarity and collectivistic 
attitudes. Firstly, the data presented a strong degree of group identification. For example, 
most people liked to work in their group (which is in most cases a newly created group, as 
showed above) and perceived their colleagues as helpful. Some sewers however revealed a 
more sceptical attitude in the interviews. For example, "if you have a problem now with 
your work nobody comes and helps you" (sewer nol 1993). This is in line with 
supervisors' instructions, who did not want that sewers help each other, because this was 
now the job of the method trainer.
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The remaining two questions indicated that social interactions between the workforce for 
example after work were very limited. Yet, these findings do not challenge the Overall 
result of a strong group identification: Private contact among work group members might 
not be a necessary condition for work group identity and might be the result of very 
practical reasons. For example, a lot of workers live now far away (which was not the 
case before); the working groups consist of new colleagues; their free time gets occupied 
with organising various household and private issues (such as insurances, banking - 
which formerly did not exist or were organised by the State); and they need more private 
time to "digest" all the societal changes and to recover from the exhausting work (e.g. 
interview knitter no 2, 1993). Furthermore, the question assumes that people saw each 
other more frequently in the socialist times, yet this might not be true for all people (one 
person wrote exactly this remark in her questionnaire). Finally, the fact that a large 
majority had no real contact with workers in other workgroups (see also question AP, 
section 9.4, showing the lack of information workers have of what is happening in other 
parts of the enterprise) might be a sign for a weak group identity of the whole workforce 
but might equally be regarded as an indicator of a strong and close community of the 
individual work groups. It also reflects the "departmental principalities" which 
characterized most socialist companies (see chapter 2).
Moreover, the interviews dealt with people's private circumstances which could have a 
positive effect on their social identities. Most workers lived in small villages with strong 
community and neighbourhood life, which seem to have let Unification simply wash over 
them (a finding which has also been reported in other studies, e.g. Gebhardt and 
Kamphausen 1994).
Secondly, when directly addressing facets of solidarity (collectivism) the data depicted an 
overall perception of a decreasing solidarity within the whole workforce at Bodywear and 
within the work group itself. This was actually the thing people mentioned in the 
interviews they missed most of the socialist era. For example, "the atmosphere changed 
totally"; "everybody only thinks about his/her performance"; "in earlier times we had much
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more comradeship. We even had voluntary 'godparenthoods' for new sewers." (sewer no
3,5 1994). "If there is something I want back from the old times, then it is the collegiality 
and the social intercourse we had here" (knitter no 2,1993).
In addition, most people admitted they would themselves rather fight alone for their 
interests than rely on their colleagues. This is in contrast to the above statement that most 
could rely on their colleagues. However, it might be a different issue whether you can rely 
on colleagues to help you with your work, or whether you want them to help you pursue 
your own interests.
Although the obvious interpretation might be a decreasing solidarity and thus 
increasing individualistic attitudes, we interpret this data differently. Firstly, people were 
disappointed about this decreasing solidarity. Thus, one can argue that only because they 
still strongly identify with their workgroup, are they able to feel the loss of solidarity so 
strongly. In addition, as outlined in chapter 5, perceiving a decreasing solidarity does not 
mean that workers necessarily behave more "individualistic". For example, a surprisingly 
large number (33%) said they would sacrifice money to secure the job of a co-worker. A 
sewer commented, "I would sacrifice 100 DM if my colleagues could keep their job. 
Although the others would probably call me crazy." This is an astonishing statement of 
solidarity.
To conclude, Bodywear workers identified strongly with their work groups, had 
collectivist beliefs and attitudes, and were concerned about the decreasing solidarity among 
the workforce.
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(ii) GTB survey
table 8.4.2: level of items of workgroup identity and related items in the GTB firms
strongly agree no view 
disagree
agree S 8,y N
BN I identify strongly with my group. 17.7 9.8 17.2 31.1 24 .2 396
BL I would like to change the workgroup. 61.9 17.8 6.9 8 .9 4 .5 404
BM I increasingly feel isolated in my group. 42.1 26.7 7.9 15.8 7 .4 433
BO In the old days (GDR) group solidarity 
was much better.
9.3 7.8 3 .2 20 .8 58 .9 409
BS Only those who depend on themselves 
at work get ahead.
18.6 19.3 8 .2 28.7 25 .2 404
BP I accept group decisions also if I am 
different opinion.
4 .2 5 .2 5.7 50 .4 34.5 403
BR In general problems are better solved 
in groups than alone.
5 .4 7.9 5 .4 27.1 54 .2 406
BQ 1 prefer to work in groups than alone. 13.3 11.8 6.1 24.3 44 .5 407
In the GTB survey the number of items on solidarity was decreased and substituted with 
questions of people's general attitude to "collectivism" with regard to working habits (see 
chapter 7).
There was a strong work group identity. For example, 80% did not want to change 
their group, which is similar to the Bodywear response. But 69% did not feel isolated 
within their work groups, much larger than 39% in the case study. This might be due to 
the different sample (mixed sample at Bodywear, union members only at GTB). Similar to 
the Bodywear results, group solidarity was perceived as decreasing. The possible 
difference between group identification and perception of solidarity decreasing was already 
discussed in the case study survey.
Moreover, over a half thought that only those who depend on themselves got ahead 
at work (see similar question in Bodywear). This more "individualistic" response to "life 
chances" might be explained by the fact that people think this is how they should behave in 
the new capitalist world, thus conforming to new norms, but is not necessarily an 
indication that they actually will behave like this. This was also supported in the case study 
interviews: people had a very precise picture of how they should behave for their best
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advantage, perhaps because they see those behaving in this way getting along. However, 
most declared that they had problems conforming with these new norms, attributing this to 
their different, "old-fashioned" personality. And as we will see later (chapter 10) most 
people thought their behaviour did not change during the transformation so far.
Finally, the sample presented strong collectivistic attitudes. For example, 85% 
would accept decisions made by their group even if they have a different private opinion. 
Overall, the questions yielded a high degree of workgroup identification and of 
collectivistic attitudes, but also a decreasing solidarity, all of which is consistent with the 
findings of the case study.
In sum, both data sets support the continuing importance of the work collective, and the 
perception of a decreasing solidarity among workfellows, results which are in line with 
various empirical surveys (see also Becker 1993:35). For example, the Allensbach 
representative poll in East Germany (1994, in FAZ 13.4.94) found that 87% of the East 
German population thought that solidarity among people has decreased since Unification. 
Brahler and Richter (1995:8)204 found that East Germans revealed significantly higher 
collectivist attitudes than their West German counterparts.
The strong group identity and the importance of solidarity adds support to the 
argument of some authors that the previous work communities in the old GDR had an 
emotional importance for the workforce (and not just an instrumental one, see chapter 5: 
e.g. Diewald 1995; Gensior 1992). The finding of strong group identities in both samples 
challenges the widespread argument in some literature of an identity crisis and a virtual 
elimination of social identities in favour of individualistic attitudes (see chapter 5: e.g. 
Belwe 1992; Maaz 1991; Marz 1993; Rottenburg 1992). Thus, with regard to this 
dimension of individualism/collectivism (see table 5.3) the individualisation thesis cannot 
be supported at least with respect to relations at work.
It should be mentioned that the data gives no information on the development of 
group identity (i.e. it might have decreased compared to former times, although this seems 
unlikely given the strong degree of identity present today). Some critics might object that
204 Their sample consisted of 2025 West Germans and 1022 East Germans.
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the surprisingly strong workgroup identity in the samples is due to the predominately 
female workforce. Yet, the theoretical justification (that females have a stronger 
identification to their workfellows than males) might be more difficult to obtain. More 
importantly, t-tests revealed that there was no difference between males and females in the 
GTB sample concerning their workgroup identity. Females however perceived more 
strongly than males that the workgroup solidarity was decreasing (see appendix A 2.6).
8.5 Causal attribution of workplace problems at GTB
table 8.5: level of items of attribution in the GTB firms2^
./.
disagree
I' disagree no view agree a S g'y N
external attribution
R Lack of support from politicians and 
Treuhand for the textile industry [accounts 
for many job losses].
4.0 2.9 12.8 10.2 70.1 421
AH The politicians are the ones to blame 
[for unequal pay level].
1.2 0.9 4.0 7.3 86.7 427
J Management exploits us, taking advantage 
of the devastating employment situation.
4.5 6.1 10.4 30.4 48.7 425
AF East German employers take advantage of 
the current labour market situation 
[therefore unequal pay level compared to 
West Germany].
5.7 5.2 10.4 21.3 57.2 423
K It is not so much management's fault, as the 
introduction of market economy which 
inevitably increases work pressures.
5.2 5.6 8.0 37.3 43.9 426
S Incompetent management [accounts for job 
losses].
27.5 19.1 22.7 22.5 8.2 414
Q lack of demand for our products [accounts 
for job losses].
21.6 20.7 11.5 23.1 23.1 416
205 i n the original questionnaire questions were subdivided differently according to the three topics: pace of 
work, job insecurity and pay level (see appendix A 2.3).
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1. strongly
disagree
disagree no vtew agree
a £ ^ g!y
T
internal attribution
1
Not enough effort from the workers 
[accounts for job losses].
51.3 18.9 6.7 19.4 3 .6 417
U Wages are too high [therefore job losses]. 79.3 14.7 1.9 1.7 2 .4 421
L The workforce does not offer enough 
resistance to management's strategies 
[in terms of work pace].
5 .2 10.1 3.5 30 .4 50 .7 424
V Workforce doesn't show enough solidarity 
with colleagues made redundant.
10.9 16.4 24.4 22.7 25 .6 414
There was a high degree of external attribution to politicians, but more divided ones 
concerning the management. For example, nearly 80% felt that management had taken 
advantage of the employment situation with regard to work pace and pay levels206. 
However, the same amount of people also agreed that it is not so much management's fault 
as the pressures of the market economy which increased the pace of work. With regard to 
job insecurity only a third saw the incompetence of management as the core cause, and 
there was a two-sided view of whether it was due to the lack of demand for the products. 
Thus, people might have strong feelings about management's abuse of the devastating 
employment situation, but when asked whether they think the latter is due to incompetence 
or to inevitable market pressures on management, it seems that people prefer to blame the 
external market pressures. This might reflect the perceived reality in these companies. 
Another interpretation might be that this attitude arises out of the former experience that 
directors were merely tools of the System and that this continues today. As one worker 
argued: "only the System changed" (knitter no 4 1993).
With regard to internal causes, job losses were linked with lacking 
solidarity/resistance of workers rather than an inadequate performance of the workforce.
In sum, external attribution was stronger than internal attribution. As noted in chapter 5, 
Stratemann (1993:16) argues that external, situational attribution has been the prevalent 
form of attribution in the GDR ("the System is to be blamed"), and our data supports the
206 These questions could have been also discussed in the section on them-and-us feelings.
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view that this will continue to be so for some while. The currently perceived helplessness 
within the transformation process might also support this type of reaction.
Conclusion of Chapter 8
Summing up the discussion of workers' perceptions of various facets of the organisational 
transformation, the data provided a rather depressing picture of the current working 
conditions and management-workforce relations of Bodywear as well as in the GTB 
survey companies. It substantiates the claim made in the literature that the transformation 
has left the workers highly dissatisfied and disappointed. It also provides new insights 
other studies have not dealt with. For example, them-and-us feelings were strong and 
indicate a deterioration of the workplace climate during the reorganisation of the 
enterprises; and the strong workgroup collectivity challenges the supposed increasing 
individualism of East German workers.
With regard to the general literature on organisational transformation, in particular 
on personnel management in transformation (chapter 3:3.1.3), one could suggest that 
companies which practiced organisational changes without involving their workers 
(procedure) and/or adopted intensified "tayloristic" production methods (content), did not 
succeed to achieve job satisfaction among its workforce. This might generate future 
problems in terms of work motivation and company commitment once the threat caused by 
job insecurity is less predominant. Both samples of workers can be characterized as 
showing "compliance" but not "commitment" to their organisation or management (for the 
different terms see Walton 1985). For example, the workforce of Bodywear and of the 
other companies had a more negative view of management and the general workplace 
climate than did the works councillors. Thus, the question as to whether the "harmonious" 
workplace relationship between management and works councils (as shown in the 
councillor questionnaires, see chapter 4) is also perceived by the workforce can be 
answered negatively. The workforce yields no "unitarist" view but rather a "them-and-us"
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perception of the workplace relations. To what extent this is caused by the tayloristic re­
structuring of the work or by a lack of direct employee involvement is hard to say. As 
noted before job dissatisfaction and them-and-us feelings are familiar outcomes of 
organisational interventions in western companies too, and it raises the difficult question of 
how far they a "normal" reaction to organisational change rather than a specific reflection 
of transformation.
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Chapter 9 Interest representation and collective activities from the
viewpoint of the workforce: the case study and the GTB survey
This chapter provides the empirical basis for the second topic of this study, the relationship 
between the workforce and the interest institutions from the viewpoint of the workers (see 
table 7.1). It discusses the variables of the two questionnaires exploring workers' 
perceptions of the new interest institutions and collective activities: collective 
instrumentality (9.1), general views of interest representation (9.2), union identity (9.3), 
communication flow and collective interests (9.4).
9.1 Perceived instrumentality of the works council, union and of 
collective activities
9 .1 .1  Instrumentality of works council
(i) Bodywear survey
table 9.1.1: level of items of the perceived instrumentality of the works council and of related items at Bodywear
./. stronglydisagree
disagree no view agree
a £ £ g'y N
AS We do not need a works council, since 
management takes sufficient care of us.
53.8 24.2 11.7 7.7 2 .6 273
AQ The former BGL represented our interests 
better (than the works council).
20.8 26.4 24.5 20.1 8.2 269
AN The works council so far has put forward 
workers' interests very well.
8.5 18.4 15.1 41 .9 16.2 272
CJ The works council wants to help, but has 
no power.
9.5 14.1 17.2 43.1 16.0 262
AO Works council and management are 
in league with each other.
8.8 11.7 49.1 19.4 11.0 273
Cl It's a waste of time to consult the works 
council, they are not interested in my 
problems.
28.1 26.2 13.7 27.8 4 .2 263
CC Did you consult the works council with a 
problem during this year?
yes: 22.0 no: 78.0
270
CL Usually I do not have any grievances. 14.5 20.9 4 .0 49.8 10.8 249
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The first five questions dealt with workers' perceptions of the effectiveness of the works 
council. Nearly 80% regarded the works council as a necessary institution. In addition, 
nearly half preferred the works council to the former BGL (former union) (though nearly a 
third thought the latter represented workers' interests better, and a quarter abstained).
The interviews confirmed this result, although there was a general confusion about 
the BGL's functions. Most interviewees tended not to differentiate between the institution 
of the BGL itself and its context (often they equated the BGL with the Party, e.g. 
supervisor 1, knitting 1993). This can be tracked back to the fact that the BGL was a part 
of the company's triumvirate, and its work was therefore difficult to distangle from the 
overall company policy (see chapter 2). In addition, asked more specifically about the 
functions of the BGL, most sewers were not sure. "What did the BGL for you? "it was 
present" (sewer no 3 1994). The only thing everybody mentioned was its administrative 
function of holiday places. A few argued, that "the BGL was more present at the actual 
workplace and could intervene more easily" (written remark on the questionnaire). Yet, a 
lot held the view that "the works council is doing a lot here, more than the BGL" (knitter 
no 1, 1993). Moreover, a forthcoming question (question CX, section 9.2) asked for who 
represented workers in former days, and the BGL was only mentioned by 13%.
The next issue dealt with the more specific work of the council in representing workers' 
interests (i.e. not personal but collective interests). Over a half of the sample agreed that 
the works council had done this very well. However, the same fraction perceived the 
works council as powerless. This contradiction is difficult to interpret. Most obviously it 
could signify a realistic assessment of works councils' possibilities and the current scope 
of action. The works council is willing and maybe has potential, but is not yet able.
The interviews revealed more accusations and resentments than praise. For 
example, "the works councillors talk a lot about their activities in the assemblies but 
nothing happens", "they have weekly meetings but no results, and in our daily life they 
and their achievements are not really visible" (sewer no 3,4 1994). Several also argued that 
the council not only represents workers' interests, but also management's (a frequently 
mentioned example was Saturday work to which the works council agreed, see chapter 4).
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But when asked in the survey whether the works council and management are in league 
with each other, nearly half of the sample did not know. One gets the impression that the 
interviewees were highly emotional, and enjoyed blaming nearly everyone in the company, 
whereas the survey seemed to have been answered in a more thoughtful way. The 
difference might also lie in the selection of interviewees (although it was tried to get a 
balanced sample of obedient workers and troublemakers), and could also indicate people's 
possible unsureness and confusion over these issues.
The last three questions investigate whether people consults the works council in practice. 
Although most workers had not recently consulted the council, for more than half of them 
it is (in theory) not a waste of time to do so. The interviews suggested that workers who 
were more positive about the usefulness of the works council, have had contact with the 
works council (e.g. sewers no 8,7 1994), whereas the more sceptical ones had not had 
any personal experience.
Whether the level of consultation is low or high is difficult to evaluate since there is 
no directly comparable East or West German data available. However, it is well-known 
that a large number of problems at German shopfloors are usually regulated informally 
directly with the supervisor, and thus this relatively low response might well be seen as 
"normal" for the German standard.207 Moreover, in many cases in Bodywear it seemed 
sufficient just to "threaten" the supervisors with consulting the works council, as was told 
by several workers in the interviews. Another reason might be that workers might have no 
grievances, as more than 60% in the survey admitted. Or, they might not feel it to be 
"morally" justified to express them. Various reasons are brought up in the interviews: "you 
should be happy with what you get — this is a question of education" (sewer no 2 1994). 
This reminds one of the propagated socialist ideal of a "clean, orderly, and obedient
207 E.g. Krieger et al. (1989:174) in a representative study of West German employees found that 40% 
consult their supervisors and 29% the works council when having problems. Feist et al.'s (1989:89) study 
(based on a representative sample of blue collar workers in the "Land" Hessen, West Germany) showed that 
36% consulted the supervisor, 39% the works council and 27% prefered to represent their interests alone 
(the rest goes to the union/ shop steward). Moreover, Morgenroth et al. (1994:90) found gender to have an 
impact. Based on interviews of 110 West German union members they found that females prefered an 
informal way of interest representation, whereas males were more attuned to consult the works council.
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socialist worker". Another example is: "... [this is the] price we have to pay for getting the 
company working" (dyer no 1 1993).
A further obvious reason might be the fear of risking one's job if one complained 
too much (as was suggested in the written comment in one questionnaire). For example, 
several sewers mentioned a person who was directly threatened with dismissal by the 
supervisor if she consulted the works council (sewer no 3, 6, 1994). The works council 
itself confirmed this was increasingly happening.
In sum, it seems safe to say that workers at Body wear were more or less positive 
about consulting the works council, but that some were restricted in doing so out of fears 
(to risk the job) rather than because they believed that the council was not helpful.
(ii) GTB survey
table 9.1.2: level of items of instrumentality of works council in the GTB firms
./. stronglydisagreee
disagree no view agree strongly
agree N
AT We don't need a works council since 
management cares enough for us.
71.1 18.2 2.8 5.7 2.1 422
AU I can solve my work problems with my 
supervisor alone, 1 don't need the works 
council for that.
58.1 19.5 4.5 13.1 4 .8 420
AS The old BGL represented my interests better 
than today's GTB and works council.
28.0 22.5 13.3 27.5 8.8 422
W Works council does not oppose management 
strategies strongly enough [to secure jobs].
18.3 22.6 9.5 29.3 20 .2 420
M Our works council is not powerful enough 
to negotiate better working conditions.
13.3 17.8 12.9 32.8 2 3 .2 427
The GTB survey focused more on union members' perceptions of the works council as an 
institution and its work successes. The overall necessity of works councils was widely 
acknowledged and confirmed the Bodywear result. The comparison between the BGL and 
the works council received again more divided answers, but still more than a half preferred 
the works council (similar to the Bodywear result). With regard to members' perception of 
works council effectiveness in dealing with specific workplace issues, the results were 
nearly equally split in positive and negative perceptions, but with slightly more emphasis
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on the negative side. The result was therefore slightly more negative than at Bodywear. 
However, one should note that people were not being asked here their overall views on 
being represented by their works council.
In conclusion, the major findings of both surveys regarding works council 
instrumentality were firstly the overall acceptance of the works council as a necessary 
institution, and a clear preference for the new interest institution. This also confirms the 
preliminary suggestion in the works council questionnaire, that works councils saw 
themselves being accepted by their workforce.
The second major result refers to the works council's actual work, and this is 
perceived in the two surveys slightly differently. Bodywear respondents made a realistic 
but overall positive evaluation, although they were more critical in the interviews, whereas 
the GTB sample was more evenly divided. The slightly better score for the works council 
of Bodywear again might support the hypothesis that this council is relatively successful in 
its interest representation (see chapter 4).
One needs to address how these findings relate to the hypothesis in the literature 
that workers are highly disillusioned over the effectiveness of works council (with respect 
to the redundancies, co-management etc.) (see chapter 5:5.2). Workers in both surveys 
were realistic about works council's limited resources in these economic circumstances. 
This might be disillusioning, yet it did not lead people to reject the institution as such. In 
addition, Bodywear workers even argued that the works council did a good job in 
representing them. In short, although the findings do not suggest highly effective and 
powerful institutions workers conclude that this is related more to the external conditions 
than to the design of the institution as such. In conclusion, the data adds support to the 
more positive studies about workers' attitudes towards the works council such as Heering 
and Schroeder (1992) and challenges pessimistic studies such as Jander et al. (1992) (see 
chapter 5). Moreover, the data is more positive than the DGB Trendbarometer results for 
the GTB (West and East): These were in 1992 considerably below the DGB German 
average with only 6% approving the works council's work (no separate data for 1994).
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However 59% did not answer and the sample consisted only of 83 persons, which 
questions the data's reliability.
Finally, the support for the works council does not mean that people now rely exclusively 
on formal interest representation. But it is safe to say that the informal interest 
representation is not the major form of representation in today's shopfloors in the textile 
industry. A mix of formal and informal mechanisms (with a predominance of the former) 
is most probable, as the West German experience also shows (e.g. Morgenroth et al. 
1994:90).
9 .1 .2  Instrumentality of the union
(i) Bodywear survey
table 9.1.3: level of items of perceived instrumentality of the union at Bodywear^^
strongly
disagree
disagree no view agree strongly
agree N
BB The union had not yet done a lot at this 
place.
10.1 15.5 27.9 28.7 17.8 258
BC The union's pay policy only worsens 
the economic situation and risks jobs
28.3 26.4 26.0 13.2 6 .2 258
BE If the unions would not exist the East 
German employment situation would look 
even worse.
8.1 8.9 27.5 27.9 27.5 258
BP Unions make the worker class more 
powerful.
9.3 15.0 15.5 36.7 23.5 226
BD The union works more for the West 
German workforce than for us.
10.1 12.8 36.8 20.5 19.8 258
Nearly half of the sample thought that the GTB has not achieved anything at Bodywear, 
but roughly a third did not know and a quarter thought the union had. Also the interviews 
revealed that union policies were seen as too remote from people's day-to-day working 
life. This might well be fostered by the absence of union stewards in this company.
208 jfog high absense rate in this section is due to the fact that non union members did not (and should 
not) answer. However, some did nevertheless.
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Moreover, West German studies (e.g. Morgenroth et al. 1994:109) and other East German 
studies (Mickler et al. 1992:17) revealed a similar perception of unions' relative 
unimportance regarding workplace issues.
With regard to the union activities on industrial level (e.g. pay policies) however 
the judgement was much better, and over a half thought the union is necessary (to improve 
the employment situation) and makes the workforce more powerful. Thus, the union was 
accepted as a necessary institution supporting the claim that the institutional transfer of 
West German unions succeeded with regard to this workforce.
Finally, around 40% argued that the union is biased toward their West German 
members, but a nearly the same amount did not know. Thus, one can conclude that there is 
not a strong support for this popular claim which is also underlined by the fact that the 
presumed "western" bias of the union was not mentioned as a major reason for not joining 
the union (see chapter 10: section on "joining" question BL). One explanation might be the 
unions personnel policy to keep most former East German officials in post (see chapter 4).
The interviews presented a slightly more negative picture of the union. Although 
some respondents agreed that the GTB is fighting for their interests during bargaining, a 
lot are depressed by the results: "they fight for us but in the end nothing is coming out" 
(sewer no 1, 1994). In addition, asking whether the union is representing their interests, a 
lot did not really know how to respond (e.g. sewers no 4, 7 1994). This inconsistency of 
quantitative and qualitative data could be due to the fact that these questions ("how is the 
union representing you" etc.) are more difficult to answer in an interview than in pregiven 
statements to tackle. In addition, as mentioned in the previous section workers seemed to 
use the interviews partly to "let off steam" on everybody. Thus, assuming that the 
questionnaire answers are more reliable one can argue that in overall the union was 
accepted and appreciated as a necessary and legitimate interest institution.
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(ii) GTB survey
table 9.1.4: level of items of perceived instrumentality of the union in the GTB firms
r . $
singly N
X GTB not putting enough pressure on 
employers [to secure jobs].
10.2 10.2 17.6 27.1 34.9 421
AG The GTB is not doing enough to secure 
the adjustment of East German wage levels.
7.5 10.8 9.2 25.9 46.6 425
The two questions dealt with the union regarding specific issues. Union's effectiveness 
was perceived more negatively than works council's effectiveness (see above) and also 
more negatively compared to the responses at Bodywear.209 This might be due to the 
slightly different questions asked in both surveys.
In sum, both data sets present a negative perception of union instrumentality concerning 
shopfloor issues, a mixed evaluation of collective bargaining outcomes (Bodywear vs 
GTB sample), and a positive perception of the necessity of the union. This resembles 
some results of the existing empirical studies on union-membership relations (chapter 5). 
For example, the perceived necessity of unions is in line with WeBels' (1992) finding that 
the unions are the most important (voluntary) organization for East Germans, and also 
with Gabriel's (1993) finding that unions are more trusted in the East than in the West.210 
In addition, the critical evaluation of union's achievements has been also shown in the 
DGB Trendbarometer (in the East and West).
Finally, it should be noted that none of this data indicates possible reasons for 
these perceptions of instrumentality. For example, how far does the assumed 
disappointment with the former union and the former socialisation influence today's 
perception of instrumentality? One hint is however given in the respondents' comments in 
the free space of the questionnaire. Quite a few people declared that they felt like "paying
209 I.e. compared to all workers and compared to union members only at Bodywear (see t-tests).
210 Referring to IPOS, a representative study in West and East Germany.
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members as before". This might indicate a frustration over a perceived absense of internal 
democracy in the union, and a feeling that member-union relations had not really changed.
9 .1 .3  Instrumentality of collective activities and related issues
(i) Bodywear survey
table 9.1.5: level of items of perceived instrumentality of collective activities and related issues at Bodywear^ ^
./. strongi)! d,sagrec no view agree S gly N
CK Improvements at the workplace can only 
be realized through collective action of 
all colleagues.
7.7 11.2 11.2 24.6 4 5 .4 260
AR The works council is only as strong as 
they are supported by the workers.
2.6 11.6 24.3 34 .0 2 7 .6 268
CM If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker 
you can't do anything against it.
6.2 2.7 16.2 15.8 59 .2 260
CH If you complain nowadays about 
your job. you get sacked.
15.5 23.8 13.2 35.5 12.1 265
Collective action was seen by 70% as the only means to change the working conditions, 
and the same number saw the necessity of collective support for the works council. But 
few believed that collective action had any chance in the case of a plant closure (as 
happened with the knitting plant). One could argue that this reveals a realistic perception by 
workers of their limited power to prevent plant closures in the existing economic situation 
rather than a general disapproval of collective action. It also provides an interesting point 
that people might evaluate the effectiveness of collective action differently according to the 
level the action and focus takes place (e.g. shopfloor vs industrial level).
The interviews were characterized by an overall mood of serenity and scepticism. 
For example, "acting leads to nothing", "there is nothing we can do" (sewers no 3, 5 
1994). When asking about the specific workplace problems the interviewees never 
regarded collective reactions as an option to be considered ("this doesn't change anything", 
sewer no 9, 1994). Some interviewees argued that people were more prepared to speak up
1 The few double answers (e.g. "union" and "works council") were treated as missing cases.
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in the company assemblies more in former times than today. "Today you do not know 
whether what you say is right or wrong, and what they want to hear" (sewer no 2, 1994); 
"Everybody is silent in the assemblies [today], but afterwards the talking starts" (sewer no 
10, 1994). One gets the impression that East German workers grouse a lot among each 
other, yet rarely stand up for their interests (e.g. West German manager interview (see 
chapter 4), and also Alt et al. 1993:24).
One can think of at least three explanations for this divergence between quantitative 
and qualitative findings. Firstly, it could be a methodological problem, i.e. due to the 
small, not representative sample of interviews, and or due to the survey design which did 
not ask more detailed questions on collective reactions to workplace grievances. Secondly, 
it could be a sign that people have unstable, incoherent attitudes: on the one side they 
realize that only solidaristic action can achieve something (perhaps supported by the 
positive experience of the peaceful turnaround in 1989). On the other side, they perceive 
no chance of influencing management decision-making and therefore do not act. Thirdly, it 
could be a reaction to the perceived high job insecurity. In the survey 48% agree that you 
get sacked if you complain.
In sum, one might argue that people strongly believed in collective action as an 
effective and necessary means, yet were frustrated about its potential success in the current 
economic circumstances.
In addition, there are some statements in the interviews concerning the role collective 
action played in former workplace relations, which might be worth reporting regarding the 
suggestion reported in chapter 5 that the absense of voluntary collective activities in former 
times might prevent participation today (e.g. Mahnkopf 1991).
There is some tentative evidence that expressing grievances over working 
conditions was rarely done before. "You got used to the fact that nothing is changing 
anyhow" (sewer no 3 1994). And there was the additional fear that you were 
disadvantaged in the holiday place distribution or got a bad remark in your personnel file 
etc. (sewer no 4 1994). Only during the turbulent times in 1989 people felt more confident 
expressing their dissappointment. "People didn't mince their words anymore. Once some
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people start, others follow" (no 4). Protocol documents of company assemblies from that 
period (e.g. November 1989) showed that quite a few people mentioned problems and 
suggested necessary improvements.
However, some workers said that people used to speak up more in former times 
than today, but others counter that the complaints had no impact then. "Now they listen to 
your claims, since they want to avoid conflicts and are interested in the ideas. I wouldn't 
have thought this is the case in a West firm" (sewer, no 5 1994). This is in line with the 
councillors' view that management does try to foster a trustful relationship with the 
workforce (chapter 4: 4.4). One can tentatively suggest that this was a rather obedient, 
even obsequious workforce in former times, which might have spoken up at certain times, 
but was not highly involved in informal bargaining with their supervisors, as some 
literature suggests (Kern and Land 1991). However, the assumed low level of practice of 
voluntary collective activities in the GDR did not prevent people to have a generally 
positive view of collective activities today.
(ii) GTB survey
table 9.1.6: level of items of perceived instrumentality of collective activities in the GTB firms
./. stronglydisagree
disagree no view agree strongly
agree N
AV Works council and GTB will only be
effective if they get active support from 
the workers.
5.0 6.0 6.0 20.1 62.9 418
AL Strikes are an effective means to strengthen 
the union during collective bargaining.
7.3 8.7 10.4 28.9 44.7 425
The two questions revealed a highly positive distribution and provide a more positive 
response to collective action than did the case study (also with regard to union members 
only at Bodywear, see t-tests in appendix A 2.6).
In sum, despite the slight differences between the two data sets, the common result is that 
people are generally attentive to the principle of collective action, yet judge its success
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chances at shopfloor level in the current circumstances as lower than at industrial level (i.e. 
strikes). It is an interesting finding that people differentiate the strength of collective action 
according to the different levels of action (micro/ meso). It also suggests that workers are 
not sufficiently "individualistic" that they cannot appreciate "collective" activities, as is 
argued in some literature.
Moreover, it has been argued that East Germans lack experience in "voluntary" 
collective action and therefore cannot perceive it as effective. This cannot be supported by 
the data, especially not with the GTB sample. One could argue that workers have learnt 
over the last years that their interest representation needs active support, and that strikes 
can make a change (e.g. the "successful" strike of East German members of the IG Metall 
in 1993 which lasted two weeks, the first large-scale strike in the East). Yet, one can also 
argue that workers might remember the possible "informal" group actions on the former 
shopfloor and regard this kind of collective action as instrumental and even more 
successful than works councils' activities. Consequently, workers might still prefer to rely 
on themselves to represent their interests than use institutional procedures, and thus the 
informal interest representation might not yet substituted by formal institutions. However, 
this analysis overlooks the fact that group actions seem never to have been the norm in the 
former textile plants, and that the interest institutions are overwhelmingly accepted by the 
workforce. As mentioned before, a continuous interplay of informal (group) and formal 
interest representation on shopfloor level might be the most likely scenario (see chapter 3, 
e.g. Morgenroth et al. 1994:90).
Finally, with regard to the whole section on collective instrumentality it should be 
also noted that the variety of results of these variables adds support to the assumed multi­
dimensionality of the concept (see chapter 7).
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9.2  General views on interest representation at Bodywear
The purpose of these questions was to provide additional information of people's views on 
their interest representation in former and current times.
table 9.2: level of items of interest representation at Bodywear
Who represents your interests today with 
following working conditions? (in %)
regard to the
- ' y s£|p||i|| ,
union works personnel 
council dept.
super-visor
p H H
CR pay level 41.4 18.2 14.8 12.9 12.9 209
CQ job security 13.2 32.9 13.2 17.4 23.3 219
cw working time 20.6 27.3 14.8 22.5 14.8 209
cv health & safety 9.7 21.5 2.7 25.8 40.3 186
cu introduction of new technology 0.0 4.9 4.3 76.2 14.6 185
cr qualification/training 2.9 6.4 38.6 13.5 38.6 171
cs job requirements 1.5 10.8 6.2 66.7 14.9 195
cx And who did represent best your interests in form er  times? (one only) 224
BGL =13.0%  
plant director = 7.6 % 
supervisor = 34.8 %
my workgroup = 10.3 % 
nobody, myself alone = 33.0 % 
different (specify)__ = 1 . 3 %
The union was mainly seen as representing wage interests, but not for example job 
security concerns. The works council was seen as representing the workforce in its 
traditional tasks (e.g. working time) but not for example with regard to the introduction of 
new technology. This supports the assertion in the literature (see chapter 3) that there is 
little activity on an issue which is seen as a major general problem of German works 
councils, especially for the East German ones (e.g. Mahnkopf 1992). Similarly, the 
personnel department was the major representative for training, and the works council was 
not seen to be in charge. The supervisor was also the representative of most workplace 
issues. However, the modal response was that workers felt represented by nobody 
regarding training and health & safety (this was also pointed out in several interviews, e.g. 
supervisor in knitting no 1 1993).
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In sum, there is a fair distribution of representative bodies depending on the issues. This 
might be partly due to the dual system of interest representation in Germany (see chapter
3). However, one wonders sometimes whether people had not picked out the actor who is 
theoretically responsible for that specific issue rather than the true representative (e.g. 
regarding new technology or work requirements: is the supervisor really representing 
workers' interests?). Yet, the surprising dominance of the supervisors could be also 
explained as a legacy of former times where the supervisor was seen as being more a 
"friend" of the work group than today.
With regard to the representation of interests in the socialist days, the BGL got the third 
place after the supervisor and nobody, and was placed higher than the workgroup. This 
confirms an earlier hypothesis on the low effectiveness of the former state union in 
representing workers interests (see chapter 2). It might also support earlier suggestions of 
the limited extent of informal bargaining between the workgroup and supervisors in these 
firms (see chapter 3, 4). A comparison between former and current times which could 
show us changes of interest representation, is not really possible with this data. However, 
one might say that the union and works council are both seen as fulfilling more 
representative roles (especially in the three traditional issues, pay, job security and 
working time) than the BGL did in former times. This could be used as another support 
for the successful institutionalisation of the two organisations.
In sum, this section supported the findings on the necessity of the interest 
institutions and their overall effectiveness in representing workers interests in the 
traditional areas.
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9.3  Union identity and related items
(i) Bodywear survey
table 9.3.1: level of items of union identity and related items at Bodywear
./. stronglydisagree
disagree no view agree strongly
agree N
BR It is important for me to belong to the union. 22.8 12.4 15 28 .0 21 .8 193
BQ I never tell my friends that I am a union 
member.
50.6 12.2 7.8 15.6 13.9 180
BS I would stay in the union if I had to work 
on short term or became unemployed.
28.5 5 .2 30.1 14.0 22.3 193
BU Not belonging to the union is anti-social. 78.8 8.5 9 .0 1.4 2 .4 212
BF I regard myself as a member of the 
working class.
9.2 6.7 12.1 17.1 5 5 .0 240
AY It's difficult to be loyal to both 
the union and the company.
6.7 9 .4 38.2 28.3 17.3 254
BA As a union member you are discriminated 
against by your supervisor.
46.3 9 .0 36.5 4 .7 3 .5 255
These questions were mainly filled out by union members, although this was not explicitly 
required. The first four questions asked directly for peoples' identification with the union. 
Over half stated that union membership was important for them, and even a larger number 
did not hide their membership from their friends. With regard to keeping their membership 
in the case of unemployment, the answers were, unsurprisingly, more divided. 
Nevertheless, these figures might be interpreted as a consistent (although not extremely 
strong) positive identification with the union. However, one might object that the 
questions do not provide a good measurement of identity. The questions are not precisely 
worded, i.e. it is not clear why it is important to belong to the union and why they want to 
stay in the union if unemployed (both could have instrumental reasons as well). The GTB 
survey tried to avoid these misunderstandings.
Furthermore, 87% thought that not belonging to an union is not "anti-social". This 
might indicate that joining the union was not a social norm anymore as it was before. 
However, over 70% (of non union and union members) described themselves as 
belonging to the working class. This is in contrast to Hofmann and Rink (1993) who claim
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the disolution of the "worker milieu" (Arbeitermilieu) in East Germany. It is also a striking 
number compared to the western experience, where "working class" is increasingly 
becoming something you do not want to belong to ("embourgeoisement" of the working 
class, see Goldthorpe et al. 1968; Kern and Schumann 1970; Zweig 1961). An 
explanation might be the legacy of the former glorification and high status of the working 
class. Perhaps it is also pure obstinacy. But it might also be a sign of a (still) strong 
collectivist feeling among the workforce.
The next question asked about dual loyalty to the firm and the union. Although a 
majority of 45% thought that it is problematic to be loyal to both, 38% did not know, 
which might indicate, that this has never been an issue before. People experienced unions 
as being a normal, accepted part of the socialist company life, not as autonomous bodies 
but rather part of a unity with management. This might also influence people's perception 
that union members are not discriminated against at their workplaces, as the last question 
shows.
(ii) GTB survey
table 9.3.2: level of items of union identity and related items in the GTB firms
strongly
disagree
disagree no view agree strongly
agree N
BF I share the aims and values of the union. 5 .4 6.1 13.2 44 .9 30 .4 408
BG Union solidarity is very important for me. 4 .6 3.9 11.2 32.8 4 7 .4 411
BB I feel a sense of pride in being a member 
of the GTB.
9.2 18.2 15.8 35.7 21.1 412
BE I feel strong ties with the other union 
members (in my plant).
11.7 19.6 22.7 31.1 14.9 409
BC I would remain in the union, even if 
I were unemployed.
22.7 14.3 20.5 14.7 27 .8 414
BA I seriously think about quitting the GTB 
in the future.
44.3 21.2 11.1 14.5 8 .9 415
This survey expanded and improved the measurement of union identity. Overall, a large 
majority of members identified strongly with their union. 80% declared that union 
solidarity is very important for them. Slightly fewer felt strong ties with other members, or
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would remain in the union if unemployed (43% which is slightly more than Body wear's 
36%). Finally, a majority of 65% was not thinking of leaving the GTB, albeit nearly a 
quarter were. This is however much less than the average in East Germany as illustrated 
by the DGB Trendbarometer (54% were thinking of leaving their union in 1994). This 
better result could be due to the overrepresentative share of union or works council 
officials in the GTB survey sample, yet t-tests showed no significant differences for this 
question. In short, the data yielded a strong degree of union identity and a more reliable 
measurement than that of the case study.
In sum, the strong union identity of both samples is in line with the high degree of 
solidarity and collectivist attitudes discussed earlier (chapter 8). It gives evidence that the 
postulated East German "identity crisis" regarding public institutions has not affected these 
samples yet (see chapter 5). For example it challenges Fichter's proposition (1996), that 
high union identity exists only in conflict situations, or Eidam and Oswald's (1993:167) 
assertion, that the unions have not yet succeeded in developing a culture of solidarity and 
commitment. Unfortunately, there is no comparable empirical study of "union identity" 
(neither in the West nor East).
Finally, it should be repeated that the survey did not intend to obtain information 
on the development of its attitudinal variables (i.e. recently "developed" by union 
members or a legacy of the past). Thus, it did not address the question how do the 
"disappointing experiences with the former union" impede identification with the current 
union, or what is the link between "people's former socialisation" and their union identity 
today. What is possible however to examine is the relationship between the strong union 
identity and the weaker collective instrumentality which will be dealt with later in Part 4.
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9 .4  Information flow between collective institutions and the workforce 
and collective interests at Bodywear
table 9.4: level of items of information flow and collective interests at Bodywear
./. no view agree a £ £ 8ly N
AX You get well informed about the work 
of the GTB.
18.2 23.6 13.6 39.1 5.4 258
AK You are not sufficiently informed 
about the work councils' work.
6.4 15.6 10.3 34.0 33.7 282
AP The works council guarantees 
another job for all knitters.
4.5 1.9 76.1 5.6 11.9 268
AW Please state one important difference between the works council 
and the union. Just write what comes into your mind:
69
mentioned one difference = 23.0% no answer = 76.3%
BV Guess how many of Bodywear's workforce are union members? 214
0-20% = 9.3% 31-40% = 
21-30% =15.8% 41-50% =
20.3%
15.8%
51-100% = 12.4%
AM The work of the works council is 
a frequent topic of our chats.
20.3 31.3 11.0 23.0 7.9 272
AL Our group keeps the works council informed 
about relevant events on the shopfloor.
9.3 15.9 33.7 26.3 14.8 270
AZ In our workgroup we often discuss union 
issues.
46.9 34.6 3.1 13.5 1.9 260
The first five questions dealt with the information flow . Workers felt insufficiently 
informed by the works council and were divided with regard to the union. Interestingly, 
there is no significant difference between union and non union members regarding both 
institutions, as t-tests found out. The slightly better evaluation of the union might be traced 
back to the "information desk" of the GTB at Bodywear (being set up just at the time of the 
survey) rather than to different underlying communication policies of the two institutions. 
Moreover, the works council is a major channel for union information (especially when 
there are no union stewards, as is the case in most sites in the East, see chapter 3).
The next questions examined how informed workers actually were. Asked about a 
specific, at that time major, success of the works council in the knitting plant (see chapter
4) nobody in the other departments seemed to be informed. In the same vein, 76% could
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not or did not bother to provide a distinction between "union" and "works council". Out of 
the few people who filled out this open question, most argued that "the union represented 
workers, and the works council represented management". But there were also remarks 
such as, "the works council cares for us, the union is only for paying members". Some 
people maintained that there was no difference at all between the two institutions, while 
others argued that the works council was more approachable than the union. Further 
comments were, "the union is more powerful", "Betriebsrat = Geheimrat" (works 
councillor = secret servant), and one person wrote very 'philosophically', "according to 
the situation one is quicker in giving in than the other (dialectical interrelation see Marx)".
In sum, there are mixed and divergent perceptions of the two institutions. It is 
striking that quite a few people mixed up the union with the former BGL and actually 
compared the works council with the BGL. This also occurred in the interviews. The 
difference between old union, new union and works council was often not yet clear (e.g. 
sewer no 5 1994). In the interviews the works council was seen as a transmission belt 
between management and workers as was the former BGL, rather than a pure 
representative body of the workforce or of the management. "The works council 
represents the company and also the workers" (sewer no 4 1994). However, one can 
either relate this to peoples' continuing association of the works council with the former 
BGL, or to the belief that the works council is actually acting as a prolonged arm of 
management. Furthermore, only 20% knew the correct union density figure at Bodywear 
(between 31-40%).212 Although it is difficult to investigate the actual amount and quality 
of information flows between the two institutions and the workforce by survey and 
interview method (participant observation during a longer time seems more appropriate), 
one can conclude that workers felt largely left out and uninformed about what is going on. 
Insufficient information supply, a lack of experience and/or interest might be all reasonable 
explanations.
2 *2 T-tests revealed that union members were more likely to guess the right density figure than non- 
members.
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Finally, the last three questions refer to workers' interest in the institutions, which can be 
interpreted as indicating a preliminary interest in collective issues. The data suggested a 
rather low interest in common affairs. Most did not discuss union issues, a few more 
discussed works council affairs, but on the other side 41% kept the works council 
informed about group issues. However, this is not an uncommon finding also in western 
societies. There is evidence that interest in collective issues is low for most workers but is 
"switched on" in times of concern (e.g. before collective bargaining rounds or strikes) 
(e.g. Zoll 1979).
As outlined in chapter 7 it might be interesting to examine the possible relation 
between these variables and union identity or instrumentality. For example, do people who 
feel well informed perceive a higher instrumentality of the interest institutions than those 
who feel less informed? Or are strong union identifiers more interested in collective issues 
than weak identifiers? These questions will be addressed in Part 4.
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CONCLUSION OF PART 3
WORKERS' PERCEPTIONS 
OF THE TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE RELATIONS
" ... May I add a few comments. Today you are as an employee completely and 
utterly at the management's mercy. Obviously the union tries to represent the 
interests of the worker. But in the end it is always the profit which wins, and only 
the profit. The individual human does not count anymore in this system. Due to 
the market situation (unemployment) in East Germany it is very easy to tie 
workers' and the union's hands. A worker in East Germany earns in average 60-
80% of the wage his colleague in West Germany gets, and this with the same
level of living expenses. You are forced to work also for a low wage in order to 
survive. In the GDR you were not allowed to travel abroad. Today you cannot 
afford it. A large amount of law needs to be overhauled by the government. May I 
conclude with my own, very personal view. The socialist system, combined with 
a market economy, i.e. with the free market economy, might be the golden mean 
in order to prevent Germany becoming one day a third world country...."
("anonymous worker from East Germany", written on the back of his/her questionnaire,
1993)
Part 3 was concerned with workers' perspectives of the transforming workplace relations.
It was earlier proposed that this perspective is necessary to really understand the
transformation process. In a nutshell three relationships were explored: between workers 
and management, between the workers themselves, and between workers and works 
council/ union.
Worker- management relations were not harmonious in either data set. 
Management was seen as having deteriorated the working conditions in virtually all aspects 
(e.g. through an intensification of work), and were described as distrustful "exploiters". 
Workers felt betrayed, humilitated and not involved in the organisational transformation 
process.
Yet, with regard to the relationship among the workforce, this development did not 
lead (yet) to a complete de-solidarization and increasing competition among the workers.
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Although workers felt a decreasing solidarity among their colleagues, they still identified 
strongly with their work collectives.
Regarding the relationship between the workforce and the new interest institutions 
the result was mixed. Works councils and the union were accepted, but their specific 
effectiveness was evaluated differently and, on average, more negatively. On the other 
hand the instrumentality of collective activities was seen slightly more positively. It seems 
that people have complex views on interest representation, and this underlines the 
complexity of workers' attitudes in general and in particular in times of change and also 
comprises an important methodological point on debates about collectivism, 
instrumentality and unionism. As was already pointed out in table 5.3 (chapter 5) there are 
likely to be various dimensions of individualism/ collectivism, rather than a simple "black 
and white" picture. For example, the surveyed textile workers believed in the value of 
works councils, unions and of collectivism, but were less sure about solidarity. Or they 
attributed representative duties not only to works councillors and union officials but also to 
their supervisors. Furthermore, union members revealed strong union identities but a 
generally low perceptions of the instrumentality of the union.
One could speculate that this divergence between identity and instrumentality can 
only last for a short while. According to Newton and McFarlane Shore (1992:278) it 
characterizes a "cognitive dissonance" (e.g. Festinger 1957), and thus creates tensions 
within individuals which they will attempt to reduce. Ultimately these people will either 
reduce their identification with the union or will enhance a positive perception of the 
unions' instrumentality. However, it might be that this presumed cognitive dissonance is a 
rather "normal" phenomenon which comes and goes during a membership life. The next 
Part will investigate the relationship between the two dimensions of collectivism in more 
detail.
Finally, what do the attitudes discussed in Part 3 tell us about the two underlying questions 
of this study, the "individualisation" of the workforce and the "institutionalisation" of the 
interest representation?
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With regard to the widespread claim that East German workers are becoming increasingly 
individualistic, passive and instrumental, Part 3 dealt with five of the attitudinal 
dimensions outlined in table 5.3. Collectivist attitudes were characterized by a mixed 
perception of the instrumentality of the interest institutions and strongly positive 
perceptions of the instrumentality of collective activities, a strong union and workgroup 
identity, strong them-and-us feelings, general collectivist attitudes, and a rather low 
interest in collective concerns. Thus, the average textile worker is not alienated from 
collectivist values, has rather a strong sense of solidarity and of them-and-us feelings, and 
union members identify with their union. Moreover, people perceive the interest 
institutions as important to have, they do not dismiss them as useless just because they are 
not perceived as highly successful at the moment.
As will be recalled, table 5.3 did not distinguish necessary or sufficient dimensions 
of collectivism. However, it seems safe to conclude that with regard to most attitudinal 
dimensions these workers can be characterized as "collectivists". The individualisation 
thesis can therefore not be supported with regard to the examined attitudes of the 
workforce. However, they should not be classified as 'pure' collectivists since they 
display some mixed responses. This will be further discussed in the next chapter, which 
examines their behavioural patterns, e.g. whether they react individualistically, or 
passively, as has been suggested in the literature.
With regard to the second hypothesis, it was argued in chapter 3 that one essential, 
necessary condition of an effective functioning of the collective institutions is that the 
actors involved accept them. Both data sets presented a strong belief of workers that the 
two institutions are necessary and important, although they were realistic with regard to the 
restricted power of the institutions during these difficult economic times. This is a 
reassuring result that after three or four years the institutional transfer has settled in 
people's minds. It also confirms the findings of the works councillor questionnaires which 
gave the impression that, perhaps selectively, management works together with the works 
council rather than tries to avoid and obstruct them as much as possible, and confirms the 
works councillors' view that the workforce is supporting them (see chapter 4). With
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regard to the other variables which characterize the institutionalisation from the workers' 
viewpoint and which are mentioned in table 3.2 (chapter 3) two yielded more mixed 
results: workers displayed a weak interest in collective issues (yet as outlined the low 
interest level might be a quite normal phenomenon). They had a positive view on utilizing 
the works council in theory as a grievance institution yet were threatened to do so in 
practice. Finally, the strong union identities (and indeed the union membership figures) 
give another support for the institutionalisation of the union. Whether workers also 
support the institutions actively is matter of the next chapter.
Finally, the data also suggests that informal interest representation does not play a 
major role in these textile companies, thus the formalisation of interest representation in the 
West German system did succeed. Thus, the various dimensions of "institutionalisation" 
which were here discussed seem to support the hypothesis that the works council and the 
union are institutionalised from the viewpoint of the workers.
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PART 4
WORKERS’ REACTIONS: THE WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE 
IN COLLECTIVE ACTIVITIES AND ITS DETERMINANTS
Part 4 discusses various forms of workers' reactions to the transforming workplace 
relations and analyses the relevance of the selected theories in determining workers' 
willingness to participate in collective activities. The discussion has two aims: Firstly, it 
continues to analyse of two main hypotheses of this study, the "individualisation" of the 
workforce and the "institutionalisation" of the interest organisations. Secondly and 
primarily, it investigates the applicability of the four social psychological theories in the 
East German context and the possible interrelations between them.
Chapter 10 focuses on the level of activism in both data sets, and chapter 11 
examines the determinants.
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Chapter 10 Workers' reactions to the transforming workplace relations: 
behavioural variables in both surveys
The chapter discusses workers' reactions to the transforming workplace relations by 
focusing on their willingness to participate in collective activities (10.1), which is the 
dependent variable in the further statistical analysis. It also investigates two other variables: 
reactions to workplace problems (10.2), and reasons for joining the union (10.3). The 
former is used as an additional proxy for the willingness to become active. The latter 
provides some insights of how people made the decision to join the West German union, 
which might have some parallel to people's approach to participate in the union, which is 
discussed in the next chapter.
10.1 The willingness to participate in collective activities
(i) Bodywear survey
table 10.1.1: level of items of willingness to participate in collective activities at Bodywear
./.
strongly
disagree
disagree no view agree strongly
agree N
AV I will attend the next works council 
assembly.
3.7 2.2 22.3 8.4 63.4 273
AT I will attend the next works council election. 9.2 4.4 32.2 8.1 46.2 273
BO I never visit union e v e n t s . ^  3 4.4 5.9 19.5 32.2 38.0 205
CN "Bischofferode" (mining strike) has a 
meaning throughout East Germany and 
if the union would call a strike I would 
participate.
10.0 5.8 37.8 20.8 25.5 259
AU If my colleagues want me to, I would 
stand for the works council election.
58.7 16.2 17.3 3.3 4.4 271
BT I am not a very active and loyal member. 15.2 10.5 19.3 36.8 18.1 171
213 xhe question in the original questionniare: "do you visit union events?" (1 always/2 quite often/3 
sometimes/4 very rarely/5 never) was here transformed.
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The high willingess to attend works councils' assemblies was in line with the works 
councillors' statement that these assemblies are always well attended. This is hardly 
surprising taking into account that these meetings take place during working time and are 
more or less obligatory to attend.214 Fewer but still over a half, were willing to attend the 
next works councillor election (early summer 1994), while a third did not know at this 
stage. This cannot support the expressed concern of the works council of a decreasing 
interest of the workforce in works council elections (see chapter 4). Indeed, the actual 
attendance rate in the following year was 85% (of total workforce) which is very high.
With regard to the union, responses were more varied. A large majority was not 
willing to attend union events (albeit more than a third do not know). Union events were 
not specified and thus can mean different things to different people (e.g. assemblies, 
cultural events, demonstrations). One reason for this low level might be that these 
questions were also filled out by non union members. It is obvious that, as the t-tests 
confirmed, members attended works council assemblies, union events and strikes more 
than non union members. In addition, it has to be taken into account that the GTB did not 
organise a great amount of "events" (especially when compared with the former socialist 
union). It will be remembered that the first union "event" at Bodywear (the information 
desk) took actually place at the time of the survey. However, the percentage of people 
attending these events is still quite low compared to WeBel's study (see chapter 5) which 
revealed 34% of employees attending union events in East Germany in 1990. However, 
one might object that in 1990 union events happened more frequently due to the 
extraordinary situation of the union mergers at that time.
On the other side, there was a high willingness to participate in strike action. One 
could however object that the results might be biased by the emotions evoked at that time 
by the famous hunger strike in the mines in Bischofferode. The interviews (in 1993 and 
1994) were much more stamped by a wait-and-see attitude towards the usefulness and 
effectiveness of strikes. Interviewees all provided an "instrumental", "rationed" approach to 
strikes, thus mentioning pros and cons, emphasizing the economic situation and the
214 Works council assemblies take place four times a year (by law: BetrVG 1972, $ 42), elections each 
third year.
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possible West German winner of East German strike activities ("only the West German 
plants would profit if we strike" [knitter no3, 1993]). The author met nobody who was 
enthusiastic to take part in a strike. But who is enthusiastic about striking in the West? 
Also one should keep in mind that interviews are generally leading in that they push 
respondents to provide "rational" explanations for their attitudes and behaviour. In 
addition, the interviews also gave evidence that some people just looked for an excuse for 
not acting, and not becoming responsible for their action. For example, "we are not used 
to strikes", "we are happy what we have got" were common phrases.
Another reason why strike participation might be lower in reality than expressed in 
the survey is that industrial action is not really an issue for the workforce of Bodywear. 
They are paid the bargained wage and they work for a prosperous privatised company with 
a relatively stable employment situation.
On the other side, the token strike (over pay and working conditions) happening 
two years later at Bodywear (1995) can provide another support for the declared activism 
in the questionnaires. Obviously, it depends on how one interprets the way workers 
participated in it (i.e. "reluctantly" forced or voluntarily) whether this can be taken as a 
support for workers' strong inclination to participate in collective activities. One has also to 
account for the fact that attitudes might have changed during that period of time. Talking to 
the councillors in 1995 did however not provide any evidence that this had happened. In 
sum, the data does not allow us to make final judgements about a possible difference 
between expressed willingness and actual behaviour. However, the strong willingness to 
participate in strikes is a surprising and important finding in itself.
Finally, three quarters were not interested in standing for works council election. 
This proportion seems not markedly different from what is known of West German 
employees (e.g. Krieger et al. 1989) or union members (e.g. Zech 1993), or indeed from 
other western countries (Brett 1980; Van de Vail 1963). For example, Krieger et al. 
(1989:163) found that 72% of their representative sample of West German employees in 
various industries refusing to stand for works councillor election and 26% agreeing (out of 
which 30% are male, and 19% are female). Thus, it seems that people are easier to 
mobilize for selective activities than for continuous voluntary commitments, despite the
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fact that they acknowledge the significance of worker's support for the council (see items 
discussed above). However, a single question is not obviously sufficient for valid 
statements regarding members' attitudes towards this kind of participation, and the GTB 
survey included more items on this issue.
The very last question refers to employees' own perceptions of being an active and 
loyal union member. More than half felt they are not an active and loyal member. 
However, the question does not distinguish between active and loyal, which might not be 
correlated in all cases: in addition this question was answered by only 39% of the sample. 
This question is therefore statistically not highly reliable, and is improved in the GTB 
survey.
In sum, the findings are mixed: on one side workers were willing to participate in 
"normal" works council activities and also in strikes, on the other side they were reluctant 
to stand for a councillor post and do not see themselves as active and loyal union 
members. The strong willingness to become active in certain activities however challenges 
the works councillor's view at Bodywear of the generally "inactive workforce" (see 
chapter 4).
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(ii) GTB survey
table 10.1.2: level of items of willingness to participate in collective activities in the GTB firms
./. strong!ly disagree no view agree £S8'y N
AJ I would take part in demonstrations/ 
rallies during collective bargaining.
7.5 12.7 20.9 26.4 32.5 416
AK If the GTB calls a strike I would participate. 9.7 9.0 18.4 17.7 45.3 424
AW I will attend the next works council 
assembly.
6.9 1.4 11.2 5.5 74.9 418
AO Did you vote in the recent works council election? 412
yes = 91.5% no = 8.5%
AX If asked I would have stood for 
the works council election.
26.6 18.2 17.7 12.4 25.1 418
AY If asked 1 would serve on a committee 
for the GTB.
40.4 19.2 22.6 10.1 7.7 416
AZ I constantly try to recruit new members 
for the union.
35.6 19.5 18.0 16.1 10.7 410
BD I don't see myself as a union activist. 9.4 11.1 9.9 34.5 35.0 414
The GTB survey focused more on activities of the union than the case study. The items 
can be divided into two broad categories, "organised" and "self-initiated" forms of 
collective activities. The former comprises activities organised by the union or work 
council where people "submissively" join without making any initiative of their own. The 
latter comprises activities where people deliberately take the initiative to become active. 
These two categories are later confirmed by factor analysis (chapter 11).
The frequency distribution revealed a 'high' level of willingness to join organised 
forms of participation (such as strikes), and a relatively low inclination to become active on 
one's own. In other words, the involvement in self-initiated activities was much lower in 
absolute terms than the organised activities. A comparison with the case study data is 
possible with regard to the last three questions of the first category. Attending works 
council assembly and actual voting in works council election yielded similar results, as did 
strike participation, which was somewhat higher in the GTB sample (63% vs 47% in 
Bodywear). This difference might well be due to the different sample (union members and
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members/non members in the case study — similar differences have been found in Krieger 
et al. 1989).
These results challenge the popular notion of East Germans being passive and 
reluctant to strike (e.g. Mahnkopf 1992, Woderich 1992, see chapter 3). This becomes 
especially evident taking into account the usual association of the textile sector as a 
traditionally female-dominated and not highly militant union sector and the fact that the 
East German textile industry by now consists of small plants (see the structural theories of 
participation, chapter 6). T-tests revealed no significant differences between females and 
males regarding the participation items (see appendix A 2.6).
The recent token strike (1995) and the other actions during collective bargaining 
during 1993-1994 do not contradict to the general non-militancy of the GTB. This has 
been also underlined by the works council questionnaire (1993) which revealed no 
incidence of industrial action of any kind in the surveyed companies (see chapter 4). 
Consequently, it might be argued, as in the Bodywear survey, that the correlation between 
willingness to become active and the actual behaviour is much looser in the East than in the 
West. One reason could be that East Germans might think they should participate (because 
of group norms, socialisation etc.), but nevertheless might not do in the actual situation, as 
long as they are not "forced" or heavily mobilized. It could be also due to a cost-benefit 
analysis which prevents an engagement because it is seen as ineffective in these economic 
circumstances. This would be supported by the case study interviews presenting a more 
cautious "wait-and-see" approach to strikes.
On the other hand, the data does not differ significantly from available West 
German data. For example, Wiedenhofer (1979:45) found in his sample of West German 
union members in the food industry (NGG) 60% who would participate in a strike. And 
the study of Krieger et al. (1989:127) examined in a representative survey of West German 
union members whether they would follow the call of the unions to participate in the 
following activities: "public declaration" (Kundgebung) (60%), demonstration (42%), 
strike (34%), silent minute (53%), human chain (9%), "occupation of the plant" (5%). 
15% did not participate out of principle. In addition, one should not forget that 
participation is only possible if there are opportunities available, and this depends among
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other things on the structure and degree of internal democracy and strategies of the 
particular union (see Lawrence 1994:11). In sum, it is not clear that the gap between 
willingness and activity is significantly different in East from that in West Germany.
With regard to the more "difficult" self-initiated forms of participation in the 
survey, slightly over a third would have stood for works council election, which is higher 
than at Bodywear (7% all workers, 11.2% union members only). Considerably fewer 
(18%) wished to serve on a union committee, and over a quarter tried to recruit new 
members on a constant basis. Overall, as already mentioned in the case study, the findings 
support an established western theory, that members are far easier to mobilize for selective 
collective actions than for continuous voluntary commitments. The results are also in line 
with available West German data. For example, Wiedenhofer (ibid.:44) found 20% willing 
members to stand for works council election, the Sozialreport (1993:30) found 23% 
willing to become active for "worker interests", and Krieger et al. (1989:165) found 36% 
of their union sample (representative for West Germany).
The last question refers to people's own perception of their activism: 70% saw 
themselves as not active members. The GTB survey improved the question in that it did 
not combine "loyalty" and "activity", and only decreased the number of people with "no 
views" compared to Bodywear. Thus, the result is more reliable than the, more or less 
similar, Bodywear result. It is also in line with (West) German findings. Weischer (1993) 
quoted a representative study on political consciousness of West German employees, 
where 20% declared themselves as active union members (Infas-study). And also the DGB 
Trendbarometer yielded 26% declared active members in East vs 17% in West in 1994, 
which is in both regions lower than in 1992 (East 33%, West 24%). For the GTB (West 
and East) subsample the results in 1992 were below the East or West activity rate with 
only 19% activists, however the sample consisted of 83 persons only and is therefore not 
highly reliable (it is not said how many of these were East Germans).
Finally, the question is used as an indicator of how far people's own perception of 
activism correlates with the survey's "artificial" measurements of participation. The 
correlation is significant (r= -.30) which can be interpreted as supporting the question's 
validity.
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In sum, the findings resemble the Bodywear data in that their willingess to become active 
depends on the type of activity. Thus, the union members are highly willing to participate 
in organised activities, but less in self-initiated activities. And both samples do not 
characterize themselves as highly active members.
10.2  Reactions to workplace problems
This variable was included as an additional proxy for willingness to become active, not as 
a dependent variable on its own.
(i) Bodywear
Four different types of responses to job insecurity were examined: individualistic or 
collectivistic responses, externalizing or no reaction at all (avoidance). The first part asked 
for the approach to secure the company's survival, the second asked for individual job 
security.
table 10.2.1: levels of items of reactions to workplace problems at Bodywear
BW/BX/BY In general: how do you think the "viability" of Bodywear can be secured for long term? 
(max. three) (N of BW=251, of BX=187, of BY=97) (% = sum of BW, BX, BY)
5 by means o f better performance o f m yself and my fellowworkers 29.5 %
4 " more codetermination/involvement o f the employees 18.9
3 " better management 17.4
2 " a more powerful works council 12.0
7 " politics (industrial policy) 11.8
1 " a more powerful union 7.3
6 " lower pay levels and cost savings at all workplaces 5.2
8 " not at all 3.4
9 " different reason (please specify) 1.7
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BZ/CA/CB How can you improve your job security?
(max. three) (N of BZ=243, of CA=117, of CB=27) (%= sum of BZ, CA, CB)
1 I have to work better than my fellowworkers 38.2 %
2 I have to have a good relationship to my supervisor and do not "rebel" 22.5
3 I have to solidarize with my colleagues 17.1
5 I cannot do anything 12.4
4 I have to become engaged in union or works council work 6.2
6 something else (please specify) 3.6
With regard to the company level 38% of the sample chose collective measures (point 1, 2, 
4), 35% took individual measures (point 5, 6), 29% took external measures (point 3, 7), 
and 3% chose avoidance (point 8). Thus, the majority responded collectively to the threats 
at the level of the firm. On the other side most were inclined to act individualistically in the 
face of threats to their own job: 61% chose individual measures (point 1, 2), 23% chose 
collective measures (point 3, 4), and 12% chose avoidance (point 5). The relatively low 
level of avoidance challenges the widespread impression of "apathetic East Germans" (e.g. 
Mahnkopf 1992).
In sum, people chose more individualistic than collectivist strategies concerning the 
security of their own job, but slightly more collectivist strategies regarding the overall 
security of the firm. Thus, one might argue that at their workplace they conformed to the 
management slogan that increasing productivity helps to secure jobs. But for the well­
being of the firm more employee involvement, a strong interest institution alongside better 
performance was preferred.
This interplay of threat definition- interest definition is echoed in some previous 
data. For example, collective action was seen as highly effective at industrial level (i.e. 
strikes) but less at shopfloor level (see chapter 9:9.1.3). It also reflects the German dual 
system of industrial relations (i.e. collective action at shopfloor level is not common). 
Moreover, it supports the proposition that people are difficult to classify as pure 
collectivists or pure individualists. They might be both depending on the circumstances, 
i.e. the levels of threat.
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(ii) GTB survey
The GTB survey investigated alternative reactions to job insecurity, and also to two other 
workplace problems, work pace and pay level, together with the attribution of those 
problems, which have been already discussed on their own (section 8.4). It utilized Likert 
scales (instead of ranking questions of the Bodywear survey).
table 10.2.2: level of items of reaction to problems in the GTB firms
1
reaction to job insecurity
strongly
disagree
disagree no view agree strongly
agree
Y I cannot do anything [in order to improve 
my job security].
11.1 7.8 14.6 15.6 50 .9 424
Z I would try everything not to attract any 
negative attention [to improve my job 
security].
5.5 15.8 9 .3  24.9 44 .5 418
AD I would look for another job [to improve 
job security].
24.0 16.1 19.2 17.7 23 .0 417
AA I have to work better than my workfellows 
[to improve my job security].
6.9 20.3 8.9  25.1 38.8 418
AB I have to act together with my colleagues. 13.5 16.6 21 .4  22 .2 26.3 415
AC I have to support more actively works 
council and GTB.
5.3 4 .8 16.5 27.3 4 6 .2 418
AE It's the task of the works council not of 
us workers to [improve job security].
12.2 11.1 4 .4  36 .0 33.7 422
reaction to intensified work pace
N I cannot do anything [to improve 
working conditions], because 
otherwise I will risk loosing my job.
10.0 9.3 8 .2  30.1 42 .3 428
0 I have to act together with my workfellows 
[to improve our working conditions].
7.5 9 .9 9 .6  28 .9 44.1 426
P Works council has to deal with it 
[improving working conditions], 
it's not our responsibility.
11.0 10.0 2.1 38 .2 38.7 429
reactions to unequal pay
Al I cannot do anything [in order to improve 
the pay level in the textile industry].
11.5 12.2 20 .4  18.9 36 .9 417
AM With company bargaining we are better 
off than with industry level bargaining.
32.7 14.1 27 .2  14.1 11.9 419
AN I would prefer to negotiate my pay 
individually with my employer.
39.1 17.7 16.5 18.1 8.6 419
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With regard to the first problem, job insecurity, all four responses, avoidance, 
individualistic or collectivist reactions and institutional strategies, were offered. The other 
two issues, work pace and pay level, offered fewer options (avoidance, collectivist, 
institutional; and avoidance, relatively individualistic, strongly individualistic).
Overall, the first two issues displayed incoherent results. A large majority agreed 
strongly to all given, contradictory possibilities. For example, with regard to job 
insecurity, 67% agreed that they cannot do anything, yet 70% also argued that they have to 
perform better than their colleagues. The last section on pay level revealed a clearer picture. 
Over a half thought the individual was powerless with regard to the pay level in the textile 
industry, and most rejected company or individual pay bargaining. Thus, similarly to 
Bodywear, they preferred collective responses at an industry level.
One could explain the incoherence of the answers regarding the first two sections 
with a methodological fault, arguing that the respondents simply did not understand the 
exercise, and that therefore results are unreliable. However, one could also treat the 
answers seriously and wonder whether this does not tell us something worthwhile. It 
might be the case that people simply do not know whether they have a clear behavioural 
preference. It might vary from situation to situation. They might be right in showing their 
confusion. This points to a major general problem in attitudinal surveys, which always 
create the impression that people know what kind of attitude and behavioural preference 
they have and that these are stable. The reality might be quite different (see also Billig 
1989).
To conclude, the case study's finding of a preference of individual reactions at 
shopfloor level and collectivistic reactions at company/industry level can only be partly 
supported with regard to the issue of unequal pay.
10.3 Joining the West German union at Bodywear
This variable is not a behavioural variable in the strict sense, it rather examines possible 
determinants of people's decision making to join the union. As outlined in chapter 1 this
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study did not use joining decisions as the major dependent variable for various reasons. 
However, this question might be used as a first attempt to predict workers' approaches, 
e.g. instrumental or collectivist, to collective activities. The assumption of the literature is 
that East Germans approach joining and staying decisions in a highly "instrumental way" 
(e.g. Mahnkopf 1992).
table 10.3: level of items of joining/not joining decisions at Bodywear
BL,BM,BN If you are a union member, why? (maximum three)
(N of BL=119, of BM=90, of BN=63) (%= sum of BL,BM.,BN)
1 because of the free legislative consulting and legal help in case of dismissal 29%
3 in order to support the union in its collective bargaining with the employers 21.7
6 because I was a member also in former times 21.0
2 because of the strike money 14.7
5 because I believe in the principles and values of trade unionism 8.8
4 because most of my workfellows are members as well 4.0
7 different reason (please indicate! 0.7
BI,BJ, BK If no union member, why not? (maximum three)
(N of BI=132, BJ=89, BK=38) (%= sum of BI, BJ, BK)
4 the former union disappointed us too much. 29.3 %
5 the unions do not do enough for the East German worker. 23.6
6 the union fee is too high 17.8
1 the works council sufficiently represents my interests. 10.0
3 union do not interest me 8.9
7 other reason (please indicate! 5.4
2 Bodywear cares sufficiently for its workforce 5.1
The reasons to join can be divided into instrumental, collective and social reasons215. The 
reasons for not joining are more varied: the bad experience with the former FDGB, no 
belief in the instrumentality (or necessity) of unions, and no interest in union affairs.
215 The "social" reasons are difficult to interpret, since they could be interpreted as loyalty to the union or 
pure idleness to leave.
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The three most frequently chosen reasons for joining the West German union (i.e. staying 
in the union) were an instrumental, a collectivist and a social reason. "Solidarity", i.e. a 
belief in the principles of trade unionism, was mentioned by only 9%.
The absence of pure ideological reasons was also manifested in the interviews. 
Most people brought up the two "traditional" functions of unions, providing security and 
collective bargaining. For example, "I am a member for security reasons. Something could 
happen. It could come to a strike perhaps. It could come hard. You never know" (sewer 
no 3 1994); "You need them now for the pay bargaining. In earlier times you didn't need 
the union for that" (sewer no 7 1994). "You need the union in case of a dismissal (sewer 
no 5 1994) and "GTB you need for dismissals, not really before" (sewer no 8 1994). The 
solidarity of working people was definitely not a reason mentioned in the interviews. 
When asking directly for it, one reply was, "Solidarity? No idea. What do I get out of it?" 
(sewer, no 3 1994)
However, classical reasons (security and pay) have been shown to be also 
prevalent in western studies on joining (see Gallie 1989; Lind 1996:114; Whitston and 
Waddington 1994). Newton and McFarlane Shore (1992:293) even suggested that 
newcomers' most likely form of membership is instrumental (rather than value-based). 
This can obviously be criticized for assuming (rather than explaining) a causal arrow from 
instrumentality to value-based membership. It also would raise the question whether the 
instrumental approach of East Germans is inevitably due to their being newcomers and not 
due to other reasons (e.g. a legacy of the former socialisation).
In sum, the suggested highly instrumental approach of East Germans to unions is 
not fully supported here, the data is more split: 44% instrumental reasons vs 35% 
collective and social reasons. It seems safe to say that the East German workers do not 
seem to behave more instrumentally than what we know from western workers.
The reasons why people did not join or left the union, were mostly related to the union 
itself (e.g. too western oriented, fees) rather than to general "anti-union" sentiments (e.g. 
"unions do not interest me") or because unions were not seen as necessary anymore. This 
is in line with statements in the East German literature (see chapter 5:5.3 (iii), e.g. Bialas
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and Ettl 1993). Similar results have been also found in West German studies. For 
example, Prott (1993:32)216 stated that the most frequent reasons for leaving the union are 
unfulfilled expectations (disappointment) which led firstly to an inner withdrawal, 
(followed by an actual exit) and/or "socio-economic” reasons (restricted personal financial 
situation makes them thinking of cost/benefits). In other words they did not leave out of 
antipathy against the labour movement ideas.
The interviews at Bodywear revealed that many workers did not really know why 
they were not in the union. Many had just never thought about this before. For example, 
"just like this. I just stopped paying" (sewer no 4, 1994); "I do not know why I left. 
Perhaps it was a mistake" (sewer no 9, 1994)217. Nevertheless, there were also voices 
like, "I am not in the union and will never be. They should show first what they are doing, 
before I give money to them. We also have to perform first before we get paid" (sewer no 
6, 1994). Others refered to the "high" union fee (1% of their wage). Finally, one 
temporary dyer argued, "if I get a full time contract I will perhaps enter the union. You 
then perhaps get additional money, no?"
Overall, it seems safe to say that most workers left the union because they do not 
believe in unions' effectiveness, presumably out of disappointment with the former 
FDGB, and not because of "anti-union" sentiments. This provides an important message 
for the unions that they could recruit new members if they only were more convincing 
- about their instrumentality.
In conclusion, there is a mixture of different reasons for joining or not joining. 
Instrumental reasons were not as predominant as one might have imagined from the 
literature, but they were most frequently chosen. The two major reasons, "legal help" for 
being a member, and "disappointment with the FDGB" for not being a member, are in line 
with the suggestion made in the literature, that there is experiences with the former union 
still have an impact today and that instrumental approaches dominate. Nevertheless, the
216 study based on interviews with 50 former union members of the German union HBV (union of 
banking and retailing).
217 The last remark also indicates the fragile interview situation at this company as the interviewees were 
constantly worried not to say something "wrong".
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"instrumental" approach is not the only one and collective reasons have an important role 
as well. In addition, one should note that these pre-given catalogues of reasons tend to bias 
people to justify their decisions rationally. Catalogues presume that people make 
conscious, rational decisions. Thus, the risk is that people might choose to say the GTB is 
too western-oriented, only because it is popular and legitimate to say so. Or that they 
mention "legal help" because it is something the union itself propagates.
We will not investigate whether the reasons for joining the union have any impact 
on people's decisions to participate in collective activities. However, the mixture of 
instrumental and collective reasons might suggest that also participation decisions will not 
be determined by one approach only as has been already proposed in chapter 7. This will 
be further examined in the next chapter.
Conclusion of Chapter 10
Overall, the major result is that both data sets presented workers who were strongly 
willing to participate in certain activities, who reacted collectively to certain workplace 
problems and who joined, i.e. stayed in the union due to collective or instrumental 
reasons. Together this creates a different picture to the common (western) view of the 
"dreary", passive "Ossis" (East Germans) (e.g. Mahnkopf 1992), and enhances doubt 
about the "individualisation" thesis.
However, people's behaviour is difficult to be classified as purely collectivistic or 
purely individualistic, which adds to the similar findings regarding their attitudinal patterns 
discussed in the previous chapters. Many displayed mixed responses. For example, there 
was mixed degrees of willingness for different categories of collective activity (which adds 
another support to the hypothesis of participation being a multi-dimensional concept), and 
people also revealed individualistic or collectivistic reactions to different types of 
workplace problems. Reasons for this mixed pattern might be the fact that the parameters 
of their decisions are often not known, unclear and confusing, that too many factors play a
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role, and because the fear of job insecurity overshadows all decisions. People seem 
essentially to muddle through their new situation. They might react individualistic in one 
occasion or the other (and who tells us that people did not do this in the past?), but many 
of their values and attitudes are (still) rooted in collectivist ideas.
Whether this is a normal state of affair or a product of the transformation of the 
GDR and its attendant confusions, is obviously hard to tell. However, there is some 
evidence from West German studies that it might well be the former. For example, Zoll 
developed a useful typology comprising three ideal-types of union members (1979: 349) in 
an empirical study on "strike and worker consciousness" during a large-scale strike of the 
IG Metall in West Germany (see also Prott 1993 for two categories similar to Zoll's first 
and second type).
Firstly, there are passive members, who show little active support for the union, 
and whose interests are represented by the general union interests. These have a 
consumption approach to the union (service-oriented) and delegate the representation of 
their interests to the union machinery. They are generally against industrial action and 
prefer cooperation and negotiation. To characterize this group the term "delegation" was 
chosen. Secondly, these are actively committed members, who are conscious of their own 
interests, participate extensively in union activities ("we are the union"), and reveal a 
strong identification. This group can be characterized with "strong social identity". 
Thirdly, there are average members, who show a low involvement in "normal" times, but 
can be mobilized in critical periods. They see the necessity of both interest representation at 
company and industry level. They can be critical about the union in certain circumstances, 
but this does not affect their general attitude toward the union. They think that the interest 
representation should adapt to the given circumstances, they are for peaceful bargaining 
but also in favour of strikes if necessary. They can be best characterized as having 
"loyalty" to the union.
Leaving the possible criticism of this kind of typology aside, one can conclude that 
although the Bodywear and GTB samples obviously contain members of all three 
categories, the modal members are of the third type. They have a basic identification with 
the union and what it stands for, and although they are not too ambitiously active they
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probably can be mobilized on certain issues or occasions and they are convinced of the 
possibility of the effectiveness of collective action. Thus, they "switch on" collectivistic or 
individualistic characteristics depending on the situation. One can conclude from this 
classification that East German workers or union members do not seem to behave 
significantly differently than their West German counterparts.
Finally, the overall positive willingness to become active adds support to the 
"institutionalisation" thesis. As outlined in chapter 3 (table 3.2) behavioural commitment to 
support the interest institutions was seen as a important dimension of an successful 
institutionalisation.
A last point should be added: Throughout the chapter it was noted that the 
questionnaires did not intend to investigate possible causes for current behavioural (and 
attitudinal, see Part 3) patterns, i.e. whether they are merely a continuation of former 
behavioural patterns or new patterns due to current structural forces. One question in the 
Bodywear survey asked however for workers' own judgement how far their behaviour 
changed since 1989.218
CP How do the societal changes in East Germany after the "Wende" 
influence your behaviour? (one answer only) N= 248 blue collar
ISDA study
blue and 
white 
collar
I am more active than before = 1 1 .3  % 15.1 20.3
I did not change at all = 56.9 % 59 .0 51 .9
I live a more secluded life = 31.9 % 25 .6 27.8
Over a half felt they did not change their behaviour in post-1989 (i.e. during the last four 
years), whereas a third thought their life style had become more secluded. This is similar 
to the answers of the large-scale survey in 1991 by ISDA (1992:246) (see slanting figures 
in table).The last answer does not necessarily mean passivity, it might just indicate a 
revival of the private vs. public life sphere. Overall, this question reinforces doubts as to 
whether people change so quickly following societal transformation (see also Stratemann 
1993), and is in contrast to some studies proposing significant changes in people's 
behaviour. For example, Fischer (1991:220) found that between May 1990 and October
2 18 This question belongs to the section on "general attitudes towards Unification" (see chapter 8).
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1990 there were significant changes in the distribution of personality types among East 
Germans (leisure-oriented type, inactive type, social oriented type). His "inactive" 
category increased from 12% in May to 43% in November 1990 (to the expense of the 
leisure oriented type). However, it is not clear how reliable this representative survey is 
(no information is given on the survey itself, nor is it clear whether this period is long 
enough to allow generalizations of the results). Our data in contrast suggests a certain 
stability in peoples' behavioural patterns.
The next chapter will investigate the determinants of peoples' willingness to 
participate in collective activities.
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Chapter 11 Predicting "who participates in collective activities?" in both 
surveys
This chapter analyses the significance of the attitudinal (and demographic) variables, 
discussed in chapter 8 and 9, as antecedents of people's willingness to participate in 
collective activities. In particular, it investigates whether any of the four social 
psychological theories can explain participation behaviour in the East German context, and 
it also contributes to the theoretical discussion of the interrelationship of these theories (see 
chapter 7).
Factor analysis was conducted in both surveys trying to summarize the items (i.e. 
questions) of each (dependent and independent) variable, thus to check whether the 
indicators are really related to each other (and not to indicators that are supposed to 
measure other variables) (see appendix A 3.1). Descriptive statistics, i.e. means and 
standard deviation, as well as intercorrelations were then estimated for all variables. The 
antecedents (independent variables) were put into (linear) regression analysis (ordinary 
least square regression) for the participation factors (dependent variables) of the two 
surveys. The independent variables were as follows: instrumentality of interest institutions 
and collective activity itself, union and workgroup identity, them-and-us feelings, 
attribution of workplace problems, information flow/ collective interests, job 
dissatisfaction, and some demographic variables (see chapter 7).
Both surveys are separately discussed (11.1 Bodywear, 11.2 GTB). The last 
section (11.3) summarizes the results in both surveys and compares them to the literature. 
It also investigates the interrelations between major antecedents, in particular between 
social identity and collective instrumentality.
11.1 The determinants of participation at Bodywear
The Bodywear survey yielded two dependent factors of participation: low intensity and 
high intensity participation. Thus, the division was not between works council and union 
activities, but regarding the "intensity" of effort. The low intensity participation deals with
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attending the assembly and works council election which takes places during working time 
and are attended usually by most people. High intensity participation includes joining a 
strike, standing for election and attending union events.
The six independent variables yielded five factors of instrumentality (negative 
evaluation of union, positive instrumentality of union, negative instrumentality of works 
council, no necessity of works council, and instrumentality of collective activities), one 
factor of union identity, two factors of workgroup identity (decreasing solidarity, 
individualism/isolation), three factors of them-and-us feelings (them-us today, company 
identity, capitalism better), two factors of information (interest in information, receiving 
information), and two factors of satisfaction (job dissatisfaction, pay satisfaction).
In sum, the factor analysis produced some interesting and useful factors (see 
appendix A 3.1.1), yet in some cases they were unreliable according to their alpha 
coefficients being below .60.219 With regard to the two dependent factors, "low intensity 
participation" was kept (the alpha is just below .60), whereas "high intensity participation" 
revealed a very low alpha and thus its items were discussed separately. Two regression 
analyses were then conducted for each of the dependent variables, one with all independent 
factors and the other only with the "reliable" factors (i.e. with an alpha coefficient above 
60)220 and selected items substituting the lacking factors. The factor-based regressions 
produced slightly different antecedents, and it seemed therefore better to use the item-based 
regressions only. The selection of the items took place in two ways. Firstly, an "intuitive" 
(inductive) way, whereby items were selected which were thought to have an impact on the 
dependent variable and then this equation was step by step reduced (i.e. the items with the 
lowest t's were excluded until the significant items "stabilized" and the R square did not 
increase significantly when further reducing the equation). Secondly, a "mechanistic" way 
of selecting items, whereby all items (37 including the 4 reliable independent factors) were 
included in an equation and the equation was then step by step reduced. The following 
discussion relies on this second method. A correlation of all antecedents of low and high 
intensity participation is presented in the appendix (A 3.2).
2*9 There is no rule in the literature on the minimum level of the reliable alpha coefficient, however the 
common consensus seems to be between .50 and .60.
220 These are decreasing solidarity, them-us feelings, company identity, and job dissatisfaction.
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11.1.1 Low intensity participation
The (mechanic) item-based regression equation was six times reduced and produced the 
following result (table 11.1.1).221 Means, standard deviation and intercorrelations are 
shown in table 11.1.2.
table 11.1.1: Predicting low intensity participation at Bodywear: standardized regression coefficients using 10 
items222
h.D. low intensity 
Independent variables participation (part.al)
SigPT Beta
BB union has not done a lot at this place here + .055 .161
BC unions’ pay policy only worsens economic situation - .0 0 1  
and risks jobs
- .2 8 0 * *
Cl waste of time to consult works council, they are not - .114 
interested in my problems
-.129
ANnew works council has not put forward workers interests - .0 2 0  
very well
- .1 8 8 *
AS don't need a works council, mgt cares enough for - .060 
workers
-.148
BU not belonging to the union is "anti-social" + .086 -.131
BQnew I tell my friends that 1 am in the union + .063 -.147
AJ In general: an "individualistic" social system where - .0 2  0 
everybody has the chance to lead a better life than 
others, but also has the risk of failing, is better than a 
"collectivist" social system, where all have equally 
mediocre life chances.
- .1 7 8 *
AZ our group often discusses union issues + .0 0 1 .2 5 8 * *
DC age .0 0 6 .2 2 3 * *
(*= p<=0.05, **= p<=0.01)
R square (adj.) = .27809, standard error = .72488, residual = 128(cases), F = 6.31593 (sig F = .000)
22 * A fa c to r-b a sed  regression of low intensity participation revealed only two significant antecedents, age
and positive union instrumentality. Thus, the older workers were and the more they regarded the union as
instrumental (e.g. "making workforce more powerful") the more likely they were to attend the works
council assemblies/election. However, these two antecedents were not highly revealing. A transformation
of the dependent factor into a dummy variable (split according to the median) did also not improve the
equation. The "intuitively" item -based  regression selected 19 single items: The idea was that for such a
basic activity people would decide with regard to their views of the works council, their group affiliation
("group pressure"), their union membership and identification, them-us feelings and job dissatisfaction (if
they are really dissatisfied they would use the assembly to express their discontent), a basic interest in
works council information, and regarding demographic variables, gender and age. The equation was step-by-
step reduced to seven items. Four antecedents occured, explaining 20% of the variance in 155 cases: age,
and three items of a positive instrumentality and necessity of the works council.
0 0 0zzz  In the following regression and correlation loadings are rounded up to three digits, means and standard 
deviation are rounded up to two digits. h.D. is the hypothesized direction according to the literature (chapter
6).
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table 11.1.2: means, standard deviation ( [-] = negatively worded)
means
part.a 1 low intensity participation 3.30
standard
deviation
.86
N .
cases
276
BB union has not done a lot at this place here 3.28 1.22 258
BC(-) unions’ pay policy only worsens economic situation 
and risks jobs
2.43 1.21 258
Cl waste of time to consult works council, they are not 
interested in my problems
2.54 1.27 263
ANnew
(-)
works council has not put forward workers interests 
very well
2.61 1.20 272
AS don't need a works council, mgt cares enough for 
workers
1.81 1.08 273
BU not belonging to the union is "anti-social" 1.40 .89 212
BQnew I tell my friends that I am in the union 3.70 1.54 180
AJ In general: an "individualistic" social system where 
everybody has the chance to lead a better life than 
others, but also has the risk of failing, is better than a 
"collectivist" social system, where all have equally 
mediocre life chances.
3.27 1.18 256
AZ our group often discusses union issues 1.89 1.10 260
DC age 2.35 .97 248
table 11.1.3: intercorrelation (*= p<=0.05, **=p<=0.01)
part.al BB BC Cl ANnew AS BU BQnew AJ AZ DC
part.al
BB .001
BC -.217** .269**
Cl -.213** .196** .185**
ANnew -.272** .090 .027 .222**
AS
BU
-.146*
-.050
.009
-.006
.214**
.088
.176**
.036
.157**
.007 .198
BQnew .089 .058 -.205** -.004 -.045 -.059 .038
■ • 
AJ -.022 .040 .105 -.096 -.055 -.045 .079 .012
AZ .170** -.052 -.041 -.057 -.164** -.057 .094 .072 .013
DC .282** .051 .002 -.047 -.210** .126 .051 .075 .077 .096
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The "mechanically" designed equation emphasized the measures of collective 
instrumentality223 but collective interests and the perception of an unfair economic system 
were equally important. Virtually all included antecedents have a t-significance of at least 
10% indicating a rather complex picture of possible predictors which is further 
substantiated by the intercorrelation of several items. Thus, the analysis comes up with a 
cluster of antecedents rather than a very specific single item. Another major finding is that 
neither job nor group related factors played a role for this low intensity activity (which 
more or less most workers joined). In addition, company identity and the hypothesis that 
strong company identifiers were more likely to be committed to engage at the workplace 
(with the works council) did not play a role, nor did them-and-us feelings (except the 
feelings regarding capitalism).
Thus, social identity or frustration-aggression theories had no explanatory power. 
The major explanator was the rational choice theory and the concept of "collective 
interests". The importance of the instrumentality antecedents is somewhat surprising, since 
the decision to attend these assemblies (or to fill out the list of the election) does not really 
involve any individual costs. Yet, it seems that people must have the feeling that it is 
"worthwhile" to attend and this is affiliated with their general perception of the interest 
institutions.
Regarding the demographic variables only age played a role. The age effect 
confirmed earlier hypotheses of a generation impact (the older generation might be more 
used to obey going to organized meetings, and might be more interested in the future of the 
company and of their jobs). Gender and union membership were not significant.
An additional regression analysis showed that older workers were more likely to 
attend these meetings if they were male, whereas younger colleagues were influenced by 
the perception of instrumentality (question BC).224 The correlation table revealed in 
addition that older workers were more likely to be convinced that their interests were well 
represented by the works council than younger ones (or the other way around). Thus, it 
seems that contrary to some suggestions in the literature (see chapter 5) older workers
223 This emphasis is similar to the result of the "intuitive" equation.
224 Older workers: adj.Rsquare= .17547, standard error= .92809, residual= 73, F= 2.93899, sigF= .0050;
younger workers: adj.Rsquare= .14512, standard error= .70541, residual= 47, F= 2.05622, sigF= .0534
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seemed to be more positive about the works councils than younger colleagues, despite the 
fact that they might have been more used to the old system and are more reluctant to accept 
the new institutions (or more disappointed about the former interest representation and thus 
not convinced of the new institutions' effectiveness).
Finally, another interesting point is how far people's decisions were influenced by 
their union membership. Although the variable itself has no significant impact, separate 
regressions for non union members and members revealed some interesting differences225. 
Non members produced two significant antecedents, works council and union 
instrumentality (ANnew, BC). Members on the other hand were influenced by their 
interest in union issues (AZ) and their feeling that the union is not only acting in the interest 
of its West German members (BD). It follows that non members were likely to be slightly 
more calculative than members, who depended more on their degree of "affiliation" to the 
union.
11 .1 .2  High intensity participation
(i) Standing for works council election
The first regression (including the 37 independent items) produced already most 
antecedents which remained significant during the process of eliminating insignificant 
items. The result is shown in table 11.1.4.
225 Union member: adj.Rsquare= .15136, standard error= .73014, residual= 65, F= 1.86029, sigF= .0386;
non member: adj.Rsquare= .33881, standard errors .71433, residual= 34, F= 2.53731, sigF= .0102
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table 11.1.4: predicting standing for works council election at Bodywear: standardized regression coefficients of 
9 independent items
h.D. standing for works
council election (AU)
Independent variables SigT Beta6
AS we don't need a works council, - 
management cares enough for workers
.0 0 5 .1 9 4 * *
BC union's pay policy only worsens - 
economic situation and risks jobs
.143 -.099
AR works council is only as strong as it + 
gets supported by workers
.0 0 3 .2 0 5 * *
Z not interested in my fellow workers .264 .074
K capitalist firm is more fair, because - 
only performance criteria count
.079 -.120
AL our group keeps works council well + 
informed about what happens at our 
workplaces
.530 -.042
AZ our group often discusses union issues + .0 3 9 .141*
DC age .0 2 3 - .1 5 4 *
DB gender (l=female. 2=male) .0 0 1 .2 6 3 * *
(*= p<=0.05, **= p<=0.01)
R square (adj.) = .17452; standard error = 1.01722; residual = 189; F = 5.65122 (Sig F = .000)
table 11.1.5: means, standard deviation
means standard
deviation
N = cases
AU standing for works council election 1.79 1.12 271
AS don't need a w. council, mgt cweres 
enough for workers
1.77 1.06 230
BC union's pay policy only worsens 
economic situation and risks jobs
2.40 1.20 221
AR w.council is only as strong as it gets 
supported by workers
3.78 1.05 227
Z not interested in my fellow workers 2.30 1.28 234
K capitalist firm is more fair, because 
only performance criteria count
3.36 1.36 233
AL our group keeps w.council well 
informed about what happens at our 
workplaces
3.26 1.17 227
AZ our group often discusses union issues 1.91 1.12 225
DC age 2.34 .97 239
DB gender (l=female, 2=male) 1.06 .24 236
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table 11.1.6: intercorrelation (*=P<=0.05, **=P<=0.01)
AU AS BC AR 7 VZ K AL AZ DC DB
AU
: ' £ ' •:
AS .126*
BC -.104 .214**
AR .087 -.233** -.012
z .032 .091 .116 -.136*
K -.097 .153* .166** -.029 -.002
AL -.049 -.112 -.015 .137* -.037 .043
AZ .191** -.057 -.041 .118 -.004 .055 .247**
DC -.044 .126 .002 .006 .119 .195** .031 .096
DB .306** .006 -.061 .057 -.033 -.093 -.039 .113 .1 11
In short, the likely candidate for works council was characterized as young, male, having 
collectivist attitudes (i.e. aware of collective interests, critically judging the new 
"individualism"), and being convinced of collective activity (i.e. the necessity of workers' 
support of the council), but not of the necessity of the institution as such. Two main 
findings stand out. Firstly, the importance of demographic variables, age and gender, and 
secondly the contradictory results of the instrumentality variables.
With regard to the former, females were less likely to stand for election than males, 
confirming the earlier made hypothesis that for more "intense" (time-consuming) activities 
the female "double burden" might prevent participation (see chapter 6). Remember that 
gender did not play any role in attending the assemblies (which does not take any leisure 
time). However, the dominance of the gender variable here might also indicate that the 
equation did not address relevant underlying factors. In addition, one should be aware of 
the methodological problem that males only make 7% of the sample. However, excluding 
the variable gender in the main regression did not make any major impact226 and separate 
regressions for males and females did also not turn out to be significant.
Furthermore, older workers were less likely to stand for election (but more likely to 
attend the assemblies). A separate regression for older and younger workers revealed again
226 Except that variable K ("individualism is better") becomes significant (with a negative sign).
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the strong correlation between age and gender (older and males).227 With regard to the 
latter result, the second strongest antecedents is instrumentality of collective activities. 
Thus, not instrumentality of the works council nor union membership or union identity as 
one would have imagined. In other words, "the works council needs to be supported and 
therefore I stand for election". Strangely enough the other major variable (AS) is 
contradictory. It says that the more people perceive the works council as not necessary, the 
more likely they were to stand for election.228 It is obviously difficult to find an 
explanation for this incoherence. One could relate this incoherence to a purely statistical 
reason or to the content, which is more difficult.
Statistically there was a correlation between this variable and two others (K, AR) 
whereby AR had a negative sign: people who think the works council is not necessary also 
think that capitalism is a fairer system and deny that works council is only strong with the 
support of the workforce. Excluding one variable (K, AR) from the equation immediately 
rendered AS insignificant. And excluding AS made the beta of AR decreasing. In addition, 
creating a factor of these three variables and including it in the regression rendered the beta 
negative albeit on an insignificant level. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient of the 
single item AS and the dependent variable (AU) was quite small (.13 with 5% 
significance). In short, one could argue that the three variables belong closely together and 
make sense, but putting them all into the regression changes the sign of AR out of unkown 
reasons.
Regarding possible contextual reasons one could only argue that prosperous 
councillors might have such a highly cooperative idea of workplace relations that they were 
not convinced of the need for worker representation, but still "sacrifice" themselves out of 
other reasons which have not been tackled (e.g. job security, self-esteem, power). 
However, the regression revealed that a basic interest in union issues was necessary 
(although union membership was not). In addition, a critical perception of the new
227 Separate regression (split according to the median of 2.00) reveals that older ones were influenced 
primarily by their gender, whereas younger colleagues were influenced by a variety of items (similar to the 
main equation): older worker (>2.00): adj.Rsquare= .17547, standard error= .92809, residual= 73, F= 
2.93899, sigF= .0050; younger worker (<=2.00): adj.Rsquare= .14621, standard error= 1.07607, residual= 
106, F= 3.18823, sigF= .0019
228 Also recoding the item into the positive variable ASnew did not change the direction.
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"individualistic" system (K) was also of advantage, and could be standing for a general 
perception of unfairness or for dissatisfaction. Thus, it is very difficult to provide an 
encompassing contextual explanation. However, it should be noted that the to be explained 
cohort of volunteers is actually very small (8%) (see chapter 10), and this might have an 
effect on the results, and that the variance explained in this equation is only 17%.
Finally, a variety of concepts such as job-related issues, them-and-us feelings, 
company identity, group or union identity and union membership did not reveal significant 
betas. A separate regression for union and non union members revealed different 
approaches229: Union members were mainly guided by their gender and a belief that the 
capitalist system is not "better", non members on the other hand were solely influenced by 
instrumentality issues (see similar finding in low intensity participation).
229 Union member: adj.Rsquare= .18329, standard errors 1.11459, residual= 81, F= 3.24423, sigF= .0021;
non member: adj.Rsquare= .21009, standard error= .90734, residual= 96, F= 4.10287, sigF= .0002
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(ii) Visiting union events
As noted before this variable asked for participation in not frequently occuring activities 
such as leisure events, (public) union meetings or demonstrations. The original regression 
of 37 items revealed only union membership as significant. Table 11.1.7 presented the 
final "leaner" equation.
table 11.1.7: predicting visiting union events: standardized regression coefficients of 7 independent items
Independent variables
h.D. visiting union events 
(BOnew)
Sig T Beta
BQnew I certainly tell my friends that I am in 
the union
+ .0 0 4 .2 3 1 * *
F solidarity among colleagues decreases - .198 -.107
Wnew I cannot rely on my colleagues - .269 .090
themus them-and-us feelings + .072 .149
A Knew sufficiently informed about w.c.'s work + .373 .075
AX well informed about work of union + .0 0 5 .2 3 3 * *
BH union member (l=yes, 2=no) - .0 0 6 - .2 1 9 * *
(*= p<=0.05, **= p<=0.01)
R square (adj.) = .15003; standard error = 1.00549; residual = 141; F = 4.73209 (Sig F = .0001)
table 11.1.8: means, standard deviation
means standard
deviation
N = 
cases
BOnew visiting union events 2.06 1.10 205
BQnew I certainly tell my friends that I am in 
the union
3.74 1.53 163
F solidarity among colleagues decreases 3.78 1.21 236
Wnew I cannot rely on my colleagues 2.31 1.17 235
themus.2 them-and-us feelings 2.44 .60 235
AKnew sufficiently informed about w.c.'s work 2.28 1.24 234
AX well informed about work of union 2.94 1.25 222
BH union member (l=yes, 2=no) 1.54 .52 236
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table 11.1.9: intercorrelation (*=p<=0.05, **=p<=0.01)
BOnew BQnew F Wnew themus AKnew AX BH
BOnew
BQnew
Wnew
.229**
-.047
.062
-.097
.020 .287**
themus.2 .032 -.070 .249** .119*
AKnew .071 -.006 -.045 -.072 -.245**
AX .227 -.103 -.060 -.070 -.223** .217
BH -.304** -.161* -.057 -.029 -.057 .021 .078
The regression resulted in three major antecedents: union members, with a positive union 
identity and a perception of being well informed by the union, were more likely to 
participate. Strong them-and-us feelings were supportive as well. Instrumentality measures 
did not play a role, nor does job dissatisfaction or any other demographic variables except 
union membership. Thus, whereas the works council election was heavily influenced by 
instrumentality issues, visiting union events seemed not to be a calculated activity.
A separate regression for union members and non members revealed a similar picture for 
members, but non members showed to be entirely influenced by their them-and-us 
feelings.230 Concluding, for union members the decision to get involved in the union 
depended mainly on their union identity and the wish to be properly informed (similar to 
low intensity participation). It seems that a good communication policy by the union was 
essential for mobilizing its members. Non members however with strong them-and-us 
feelings might join these events, but do not necessarily join the union.
In addition, the intercorrelations revealed two interesting relationships. Firstly, the 
more workers felt that they were informed by the union the less them-and-us feelings they 
had. Yet, there was no association between receiving information and peoples' perception 
of instrumentality as was proposed in chapter 7. Secondly, the stronger the them-and-us 
feelings the more people thought that the solidarity among colleagues (i.e. "us") decreased.
230 Members only: adj. R square = .18856, standard error = .92351, residual = 70, F = 2.18925, sigF = 
.0117; non members: adj. R square = .25353, standard error = .78264, residual = 24, F = 1.81913, sigF = 
.0874
2 6 6
In other words, them-and-us feelings might not necessarily always increase in-group 
solidarity (see chapter 6), but rather the experience of distrust within intergroup relations 
can spread over to intragroup relations as well (thus among the group members).
(iii) Joining a strike
The starting equation (with 37 items) already produced six antecedents which stayed 
significant during the process of excluding the insignificant items, resulting in table 
11 . 1. 10 .
table 11.1.10: predicting joining a strike at Bodywear: standardized regression coefficients of 11 independent 
items
Independent variables
h.D. joining a strike (CN): 
all cases
Sig T Beta
joining a strike: 
young union members 
only
SigT Beta
BB union has not done a lot at this place 
here
■ .0 0 9 .204** .0 2 3 .1 8 8 *
BC unions' pay policy only worsens 
economic situation and risks jobs
- .067 -.132 .055 -.148
BD union works more for West German 
members than for us
- .0 0 5 - .2 1 7 * * .0 0 3 - .2 4 4 * *
CM If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker 
you cannot do anything against it.
- .0 3 4 .149* .172 .100
BR important for me to belong to the union + .099 .148 .0 0 0 .2 9 2 * *
Z not interested in my workfellows - .0 0 8 .194** .059 .144
CF my current pay is justified - .0 2 2 - .1 7 2 * .0 0 8 - .2 1 2 * *
AX well informed about work of union + .0 4 2 .152* .184 .105
DC age .0 0 0 - .2 7 2 * *
BH union member (l=yes, 2=no) - .0 0 0 - .3 3 3 * *
(*= p<=0.05, **= p<=0.01)
all cases: R square (adj.) = .31895; standard error = .98377; residual = 142; F = 8.11847, sig F = .000 
young members: adj.Rsquare = .21640, standard error = 1.05524, residual = 144, F = 6.24700, sig F = .000
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table 11.1.11: means, standard deviation
means standard N
deviation cases
CN joining a strike 3.46 1.22 259
BB union has not done a lot at this place 
here
3.30 1.22 222
BC unions' pay policy only worsens 
economic situation and risks jobs
2.40 1.20 221
BD union works more for West German 
members than for us
3.22 1.22 221
CM If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker 
you cannot do anything against it.
4.18 1.20 231
BR important for me to belong to the union 3.19 1.48 174
Z not interested in my workfellows 2.30 1.28 234
CF my current pay is justified 2.27 1.41 226
AX well informed about work of union 2.94 1.25 222
DC age 2.34 .97 239
BH union member (l=yes, 2=no) 1.55 .52 239
table 11.1.12: intercorrelations (*=p<=0.05, **=p<=0.01)
DC BHCF AXCN BC BD CM BRBB
CN
BB -.009
BC -.154** .269*
BD -.167** .352*
CM .085** .057 .081 .059
BR .282* -.067 -.001 -.086
.177* .145* .006
.063 -.157* -.019 -.028 -.047CF -.210** -.053
.300**AX -.001 -.209** -.042 -.120 -.067 .132 -.051
DC -.158** .051 .090 .050.002 .032 .158* .165* .119
.108 .078 -.174**BH -.361** .039 .154 .100 -.069
Compared to the other two measures of high intensity participation this equation revealed a 
large variety of significant antecedents. The antecedents were union membership (as in 
visiting union events), age (as in standing for election, i.e. younger workers more strike 
prone), and at least one measure of each theory (i.e. rational choice, social identity, 
"collective interest", frustration-aggression). However, a few items turned out to be
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contrary to the hypothesized direction. Firstly, the perception that "the union did not 
achieve anything at this workplace" was supportive rather than a barrier to union activity, 
and so was the belief that a worker is powerless facing plant closure. Both seemed to be an 
incentive for union members to achieve something on a higher (industrial) level instead. 
Secondly, the antecedent "no interest in colleagues" (Z) was more difficult to explain. It 
could only mean that activists had no interests in their work colleagues but rather saw the 
union as their primary social group.
A separate regression was conducted for union members only.231 The most important 
determinants were age, negative union instrumentality at workplace level (BB) and being 
well informed by the union (AX). Thus, union members were more likely to join a strike if 
they saw unions not being effective at workplace level. Similar findings were made 
regarding workers' different reactions to different workplace problems (see chapter 10, 
e.g. individualistic reactions to threats of job security, collectivist reactions to threats to 
company survival).
The correlation table (for union and non union members) presented the two 
variables being interrelated: well informed workers perceived the union in a more positive 
light than less informed ones (and the other way around) as it was proposed in chapter 7. 
In addition, well informed workers were also more satisfied with their pay. It might be that 
the union achieves to explain the current pay level more satisfactorily than the employers' 
side. At last, union identity (BR) was obviously highly related to union membership. It 
follows that excluding union membership from the equation rendered BR significant.
A further regression for younger and older workers232 indicated that whereas union 
membership is important for both, the younger workers were more influenced by their lack 
of interest in the works council (AM, AKnew with negative signs) and consequently might 
had the desire to achieve something at a higher (industrial) level. A regression for the
231 Adj.Rsquare = .23332, standard error = .90664, residual = 65, F = 2.40327, sigF = .0053. The 
regression for non union members did not become significant.
232 Younger (<=median of 2.00): adj.Rsquare = .40421, standard error = .91925, residual = 58, F = 
3.86449, sigF = .000; older: adj.Rsquare = .927003, standard error = .95703, residual = 34, F= 2.06865, 
sigF = .0332
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largest subset, young union members, is presented in table 11.1.10. Activists were high 
union identifiers and were dissatisfied with their pay level and the achievements of the 
union on workplace level. In contrast, older workers (members and non members) were 
influenced by their perception of union instrumentality (positive perception of general 
effectiveness but negative regarding the achievements at shopfloor level), and whether they 
were well informed (more information rendered them more strike-prone). In addition, the 
correlation provided more support that older workers were more likely to be in the union.
11.1 .3  Summary
Finally, the question arises whether the results of the four equations produce a common 
pattern of antecedents. Table 11.1.13 provides an overview of the findings.
table 11.1.13: summary of significant antecedents of participation at Bodywear
low
intensity
participa­
tion
high intensity participation
works union strike
council event
election
instrum entality:
- instrumentality of institutions
- instrumentality of coll. action
X X X
X
socia l identity:
- union identity
- group identity
- them-us
- company identity
- general judgement (collectivist 
attitudes)
X
X
X
frustration-aggression: 
-job/pay dissatisfaction x (pay)
information:
- receiving information
- interest in information X X
X X
demographic:
- union membership
- age
- gender
- qualification
X X
X
X X
X
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In overall, the theories of rational choice and social identity and also the variables of 
information (i.e. collective interest) produced the major predictors besides the demographic 
variables which came out more strongly than expected. Frustration-aggression theory had 
little explanatory power, as had gender, or the variables them-and-us feelings, company 
identity or "general judgement". With regard to the high level of dissatisfaction and them- 
and-us feelings in that plant this is an unexpected outcome. However, it might well be that 
it is due to the standard deviations being too small to have any statistical impact (e.g. them­
us). Furthermore, it is interesting that job insecurity as an item of job dissatisfaction did 
not emerge as a significant antecedent throughout the analysis. Again, this might be due to 
insufficient variation, but it might also question the underlying "economic theory" (see 
chapter 6).
In a nutshell one can argue that standing for election is a mostly calculative affair as 
is low intensity participation, whereas joining union events is more related to identity and 
"moral" affiliations and strike participation is somewhat in between. It is difficult to find 
clearly differing patterns for low and high intensity participation. The major difference is 
that social identity items do not have any impact on low intensity participation but have in 
some high intensity cases. Overall, the antecedents of low intensity participation resembled 
most those of works council election. Thus, one could argue for a division between 
activities within the workplace (related to the works council), and outside activities 
organized by the union. Workplace activities were then a more calculative affair than the 
union guided activities. This seems to support the earlier mentioned difference between 
works council being an institution implemented by law and the union being essentially a 
voluntary membership organisation.
Furthermore, a few words seem necessary about the two major demographic variables, 
union membership and age. Interestingly, union membership influenced positively union 
activities, but did not have an impact on works council oriented activities. This might be 
interpreted as indicating the relative independence of works councils from the union in the 
views of the workforce within the German dual system of industrial relations. On the other 
side, union members were determined by a variety of issues such as age, union identity,
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level of information and negative union instrumentality at workplace level, whereas non 
members were basically guided by two items, perception of instrumentalities and them- 
and-us feelings.
Older workers were more likely to be a union member, to participate in low 
intensity activities (which were here purely works council activities), to have a strong 
union identity, but on the other side regard the capitalist system as more fair. On the other 
side, younger workers were disproportionately interested in high intensity activites. It 
follows that the proposition in the East German literature (see chapter 3) that workers who 
experienced the former socialist union (i.e. the older ones) must be highly disappointed 
and therefore opposed to the new unions cannot be supported. In contrary, it seems the old 
FDGB must have achieved some kind of positive, lasting identification with the union 
among its members, whereas the GTB has so far not been able to get the younger workers 
to identify with the union.
Finally, one should note that the amount of variance explained in the above 
regressions is between .15 and .32 which is not high but in line with the literature. It 
compares with figures of 13%-24% (Kelly and Kelly 1994), 26% (Flood 1993), 36% 
(Kuruvilla et al. 1990), 38%-43% (Klandermans 1984b), 29%-42% Martin (1986), and 
16%-28% Schutt (1982).
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11.2  The determinants of participation in the GTB survey
The factor analysis yielded two dependent factors, "self-initiated" and "organised" 
participation (see also chapter 10). Self-initiated activities are not to be confused with "high 
intensity" activities. Self-initiated activities refer to activities where the individual member 
is acting voluntarily on its own, whereas organised activities are events which the member 
joins among other members and where the individual is part of a mass movement. Thus, 
the factors differ from the Bodywear survey (low and high intensity participation), which 
obviously makes a comparison of the antecedents of the two samples difficult. The 
different factors are a surprise in the sense that both surveys ask various similar 
questions.233 Various explanations are imaginable: It could be due to the fact that the GTB 
survey put more emphasis on participation in the union, or that the samples are different. 
However, a factor analysis of the Bodywear items for union members only yielded the 
same factors as the mixed sample. Another explanation could be the fragility of the data set 
of Bodywear.— It remains to say that this phenomenon underlines the multi­
dimensionality of the concept participation. Moreover, it supports the thought of Kuruvilla 
et al. (1990:381) that applying the theories of collective activities for the first time to a new 
cultural context might not produce highly reliable measures of participation.
With regard to the five independent variables, the factor analysis produced three 
factors of instrumentality (negative instrumnentality of union/works council, no necessity 
of works council, instrumentality of collective activities), one factor of union identity, two 
factors of workgroup identity (collectivism, workgroup identity), three factors of 
attribution (external attribution to politics/management, internal attribution to lacking 
workers' effort, and internal attribution to lacking solidarity of workforce), two factors of 
job dissatisfaction (general job satisfaction, specific job dissatisfaction), and two factors of 
them-and-us feelings (former trust relations, current them-us).
Similar to the Bodywear survey not all factors yielded a high enough alpha 
reliability. Two regressions were conducted, one substituting the "unreliable" factors with
233 The first four items in the table (AJ to AX) are similar to the Bodywear questionnaire, but they fall 
into different categories. However, putting these four items only into factor analysis did also not yield the 
same factors as in Bodywear (which equation included one additional item).
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their single items, the other using all factors (reliable and unreliable ones). Contrary to 
Bodywear the resulting antecedents were mostly identical, and the "factor-based analysis" 
was therefore used in the following.234 This similarity might serve as an indicator of the 
data set is more robust than that of Bodywear.
table 11.2.8: Predicting self-initiated and organised participation in the union and works council: standardized 
regression coefficients for 13 independent factors and four demographic variables
Independent variable h.D.
(admpart2)
self-initiated
participation
SigT Beta
(occpart2)
organised
participation
SigT Beta
negative instrumentality of works 
council/ union (tuinst.b)
no necessity of works council (wcinst.b)
instrumentality of collective activities + 
(cainst.b)
.648 -.026
.531 -.032 
.0 3 0  .1 1 0 *
.528 .036
.577 -.029  
. 0 0 0  .3 4 6 * *
union identity (tuiden2) + 
collectivism (grcoll.b) + 
work group identity (griden.b) + 
former trust (ftrust.b) + 
current them-us (themus.b) +
.0 0 0  .2 2 7 * *
.265 .057 
.510 -.032 
.969 .002 
.312 -.054
.0 0 1  .1 8 0 * *
.165 .071 
. 0 4 6  - .0 9 9 *
.754 -.016 
.586 -.029
external attribution (ex att.b) +
internal attribution: lacking work effort 
(att eff.b)
internal attribution: lacking solidarity 
(att sol.b)
.123 .086 
.904 .006
.765 -.016
.0 4 5  .1 1 2 *  
.0 0 1  - .1 8 0 * *
.200 -.071
general job satisfaction 
(gensat.b)
specific job dissatisfaction + 
(dissat.b)
.578 .029 
. 0 1 2  .1 3 3 *
.779 .015 
.903 .006
gender (l=female, 2=male) (BK)
blue/white collar (1= blue, 2 = white) 
(Blnew)
w. council member (1= yes, 2= no) (AP) 
age (BJ)
.0 0 5  .1 4 0 * *
.605 .026
.0 0 0  - .3 3 8 * *
.857 -.009
.291 -.052 
.532 -.032
.142 -.073 
.749 -.016
(*= p<=0.05, **= p<=0.01)
self-initiated participation: R square (adj.) = .27217, Standard error = .76409; residual = 322 cases, F =8.45692 
(Sig F = .000); organised participation: R square (adj.) = .26403; Standard error = .58883; residual = 322 cases, F 
= 8.15402 (Sig F = .000)
234 See item-based analysis in appendix (A 3.3).
table 11.2.9: means, standard deviation
, . 
1 . self-initiated participation
mean
2.01
standard N = cases 
deviation
.
.90 420
2. organised participation 2.82 .71 427
3. negative instrumentality 
of works council/union
2.57 .75 432
4. no necesssity of works 
council
1.32 .57 423
5. instrumentality of 
collective activities
2.71 .59 430
6. union identity 2.79 .68 418
7. collectivism 2.70 .65 408
8. workgroup identity 2.83 .73 405
9. former trust 2.59 .84 428
10. current them-us 3.02 .61 430
11. external attribution 3.03 .56 432
12. internal attribution (effort) 1.23 .60 421
13. internal attribution 
(solidarity)
2.86 .75 429
14. general job satisfaction 1.82 .84 429
15. specific job dissatisfaction 2.51 .60 431
16. gender 1.25 .43 403
17. blue/white collar 1.20 .40 405
18. w.council membership 1.74 .44 404
19. age 2.57 .96 404
table 11.2.10: Intercorrelations of all
1.
2. .30**
3.
4.
-.08
-.16**
.05
-.13** .14**
5. .18** .37** -.02 -.15**
6. .36** .29** -.14** -.17**
7. .17** .18** .06 -.04
8. .02 -.06 -.13** -.03
9. .02 .06 -.02 .13**
10. .01 .11* .21** -.08
11 .14** .19** .27** -.12*
12. -.05 .  23** -.03 .09
13. .-.02 -.01 .36** -.04
14. -.06 -.11* -.08 .06
15. .12* .12* .21** .00
16.
17.
.14**
.05
-.08
-.07
-.09
-.11*
-.09
-.15**
18. -.39** -.10* .18** .19**
19. .09 .07 .09 .07
19 variables (2-tailed significance: * = p<0.05,
f ' %  - V  i , ;  v >
5. 6. 7. 8. 9.
.28**
.17** .26**
.02 .13** .19**
.04 .11* .05 -.07
.01 .03 .00 -.04 .14**
.19** .10* .07 -.06 .09
-.05 -.02 -.12* -.05 .05
.09 .07 .05 -.03 .03
-.09 -.10 -.03 .02 . 21**
.13** .09 .06 -.12* .15
.05 -.04 -.06 .05 -.19**
.05 .06 -.05 .03 .01
-.05 -.12* -.03 -.01 .07
.10 .20** .06 .04 .07
= p<0.0)
10. .11 12. 13. 14. 15 16. 17. 18. 19.
.31**
-.25** -.13**
.20** .29** .10*
-.16** . 21** .14**
.18** .26** .04
-.07 -.01 -.03
-.13** -.01 .14**
-.06 -.03 .10
-.04 .09 -.09
-.16**
.24** -.20**
-.12* .12* -.18**
.06 -.00 -.12*
.08 .02 .08
.08 -.04 .03
-.01
-.14** .01
.05 .20** .02
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Discussion
Self-initiated participation
Five major antecedents emerged. Males, high union identifiers, works council members, 
people with strong (specific) job dissatisfaction and belief in the instrumentality of 
collective activities were more likely to participate in self-initiated activities. This supports 
the underlying social identity theory, as well as the frustration-aggression and rational 
choice theory. It also supports the earlier mentioned thesis of the "double burden" 
phenomenon preventing female's engagement in more time-consuming activities. 
Attribution theory was not supported, nor were other variables of social identity theory 
(work group identity, collectivism, them-and-us feelings). In addition, general satisfaction, 
age and job status had no predictive power.
The two major factors, works council membership and union identity were further 
analysed. To examine whether the general equation was biased (due to the slight 
overrepresentation of works councillors in the sample), separate regressions for works 
council members and non members were conducted.235 The regression for works council 
members revealed two significant antecedents which were different from the above, works 
council necessity and general job satisfaction (both with a negative sign). On the other 
hand, the equation for non council members produced instrumentality of collective 
activities and union identity as above, and thus it can be concluded that the councillors did 
not bias the outcome.236 Overall, works councillors were driven by a general concern for 
the deteriorating working conditions and by the conviction of the importance of a (strong) 
works council, whereas non council members got engaged because of their affiliation to 
the union and general belief in collective action, thus issues not directly related to the 
works council itself.
235 Additionally the variable was excluded from the equation which did not alter the result.
236 Works council member: Rsquare (adj.)= .25214 (standard error = .79885), residual = 81, F = 3.04396 
(sigF = .0005); non member: Rsquare (adj.) = .10841 (standard error = .73308), residual = 225, F = 
2.83156 (sigF = .0003).
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Furthermore, regressions were conducted for low and for high union identifiers, but did 
not come up with major differences.237
Organised participation
Again, five major antecedents emerged which were however not all the same as of self­
initiated participation. Only two antecedents were similar (instrumentality of collective 
activities, union identity). The different antecedents give another support of the hypothesis 
of participation being a multi-dimensional concept (see chapter 7).
Additional significant variables were workgroup identity, internal and external 
attribution; in contrast to the self-initiated participation, no demographic variables turned 
out to be significant. In sum, rational choice theory had here the most explanatory power. 
Attribution theory and social identity theory (though not the items collectivism and them- 
and-us feelings) got supported as well, yet frustration-aggression theory did not. Thus, 
people who participated in organised activities had a positive perception of the 
instrumentality of their action, were strongly attributed current problems externally (e.g. 
management), and were high union identifiers. They were female or male, young or old, 
blue or white collars, works councillors or not without any difference.
The antecedents were considered in more detail. With regard to union identity the above 
mentioned "item-based" analysis (splitting participation into its three items) came up with 
an interesting finding. Union identity was significantly related to (organised) participation 
in demonstrations, but not to strikes or assemblies. One could therefore argue that 
cost/benefit calculations are more difficult to make regarding demonstrations, which 
renders identification and solidarity more important. Finally, a separate regression analysis
237 Split according to the median = 2.90: high identifier (>2.90): Rsquare (adj.) = .32371 (standard error= 
.75440), residual= 142, F= 5.72670 (sigF= .000); low identifier (<= 2.90): Rsquare (adj.) = .06549 
(standard error = .77812), residual = 164, F = 1.78841 (sigF = .0365). High identifiers yielded the same 
antecedents as the main equation (and in addition group collectivism and external attribution), whereas low  
identifiers produced two antecedents (of the main equation), instrumentality of collective activities and 
works council membership.
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revealed that high or low union identifiers were mainly influenced by the same 
variables.238
Workgroup identity yielded a negative beta coefficient which is contrary to the 
social identity theory, i.e. the more union members identify with their workgroup the less 
willing they are to participate. Yet, the item-based analysis characterized "happiness with 
the group" as the major item within this factor. The factor might then be explained with the 
frustration-aggression theory, i.e.that people who are dissatisfied with their group are 
more likely to become active than their satisfied colleagues.
Within the measures of attribution, "internal attribution" (lack of work effort) 
revealed a negative impact (i.e. people who do not make internal attributions are more 
likely to participate) which is equal to the external attribution with a positive sign.
Furthermore, job dissatisfaction had no impact, which might be explained by the 
fact that strikes or demonstrations are not the usual type of reaction to workplace problems 
in German industrial relations.
Women are as likely as men to participate in organised activities, where time 
problems are less severe, which could be also traced back to the hypothized "equal" gender 
socialisation of the GDR. Unfortunately no comparable western study is available which 
examines gender differences regarding these two types of participation.
Finally, although works council membership had no impact as a variable, a 
separate regression for councillors and others showed that councillors were most 
influenced by their perception of instrumentality of collective activities, whereas non 
councillors took also other issues into account such as their union identity and degree of 
external attribution (similar to self-initiated participation).239 This is different to their 
approach to self-initiated participation. Thus, councillors had a more cautious, calculative 
approach to strikes, perhaps because they are more aware of the costs and risks involved.
238 Low identifier (<= median 2.90): Rsquare (adj.)= .26544 (standard error = .59680), residual = 164, F= 
5.06533 (sigF= .000); high identifier: Rsquare (adj.)= .10935 (standard error= .58609), residual = 142, F= 
2.21245 (sigF= .0071)
239 Works council member: Rsquare (adj.)= .16132 (standard error = .60229), residual = 81, F= 2.16613 
(sigF = .0126); non member: Rsquare (adj.)= .30026 (standard error= .57725), residual = 225, F= 7.46346 
(sigF= .000)
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11.3.1 Comparing the findings with previous studies
The following table (11.3.1) provides an overview of the significant antecedents of the 
measures of the four social psychological theories and of the demographic variables in both 
surveys. It should be remembered that the two surveys had different samples (mixed vs 
union members only), tested different measures of participation and some different 
antecedents. All this rendered a comparative analysis difficult. In addition, the comparison 
with the previous research must be tentative, since similar variables were often tested 
differently and the regression equations often included antecedents not tested in Bodywear 
or GTB.
table 11.3.1: summary of significant antecedents of participation in both surveys (./.= was not asked)
tested independent variables of 
participation in the two surveys 
(B= Bodywear, G= GTB survey)
significant in 
Bodywear (for at 
least one form of 
participation)
significant in 
GTB
instrumentality of collective 
activities (B, G)
V V
instrumentality of interest 
institutions (B. G)
V
union identity (B, G) V V
workgroup identity (B, G) V V
collectivism (B, G) V
(current) them-us (B, G)
former trust (G) ./.
internal attribution (G) ./. V
external attribution (G) ./. V
information/ common interests (B) V ./.
general job satisfaction (G) ./.
specific job dissatisfaction (B, G) V V
gender (B, G) V V
age (B, G) V
blue/white collar (G) ./.
works council membership (G) ./. V
union membership (B) V
qualification (B) ./.
281
Instrumentality of collective activities but not instrumentality of union/works council turned 
out to be significant for both types of participation in GTB and was found to be the major 
variable of the concept "collective instrumentality".240 At Bodywear both factors of 
instrumentality were significant. As said before this supports the hypothesis of the multi­
dimensionality of the concept collective instrumentality. Both variables are in line with 
previous research, for example by Fullagar and Barling (1989), Glick et al. (1977), 
Klandermans (1986b), Kuruvilla et al. (1990) and Martin (1986) who found their 
measures of instrumentality (of unions) to be associated with union participation.241
With regard to the social identity theory union identity was significant for both types of 
participation in GTB and for visiting union events in Bodywear. Union identity was also 
found to be the main factor of social identity to determine participation.242 Overall, this is 
consistent with Fullagar and Barling (ibid.) and Kuruvilla et al. (ibid.) who found union 
identity (loyalty) and participation to be related, as did Kelly and Kelly (1994) with regard 
to both types of participation (easy and difficult), and McShane (1986:181) with regard to 
his variable "value of unions" and administrative participation.
Work group identity was a significant antecedent for organised participation in 
GTB only, and in Bodywear it was significant for strike attendance. Workgroup identity 
has been rarely examined, however Kuruvilla et al. (1990) found this variable to be 
significant regarding union participation.
Collectivism was not significant in the GTB survey, but in Bodywear a related 
variable (general judgement) was significant with regard to low intensity participation.
240 A regression was conducted for each of the two types of participation in the GTB survey with the three 
factors of collective instrumentality as independent variables. The instrumentality of collective activities 
was the main antecedent at both times. Moreover, people's perception of collective action was not 
influenced by their perception of the institutions. This was confirmed when analysing the possible 
antecedents of the perception of collective action as a dependent variable (all other variables as independent). 
Thus, the significant correlation (-.14**) between the factors, no necessity o f works council and 
instrumentality of collective activities, is not sufficiently strong to survive in the large-scale regression.
241 Glick et al. (ibid.) found a correlation with "representing the union", but not with "attending union 
meetings". Klandermans (1984b) is one of the few studies which tested the instrumentality of collective 
action (as an item within his "collective motives"). The "collective motives" were significant, however, he 
did not report individual the beta coefficients of the separate measures of instrumentality.
242 A regression was conducted for each of the two types of participation in GTB, with the factors of 
social identity as the only independent variables.
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Thus, Kelly and Kelly's (1994) finding of a significant relation with easy but not with 
difficult participation can only be partly confirmed.
Current or former them-and-us feelings did not yield any significance in either 
survey. These results do not support Kelly and Kelly's (ibid.) finding that their variable 
"outgroup stereotyping" was correlated with easy participation, but not with difficult 
participation. On the other hand, our finding is in line with Fullagar/Barling's (ibid.) who 
found their related variable "Marxist beliefs" was not significant for union participation.
Furthermore, the three measures of social identity (union identity, workgroup 
identity, collectivism), but not them-and-us feelings, were intercorrelated in the GTB 
survey243. This is in contrast to the hypothesis of the social identity literature which 
suggests a link between them-us and identity (i.e. the stronger the identification with the 
group the stronger are them-and-us feelings) (e.g. Kelly and Kelly 1993,1994). Them- 
and-us feelings might be better understood in this context as a reaction against changing 
working conditions, i.e. management styles, than as being affiliated with group feelings 
(e.g. outgroup stereotyping).
The interrelations between the three social identity factors244 were further examined 
by separate regression analyses (each of the social identity variables being dependent 
variable and the other two being independent).245 Union identity and workgroup identity 
were not correlated with one another, and collectivistic attitudes were the pivotal point in 
the triangle relationship (table 11.3.2). This finding suggests a refinement of the literature 
in that collectivist attitudes rather than workgroup identity have an impact on the strength of 
union identity, and it adds support to a similar finding of Kelly and Kelly (1994:26) and of 
Hinkle and Brown (1990, quoted in Kelly and Kelly).
243 The following analyses were conducted for the more reliable factors of the GTB survey only.
244 Them-and-us feelings were excluded. Conducting four regression analyses with all four factors as 
dependent variables did not reveal any significance of them-and-us feelings.
245 First regression (workgroup identity= dependent): collectivism: beta coefficient = .178** (sigT=.0005), 
union identity: beta coefficient=.075 (sigT=.1420); Rsquare (adj.) =.03915 (standard error=.70629), 
residual=395, F=9.08887 (sigF=.0001); Second regression (collectivism= dependent): group identity: beta 
coefficien ts 169** (sigT=.0005), union identity: beta coefficient=.230** (sigT=.000); Rsquare (adj.)= 
.08616 (standard error=.60524), residual=395, F=19.71441 (sigF=.0000); Third regression (union identity= 
dependent): workgroup identity: beta coefficient=.073 (sigT=.1420), collectivism: beta coefficient=.236** 
(sigT=.000); Rsquare (adj.)=.06284 (standard error=.65776), residual= 395, F= 14.30989 (sigF= .000).
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table 11.3.2: regression coefficients of collectivism, union identity and workgroup identity (**= p<=0.01)
.178**
collectivism
workgroup identity
.169**
.230**
union identity
With regard to the variables of micro-mobilization, "information" variables were found to 
be significant in all four types of low and high intensity participation in Bodywear. The 
only study known to the author which tested this variable in some form is McShane (ibid.) 
whose variable "interest in union business" was correlated with administrative participation 
as well as with union meeting attendance, and thus supports this study's outcome.
Attribution was found to be significantly related to organised but not self-initiated 
participation in GTB. All factors of attribution were intercorrelated and did not show a 
single main factor but external attribution was the most important antecedent for self­
initiated participation and external and internal attribution were the most important 
antecedents for organised participation. There is no comparable previous study known. 
However, as mentioned in chapter 7 van Vuuren et al. (1991) found attribution (of job 
insecurity) to be a significant correlate for participation in collective action, but also for 
individual action and avoidance.
Job dissatisfaction was a significant predictor in both surveys (i.e. pay dissatisfaction was 
significant for strike attendance in Bodywear and specific [but not general] dissatisfaction 
was significant for self-initiated participation in GTB). It is interesting that specific job 
dissatisfaction was more powerful than general satisfaction, which adds support to the 
theory of Deshpande and Fiorito (1989) or Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) that specific 
attitudes are better predictors of specific behaviour than are general attitudes.
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Several studies have confirmed the general relationship. For example, McShane (1986) 
found job dissatisfaction to be related to union meeting attendance (but not to 
administrative participation in the union), Martin (1986) found dissatisfaction with pay 
equity to be related to strike attendance, and Fukam and Larson (1984) found it to be 
related to "union commitment". Kuruvilla et al. (1990) found extrinsic, but not intrinsic 
dissatisfaction to be a significant correlate for participation. Fullagar and Barling (1989) 
found both to be linked indirectly only to participation (via union loyalty). This contrasts 
the argument of Gordon (1980,1984) that job dissatisfaction predicts initial union activity 
(e.g. joining in studies by Brett 1980 or DeCotiis 1981) but not afterwards.
Finally, with regard to the demographic variables, gender was found to influence 
participation in both surveys (in Bodywear for "standing for works council election", in 
GTB for "self-initiated participation"). Thus, concerning highly time-consuming activities, 
males were more likely to participate than females. Barling et al. (1990)'s request for 
studying gender as a moderator rather than a direct predictor cannot be supported here. 
However, previous research revealed divergent results. For example, Glick et al. (1977) 
found gender to be associated with the willingness to attend union meetings but Kuruvilla 
et al. (1990) did not find a significant relationship between gender and union participation.
Age was significant in Bodywear (younger workers with regard to standing for 
works council election and strike, older with regard to low intensity participation), but not 
in GTB. Previous research is in line with the Bodywear results. For example, Martin 
(1986) found youth to be important for strike participation, as did Kuruvilla et al. (ibid.) 
with regard to union participation.
Union membership was significantly correlated with visiting union events and 
strikes in Bodywear, works council membership was a significant correlate for self­
initiated participation in GTB. Blue/white collar work was not a significant correlate in 
GTB. These three variables have not been tested in previous studies. Qualification was not 
significant in Bodywear contrary to some western findings (e.g. Kuruvilla et al. 1990; 
McShane 1986).
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To conclude, four main common factors in both surveys can be extracted. They are 
collective instrumentality, union identity, and also information and attribution. In other 
words rational choice theory, social identity theory, and "micro-mobilization" theory each 
show significant explanatory power.246 The factors of the frustration-aggression theory, 
as well as the demographic factors did not present a consistent pattern (e.g. age is 
significant in Bodywear but not in GTB) or were insignificant throughout (e.g. 
qualification, job status). It should be noted that the insignificance of these variables does 
not necessarily refute their underlying theories (i.e. it might be that the variables did not 
show enough variation, e.g. general job satisfaction in GTB, or that the measures could be 
criticized for being deficient).
A final point deserves notice. Throughout the study we have assumed that 
participation is the dependent variable to be explained and collective instrumentality, union 
identity and others are the explanatory factors. However, this is obviously a theoretical 
assumption. Fullagar and Barling (1989:219) state that the literature is equivocal in terms 
of the direction of the relationship between union loyalty (identity) and participation in 
union activities. The ability of cross-sectional data (as used in this study) to prove this 
assumption, thus to distangle cause and effect is obviously less than if one had employed a 
longitudinal design. In addition, empirical evidence on whether attitudes such as union 
identity cause committed behaviour such as participation, or whether enacting behaviour 
results in committed attitudes remains ambiguous (e.g. Fullagar and Barling 1989:216; 
Mowday et al. 1982). In order to test how far the willingness to participate influenced 
peoples' union identity and their perception of instrumentality of collective activities, two 
regression analyses (in the GTB survey) were conducted using participation as an 
independent variable.247 The instrumentality of collective activities was heavily influenced 
by organised participation (beta= .352**), but not at all by self-initiated participation. 
Union identity on the other hand was influenced by both types of participation (self­
initiated participation beta=.203**, organised participation beta=.144**). In sum, the data
246 However not all measures of the theories were significant (e.g. them-and-us feelings of social identity 
theory).
247 Instrumentality: Rsquare (adj.)=.22882 (standard error=.52083), residual= 321, F=6.58807 (sigF=.000); 
identity: Rsquare (adj.)=.26451 (standard error=.57907), residual= 321, F=7.77314 (sigF=.000).
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revealed that the three concepts were highly interrelated and, as explained, cause and effect 
was impossible to manifest. More importantly, the findings provide further support for the 
results of the regression analysis. In particular, they confirm the close relationship between 
organised participation and instrumentality.
11 .3 .2  Determinants of the antecedents of participation
As mentioned throughout the discussion of the frequencies (Part 3) the questionnaires did 
not focus on the determinants of the independent variables. However, we can examine 
possible determinants within the sets of independent variables. As has been noted in 
chapter 5 and 7 most previous studies have not examined possible interrelations between 
the antecedents of collective participation in much detail.
A regression analysis was conducted for the determinants of the major variables of 
the four theories of participation in the GTB survey, i.e. instrumentality of collective 
activities, union identity, external attribution, and (specific) job dissatisfaction (see 
appendix: A 3.4, also for similar regression of Bodywear). Overall, we found support for 
most of the hypothesized interrelations of the independent variables (see chapter 7:7.2). 
Firstly, union identity and collective instrumentality were each other's most important 
predictor, and their relationship will be discussed in more detail below.
Them-and-us feelings were influenced negatively by internal attribution (i.e. the 
less workers attribute work problems to their own lack of effort the more likely they 
perceive a them-and-us climate), and positively by external attribution as has been 
hypothesized. This is consistent with the earlier made proposition (chapter 9) that it might 
not be previous them-and-us feelings which are the cause of the current them-and-us 
climate but rather the current changes in workplace relations, which make workers perceive 
a them-and-us climate.
Attribution was interrelated with instrumentality, which is an unexpected 
association, but not with social identity as was hypothesized. Thus, the more people
287
attribute their problems externally the more they perceive collective activities as 
instrumental (and the other way around).
Specific job dissatisfaction was associated as expected by general job 
satisfaction248. More interestingly, blue collars were more dissatisfied than white collars, 
and females more than males, which might be traced back to the fact that blue collar jobs 
and female jobs (sewing) were in general more strongly affected by the organisational 
transformation than white collar and male-dominated jobs (e.g. knitting, dyeing). 
Moreover, external attribution of work problems supported dissatisfaction (as expected), 
and a strong workgroup identity made workers more satisfied with their working 
conditions. Thus, the workgroup atmosphere was an important factor of the overall 
working conditions. Whether this is a general phenomenon or specific to the East German 
context is hard to tell. However, it is surely not caused by the female-dominated 
sample.249 Finally, dissatisfaction was not linked with them-and-us feelings, in contrast to 
the proposed association between frustration-aggression theory and them-and-us feelings.
In sum, the two studies found several significant interrelations between the antecedents of 
participation, especially between social identity and instrumentality. These intercorrelations 
might be a major reason why no single antecedent, either in the GTB or in the Bodywear 
sample, provided a sufficient explanation on its own. It seems safe to say that the 
antecedents are more complementary than competitive, i.e. mutually excluding, 
explanations as has been sometimes suggested in the literature but not tested (see chapter 
7:7.2). Finally, the findings also highlight that the attitudinal dimensions of 
"individualism" (see chapter 5: table 5.3) or indeed of the "institutionalisation" of interest 
representation (see chapter 3: table 3.2) are not single, independent but strongly interrelated 
dimensions.
248 However excluding this independent variable from the equation did not significantly change the 
constellation of the other antecedents.
249 The regression was repeated for males only and did not show any difference regarding the importance of 
group identity.
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Comparing the findings of self-initiated and organised participation one can conclude that 
organised participation was mainly explained by instrumentality of collective activities, and 
to a lesser extent by union identity and attribution. Self-initiated participation on the other 
side was mainly explained by union identity and works council membership. Thus, union 
identity and instrumentality of collective activities were the only antecedents which yielded 
significance in both types of participation. Whereas them-and-us feelings, collectivism and 
age are the only items which did not turn out to be significant in both equations. More 
focussed, comparing rational choice theory and social identity theory, one can argue that 
union identity "predicts" self-initiated participation, i.e. the more "difficult" form of 
participation, whereas instrumentality of collective activities is the major factor for more 
"easy" activities such as strikes and demonstrations. It seems understandable that a 
temporary event such as a strike with more "visible" costs provokes a cost-benefit 
calculation more strongly than on-going collective engagements. The relationship between 
the two antecedents will be further discussed below.
Finally, the variances explained in the GTB survey are 26% and 27% and therefore 
lie in the range of the Bodywear results. The "normal" share of variances explained in both 
surveys provides additional support for the assumed applicability of the theories to the East 
German context.
11.3  Summary of findings and implications
This section summarizes the findings in both surveys, Bodywear and GTB, and compares 
them with previous findings of studies outlined in chapter 7 (11.3.1). It then discusses 
possible interrelations between the antecedents (11.3.2), and examines the relationship 
between social identity and collective instrumentality in more detail (11.3.3).
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11.3.3 Relationship between union identity and collective instrumentality
Finally, the strong intercorrelation between instrumentality of collective activities and union 
identity is further examined. First of all, it should be noted that the relationship could 
simply be due to multi-collinearity, yet according to Bryman and Cramer (1994:239) this 
should emerge only by Pearson's r exceeding .80 (which is not the case). Besides, by 
using standardized regression coefficients the problem of multi-collinearity is restricted 
(Bryman and Cramer ibid.). It seems therefore more likely to indicate a theoretical affinity.
The intercorrelation between the two variables does not yet tell us wether one 
variable is the leading part. As has been stated in chapter 7 this study does not propose a 
priori a master frame to understand predictors of individuals' decision-making regarding 
participation, which is in contrast to Klandermans (1995) and others using rational choice 
theory as some kind of master frame (also Newton and MacFarlane Shore 1992). 
However, the causality between the two variables is difficult to test with cross-sectional 
data. Longitudinal research, preferably qualitative nature, seems necessary. Gallagher and 
Strauss (1991:149) note that the relative scarcity of longitudinal studies in this area makes 
it difficult to determine the direction of the causal relationship between instrumentality and 
commitment/ identity. However, whether it is possible at all to establish causalities with 
statistical methods is subject of a longstanding debate in philosophy (see Howson and 
Urbach 1990 or Sosa and Tooley 1993). For example, path analysis is not able to confirm 
or reject hypothetical causalities (Bryman and Cramer 1994:248).
Taking this into account the data can nevertheless tell us something. Two issues 
have to be discussed. Firstly, whether the association between the two variables is a 
positive or negative relation (table 11.3.3). A negative relation would imply that the more 
people identify with a social group (union) the more likely it was that they were not 
calculating a cost/benefit analysis of their participation efforts. This is the relation one 
would commonly expect. In contrary, the positive relation states that the more people 
identify with their social group the more they perceive the instrumentality of the group or 
of collective activities in a positive light. And at the same time, the more a person perceives 
the instrumentality of this group or of collective activities as positive the more he/she will
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identify with this group (in order to increase his/her positive self-esteem). Surprisingly, the 
data of the GTB survey supported the positive relation (positive beta weights). Thus, the 
more workers' decisions to become active are influenced by their union identity, the more 
they are also influenced by their perceptions of instrumentality. This could mean that union 
members who are not strongly committed to their union also do not care about costs and 
benefits of participating, whereas instrumentality issues become important for high 
identifiers.
table 11.3.3: positive and negative relation between instrumentality and identity
identity
A
identity
instrumentalityinstrumentality
negative relationpositive relation
Secondly, the question arises whether there are different determinants of low and high 
union identifiers' perception of instrumentality of collective activities. Separate regressions 
were conducted for high and low identifiers. Collectivism and job dissatisfaction had a 
major influence on low identifiers' perception of collective activities. Thus, the more they 
were "collectivists" and/or are dissatisfied with their jobs the more they perceived collective 
activities as worthwhile250. The equation for high identifiers was not significant251 (they 
were influenced only by their perception of instrumentality of the union and works 
council). One might tentatively conclude that low identifiers were less influenced by 
calculative perceptions than high identifiers, which supports the above result. It also 
resembles Kelly and Kelly (1993:16) who found no evidence that a strong social 
identification with the union reduces the relevance of value-expectancy calculations or that
250 (3^ ^  <median of 2.9: Rsquare (adj.) = .064 (standard error =.61389), residual = 165, F = 1.81447 (sig 
F = .0363)
251 Cases >= median of 2.9: Rsquare (adj.) = .00972 (standard error =.49792), residual = 143, F= 1.10334 
(sigF = .3586)
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weak identifiers are more likely to weigh up costs and benefits of union participation.
Table 11.3.4 illustrates the result.
table 11.3.4: interrelations between instrumentality of collective activities, union identity, and participation
instrumentality of 
collective activities
*.> participation in 
collective activities
union identity
Union identity influences people's perception of collective instrumentality, and at the same 
time the perceptions have an impact on their identity. What come first remains a "chicken- 
egg" problem. Yet, it opposes the popular notion of union members (workers) as either 
"rational individuals" or "social beings". They might well be both at the same time. It 
might also resemble the well-known ambivalence between the symbolic and the material 
dimension of social phenomena. In any case, one major implication is that instrumentality 
is not just a moderator of the link identity - participation, nor is identity just a moderator for 
instrumentality, as suggested for example by Fullagar and Barling (1989).
Concluding the chapter three major results should be highlighted. Firstly, the data 
supports the hypothesis of this study that no single antecedent, and thus no single theory 
of participation, has encompassing explanatory power (see chapter 7). The antecedents are 
complementary rather than competing explanations. The fact that East German workers 
seemed to be guided by both, instrumental and collective, motives and not exclusively by 
cost/benefit calculations in a context which makes instrumental approaches to collective 
activities highly probable (according to several theories) gives particular weight to the 
argument that the concepts social identity and collective instrumentality are complementary 
and interrelated. Secondly, the comparison with previous, mostly western studies provides 
some indication that the East German sample does not behave in a notably different way
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from western workers, and thus supports the theories' applicability in this new cultural 
context (see chapter 6).252 Thirdly, the data provides another challenge for the 
"individualisation" thesis. Thus, the finding that East German workers are not exclusively 
guided by cost/benefit calculations with regard to collective activities suggests that the 
workforce of the two samples is not yet individualised in this regard (see chapter 5: table 
5.3).
Obviously further comparative research, for example with West Germany, is needed to substantiate this 
point.
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Chapter 12 Conclusion
"Instead of an institutional vacuum, we find routines and practices, 
organisational forms and social ties, that can be assets, resources, 
and the basis for credible commitments and coordinated actions."
(Stark 1992b:300)
This chapter briefly summarizes the major findings of this study (12.1). It then outlines the 
major implications for the two underlying hypotheses (individualisation and 
institutionalisation) and for the literature on collective activities. It finishes with some 
suggestions for future research and for the transformation of industrial relations in East 
Germany (12.2).
12.1 Summary of findings
The primary aim of the study was to advance our knowledge of the transformation of 
workplace relations in East Germany by examining the attitudes and behaviour of the 
workforce regarding the changes in their working environment. The focus was on 
workers' relationship with the newly installed interest institutions. In a nutshell we can 
distinguish six main findings:
(i) The relationship between management and works council was generally described 
as harmonious and cooperative by the works councillors. The works council did not 
perceive itself as a prolonged arm of management or as something pushed to the sidelines, 
but as an accepted partner. Using Kotthoffs (1981, 1994) typology these works councils 
typically fell into the category of "the respected, cooperative works council", which was 
the dominant type in his West German sample. This provides empirical support for the 
more positive view in the literature of the works councils' position in East Germany (e.g. 
Ermischer and Preusche, WISOC).
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The case study presented a company which was successfully realizing the organisational 
changes seen as necessary by management to create a market-oriented firm. The company 
was characterized by a specific mixture of optimizing the "tayloristic" work organisation 
while introducing more flexibility and higher quality standards, practicing some 
paternalistic personnel policies and bargaining with the relatively strong works council in a 
mostly cooperative way. This might be interpreted as a successful combination of socialist 
legacies and capitalist requirements within the institutional, legalistic framework of the 
German industrial relations system. Whether this is a typical privatised company of the 
textile industry or of the whole of East Germany is not known. At first glance however it 
bears a resemblance to the stereotypical picture of the traditional (West) German company.
(ii) Workers powerfully resented the changing working conditions (i.e. increasing 
work pace and job insecurity). This overshadowed their satisfaction with improvements 
such as better materials, tools, and the overall organisation of production. They were also 
very opposed to management (i.e. strong them-and-us feelings), yet blamed their situation 
not only on management but also on external factors such as the market economy or the 
inability of politicians to help. They yielded no "unitarist" view (as one would have 
expected regarding the "harmonious" relations between management and works councils) 
but rather a "them-and-us" perception of the workplace relations. Them-and-us feelings 
seemed to have increased after Unification. Thus, overall the relationship between the 
workforce and management was tense and this might have serious implications in the 
future in terms of the motivation and commitment of the workforce.
(iii) Workers' relationships with each other did not seem to have become anything like 
as individualised and fragmented as much of the literature suggests. Workers identified 
strongly with their work group, strong collectivist values and attitudes espoused even 
though group solidarity was seen to be decreasing.
(iv) With regard to workers' perceptions of and reactions to the new interest 
institutions, a complex picture was found. Workers believed in principle in the value of
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unions and works councils. Union identity was very strong. They accepted works councils 
and unions as necessary interest institutions. All the analysis of their attitudes and 
behaviour towards the two organisations supported the thesis that the process of 
institutionalisation had been broadly successful. Both unions and works councils were 
perceived as trying to represent workers' interests but with varied success which was 
linked to the hostile economic situation. Whether this means that workplace relations 
became entirely formalised, thus supplanting any informal networks which might have 
existed in the past, is hard to tell because convincing measures of previous informality 
were not available. However, it seems safe to say that today's textile shopfloors are not 
characterized by informal negotiations.
(v) Workers were willing to become active in organised activities, but less so in self­
initiated ones, which is a pattern of behaviour commonly observed in western societies 
also.
The relatively high stated willingness of union and non union members to become 
active in certain collective activities was astonishing when one considers the industrial 
sector and the female dominance of the workforce in question. It challenges the stereotype 
of the passive, lethargic East German worker. However, workers did not mainly think in 
collectivist terms when reacting to all workplace problems. For example, they were more 
inclined to pursue individualistic strategies regarding their own job security, whilst being 
in favour of collective action to oppose certain threats at company level.
(vi) The theories of rational choice, social identity and micro-mobilization were the 
most successful explanators of workers' willingness to participate in collective activities, 
whereas frustration-aggression theory as well as the demographic variables did not present 
a consistent pattern. Further analysis found strong interrelations between several 
independent variables, such as between collective instrumentality and union identity. In a 
nutshell, East German workers were guided by both instrumental and collective motives in 
their decision-making to become active. This adds support to the overall finding that these 
workers were not notably individualised.
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12.2 Implications of this study
(i) Implications for the hypothesis: individualisation of the workforce
The findings on workers' perceptions of and reactions towards the transforming workplace 
relations did not conform to the widespread hypothesis that East German workers are 
becoming clearly individualistic. Workers revealed in many cases strong collectivist 
attitudes and behaviour towards management, colleagues or interest institutions (table 
12.1, adapting table 5.2 of chapter 5).
table 12.1: dimensions of "collectivism" and "individualism" and the results of the two workforce surveys
d i m e n s i o n s " c o l l e c t i v i s m ” r e s u l t s " in d i v id u a l i s m ” r e s u l t s
b e h a v io u r
a c t i v e  b e h a v io u r :  s t r o n g  
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  p a r t i c ip a t e  in  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s
(mostly in 
organised 
activities)
p a s s i v e  b e h a v io u r :  l o w  
w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s
V
(mostly in 
self­
initiated 
activities)
a t t i t u d e s p e r c e i v e d  s t r o n g  in s t r u m e n t a l i t y  
o f  i n t e r e s t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  +  c o l l .  
a c t i v i t i e s
V
(in some 
issues)
p e r c e i v e d  l o w  in s t r u m e n t a l i t y  o f  
i n t e r e s t  i n s t i t u t i o n s  +  c o l l .  
a c t i v i t i e s
V
(in some 
issues)
u n i o n  id e n t i t y V n o  u n i o n  i d e n t i t y
w o r k g r o u p  id e n t i t y V n o  w o r k g r o u p  i d e n t i t y
t h e m - a n d - u s  f e e l i n g s V n o  t h e m - a n d - u s  f e e l i n g s
in t e r e s t  in  c o l l e c t i v e  i s s u e s n o  in t e r e s t  in  c o l l e c t i v e  i s s u e s V
g e n e r a l  c o l l e c t i v i s t  a t t i t u d e s V g e n e r a l  i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  a t t i t u d e s
" c o l l e c t iv e "  a p p r o a c h  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  
p a r t i c ip a t io n :  u n i o n  id e n t i t y  =  
m a j o r  a n t e c e d e n t
V in s t r u m e n t a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  
c o l l e c t i v e  p a r t i c ip a t io n :  
in s t r u m e n t a l i t y  o f  u n i o n /  
c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  =  m a j o r  
a n t e c e d e n t
V
Yet, the different dimensions of collectivism/ individualism revealed the complex and 
dynamic nature of workers' attitudes and behaviour. Thus, it was impossible to classify 
workers as pure "collectivists" or pure "individualists" because many displayed mixed 
responses when confronted with different issues. Workers' attitudes were equally difficult
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to classify as purely instrumental, identity-oriented or otherwise. This point becomes clear 
when examining possible determinants of individual willingness to participate in collective 
activities. This study emphasizes the importance of recognizing the different dimensions of 
collectivism/ individualism and in which circumstances and under which conditions they 
are switched on rather than assuming a general trend towards a uniform, individualised 
workforce.
As said before, whether the noted complexity of workers' attitudes and behaviour 
is a normal state of affairs rather than a product of the transformation of the GDR and all its 
attendant confusions is hard to tell. However, similar studies in western societies (e.g. 
Fullagar and Barling 1989; Kuruvilla et al. 1990) came up with a similar mix of 
individualistic and collectivist approaches to participation in collective activities, and also 
general studies of the characteristics of union membership revealed a mix of individualistic 
and collectivist characteristics in union members (e.g. Lind for Denmark, 1995; 
Waddington and Whitston for UK, 1995). One might therefore suggest that the complex 
attitudes of East German workers are more likely to be a normal state of affair.
Moreover, it seems safe to say that the data indirectly questions the persistence of 
"socialist legacies" in peoples' attitudes and behaviour which are frequently assumed to 
make these workers significantly different from their western counterparts (e.g. 
Blanchflower and Freeman 1993 for the whole of Central and Eastern Europe including 
East Germany). Clearly, this can only be a tentative and general proposition. It does not 
exclude the possibility that East Germans might for example reveal stronger degrees of 
general collectivist attitudes than West Germans (as has been found for example in Brahler 
and Richter 1995:8). However, it seems safe to conclude in overall that the data supports 
the thesis that workers' atttitudes and behaviour are not predominantly culturally-bound, 
but that their cognition of their current circumstances and environment determines to a 
large extent their behaviour.
Finally, the rejection of a general individualisation thesis does not mean that people 
did not change over time (although most workers in the Bodywear sample thought they 
had not changed, see chapter 10). It will be remembered that the study did not investigate 
the development of workers' attitudes and behaviour over time. Thus, whether the
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similarity of post-socialist and capitalist workers' attitudes and behaviour (which 
comparative data with West Germany should substantiate) is due to changes (increasing 
individualism) in the East Germans cannot be entirely excluded. However, the related 
question would be whether West German workers can be characterized as individualistic or 
whether they do not also reveal a mixture of individualistic and collectivist attitudes.
(ii) Implications of the hypothesis: "institutionalisation" of interest
institutions
As was outlined before, a successful institutionalization comprises not only the transfer of 
the institutional "hardware", but also the creation of appropriate "software" or culture (i.e. 
practices, norms and attitudes). Some literature (see chapter 5) interpreted the current 
problems of the institutions (e.g. union membership decline) as being caused (among other 
things) by a mismatch between the implemented, "foreign" "hardware" and the 
incompatible "software". This study proposes that on the contrary — with regard to the 
workforce — the "software" is not obstructing the functioning of the institutions. Studies 
on the political culture of East Germans, especially on their democratic attitudes, came up 
with the similar result of a culture strongly supportive of the new political institutions (e.g. 
Dalton 1991; Seifert and Rose 1994; Weil 1992). For example, Seifert and Rose found that 
unsurprisingly East Germans were most advanced in adapting to the Western political 
culture (West Germany was used as an example) compared to other Central and East 
European countries. Thus, as Stark (quoted above) suggested with regard to the post­
socialist societies in Eastern Europe in general, there is no institutional vacuum on East 
Germans shopfloors but instead supportive practices and norms in favour of the interest 
institutions.
In a nutshell, this study found workers providing support to the new interest 
institutions and concluded that the workforce was a stabilizing factor within the 
transformation process of these institutions, in contrast to some other literature (see chapter
5). The expansion of West German interest institutions (i.e. unions and works councils) in 
the East was accepted and supported by the workforce. Judged on most of the dimensions
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of workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the new institutions the institutionalization 
was successful (see table 12.2 adapting table 3.2 of chapter 3). The fact that the works 
councillors saw their relationship with management as cooperative and functional added 
further support to this finding.
Furthermore, it is reassuring to know that it is not mainly East German workers' 
attitudes and behaviour which are to be blamed for union (or works council) problems. 
The current problems of the workers' institutions are far more likely to be caused by 
structural factors (e.g. recession, restructuring of the industry) or by institutional actors' 
strategies, rather than by internal factors or by an unsuccessful institutionalisation of the 
two organisations. In addition, it is not the individualisation of East Germans which 
impedes the institutions’ functioning as sometimes argued in the literature. As argued in the 
beginning of this study (chapter 3) individualisation is a threat to collective institutions. A 
certain degree of collectivism is thus a necessary condition for successful 
institutionalisation, and this seems to be present in both data sets.
Besides the general strong support for the institutionalisation, table 12.2 reveals the 
mixture of workers' attitudes and behaviour towards the institutionalisation, similar to that 
which was found when "individualisation" was examined.
table 12.2: attitudinal and behavioural dimensions of the institutionalisation of interest representation (union 
and works council) from the viewpoint of the workforce and results of the two workforce surveys
d i m e n s i o n s r e s u lt s
—  a c c e p t a n c e  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t io n s t r o n g
—  a c t u a l  u t i l i z a t i o n  ( e . g .  c o n s u l t a t i o n  f o r  
g r i e v a n c e  p r o c e d u r e s )
s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  l e v e l  c o m m o n  in  W e s t  
G e r m a n y
—  a c t i v e  s u p p o r t  ( e . g .  v o t i n g  o f  w o r k s  
c o u n c i l l o r s )
s t r o n g  in  s o m e  i s s u e s ,  w e a k e r  in  o t h e r s  
( s e l f - i n i t i a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s )
—  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a n  in s t r u m e n t a l  i n s t i t u t io n l o w / h i g h  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  d i f f e r e n t  i s s u e s
—  in t e r e s t  in  i s s u e s  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n s l o w
—  u n i o n  i d e n t i t y s t r o n g
—  u n i o n  m e m b e r s h i p m e d i u m / h i g h  ( c o m p a r e d  t o  W e s t  G e r m a n y )
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One might classify the different attitudes and behaviour on three levels: culture 
("software"), structure and performance of interest institutions. The two data sets revealed 
strong support for the structure (i.e. the institution as such), a mixed perception of its 
performance, and a mixed presence of the necessary, "culture" (e.g. interest in collective 
issues, active support, union identity).
This result resembles political studies on attitudinal conditions for the successful 
transformation to democratic societies in Central and Eastern Europe (including East 
Germany) (e.g. Fuchs and Roller 1994: tables 4,5,6). Fuchs and Roller found in their East 
German sample a high degree of support for the institutions essentially constituting the 
structure of liberal democracy, a high degree of a "democratic" culture, but less confidence 
in the performance of these institutions (p. 42). The complexity of attitudes (actively 
supporting vs not supporting the interest institutions) might indicate the relatively early 
stage of the societal transformation, but equally it might characterize the normal complexity 
of peoples' attitudes towards interest institutions.
Finally, whether the implementation of the new interest institutions caused changes 
in workers' minds or whether they already had developed "attitudes" suitable for the highly 
institutionalised, West German industrial relations system is beyond the scope of this 
study. However, one might argue that East Germans were already used to a highly 
institutionalised societal system before and might have also developed some sense of a 
democratic culture during the socialist regime.253
(iii) Implications for the literature on collective activities
A major purpose of this study was to gauge the general applicability of theories of 
collective activities to East Germany, and also to test the comparative validity of different 
social psychological theories.
253 There are various attempts in political science to explain changes in political cultures, for example 
Weil's (1989) "inside learning model", which argues that people can develop a critical view towards their 
political system on their own, and his "outside learning model", where people learn by observing other 
national experiences. Weil argued that both models apply to the GDR: the GDR had already developed an 
informal, unofficial culture before 1989 which was "western-oriented" and which differed from the official 
political culture.
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Firstly, the fact that the theories were applicable (in terms of the used criteria, see chapter
6) and that most results (e.g. with regard to the level of participation) were similar to 
western experience add support to the, in Cole's (1972) terms, "structuralist view" in 
comparative industrial relations. Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that the 
determinants of union participation have some universality, and can for example be also 
extended to emerging market economies and not only to union but also to works councils' 
activities. The structuralist view which is in this context similar to modernization theory 
(e.g. Zapf 1994) would argue that collective participation in East Germany and other 
industrial relations phenomena may become more similar to those of West Germany as 
East Germany's industrial relations practices become more similar to those of the West. On 
the other side the alternative, the "culturalist" view, attributes international differences to 
unique historical and value orientations. One would expect for example significantly lower 
or higher degrees of willingness to participate and/or significant differences in the loadings 
of the antecedents. Yet, the available comparative data of West German studies did not 
support these assumed differences.254
Secondly, testing the set of theories simultaneously resulted in four major 
antecedents (union identity, collective instrumentality, and attribution and information to a 
lesser degree) which were strongly interrelated. The study emphasises that no theory is 
sufficient on its own and that the theories are complementary rather than competitive 
explanators. It confirms the importance of collective and instrumental motives. However, 
both seem to have a mutually reinforcing effect on participation rather than one playing the 
leading role as has been suggested in some previous research (e.g. Newton and McFarlane 
Shore 1992, but see Klandermans 1992:190).
(iv) Implications for future research
This study addressed a complex set of questions, and highly specific recommendations 
cannot be easily made. However, there were two broad suggestions for future research.
254 Clearly, to falsify the proposition real comparative data on West Germany is needed.
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Firstly, the study highlights an important methodological point on debates about 
collectivism, instrumentality and unionism. Future research should acknowledge the 
complexity and multi-dimensionality of workers' attitudes and behaviour. For example 
more emphasis might be put on the different dimensions of collectivism/ individualism and 
in which circumstances and under which conditions they are activated rather than assuming 
a general trend towards a uniform, individualised workforce. This also includes a more 
detailed (preferably qualitative) investigation of the relationship between the significant 
antecedents of participation, especially between social identity and rational choice. The 
well-known ambivalence about the "symbolic" and the "material" dimensions of collective 
organisation and activities should be acknowledged as a continuing, important feature of 
industrial relations research.
Secondly, one of the under-researched areas in comparative industrial relations is 
the interrelationship between institutions and actors (partly because in countries with a 
highly institutionalised industrial relations system academics tend to devalue the relevance 
of the actors). For example, Wolfgang Streeck claims that it is unions which unionize and 
mobilize people, rather than people being the initiators (i.e. some being more inclined to 
become active than others) (talk in Madison, July 1995).255 However, it is hoped that this 
study's investigation of the newly established interest institutions from the viewpoint of a 
specific group of actors, i.e. workers, has added some new insights to the understanding 
of the East German institutional transformation, and thus supported the relevance of micro­
level research. Future research of workers' perceptions and reactions could for example 
compare workers in different situations (e.g. in companies with formalised interest 
institutions and in companies without) to address the question as to how far specific 
external conditions determine peoples' perceptions. For example, would the East German 
workforce perceive the current working conditions in such a negative way if they did not 
have the works council as a secure interest representation? How far do institutions affect 
peoples' perceptions and reactions? It would be interesting to compare East German 
workers' attitudes and behaviour with those of workers in other post-socialist societies
25$ cf. political scientists such as Gabriel Almond: his work deals extensively with the relations between 
political institutions, actors and culture (e.g. Almond and Verba, 1980).
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who experience similar organisational changes without such legalized and strong interest 
institutions at workplace level.
(v) Implications for the transformation of industrial relations in East
Germany
Finally, one might ask whether this study contributes to the general debate on the future of 
industrial relations in East Germany. The literature often outlines two scenarios (JUrgens et 
al. 1993; ReiBig 1993:20; Turner 1992:12). The first is a polarization scenario (or arrested 
transformation, "abgebrochene Transformation", ReiBig 1993) in which the eastern region 
is exploited for its lower labour costs, with production facilities serving the function of 
extended assembly lines for western-based mass production (VoBkamp and Wittke 1991). 
In this scenario East Germany would emerge at the bottom of a nationally segmented 
labour market, as a permanently less developed region (a sort of German "Mezzogiomo" 
[see Boltho et al. 1995; Mahnkopf 1992]). German unions could be weakened as 
employers play the eastern workers off against their counterparts in the West. This 
scenario would most likely also include an increase in conflict and a potentially serious 
destabilization of German industrial relations.
The alternative is a modernization scenario (or successful transformation, ReiBig 
ibid.), in which firms take advantage of eager and flexible workforces and workforce 
representatives in the East to bring in the latest organisational innovations (e.g. semi- 
autonomous groups) and new technology. Works councils and unions are integrated into 
relations of partnership in the drive towards advanced levels of productivity and flexibility, 
spurring new growth for Germany as a whole. Unions influence could expand in this 
scenario, provided unions adopt bargaining strategies which cater to the innovations in the 
East, facilitate the transfer of learning in both directions (West-East and East-West), and 
prevent East-West whipsawing strategies by employers.
The data on the workplace climate of the survey companies supports the latter 
scenario more than the former. Capital-labour relations seemed to be harmonious and
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trustworthy rather than antagonistic. Moreover, works councils supported most 
rationalisation decisions. With regard to the workforce data however the decision is more 
difficult to make. This is partly due to the lack of information about what kind of 
workforce these scenarios require. One might argue that the polarization scenario would 
require either highly dissatisfied and militant workers or, if the unions were weakened, 
workers who are dissatisfied, passive and apathetic. On the other side the modernisation 
scenario seems to require workers who are committed to their company and supportive of a 
trustful, productive relationship between management and works council and a union 
which supports the modernisation processes. On the other side, "modernisation" might be 
also thought of as a process which leaves workers and interest representation without any 
influence.
The data revealed highly dissatisfied workers who supported the works council and 
the union, and who were willing to be mobilized by these institutions. To repeat, there was 
no evidence for the "nightmare" scenario of some authors of a completely individualistic, 
alienated, apathetic East German workforce who let the transformation pass by without any 
interests, expectations or commitment. Instead the workforce became a stabilizing factor 
for the institutions. It might be argued therefore that the workforce provided the necessary 
"software" for a modernization scenario which includes cooperative workplace relations. 
However, it seems also clear that the likelihood of this scenario becoming reality for the 
textile industry in East Germany will depend largely on other, external factors (especially 
in view of the tremendous current reform problems and the need to safeguard the pillars of 
the industrial relations system in the entire country, e.g. the principle of industry-wide 
collective bargaining). It strictly remains an open question in what way East German 
workers would react to a significant decentralisation and destabilisation of the institutional 
network of industrial relations. Yet, there is nothing in the results of this study that 
suggests that workers would behave fatalistically and comply passively with these changes 
as some people might wish, or indeed fear.
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A 1.1 Interview guidelines
APPENDIX 
A 1 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4™
A 1.1.1 Interview guideline: the two full-time works councillors at 
Bodywear (Summer 1993)
A . employment relations in the GDR
1. how much influence had the BGL in reality over management decisions? how effective were 
they in representing workers' interests? (e.g. overtime pay, wage group, health & safety)
2. did workers consult the BGL frequently?
3 . how informal was their relationship with supervisors? plan fulfillment pact?
4. how was the AGB (labour law) handled?
B. birth of worker council in 1989
1. who were the initiators of council? old BGL activists or qualified workers?
2 . who are the active people today?
3. what were their original demands? more than West German BetrVG?
4. was there any protest against the directors? (strike?)
C . today's workplace relations
1. cooperative, conflictory? what happened since Mai (pilot study)?
2 . bargaining outcomes
3. data: membership in union, collective bargaining agreements, redundancy plan at 
Bodywear
4. how "social" (sozialvertraglich) was the redundancy plan?
D. general
1. what are the most important tasks of works council?
2 . what is currently the major difficulty/problem in your work?
3. what was the major success in your work as a councillor so far?
4. how do you describe your relationship with the GTB?
5. how would you describe your relationship with the West German works councils (of Bodywear)?
6 . how would you characterise the general relationship works council - workforce?
7. how much information do you get from management? what kind of information? how often are 
there consultations with mangement (economic council = WirtschaftsausschuB)?
8. how often do you have works council assemblies (Betriebsversammlungen)?
9. are there any negative feelings (Distanzierungserscheinungen) in the workforce and works council 
against union officials from West Germany?
10. how would you characterize current management style/ personnel policies? how does the current 
management style differ from former managers/ styles?
11. in how far do you use the consultation rights concerning the introduction of new 
technology, training etc.?
12. how do you evaluate union pay policies (gewerkschaftliche Tarifpolitik)?
256 Copies of the German original of interview guidelines and questionnaires are available from the author.
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A 1.1.2 Interview guideline: Chief executive at Bodywear (May, Summer 
1993)
1. chronology of privatisation and company development 1989-1993
2. how would you describe the workplace climate in post-1989? How do you think workers perceive 
the transformation? What are the major problems?
3. how would you describe the former workplace relations?
—  informal/formal
—  how did you motivate people? and today?
—  how did you control the work?
—  how did you manage to fulfill the targets? plan fulfillment pact?
4. company data: e.g. balances from 1990 - 1993
A 1.1.3 Interview guideline: chief personnel manager (Summer 1993)
1. documents on personnel development, personnel strucunionre: male/female, age, 
qualifications
anticipated new redundancies, recruitment? 
labour cost development 1989-1993 
data on labour productivity, pay, absenteeism 
what are the major problems at shopfloor level? 
how is your current relationship with the works council?
1.1.4 Interview guideline: chief official of the GTB (South-East) 
(Summer 1993)
general information regarding the turnaround 1989/90: when was GTB taken over, what happened 
with members?
membership development: 1989-1993
what kind of possibilities are there for members to engage in union activities? 
union stewards? (gewerkschaftliche Vertrauensleute)
5. how is the relationship with the employer association? what about company contracts? general
problems in collective bargaining
6. what is the position of Bodywear employers: pro or contra collective bargaining? how are
workplace relations at Bodywear? how effective is works council?
7. relationship with GTB West Germany/headquarter (Diisseldorf)?
A 1.1.5 Interview guideline: responsible officer of the employers’ 
association (TMO) for collective bargaining (Summer 1993)
1. development of employers' association from 1989
2. membership development 1989-1993
2. future perspective of this industrial sector in East Germany, for association? regarding collective 
bargaining?
3. what is the position of Bodywear in comparison with other employers in the sector?
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A 1.2 Questionnaires
A 1.2.1 Questionnaire for supervisors of Bodywear (Summer 1993)
The sample consisted of 8 supervisors: four of the sewing department, two of the knitting 
and two of the dyeing department, of which seven were female, seven worked for 
Trikotwear, and five had not been supervisor in former times.
( i )  ta b le :  a b s o lu te  l e v e l  o f  i t e m s  o f  c h a n g e s  in  th e  s u p e r v is io n  j o b
no ly disagree no view agree stronglyagree
13 the company expects more commitment from us than in 
former times.
1 2 0 2 3
14 supervisors are more respected today than before. 0 2 0 4 2
17 supervisors are primarily responsible to their superior, 
not to their workers.
2 1 0 4 1
18 in former times I had more influence over when and how 
we worked in the brigade.
4 1 1 2 0
19 in former times our main duty was to organize the raw 
materials, today the main task is to organise and control 
the labour/work.
2 1 0 3 2
20 in former times there was more collegiality among the 
supervisors, today there is more competition.
1 0 2 4 1
( i i )  ta b le :  a b s o lu te  l e v e l  o f  i t e m s  o f  s u p e r v io r s ' p e r c e p t io n s  o f  cu r r e n t w o r k in g  c o n d it io n s
no stronglydisagree
disagree no view agree strongly
agree
1 there is more work today than before, and the pressure 
to perform is higher.
0 0 0 4 4
2 those who do not perform well, will be dismissed. 0 0 0 7 1
3 in former times the brigade (Meisterei) was a real 
community, today there is not a great deal of teamspirit.
1 5 1 0 1
4 in former times workers also got pleasure from their 
work, today they only work for money.
4 2 0 2 0
5 workers are as qualified as in the main plant in West 
Germany.
1 2 0 2 3
12 we were better trained in the GDR than the West German 
supervisors.
2 4 2 0 0
6 in former times more workers came to me with 
grievances, today people complain less.
3 1 1 2 1
7 a capitalist firm treats its employees fairer, because only 
performance criteria count and no personal or partial 
ones.
0 1 0 5 2
8 human beings are lazy by nature, and have to be forced to 
work.
6 2 0 0 0
9 workers are primarily motivated by pay. 0 0 0 4 4
10 more participation of workers is in theory desirable, but 
practically not possible.
2 1 1 4 0
11 I give my workers a lot of discretion, I am just 
interested in their output.
3 3 0 2 0
15 I treat my workers more strictly than before. 2 0 1 3 2
16 a great problem in former times was that you did not 
have any means of pressuring against employees.
1 2 0 1 4
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A 1.2.2 Questionnaire for the head of personnel at Bodywear (1993)
table: absolute level of items of personnel managers' perceptions of workplace relations at Bodywear
DO
strongly
disagree
disagree no
view
agree strongly
ajuee
1. the works council is a responsible 
and fair bargaining partner. 1 2 3 4 ©
2. the council is as concerned as management 
about the wellbeing of the firm. 1 2 3 4 ©
3. the works council weakens the discipline 
of the workforce. © 2 3 4 5
4. the works council never misses the chance to 
pick a quarrel with management257. © 2 3 4 5
5. we often clarify differences o f opinion informally. 1 2 3 ® 5
6. the council does not understand the problems and 
worries of the management. 1 2 3 © 5
7. the council is simply a mouthpiece of the GTB. © 2 3 4 5
8. the council pursues union politics intensively. © 2 3 4 5
9. the management informs the council extensively 
about the economic situation of the firm. 1 2 3 4 ©
10. management respects the views of the council. 1 © 3 4 5
11. management would prefer not to have a council. 1 2 3 © 5
12. the council tries to cooperate with management. G> 2 3 4 5
13. in general relations between the council and 
management are good. © 2 3 4 5
14. the council has strong support among the workforce. 1 2 3 © 5
15. the council should obtain more co-determination 
rights in economic decisions. 1 2 3 4 5
16. the workforce is not very interested in the quality
of the relationship between the council and management. 1 2 3 © 5
17. unions and employers have in principle 
divergent positions. 1 2 3 © 5
18. the GTB is a responsible collective bargaining partner. 1 2 3 © 5
19. human beings are lazy by nature and 
have to be forced to work. © 2 3 4 5
20. employees are primarily motivated by pay. 1 2 3 © 5
257 The term "management" refers to top management (Geschaftsfuhrung)
308
A 1.2.3 Questionnaire for the two full-time works councillors of 
Bodywear (Summer 1993)
table (i): absolute level of items of works councillors' views of workplace relations at Bodywear
no disa;
ugly disagree no
view
agree 3 ,y
1. management is a responsible and fair
bargaining partner. 1 2 3 © 5
2. the works council never misses the chance to
change power relations to their advantage. 1 2 3 © 5
3. we often clarify differences of opinion informally. 1 2 3 © 5
4. management does not understand the problems and
worries o f the workforce. 1 2 © 4 5
5. the council represents the GTB in the company. 1 © 3 © 5
6. we try to achieve what is in the best interest for the 
company, even if this sometimes concur with the 
policy o f the GTB. 1 2 3 4 ©
7. the management informs the council extensively about 
the economic situation of the firm. 1 2 3 © 5
8. management respects the views o f the council. 1 2 3 © 5
9. management would prefer not to have a council. 1 2 © 4 5
10. management tries to cooperate with the works council. 1 2 3 4 ©
11. in general the relations between works council
and management are good. 1 2 3 4 ©
12. management has strong support among the workforce. 1 © 3 4 5
13. the workforce is not very interested in the quality
of the relationship between the council and management. 1 © 3 4 5
14. the council should obtain more co-determination rights 
in economic decisions. 1 2 3 4 ©
15. unions and employers have in principle divergent
positions. 1 2 3 © 5
16. the GTB represents more the interests o f their
officials than of their members. 1 © 3 4 5
17. the unions are more concerned about the well-being
of their western than their eastern members. 1 © 3 4 5
18. the relationship to the GTB is close and good. 1 2 3 4 ©
19. the GTB offers primarily services to the works council. 1 2 3 4 ©
20. the GTB intervenes too much in company issues. 1 © 3 4 5
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t a b le  ( i i ) :  a b s o lu te  l e v e l  o f  i t e m s  o f  w o r k s  c o u n c i l lo r s '  v i e w s  o n  " th e  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  o f  w o r k e r s ' in t e r e s t s  i s  
im p e d e d . . ."
no
strongly
disagree
disagree no
view
agree strongly
a r^ee
1. due to differences of opinions within the works council ® 2 3 4 5
2. due to the works council being overburdened 2 3 4 5
3. because the works council has lost contact 
with the workforce. 2 3 4 5
4. because the worksforce represents contradictory interests. © 2 3 4 5
5. because specific interests do not conform with the ideas 
of the works council. 1 2 3 Q 5
6. because employees prefer to represent their 
interests themselves. 0 2 3 4 5
7. because employees present an indifferent attitude 
towards the works council. 1 2 3 © 5
8. because employees fear negative reactions by 
management if they consult the works council. 1 2 3 4 (D
A 1.2.4 First part of questionnaire for works councillors in GTB 
South-East (Summer 1994)
table (\): first general information about the textile companies: absolute level of items, valid cases; 53
02. number of workforce (1994): 1-99 employees = 25
100- 999 employees = 15
03. number of workforce (1989): 1-99 = 3
100-999 = 22
1000-3000 = 9
missing = 19
04. female rate of total workforce (1994): -50% = 3
50-89% = 20
90-100% = 16
missing = 14
2 management buy out/private 12
3 West German/foreign company 22
4 other/ missing 12
06. current board of directors: 1 all are former directors 14
2 most are former directors 8
3 some former directors, but minority 19
4 no former directors 11
missing 1
07. current supervisors: 1 all are former ones 34
2 most are former ones 7
3 same, but minority 3
4 only new supervisors 6
missing 3
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08. Did your company experience major organisational changes during the last years? (more choices 
are possible)
1 investment in machinery/tools 67%
2 restrucunionring of production 58%
3 introduction of more shift work 14%
4 introduction of piece rate system 10%
5 other 8%
missing/ nothing 13%
09. do you think that the work pace at most workplaces increased after the "Wende"?
increased a lot increased slightly stayed the same decreased slightly decreased a lot mis sin <?
21 28 2 1 0 1
10. are there any empolyment reductions planned in the next 12 months?
yes 13 no 17 don't know 21 missing 2
11. in general, how secure is your company in the next five years?
very unsecure unsecure don't know relatively secure secure missing
9 13 8 19 1 3
12. union density at your company (1994) (missing = 15)
1-30% = 7 30-50% = 12 50-80% =8 80-100% =11
13. how much did membership fall in the last two years?
-10% = 6 10-50% = 12 50- % = 3 missing = 32
14. female rate of union members in the company?
-50% =8  50-100% = 28  missing = 17
15. were there any industrial conflicts in the last two years?
yes = 3 no = 47 missing = 3
if  so, what happened? (if people answered at all: "nothing")
16. since how many years are working for the works council?
1 year = 15  2 years = 7 3 years = 9 4/5 years = 19 missing = 3
17. have you been working for the BGL formerly?
yes = 1 6  no = 34 missing = 3
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A 2 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTERS 8 - 10 
A 2.1 Pilot questionnaire: Bodywear (May 1993)
sample: 60 blue collar worker in the sewing, knitting and dveing department
1. age: below 25 years [9% ]
25 - 35 years [27% ]
35 - 45 years [43% ]
over 45 years [22% ]
2. are you the only wage earner in your houshold? yes [37% ] no [64% ]
3. do you have dependent children? yes [82%] no [18%]
4. professional education:
apprenticeship [83%] college [11%] no special education, but training-on-the-job [5%]
5. how many years do you work for Trikotwear/Bodywear?
0-3 years [65% ] 4-14 years [9% ] 15-37years [25% ]
6. have you ever been unemployed? yes [40% ] no [60% ]
7. are you frightened to loose your job? yes [30% ] a bit [23% ] no [47% ]
8. would you like to work part time? yes [42% ] no [58% ]
in sewing only: yes (55%) no (45%) - if yes, due to family reasons
9. have you been a union steward in former times? yes [19% ] no [81% ]
10. are you member of the new union (Gewerkschaft Textil- Bekleidung)? 
yes [35%] no [65%]
I. job  satisfaction
11. are you satisfied with your job? yes [66% ] a bit [ 29% ] not at all [ 3% ]
12. would you rather like to do a different work at Bodywear? yes [12% ] no [87% ]  
which kind? , why?____________
13. could you get promoted? I believe yes [0% ] I do not know [0% ] no [100% ]
14. would you like to work for a different company? yes [ 30% ] no [67% ] 
w hy?_______  common answer: for higher wages, shorter travel to work
II. work attitudes
15. what is the most important in your work? (please choose the numbers 1 to 6 in sequence)
—  possibilities for promotion [6=76% ]
—  earning good money [1=72% ]
—  good relation to your supervisor [4=35%, 5=26% ]
—  good relation to your colleagues [3=32%, 2= 27% ]
—  work conditions (new machines, friendly rooms,...) [2=33% ]
—  varied work [2=22%, 3=20% ]
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16. in general: what is most important in your life? (numerate from 1 to 6)
—  satisfying work [4=26%, 5=24% ]
—  a nice house [6=33%,5=30% ]
—  have a good family life [1=56% ]
—  earn good money [ 3=33% ]
—  employment security [1=50% ]
—  to lead a respectful life and be a
useful member of society [6=51% ]
17. in general: if an unknown person would ask you what you work, what would you answer? 
27% = my occupation, 33% = the company name, 38% both
III. perception of change
18. if  you compare your work now with your work in GDR times, what was for you the most crucial 
change?
—  technical (sewers: shift work, long joumee)
—  other things
—  nothing
—  more work
19. Did your work became more exhausting?
yes [ 53%] stayed the same [31% ] less exhausting
20. Do you earn more money than in former days?
yes [ 53% ] more or less the same [ 23% ] no [ 23%
21. Do you think your earning is justified?
yes [ 18% ] no [72% ] don’t know [9% ]
22. do you reach the same piece rate than before?
yes [ 63% ] no [ 32% ] don't know [4% ] (not really reliable) 
sewing alone: yes (44%) no (53%)
if no, why not? sewers: new rates too high
23. what is the most important thing you would like to change at your workplace if you could?
nothing (explicitely and implicitely) [37% ]
work flow, arrangements [18%j
shift, rates [16% ]
other things  [13% ]
less pressure [11%]
human, social issues [5% ]
24. what do you miss from your former work?
—  human, social issue (collegiality) [43% ]
—  different things (meals,...) [13%]
—  nothing [11%]
missing [32% ]
[53% ] 
[14% ] 
[16%] 
[11%]
[ 13% ] don't know [1% ]
] don't know [0% ]
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25. do you like the more varied work, or is it essentially more stressful?
—  makes fun and is not more stressful [13% ]
—  make fun although more stressful [73% ]
—  no fun since more stressful [15%]
26. how would you describe the relation your colleagues have to your supervisors?
very good [15% ] good [ 73% ] not very good [7% ] bad [ 2% ] don’t know [ 4% ]
27. did the behaviour of the supervisors change compared to the former times? 
yes [ 15% ] no [58% ] don't know [ 15% ]
if yes, what changed? 1/2 negative (more autocratic leadership style), 1/2 positive (more 
competence)
IV. statem ents: work attitudes, them -us feelings
28. In post-1989 a lot of new machinery have been installed. Do you support the following
statement? " Automatization should serve all, but in reality the workers pay for it."
yes, very strongly [ 23% ] a bit [ 38% ] not at all [11% ] not in our company [ 23% ]
don't know [ 6% ]
what is your opinion to the following statements?
29. "most decisions in the departments are made by the supervisor (foreman/ forewoman), but it would 
be better if the workers could have a saying too."
I agree [63% ] I don't agree [26% ] I don't know [11% ]
30. "most employers in East Germany are employee oriented (social) and consider the well being of 
their employees."
I agree strongly [ 9% ] I agree more or less [34% ] I don't agree [ 50% ] don't know [ 7% ]
31. "the management knows what is best for the company and the workforce should do what they are 
asked to do."
I agree strongly [ 11%]  I agree more or less [ 58% ] I don't agree [25% ] don't know [ 7% ]
32. "management and workforce sit in the same boat."
I agree strongly [ 16% ] I agree more or less [38% ] I don't agree [40% ] don't know [ 5% ]
33. "management will always try to exploit the workforce, if they get the chance."
I agree strongly [ 30% ] I agree more or less [ 38% ] I don't agree [ 16% ] don't know [ 16% ]
34. "if the workforce could manage the company all would be better."
I agree strongly [7% ] I agree more or less [36% ] I don't agree [ 40% ] don't know [18% ]
35. " if the employees had more rights of codetermination, we would have chaos. "
I agree strongly [ 9% ] I agree more or less [34% ] I don't agree [48% ] don't know [9% ]
36. " the employees should always be loyal to the company and should work as hard as they can."
I agree strongly [36% ] I agree more or less [55% ] I don't agree [5% ] don't know [ 4% ]
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V. union commitment
37. have you been in the SED (socialist Party)? no reliable answers
38. if member of the new West German union: why? (numerate from 1 to 4)
—  to represent the interests of the workers [1=79% ]
—  because I get benefits and help [2= 37% ]
—  because I believ in the ideals of the worker movement [3=42% ]
—  because I have been a member before [4=37% ]
39. if not a member: why? (multiple naming possible) (absolute answers)
in the capitalist economy unions can not act properly [1 lx  ]
the union is not representing the interests of the East Germans properly [12x ] 
my interests are sufficiently represented by the works council [9x ]
my interests are sufficiently represented by the management [4x ]
unions in general do not interest me [9x ]
40. do you think that union members are being discriminated by their supervisors?
yes, obviously [0% ] a bit [7% ] no [61% ] don't know [31 % ]■
41. In your opinion did the FDGB represent the interest o f the workforce in a better way than the
union today? yes [17% ] no [83% ]
42. what are the tasks of the unions in your opinion? (numerate from 1 to 5)
—  to adjust the eastern pay level to the western level [1=83% ]
—  to pursue more social tasks [2=30% ]
—  to enforce more codetermination for workers in the companies [3=37% ]
—  to unit the workforce against the employers [5=47% ]
—  to fight for better working conditions [4=28% ]
VI. works council
43. did you vote for the works council in the last election (1990)? 
yes [73% ] no [27% ]
44. will you vote again next year?
yes [44% ] no [16% ] don't know yet [39% ]
45. do you think the works council represents your interests?
in most cases yes [37% ] in most cases not [31% ] don't know [31% ]
46. do you think the works council has a good relation with the management? 
yes [46% ] no [3% ] don't know [50% ]
47. if you have a problem do you conslut your supervisor or the works council?
preferably the supervisor [30% ] depends on the kind of problem [71% ] preferably the works 
council [0% ]
48. did the BGL represent your interests better than the works council today? 
yes [17% ] no [85% ]
if yes, why? only a few replied: because the BGL cared more for them individually
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49.
50.
52.
53.
VII.
54.
55.
56.
57.
how well does the works council inform you about its work?
well informed [13% ] satisfying [ 64% ] badly [23% ] I am not interested [0% ]
does the works council have too much or too little influence on management policy?
—  too much influence [0% ]
—  enough influence [11%]
—  too little [22% ]
—  don't know [66% ]
if too little influence: in which area the works council should have more influence? no answer
what are the main tasks of the works council? (1 to 5)
—  to represent the interests of the workforce to the management [1=91%]
—  to improve working conditions [2=40% ]
—  to organize more social issus (e.g. holiday camps) [5=41% ]
—  to help with personl problemes e.g. with your supervisor [3=30% , 4=27% ]
—  to represent the union in the firm [3=27%, 5=27% ]
do you think of yourself as a member of the working class?
yes [48% ] no [15% ] don't know [13% ] this phrase has no meaning to me [23% ]
wages
are you interested in the current wages conflict in the metalworking and steel industry? 
very interested [74% ] not interested [25% ]
do you think it is worthwhile for the metal workers to go on strike? 
yes [72% ] no [16% ] don't know [9% ]
if a similar case would happen in the textile industry, would you vote for strike?
yes [57% ] no [12% ] don't know [27% ]
if no, why not? if answered than: "bad for economy, risk of workplaces"
do you think that an increase of your wages of 10% would be threaten the survival o f Body wear? 
yes [5% ] perhaps [21% ] no [61% ] don't know [10% ]
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A 2.2 Questionnaire: workforce Body wear (Summer 1993)
I. Job satisfaction
Below are a series of statements about how satisfied you are with various aspects of your job. Please indicate your opinion 
ticking the number that best shows how you feel about each of them.
strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree
A. Work load is heavier than in former times, 
and there is more pressure to perform.
B. The quality of work becomes more important 
than before.
C. Supervisors and managers are more strict 
than before.
D. We have to be more flexible today.
E. If you don't work hard, you get fired.
F. The solidarity among the workfellows decreases.
G. Formerly we had more control about when and 
how we work.
H. There is more emphasis on security and health 
issues today.
I. Formerly you had also fun while working, today 
you only work for the money.
J. You have the constant fear to get sacked.
K. A capitalist firm treats its employees in a fairer
way, because only performance criteria count and 
not personal or partial ones.
fo r  sew er an d  d yer only:
L. I prefer a free Saturday to an additional income.
f o r  d yer  only:
M. The new performence-related-pay scheme
will only create a bad atmosphere.
N. The new pay bonus should have been bound
to the performance of the group.
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II. Management at Bodywear
Do you agree with the following statements? (Again, please tick the most appropriate number on the scale). 
__________________________________________ strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree
O. I am proud to work for Bodywear. 1 2 3 4 5
P . Real partnership between management and
workforce is not possible, because we have
too different interests. 1 2 3 4 5
Q. You can never really trust your supervisor. 1 2 3 4 5
R. The workers here are exploited. 1 2 3 4 5
S . Formerly the supervisors were on the side of
the workers, today they are on management's side. 1 2 3 4 5
T. In former times we were all working together to
fulfill the quota, today there is much more a
"them and us" atmosphere. 1 2 3 4 5
U. management takes full advantage of the current
labour market situation. 1 2 3 4 5
V. I am pretty sure that Bodywear will always try
to treat its workers in a fair way. 1 2 3 4 5
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III. Workcolleagues in your workgroup
Here are a few statements regarding your work co-operation and group life. (Again, please tick the most appropriate numb 
on the scale).
strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree
W. I can rely on my colleagues, they help me
where they can.
X. You have to concentrate so much on your work,
that there is hardly time to have a chat.
Y. You often feel quite alone and isolated.
Z. I am not very interested in my colleagues.
AA. I would rather like to work in another group.
AB. I would rather sacrify 100 DM of my pay than 
see that some of my workfellows of my group 
get sacked.
AC. I rather fight for my interests alone than 
rely on my colleagues' support.
AD. Most people do not work anymore with their 
former workfellows.
AE. In former times the group solidarity was much 
better.
AF. Nowadays I hardly meet my workfellows after work.
AG. I have nearly no contact to the workers of other 
workgroups.
AH. Formerly the solidarity of the whole workforce was 
much better.
AI. Because of the job unsecurity people become 
egoistic and just think of their advantage.
AJ. In general: an "individualistic" social system
where everybody has the chance to lead a better 
life than others, but also has the risk of failing, 
is better than a "collectivist" social system, where 
all have equally mediocre life chances.
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
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IV. Works council
Do you agree? (Again, please tick the most appropriate number on the scale).
strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree
AK. You are not sufficiently informed
about the work councils' work.
AL. Our group keeps the wc informed about
relevant events on the shopfloor.
AM. The work of the wc is a frequent topic of
our chats.
AN. The wc sofar has put forward workers'
interests very well.
AO. Works council and management are in league
with each other.
AP. the wc guarantees another job for all knitter.
AQ. The former BGL did represent our interests better.
AR. The wc is only as strong as they get supported
by the workers.
A S . We don't need a works council, since
management takes sufficient care of us.
AT. I will attend the next works council election (1994). 1
AU. if my colleagues want me to, I would stand for
the election.
AV. I will attend the next work council assembly.
AW. Please state one important difference between the wc and the trade union. Just write what 
come into your mind. _________________
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V. The new trade union (GTB)
1) a few questions to the new trade union:
strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree
AX. You get well informed about the
work of the GTB. 1 2 3 4 5
AY. It is difficult to be loyal to both,
the GTB and the company. 1 2 3 4 5
AZ. In our workgroup we often discuss
union issues. 1 2 3 4 5
BA. As a union member you are discriminated
by your supervisor. 1 2 3 4 5
BB. The union had not yet done a lot at this place. 1 2 3 4 5
BC. The union's pay policy only worsens the economic
situation and risks jobs. 1 2 3 4 5
BD. The union works more for the West German
workforce than for us. 1 2 3 4 5
BE. If the unions would not exist the East German
employment situation would look even worse. 1 2 3 4 5
BF. I regard myself as a member of the working class. 1 2 3 4 5
2) a few general questions:
BG. Did you resign membership of the old union (FDGB)? 1 yes 2 no 3 no member
BH. Are you a member of the GTB today? 1 yes 2 no
(if member go to Q BL)
BI.BH,BJ if no member, why not? (please only indicate maximal three)
1 The wc sufficiently represents my interests
2 Schiesser cares sufficiently for its workforce
3 union do not interest me
4 the former union did disappoint us too much
5 the unions don't do enough for the east german worker
6 the union fee is too high
7 other reason (please indicate)_________
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BL,BM,BN if a member, why? (maximal three)
1 because of the free legislative consulting and legal help in case of dismissal
2 because of the strike money
3 in order to support the union in its collective bargaining with the employers
4 because most of my workfellows are members as well
5 becasue I believe in the principles and values of trade unionism
6 because I was a member also in former times
7 different reason (please indicate)______
BO. Do you visit union events?
1 yes, always 2 quite often 3 sometimes 4 very rarely 5 never
3) What do you think of the following statements?
strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree
BP. The union makes the workforce more powerful.
BQ. I never tell my friends that I am a union member.
BR. It is important for me to belong to the union.
BS. I would also stay in the union, if I would work
on short term or would become unemployed.
BT. I am not a very active and loyal member.
BU. Not belonging to the union is anti-social.
BV. Guess how many of Bodywear's workforce are union members?
0-20% = 1  21-30% = 2 31-40% = 3 41-50% = 4 51-% = 5
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VI. problems
We will now discuss general problems at your work.
BW/BX/B Y in general: how do you thing the viability of Bodywear can be secured for long term? (max. three) 
1 by means of a more powerful union
2 " works council
3 " better management
4 " more codetermination/involvement of the employees
5 " better performance of myself and my fellowworkers
6 " lower pay levels and cost savings at all workplaces
7 " politics (industrial policy)
8 " not at all
9 " different reason (please specify)____
BZ/CA/CB how can you improve your job security? (max. three)
1 I have to work better than my fellowworkers
2 I have to have a good relationship to my supervisor and don't "rebel"
3 I have to solidarize with my colleagues
4 I have to become engaged in union or works council's work
5 I cannot do anything
6 something else (please specify)_______
CC. Did you consult the works council with a problem during this year? 1 yes 2 no 
(if no go to Q CF)
CD. Was the issue personal or of general concern? 1 personal 2 general
CE. what was the issue about? (only one number please)
1 grievance about a supervisor
2 grievance about too high work norms/ conditions
3 grievance about additional Saunionrday work
4 threatening dismissal/ transfer
5 something else (specify)________
CF. "My current pay level is justified." Do you agree?
I totally disagree I disagree no view I agree I strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5
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CG. What is your index/comparison, if you want to show the justice/injustice of your pay level? 
(only one number please)
1 my former pay level in the GDR
2 the other pay groups at Bodywear and their work requirements/ performance
3 the other workers in my group who conduct less machines/ have easier jobs
4 the pay I would earn in the West German headquarter of Bodywear 
for the same job
5 different (specify)_______
What do you think about the following statements?
strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree
CH. If you complain nowadays about your job, 
you get sacked.
CI. It's a waste of time to consult the works council, 
they are not interested in my problems.
CJ. The works council wants to help, but has no power.
CK. Improvements at the workplace can only be
realized through collective action of all colleagues.
CL. Usually I don't have any grievances.
CM. If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker
you can't do anything against it.
CN. "Bischofferode" (mining strike) is everywhere
and if the GTB would call a strike 
I would participate.
CO. In general, I have a positive view on the future.
2 3
2 3
CP. How does the societal changes in East Germany influence your behaviour? (only one number)
1 I am more active than before
2 I did not change at all
3 I live a more passive/ retired life
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VII. summary
Who represents your interests concerning the following working conditions? (Please....)
union/ works council/ personnel dept./ mv supervisor/ nobody
CR. pay level 1 2 3 4 5
CQ. job security 1 2 3 4 5
CS. work requirements 1 2 3 4 5
CT. qualification/training 1 2 3 4 5
CU. introduction of new technology 1 2 3 4 5
CV. health & security 1 2 3 4 5
c w . working time 1 2 3 4 5
e x . And who did represent best your interests in former times? (one only)
1 BGL 4 my workgroup
2 plant director 5 nobody, myself alone
3 supervisor 6 different (specify)
CY. In general: "it is frequently argued that the East Germans will remain second class citizens for quite a whil 
Do you agree?
I totally disagree I disagree no view 1 agree I strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5
VIII. general information
CZ. your department:
sewing = 1 dyer = 2 knitter = 3
packing/quality control = 4 goods reception/stocking = 5
trimmings = 6 tailoring = 7
DA. how many earn in your household? one person = 1 two persons = 2 three and more = 3
DB. your gender? (you don't have to answer) female = 1 male = 2
DC. your age? under 30 = 1 30-40 = 2 4 1 -5 0 = 3  50 and more = 4
DD. have you been trained for your job (apprenticeship, university course) or have you learnt on the job?
on the job = 1 officially trained = 2
DE. do you hold a post in the union or works council right now? yes = 1  no = 2
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A 2.3 Questionnaire: union members of GTB South-East (Summer
1994)
I. JOB SATISFACTION
Here are some statements about the working conditions at your current workplace. Do
you agree?
stronelv disagree/ disagree/ no view/ aeree/ stronelv aeree
1. All in all our work situation is better today 
than in the former socialist enterprise 1 2 3 4 5
2. "Capitalist" enterprises treat their employees 
more fairly than did former "socialist" enterprises 1 2 3 4 5
3. In the socialist enterprise workers 
were not exploited 1 2 3 4 5
4. Today workers are exploited here 1 2 3 4 5
5. In the old times you could still trust 
your supervisors 1 2 3 4 5
6. Today I don't have any trust in my supervisors 1 2 3 4 5
7 .1 am dissatisfied with how hard I have to work now 1 2 3 4 5
8 .1 am paid a fair wage 1 2 3 4 5
9 . 1 am constantly worried about loosing my job 1 2 3 4 5
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2. PACE OF WORK
A. Here are some reasons why in many enterprises people are working 
What do you think regarding your workplace?
harder since '89.
stronelv disaeree/ disaeree/ no view/ aeree/ stronelv aeree
1. Management exploits us, taking advantage
of the devastating employment situation 1 2 3 4 5
2. It's not so much manaegment's fault, as the 
introduction of market economy which inevitably 
increases work pressures 1 2 3 4 5
3. The workforce does not offer enough resistance 
to management's strategies 1 2 3 4 5
4. Our works council is not powerful enough to 
negotiate better working conditions 1 2 3 4 5
B. Is there something you personally can do to improve working conditions?
. - - stronelv disaeree/disaeree/no view/aeree/stronelv aeree
1 .1 cannot do anything, because
otherwise I will risk loosing my job 1 2 3 4 5
2 . 1 have to act together with my workfellows 
because only collective action by all of us 
will help 1 2 3 4 5
3. Works council has to deal with it, it's not 
our responsibility 1 2 3 4 5
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3. JOB SECURITY
A . Here are some explanations for the loss of jobs in East Germany. In  vour view how
im n o r ta n t  is each reason for vour Diant?
not at all imDortant / not imDortant/ no view/ imDortant/ verv important
1. lack of demand for our products 1 2 3 4 5
2. lack of support by politicians 
and Treuhand for the textile industry 1 2 3 4 5
3. incompetent management 1 2 3 4 5
4. not enough effort from the workers 1 2 3 4 5
5. wages being too high 1 2 3 4 5
6. workforce doesn't show enough solidarity 
with colleagues who are made redundant 1 2 3 4 5
7. works council is not opposing management 
strategies strongly enough 1 2 3 4 5
8. GTB not putting enough pressure on employers 1 2 3 4 5
B. If the company decided to cut some jobs in your 
p e rso n a lly  do to inmrove vour own iob security?
departm ent, what would v o u
stronelv disaeree/ disaeree/ no view/ aeree/ stronelv aeree
1 .1 cannot do anything 1 2 3 4 5
2 . 1 would try everything not to attract 
any negative attention 1 2 3 4 5
3 .1 have to work better than my workfellows 1 2 3 4 5
4 . 1 have to act together with my colleagues 1 2 3 4 5
5 .1 have to support more actively works council and GTB 1 2 3 4 5
6 . 1 would look for another job 1 2 3 4 5
7. it's the task of works council not of us workers to 
do something 1 2 3 4 5
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4 . PAY LEVEL
A. Here are some reasons for the lower level Pf wages in EastG compared to the West.
Do you agree?
stronelv disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ stronglv agree
1. East German employers take advantage of 
the current labour market situation 1 2 3 4 5
2. The GTB is not doing enough to foster 
the adjustment of East German wage level 1 2 3 4 5
3. the politicians are the ones to blame 1 2 3 4 5
B. What are vou prepared to do to improve the pay level in the textile industry?
stronelv disagree/ disagree/ no view/ aeree/ stronelv aeree
1 .1 cannot do anything. 1 2 3 4 5
2 .1 would take part in demonstrations/rallies 
during collective bargaining 1 2 3 4 5
3. I would go on strike
during collective bargaining 1 2 3 4 5
4. strikes are an effective means to strengthen 
the union during collective bargaining 1 2 3 4 5
5. with company bargaining we are better off 
than with industry level bargaining 1 2 3 4 5
6 .1 would prefer to negotiate my pay 
individually with my employer 1 2 3 4 5
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5. GENERAL QUESTIONS REGARDING WORKS COUNCIL
AND GTB
A. General questions:
1. Did you vote in the recent works council election? 1 yes 2 no
2. Are you or have you been a member of the works council? 1 yes 2 no
3. Are you a union official? 1 yes 2 no
4. Were you an active member of the BGL?
(former union)
1 yes 2 no
B. Do you agree with the following statements? (again tick the number which best 
represents your opinion)
stronelv disaeree/ disaeree/ no view/ aeree/ stronelv aeree
5. the old BGL represented my 
interests better than today's 
GTB and works council 1 2 3 4 5
6. we don't need a works council
since management cares enough for us 1 2 3 4 5
7. I can solve my work problems 
with my supervisor alone,
I don't need the works council for that 1 2 3 4 5
8. Works council and GTB will only be effective if 
they get active support from the workers 1 2 3 4 5
9. I will attend the next works council assembly 1 2 3 4 5
10. if asked I would have stood 
for the works council election 1 2 3 4 5
11. if asked I would serve on a commitee 
for the GTB 1 2 3 4 5
12. I constantly try to recruit 
new members for the union 1 2 3 4 5
13. I seriously think about quitting the GTB 
in the future 1 2 3 4 5
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6. YOUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNION (GTB)
_____________________________________ stronelv disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree
1 .1 feel a sense of pride in being 
a member of the GTB
2 .1 would remain in the union, even 
if  I were unemployed
3 .1 don’t see myself as a union activist
4 . 1 feel strong ties with the other 
union members (in my plant)
5 .1 share the aims and values of the union
6. Union solidarity is very important for me
7. GENERAL INFORMATION
1. company name (you don't have to answer):________________
2. how long have you been working for this company?__________
3. are you: 1 blue collar worker 3 white collar
2 supervisor 4. other (please_specify)____
4. age: 1 [< 30years] 2 [30— 40 years] 3 [41-50 years] 4 [> 50 years]
5. gender:_____ 1 female ______ 2 male___________________________________
8. SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING YOUR WORK GROUP 
IDENTITY
----------------------------------------------------------------strongly disagree/ disagree/ no view/ agree/ strongly agree
1 .1 would like to change
my workgroup 1 2 3 4 5
2 .1 increasingly feel isolated in
my group 1 2 3 4 5
3 .1 identify strongly with my group 1 2 3 4 5
4. in the old days (GDR) group solidarity
was much better 1 2 3 4 5
5 .1 accept group decisions also
if I am different opinion 1 2 3 4 5
6 .1 prefer to work in groups than alone 1 2 3 4 5
7. in general problems are better solved
in groups than alone 1 2 3 4 5
8. Only those who depend on themselves at work get ahead 1_______ 2______ 3_______ 4______5
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A 2.4 Inteview guideline: 15 sewers of Bodywear (Summer 1994)
A. GDR times
1. can you describe your former relationship to your supervisor, plant director, company director?
2. how was overtime arranged in former times? was it negotiated, between whom, any specific 
regulations? how did you manage to fulfill the "target norm"?
3. did you trust your workcolleagues?
4. if you had a workplace problem, whom did you consult?
5. were there any incidences of "industrial unrest", stoppage of work?
6. did you feel "powerless" / deprived of power today compared to former times?
7. what happened exactly in October/November 1989 in the firm? Strike against directors? Any 
demands by the workforce (only against Stasi/SED or also for more employee participation?)
B. current times: grievances
1. Do you have any actual problems at your work? What was the last grievance you had?
2. what do/did you do? what would you have done in a similar situation in former times? is this a
personal or collective problem?
3. whose fault was it?
C. current times: work group
1. how many work groups do you have in the firm? (definition of groups as workgroups or shifts?)
2. if the firm would announce redundancies, e.g. 10% of the current 700 employees: where 
(department, workplaces) do you think it would be easy to cut back jobs?
3. if the redundancy would also concern your work group, what would you do? — > if answered: 
individual reaction —> 2.Question: could you not act together? advantages/disadvantages of 
collective action
4. how much do knitters/dyers/sewers earn in average? Was this difference in wages already in former 
times?
[
i
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A 2.5 Interview guideline: 10 sewers of Bodywear (Summer 1994)
A . introduction
1. how long have you worked for Bodywear?
2. how do you like your work at the moment?
3. what has mostly changed at your workplace after unification?
B. working for Trikotwear (GDR)
4. what do you miss from your former work?
5. what meaning did the brigade had for you? (group identity/solidarity)
6. more specific information on brigade life: how large was your brigade? how was the collegiality 
within your brigade? what events did you organize? who organised? how much influence did the 
brigade had over working conditions (e.g. work distribution, Saturday work,...)? what did you 
do when you has a problem? (grievance handling)
7. what was the BGL for you? And the Party? (union identity, grievance handling)
8. how was your relationship to your supervisor? (them-us, passive strength)
9. how was your relationship to the directors? (them-us)
C . turnaround/ "Wende"
10. what kind of hopes, expectations did you had in autumn 1989?
11. what happened with the directors?
12. how was the works council installed?
D . work today
13. how is the atmosphere in your group today?
14. what happend with group collegiality? — > more precise (helping, egoism, what do you do, what
do your colleagues do, meeting after work,...)
15. can you think of reasons why solidarity is decreasing? how do you feel about this?
16. how is your relationship to your supervisor?
17. do you feel you are treated fairly? more fair than before?
18. how is your relationship to directors? do you think they are competent?
19. what meaning does the works council have for you? what are they doing? ...
20. are you union member? what is your relationship to the union? what are they doing?...
21. what are you doing now if you have problems?
22. do you like working? if you had enough money would you continue working? would you leave 
Bodywear if you could find somewhere else a job for more money?
23. do you think you have more participation in work decisions today than before?
24. do you think the layoffs could have been avoided? how?
25. your opinion to Saturday work?
E. life today
26. where do you live? (village, city)
27. what do you do in your free time? how do you organise your private life in terms of seeing friends
etc.? did it change after the unification? family problems, unemployment in surrounding (e.g. 
social identity, security = "Verwurzelung")
28. comparsion before - today: if you draw a balance: do you have more advantages or 
disadvantages in post-1989 compared to pre-1989? Are you more happy now than before?...
29. how do you see your future?
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A 2.6 Significance tests of items of the questionnaires of Bodywear 
and in GTB firms
T-tests were conducted to determine if the means of the two unrelated groups of a variable 
differ.258 Age and union membership were analysed in the Bodywear survey. Gender, 
age, blue/white collar, works council membership and former BGL activists were analysed 
in the GTB survey.
2 .6 .1  t-tests of age groups at Bodywear
Are there statistically significant differences between the age-groups (item DC) in regard to all items? All 
four age groups ("under 30s", "31-40", "41-50", "over 50s") were tested. Comparing the youngest group 
("under 30s") with the oldest group ("over 50s") yielded the most significant differences and will be reported 
here.
M 1 = mean (arithmetic) of age-group 1 
M2 = mean (arithmetic) of age-group 2 
(Likert scale: 1= disagree —  5=agree)
table: comparison between M l = "under 30s" and M 2 ="over 50s"
M 1 ("under M 2 ("over 2-tailed 
no 30s") 50s") probability
___________________________________________________________________________________ p<=0.05
B increase in quality of work
F decreasing solidarity o f co- workers
K capitalist firm is more fair
O proud to work for Bodywear
Q trust in supervisors today
V Bodywear treats workforce fairly 
X "no time for a chat anymore"
Y "feeling alone"
AN works council fosters our interests well 
AT participation in works council election 
AV visiting works council assembly 
BF I am working class
BH union membership
BS stay member also if unemployed 
CK instrumentality of collective activities
4.00 4.53 .034
3.36 4.33 .000
2.87 3.74 .004
3.00 4.03 .000
3.74 3.03 .018
2.93 3.62 .021
4.30 4.74 .050
2.72 3.44 .039
2.83 3.91 .000
3.44 4.50 .000
3.70 4.62 .001
3.17 4.00 .034
1.61 1.24 .002
1.83 2.94 .005
4.13 2.88 .000
258 T-tests were used due to the non-categorical nature of the variables.
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2 .  t-tests of union membership at Bodywear
Are there significant differences between union members and non-union members (item BH) with regard to 
all items?
M l = mean (arithmetic) of group 1 (= union members)
M2 = mean (arithmetic) of group 2 (= non union members) 
(Likert scale: 1= disagree —  5=agree)
no M 1 M2 (non 
(members) members)
J You have the constant fear to get sacked 4.46 4.12 .016
Z I am not very interested in my colleagues 2.46 2.07 .016
AN The works council sofar has put forward 
workers' interests very well
3.48 3.03 .008
AT I will intend the next works council election 3.92 3.46 .010
AV I will attend the next works councils' assembly 4.31 3.99 .044
BA As a union member you are discriminated by your 
supervisor
1.75 2.05 .049
BE If the unions would not exist the East German 
employment situation would look even worse
3.57 3.12 .014
BF I regard myself as a member of the working class 3.80 3.26 .017
BG Did you resign membership of the old union 
(FDGB)?
1.63 1.36 .003
BP Union makes the workforce more powerful 3.70 2.12 .000
BU Not belonging to the union is anti-social 1.35 0.84 .000
BV Guess how many of Body wear's workforce are 
union members?
3.05 1.86 .000
CC Did you consult the works council with a problem 
during this year?
1.61 1.77 .021
CN "Bischofferode" (mining strike) is everywhere and 
if the union would call a strike I would participate
3.68 2.75 .000
CQ who represents your interests concerning 
job security
2.23 2.81 .028
CR who represents your interests concerning pay level 1.70 2.35 .040
CY In general: "it is frequently argued that the East 
Germans will remain second class citizens 
for quite a while"
4.26 3.86 .480
DC ape distribution 2.30 1.88 .004
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3 .  t-tests of blue/white collar workers in GTB firms
Are there significant differences between blue and white collare workers (item BI) with regard to all items?
M 1 = mean (arithmetic) of group 1 = blue collars 
M2 = mean (artihmetic) of group 2 = white collars 
(Likert scale: 1= disagree —  5=agree)
no M 1 (blue 
collars)
M 2 (white 2-tailed 
collars) probability 
(p<=0.05)
AN I prefer individual pay negotiations 2.47 1.98 .013
AU I can solve my problems alone, don't need works 
council
1.96 1.45 .000
BD I don't see m yself as a union activist 3.67 4.07 .031
BJ age 2.47 3.00 .000
G dissatisfied with pace of work 3.57 3.04 .019
M works council not powerful enough to negotiate 
better working conditions
3.46 2.85 .002
0 I have to participate in collective action to improve 
working conditions
4.00 3.63 .049
Q lack of demand for products causes job losses 3.14 2.58 .006
s incompetent management causes job losses 2.72 2.18 .006
T not enough effort by workforce causes job losses 2.01 2.45 .020
W works council is not opposing management enough 
and this causes job losses
3.17 2.67 .013
z not to attract negative attention = strategy for job 
security
3.99 3.47 .010
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4 .  t-tests of gender in GTB
Are there significant differences between male and female workers (item BK) with regard to all items?
M l = mean for group 1 = females 
M2 = mean for group 2 = males 
(Likert scale: 1= disagree —  5=agree)
no M l M 2 2-tailed 
(females) (males) probability
(p<=0.05)
A E  t a s k  o f  w o r k s  c o u n c i l  t o  a c t  in  o r d e r  t o  s e c u r e  j o b s , 3.82 3.35 .008
n o t  o u r  d u t y
A G  u n i o n s  n o t  d o i n g  e n o u g h  t o  f o s t e r  w a g e  a d a p t a t io n 4.00 3.68 .041
A P  m a l e s  m o r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  m e m b e r  o f  w o r k s  c o u n c i l 1.76 1.61 .009
A Y  I  w o u l d  s e r v e  o n  a  c o m m i t e e  f o r  u n i o n 2.16 2.53 .022
B O  g r o u p  s o l id a r i t y  w a s  b e t t e r  b e f o r e 4.22 3.77 .008
C  n o  e x p l o i t a t i o n  in  f o r m e r  t i m e s 3.53 3.06 .004
E  n o  t r u s t  in  s u p e r v i s o r s  t o d a y 3.23 2.74 .001
J  m a n a g e m e n t  t a k e s  a d v a n t a g e  o f  e c o n o m i c  s i t u a t io n 4.22 3.87 .013
a n d  t h i s  c a u s e s  i n c r e a s e  in  w o r k  p a c e
L  w o r k f o r c e  n o t  r e s i s t a n t  e n o u g h  a g a in s t 4.22 3.81 .006
m a n a g e m e n t =  r e a s o n  f o r  j o b  l o s s e s
N  I c a n n o t  d o  a n y t h i n g  b e c a u s e  I r i s k  m y  j o b 3.94 3.56 .019
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5 .  t-tests of age in the GTB firms
Are there significant differences between the youngest and oldest age group (item BJ) with regard to all 
items?
M 1 = means of group 1 = <30 years 
M2 = means of group 4 = >50 years 
(Likert scale: 1= disagree —  5=agree)
no
■
M i n under M 2 ("over 
50s"
...
AD I would look for another job if  my job is at risk 3.29 2.54 .007
AF management takes advantage of labour market 
situation
3.94 4.42 .018
AI I cannot do anything to increase wages 3.14 3.94 .001
AL strikes are an effective means to increase wages 4.00 4.41 .029
AW I will attend next works council's assembly 4.23 4.60 .043
BH years in employment 1.97 3.36 .000
BK gender 1.12 1.28 .024
BR groups are better problem solver 3.89 4.33 .047
N I can’t do anything because I would risk my job 3.56 4.27 .001
O I’ve to act collectively in order to improve working 
conditions
4.25 3.76 .024
BF I share the aims and values of the union 3.62 4.35 .003
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6 .  t-tests of works councillors in the GTB firms
Are there significant differences between works council members and "normal" union members (item AP) 
with regard to all items?
Ml = means of group 1 = works council member 
M2 = means of group 2 = not works council member 
(Likert scale: 1= disagree — 5=agree)
no M 1 (works
council
member)
M 2 (not
council
member)
2-tailed
probability
(p<=0.05)
AC I've to support actively works council/ union 4.36 3.89 .000
AE it is task of works council to act, not of us 
workers
3.31 3.84 .001
AG the union doesn't do enough to foster wages 3.58 4.07 .002
AI I cannot do anything against wage level 3.21 3.69 .004
AQ union official 1.72 1.98 .000
AR active in BGL 1.71 1.87 .002
AS BGL represented us better 2.28 2.82 .001
AU I can solve problem alone without works council 1.52 2.03 .000
AW I will attend next works council assembly 4.76 4.30 .000
AX I would stand for a works council post 3.92 2.55 .000
AY I stand for post in union 2.82 2.03 .000
AZ I try to recruit members 3.08 2.24 .000
BD I don't see myself as union activist 3.02 4.00 .000
BE I have strong ties with other union members 3.48 3.05 .004
BK gender 1.36 1.22 .009
BP I accept group decisions 4.24 3.96 .021
BS depend on yourself -> get ahead in life 2.88 3.37 .005
E former supervisors you could trust in 2.88 3.18 .041
H I have fair wage 1.46 1.72 .016
I I worry about job 3.95 4.37 .006
M works council not powerful enough 3.15 3.50 .044
N I can't do anything to improve working conditions 3.50 4.00 .002
P works council has to act, not us 3.41 3.96 .001
T not enough effort by workforce 1.78- 2.11 .019
W works council not oppsing management enough 2.79 3.26 .004
Y I can't do anything for job security 3.42 3.99 .001
Z I should not attract any negative attention 3.63 3.98 .024
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7 .  t-tests of former BGL activists in the GTB firms
Are there significant differences between former BGL activists and non activists (item AR) with regard to 
all items?
M l = means of group 1 = active = BGL official 
M2 = means of group 2 = not active 
(Likert scale: 1= disagree — 5=agree)
2-tailed
probability
(p<=0.05)
AA to work better than my fellows 3.33 3.77 .016
AC I have to support works council/union 4.27 3.97 .033
AD look for another job 2.60 3.06 .015
AE works council's task not of wf to act against job 
insecurity
3.28 3.80 .009
AM company bargaining better than industrial 
bargaining
2.29 2.65 .047
AN prefer individual pay negotiation 2.07 2.45 .023
AP works council member 1.57 1.78 .001
AQ union official 1.78 1.94 .005
AV works council/union need collective support 4.63 4.22 .001
AX attend next works council assembly 3.29 2.81 .024
AZ I recruit new members 2.86 2.39 .009
BA I think about leaving union 1.86 2.31 .005
BH seniority 3.29 2.99 .039
BJ age 2.82 2.53 .013
BS only relying on yourself —> get ahead in life 2.30 3.33 .006
C no exploitation in former times 3.11 3.50 .039
P works council has to act, not us against pace of 
work
3.46 3.89 .026
S incompetent management = reason for job losses 2.19 2.74 .001
z I should not attract any negative attention 3.49 3.96 .013
A 3 APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 11
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A 3.1 Factor analysis for the items of the workforce questionnaires
of Bodywear and GTB
A factor analysis for all question items of the two questionnaires was conducted at first, yet 
not surprisingly it did not reveal any usable results.259 The items were then put into 
"clusters" representing the variables/concepts (e.g. job dissatisfaction) according to the 
theoretical assumptions (see chapter 7). Factor analysis was conducted in the principal 
component form and the orthogonal (varimax) rotation was applied, which produces 
factors which are unrelated or independent of each other260. Besides, the items were 
checked for their positive and negative wording and were sometimes recoded. The factors 
were computed with the means function of the correlating items each multiplied by their 
factor loading. This method is used in order not to lose all missing values through a factor 
analysis. The missing values are substituted by the means of the items. This procedure has 
well recognized dangers but the pattern of occasional missing values meant that there 
would sometimes be a significant loss of observations if it were not done. Two measures 
of reliability were used. Firstly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)261 measure was used to 
test the sampling adequacy, thus indicating whether the items are belonging together by
259 A factor analysis for all 109 items of the Bodywear questionnaire (see appendix A 2) did not come up 
with a usuable result. 33 factors were developed, which together explained 71.6 % of the total variance (the 
first, with an Eigenvalue of 10.3 explained 9.9 % of the variance).
Factor variables (only factor loadings over 1.501)
1 CJ, CN, CM, AY, BP, CK, CY, BE, BD, CH, CP
2 AH, S, AE, Q, Y, T
3 BH, BI, BR, BJ, BS, BM, BT
A second attempt used 70 items which were selected on a more factual basis. 18 factors developed which 
together explained 62.6 % of total variances (the first factor has an Eigenvalue of 8.7 and explained 12.5 % 
of total variances).
Factor variables (only factor loadings over 1.501)
1 CJ, BD, CH, BB
3 B, D, K
4 BR, BT, BS
5 CK, CM
260 'phg resuits were double-checked with the oblique rotation, which assumes that the factors are 
correlated, yet no significant differences were found.
261 The KMO is based on an "anti-image correlation matrix" and is defined as an index for comparing the 
magnitudes of the observed correlation coefficients to the magnitudes of the partial correlation coefficients 
(Norusis 1990: B -128-9).
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examining the underlying correlation matrix (see Backhaus et al. 1994:205). It serves to 
indicate whether factor analysis is usefully to be applied or not. "Small KMO values 
indicate that a factor analysis of the variables may not be a good idea since correlations 
between pairs of variables cannot be explained by the other variables" (Norusis 1990: B- 
128-9). KMO-values should be above .50.262 Secondly, the internal reliability 
(consistency) of the factor items was tested with the Cronbach's alpha coefficient which 
should be as a general rule above .60.
A 3.1.1 Factor analysis at Bodywear
Factor analysis was conducted for the dependent variable, participation and for each of the 
six independent variables.
1 . Factor Analysis of participation items
Out of the six items of participation (see chapter 7) five items were used for factor 
analysis263. Factor analysis (table 1) resulted in two dependent variables, which will be 
called "low intensity" and "high intensity" participation.
table 1: factors of participation
AT willingness to attend next works council's election
(partAl) 
low intensitv 
participation 
.83
(mpartAl) 
high intensitv 
participation 
.11
AV willingness to attend next works council's assembly .82 .04
AU willingness to stand for works council's election .15 .52
BOnew visiting union events .18 .7 5
CN willingness to go on strike -.17 .7 0
(rounded up to two digits, FI = Factor 1), KMO =. 55, cumulated percentage of variance: 55.6
low intensity participation (AT, AV): eigenvalue: 1.61621 (% of variance = 32.3), alpha= .5897 (standardized
alpha = .5970);
high intensity participation (AU, BOnew, CN): eigenvalue: 1.16279 (% of variance = 23.3), alpha = .3634 
(standardized alpha =. 3679)
262 In the .90s marvelous; in the .80s meritorious, in the .70s middling; in the .60s mediocre and in the 
.50s miserable but still acceptable (see Kaiser et al. 1974:111)
263 Question (BT) "I am not a very active and loyal union member" was excluded. As mentioned before 
this question is not really measuring "activity", but people's perception of their activity.
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2 .  Factor analysis of perceptions of instrumentality
There are 17 questions dealing with collective instrumentality, of which 13 questions are in 
Likert scale and direct measures of the concept^^ Factor analysis was firstly conducted 
for all 13 items, yet the result proved impossible to interpret. Two separate analyses were 
then conducted for the items of works council/ union instrumentality (table 2), and of 
instrumentality of collective activities (table 3). The first factor analysis revealed four 
interpretable factors. There is a clear distinction between evaluation (instrumentality) 
measures of the union and the works council.
table 2: factors of perceptions of instrumentality
tu.n.i.l 
negative 
evaluation 
of union
tu.p.i.l
positive
instrumenta
lily Qf 
union
wc.n.i.l
negative
instrumenta
lity.of
works
council
wc.n.nel
m2
necessity of
works
council
BB union has not done a lot at this place here .77 .10 .18 -.13
BC unions’ pay policy only worsens economic 
situation and risks jobs
.63 -.25 -.13 .35
BD union works more for West German members 
than for us
.7 0 .00 .22 .00
BE without unions East German employment 
situation would look worse
.23 .76 -.20 -.07
BP union makes workforce more powerful -.25 .7 5 .06 .07
ANnew works council has put forward workers 
interests very well
.05 -.42 .4 9 .06
Cl waste of time to consult works council, they 
are not interested in my problems
.26 -.05 .65 .29
CJ works council wants to help but has no power .07 .03 .80 -.08
AQ former BGL (shopfloor branch of FDGB) was 
better in representing our interests
.32 .37 .16 .5 2
AS don't need a works council, mgt cares enough 
for workers
-.11 -.09 .05 .8 7
(rounded up to two digits, Fl=Factorl), KMO = .64, cumulated pet of variance = 60.6
negative evaluation of union (BB, BC, BD): eigenvalue =2.24533 (pet of variance = 22.5), alpha: .5521, 
standardized: .5519
positive instrumentality of union (BE, BP): eigenvalue = 1.58104 (pet of variance = 15.8), alpha: .5188, 
standardized: .5188
negative instrumentality of works council (BOnew, Cl, CJ): eigenvalue =1.17720 (pet of variance = 11.8), alpha: 
.5127, standardized .5101
no necessity of works council (AQ, AS): eigenvalue = 1.05977 (pet of variance = 10.6), alpha: .2232, 
standardized .2251
264 Excluded are items: CC, CL, AO, CH.
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The second factor analysis revealed one factor, instrumentality of collective activities. The 
factor is difficult to interpret, since one item is negatively worded. This item (CM) was 
reworded, yet resulted into a factor with a negative alpha coefficient and was therefore 
unacceptable. Thus, the single items was used instead. CM is representing (negative) 
instrumentality of collective activities in an extreme situation, whereas CK and also AR 
represents instrumentality of collective activities on shopfloor level respectively with regard 
to the works council.
table 3: factor of instrumentality of collective activities
Factor 1
AR works council is only as strong as they get supported 
by workers
-.63
CM If Bodywear closes a plant, as a worker you cannot do 
anything against it.
.55
CK improvements at workplace only possible through 
collective action of all colleagues
.63
(rounded up to two digits), KMO =.52, eigenvalue = 1.08911 (cumulated pet of variance = 36.3), no rotation)
3 . Factor analysis of union identity
There are seven questions on union identity, out of which the four questions which directly 
measure the concept were utilized in the factor analysis.
table 4: factor of union identity
(tuiden.l) 
union identitv
BR important for me to belong to the union .86
BS I would also stay in the union if working short term or 
becoming unemployed
.83
BU not belonging to the union is "anti-social" .14
BQnew I tell my friends that I am in the union .52
KMO = .56, eigenvalue = 1.70411 (cumulated pet of variance = 42.6), no rotation, alpha: .5092, standardized: 
.4793
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4 .  Factor analysis of workgroup identity
Workgroup identity was examined by 12 questions, all of which were used in the first 
factor analysis but without interpretable factors. Step by step items were deleted till finally 
two usable factors emerged.
table 5: factors of workgroup identity/ collectivism
(gr.n.sol) 
decreasing group 
solidaritv
(gr.indiv.l)
individualism/
isolation
AE Formerly group solidarity was much better. .81 .06
AH Formerly solidarity of whole workforce was better .90 .06
Al Job insecurity makes people egoistic .6 7 .34
AC I rather fight for my interests alone than rely on my 
colleagues' support.
.23 .58
Y feel isolated .43 .5 6
Wnew can rely on my colleagues -.11 .85
(rounded up to two digits, Fl=Factorl), KMO = .70, cumulated pet of variance = 60.8
decreasing group solidarity (AE, Al, AH): eigenvalue = 2.52894 (pet of variance = 42.1), alpha: .7684, 
standardized: .7704
individualism/isolation (AC, Y, Wnew): eigenvalue = 1.12059 (pet of variance = 18.7), alpha: .4872, 
standardized: .4884
5 . Factor analysis of them-and-us feelings
All ten questions were used in the factor analysis, which resulted in three factors. The item 
"R" got two very similar factor loadings and it was decided to incorporate it into the factor 
"them-us" feelings rather than into company identity, being aware of the resulting high 
intercorrelation of the two factors (-.43).
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table 6: factors of them-and-us feelings
(themus.2) 
them-us (todav)
(coiden.A2)
company
identity
(genjudA2) 
capitalism better
p real partnership between management and 
workforce not possible due to different 
interests
.64 -.05 .01
Q you can never really trust your supervisor .61 -.35 -.06
s formerly supervisors were on the side of the 
workers, today they are on mgt side
.77 -.11 -.03
T formerly all were working together to fulfill 
the quota, today there is more a "them-us" 
atmosphere
.77 -.04 -.15
U management takes full advantage of current 
labour market situation
.63 -.42 .08
R workers here are exploited .52 - .5 7 .10
O proud to work for Bodywear -.11 .8 3 .12
V Bodywear will always try to treat its workers 
in a fair way
-.15 .82 .12
AJ In general: an "individualistic" social system 
where everybody has the chance to lead a better 
life than others, but also has the risk of 
failing, is better than a "collectivist" social 
system, where all have equally mediocre life 
chances.
-.06 -.08 .80
K capitalist firm is more fair, because only 
perforamance criteria count.
-.01 .26 .69
(rounded up to two digits, Fl= Factorl), KMO = .79, cumulated pet of variance = 59.3
them-us today (P, Q, S, T, U, R): eigenvalue= 3.57816 (pet of variance =35.8), alpha: .8024, standardized: .8022 
company identity (O, V): eigenvalue = 1.28337 (pet of variance = 12.8), alpha: .7016, standardized: .7031 
general judgement (K, AJ): eigenvalue = 1.06420 (pet of variance = 10.6), alpha: .2852, standardized: .2872
6 . Factor Analysis of perceptions of information flow between 
representative institutions and workforce
Out of the eight questions dealing with the information flow, five questions were used for 
the factor analysis (the rest were not Likert-scaled) and produced two factors. One factor 
represents people's interest in information of the interest institutions and also actively 
"giving" information to them, whereas the other looks at people's evaluation of how much 
information they "receive". The first factor could thereby be a very preliminary indicator 
for people's perception of common interests.
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table 7: factors of information flow
AL our group keeps works council informed about what 
happens at our workplaces
(g.info.l) 
interest in 
information 
.77
(r.info.l)
receiving
information
.03
AM work of works council is frequent topic of our chats .7 7 .02
AZ our group often discusses union issues .62 .21
AKnew sufficiently informed about works council's work -.03 .81
AX well informed about work of the union .22 .7 4
(rounded up to two digits), KMO = .63, cumulated pet of variance = 57.5
interest in information (AL, AM, AZ): eigenvalue = 1.79309 (pet of variance = 35.9), alpha: .5624, standardized: 
.5612
receiving information (AKnew, AX): eigenvalue = 1.08241 (pet of variance = 21.6), alpha: .3568, standardized: 
.3568
There are eight questions on the perceived changes of the work organisation, which are not 
used as antecedents. Out of the six remaining questions dealing more directly with people' 
s perceptions of the changes, five were selected for factor analysis (one was not possible 
since it was not Likert scaled). Two factors emerged. Pay (dis) satisfaction is thereby so 
strong that it stands as a single item.265
table 8: factors of job dissatisfaction
A work load and pressure to perform heavier today than 
before
(jobsati2)
job
dissatisfaction
.60
(CF)
pay
satisfaction
-.21
G formerly we had more control when and how we worked . 62 .06
I formerly work was also fun, today you work only for 
money
.74 -.25
J constant fear to loose job .72 .18
CF my current pay is justified -.03 .9 6
(rounded up to two digits, FI =factorl), KMO = .66, cumulated pet of variance = 57.5
job dissatisfaction (A, G, I, J): eigenvalue = 1.84883 (pet of variance = 37.0), alpha: .6108, standardized: .6245 
pay satisfaction (CF): eigenvalue = 1.02420 (pet of variance =20.5)
265 pay dissatisfaction in the GTB survey is part of them-and-us feelings. This was also tried here but 
without success.
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A 3.1.2 Factor analysis at GTB
Factor analysis was conducted for the dependent variable and for each of the five 
independent variables (see chapter 7).
1 . Factor analysis of participation items
All seven questions on participation were put into the factor analysis. Two factors 
emerged.
table 9: factors of participation
AJ willingness to take part in demonstrations during 
collective bargaining
(admpart2)
self-initiated
participation
.27
(occpart2)
organised
participation
.79
AK willingness to go on strike during coll. bargaining -.06 .84
AW willingess to attend next works council assembly .16 .54
AX willingness to stand for works council election .80 .17
AY willingness to serve on a union committee .86 .16
AZ constantly recruiting new members .71 .06
KMO = .67; cumulated percentage of variance: 61.1,
administrative participation (AX, AY, AZ): eigenvalue = 2.41960 (Pet of variance = 40.3), alpha .7257 (standard. 
= .7311)
occasional participation (AJ, AK, AW): eigenvalue = 1.24642 (Pet of variance = 20.8), alpha = .5909, standard. = 
.5871)
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2 .  Factor analysis of perceptions of collective instrum entality
All nine questions on collective instrumentality were put into factor analysis. The emerging 
three factors resemble the factors of the Bodywear survey, which were however slightly 
more detailed.
table 10: factors of collective instrumentality
AT don't need works council, management 
cares enough for workers
(tu.inst.b) 
negative 
instrumentality 
of union/works 
council
-.06
(works
councilinst.b) 
no necessity of 
works council
.8 3
(cainst.b) 
instrumentality 
of collective 
activities
.08
AU can solve problems alone, don't need 
a works council .08 .7 4 -.30
AS
AV
BGL was better than works council/union
union/works council need active support 
of workers
.20
-.13
.50
.03
.25
.7 6
AL strikes are a effective means during 
collective bargaining .10 -.12 .55
W works council is too weak to oppose 
management .83 .00 -.22
X union provide not enough pressure on 
employer
.79 -.06 .23
M works councils are not powerful enough 
to negotiate better agreements .69 .16 -.22
AG union doesn't do enough for wage 
adaptation with West Germany .64 .13 .24
KMO = .62; cumulated pet of variance = 56.3
specific instrumentality of union/works council (X, W, M, AG): eigenvalue = 2.34748 (pet of variances 26.1), 
alpha = .7314, standardized alpha = .7299
general instrumentality of works council (necessity) (AT, AU, AS): eigenvalue = 1.59963 (pet of variances 17.8), 
alpha s  .4774, standardized alpha s  .5084
instrumentality of collective action (AV, AL): eigenvalue s  1.11591(pct of variance s  12.4), alpha s  .2303, 
standardized alpha s  .2313
350
3 .  Factor analysis of union identity
There are six items in the questionnaire dealing with union identity, four were selected.266 
One factor was produced, as happened with slightly different items in the Bodywear 
survey.
table 11: factor of union identity
BE feeling of strong ties with other union
(tuiden2) 
union identitv
members .7 4
BF share aims/values of union .82
BG union solidarity is very important for me .8 2
BB feeling of pride being a union member .6 5
KMO = .72, no rotation; union identity (BB, BE, BF, BG): eigenvalue = 2.32296 (pet of variance = 58.1), alpha = 
.7488, standardized alpha = .7560
4 . Factor analysis of workgroup identity
Factor analysis was conducted for all eight items, which produced an incomprehensible 
result. Five items were selected (BS, BM, BO was left out) and one item, BL, was 
reworded (the alpha coefficient for the factor [BL, BN] was negative). The two factors are 
different to the Bodywear factors (which did not manage to produce a factor of group 
identity as such).
table 12: factor of workgroup identity and collectivism
BP accept group decisions
(grcoll.b)
collectivism
. 4 2 9 2 4
(griden.b)
workgroup
identitv
.35140
BQ prefer to work in a group . 7 7 8 3 3 .00734
BR problems better solved in a group . 8 1 8 6 6 .07971
BN identify strongly with group .27808 . 6 2 1 5 1
BLnew I do not want to change my workgroup. -.12447 . 8 3 8 1 3
KMO = .61; cumulated pet of variance = 55.4;
collectivism (BP, BQ, BR): eigenvalue = 1.72086 (pet of variance = 34.4)), alpha = .5133, stand, alpha =.5141 
group identity (BN, BLnew): eigenvalue = 1.05082 (pet of variance = 21.0) alpha = .2935, stand, alpha = .2979
266 t wo items have a double meaning (BA, BO) in that they could stand for identity-oriented or 
instrumental attitude towards union, and were excluded.
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5 . Factor analysis of attribution
A factor analysis was conducted for all 11 items of external and internal attribution, which 
did not reveal an interpretable result. Two separate factor analyses were conducted, one for 
external and one for internal attribution. The analysis of external attribution produced three 
factors, two of those did not make any sense. A new factor analysis for the one remaining 
factor "external attribution" was conducted and the factor was computed with these new 
loadings (see brackets). The analysis for "internal attribution" revealed two factors.
table 13: factors of external attribution
(exatt.b) Factor 2 Factor 3
external attribution:
politics/
management
J management makes us work harder: 
advantage of labour market situation .65 (.69) .22 .04
R lack of support of politicians/ Treuhand .46 .05 .51
AH politicians causing lower wage level .69 (.66) -.19 .16
AF low wages due to management .74 (.73) .08 -.15
Q job losses due to lack of demand for -.05 .75 .33
s
products
bad management to be blamed for job 
losses .15 .7 9 -.25
K market competition causes job losses -.06 .00 .81
KMO = .59; cumulated pet of variance: 58.8; attribution to politics/management (J, AH, AF): eigenvalue = 
1.79127 (pet of variance = 25.6), alpha = .4322, standardized alpha =.4635; Factors 2, 3 make no sense (pet of 
variances: 17.6, 15.6)
table 14: factors of internal attribution
(atteff.b) (attsol.b)
internal attribution: internal attribution:
lacking workers' lacking solidaritv of
effort w<?rkfprce
T job losses due to lacking effort of
workforce (too lazy) .69 .14
U job losses due to high wages
.79 -.11
L heavy work load due to lacking
collective resistance of workforce -.18 .86
V job losses due to lacking solidarity
among workforce .41 .64
KMO = .52; cumualted pet of variance: 62.1; internal attribution to lack of individual effort at work (T, U): 
eigenvalue = 1.37650 (pet of variance = 34.4), alpha = .3245, standardized alpha = .3552; internal attribution to 
lacking solidarity among workers (L, V): eigenvalue = 1.10810 (pet of variance = 27.7), alpha = .3081, 
standardized alpha = .3093
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6 .  Factor analysis of general job issues
Since the questionnaire asked them-and-us feelings and job satisfaction in one section (in 
contrast to the Bodywear survey) the factor analysis incorporated all nine "job related" 
items. The item H was reworded in Hnew, in order to render the alpha reliability positive. 
Four factors evolved. Except the division between general and specific job dissatisfaction 
and the factor former trust, all factors resemble similar factors at Bodywear. The items 
were put together in one factor analysis (in contrast to Bodywear) since they formed a 
group in the questionnaire. (However conducting the factor analysis separately for the two 
groups, dissatisfaction and them-us/trust, revealed the same factors.)
table 15: factors of general job issues
(gensatb) (dissat.b) (ftrust.b) (themus.b)
general job specific job former trust currspt,them-us
satisfaction dissatisfaction relation?
A overall work situation is better than 
before
(comparative)
.8 2
(today)
-.12 -.11 -.03
B capitalist firms treat workforce 
better than socialist firms .8 4 -.07 -.07 -.09
G dissatisfied with work load today -.14 .6 8 -.07 .18
I worried about job security today -.11 .7 2 .05 -.23
F don't trust supervisor today .05 .5 7 .23 .39
C formerly workforce was not 
exploited -.02 -.05 .8 2 .09
E formerly you could trust supervisor -.17 .13 .76 -.00
Hnew I am not paid a fair wage -.13 -.13 -.10 .7 8
D today workforce is exploited -.00 .28 .15 .6 3
KMO = .65; cumulated pet of variance: 61.0
general job satisfaction compared with former times (A, B): eigenvalue = 2.10404 (pet of variance = 23.4), alpha 
= .6381, standardized alpha = .6424
specific job satisfaction (G, F, I): eigenvalue = 1.18214 (pet of variance = 13.1), alpha = .4290, standardized = 
. 4316
trust relations (them-us compared with before) (C, E): eigenvalue = 1.14835 (pet of variance =12.8), alpha = 
.4935, standardized alpha = .4937
current them-us (exploitation) (Hnew, D): eigenvalue = 1.05974 (pet of variances 11.8), alpha =.2635, 
standardized alpha = .2642
A 3.2 Correlation of all antecedents of the Bodywear survey
table 16: intercorrelations of all antecedents used in Bodywear (29 variables) ( 2-tailed significance, *= p<0.05, **=p<0.01; 291 cases)
variable I. 2, 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. IS. 16. 17. 18.
1. participation in w. 
council activity
2. participation in 
union events (BO)
.06
3. participation in 
strike (CN)
.19** .13*
4. negative union 
instrumentality
.21** .17** .13*
5. negative w council 
instrumentality
.13* .22** .47** .35**
6. pos. evaluation of 
w. council work (AN)
.45** .05 .11 .19** .06
7. positive union 
instrumentality (BP)
.29** .42** .34** .12 .21** .28**
8. no necessity of w. 
council (AS)
.17** -.06 .02 .18** .14* .02 -.04
9.pos instrumentality 
of coll. action at 
shopfloor (CK)
.15** .27** .40** .19** .54** .09 .32** .04
lO.neg instrmentality 
of coll. action (CM)
.18** .22** .43** .20** .50** .17** .22** -.01 .51**
11. union identity .25** .41** .34** .18** .23** .20** .63** .02 .14* .19**
12. workforce 
solidarity
-.00 .01 .10 .17** .22** -.04 .03 -.05 .10 .15* .07
13. unhappy with 
workgroup (AA)
-.08 .01 .17** .15** .25** -.02 -.04 .03 .07 .10 .06 .12*
14. solidarity with 
colleagues (AB)
.01 .04 .09 .03 .10 -.02 .16** .10 .11 .03 .06 .04 .13*
15. individualistic 
attitude (AC)
.01 -.05 .08 .03 .16** -.03 .00 -.01 .00 .10 -.05 .34** .20** .16**
16. isolation in 
group (Y)
-.04 .01 .09 .15** .24** -.04 -.00 .06 .08 .12* .17** .42** .21** .05 .23**
17. reliable 
colleagues (W)
.03 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.03 .09 -.01 .04 -.04 -.00 -.08 .06 .04 .14* -.05 -.18**
18. them-us .01 .06 .21** .24** .32** -.11* .03 -.02 .13* .20** .15* .36** .19** -.03 .25** .47** -.14*
1. ' 2. 3. 4. ■ 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. ' 10. 11. 12. 13. ~T4: 15. ~ 1 6 . 17. " 1 8 .
IQ company identity .55"... ■"'W.... -.08 ""-.53..... -.55 i s ” i-fa .15 ' .51 66 .rc r— ""-.'51...... - I Q iA IS*1’ - 01 ..-'55...... "58 ..............
20.job dissatisfaction -.09 .05 .03 11 13* -.01 .05 - 06 13* .10 .07 .37** .14* -.00 .17** .29** -.01 .36**
21. pay
dissatisfaction (CF)
.13* .11 .11 .03 .14* 18** 10 .12* .19** .15* .09 -.07 -.03 -.01 -.02 -.06 -.02 -.14*
22. insufficient 
information of works 
c. (AK)
19** .17** .16** .34** .25** 03 .12* 16** .09 .14* .15* .17** .09 .02 .10 .05 -.04 .19**
23. informing the w. 
council (AL)
.26** .06 .16** .07 .05 .38** .10 -.01 .08 .11 .07 .02 -.01 -.10 -.10 .02 .18** .13*
24. discussing union 
issues (AZ)
.32** .07 .09 .27** .13* .26** .19** .06 .13* .14* .16** -.06 .03 .05 .01 -.03 -.01 -.01
25. informed by 
union (AX)
.33** .10 .16 .28** .13* .28** .25** .14* .15** .11 .23** -.10 -.05 -.01 -.08 -.04 .02 -.05
26. age (DC) .33** .10 .17** .08 19** ro 00 .20** .08 .14* .28** .23** .03 -.10 -.07 .04 .07 -.07 -.04
27. union member 
(BH)
II -.02 -.07 .25 .11 -.03 -.20** .11 .16** .08 -.33** -.01 .04 -.06 .01 .00 .13 .01
28. earnings (DA) .13* .14* .29** .09 .35** .12* .10 -.04 .37** .25** .08 .03 .01 -.03 .02 -.01 -.01 .06
29. qualification 
(DD)
.13* .11 .29** .11 .32** .12* .20** -.03 .32** .27** .15* .02 .02 .00 -.00 -.05 .03 .00
15. 25. 21. 22. 23. " 24. 25. 26 . 27. " 1 3 .
2o.job dissatisfaction ' ^
21. pay
dissatisfaction (CF)
.22** -.08
22. insufficient 
information of w. 
council (AK)
-.08 .10 -.08
23. informing the w. 
council (AL)
.05 -.03 .02 .10
24. discussing union 
issues (AZ)
.06 .03 .12* .05 .22**
25. informed by 
union (AX)
.17** -.04 .30** -.02 .15* .40**
26. age (DC) .21** -.02 .23** -.03 .13* .16** .14*
27. union member 
(BH)
.04 .01 .16** .08 .11 .07 .23** .00
28. earnings (DA) .04 -.01 .27** .06 .19** .09 .10 .43** .19**
29.qualification (DD) .05 .01 .10** .05 .15** .07 .02 .43** .14* .55**
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A 3.3 Item-based regression of the GTB survey
table 17: Predicting administrative participation and three items representing occasional participation: 
standardized regression coefficients of 34 variables
Independent
variables
h . 
D.
administrative
participation
(admpartl)
T  Sig T  B eta
participation in 
demonstration (AJ)
T S ig T  B eta
participation 
strike (AK)
T  S ig T
in
B eta
attending w.council 
assembly (AW)
T  S ig T  B eta
specific
instrumentality of 
w.council/ union 
(tuinstrl)
+ .686 -.025 . .3541 -.0557 .580 .001 .251 .076
no necessity of 
w.council (AT)
- -.628 .531 -.036 .449 .654 .025 .857 .392 .044 1.139 .256 .069
BGL better than w. 
council (AS)
- -.131 .896 -.007 -1.917 .056 -.102 -2.448 .015 -.120 -1.854 .065 -.108
coll. support for 
union/w. council 
(AV)
+ 1.112 .267 .062 -1.237 .217 -.067 -1.636 .103 -.081 1.917 .056 .113
instrumentality of 
strike (AL)
+ .902 .368 .050 6.887 .000 .368 12.47 .000 .615 .906 .366 .053
union identity 
(tuidentl)
+ 3.043 ■ : m  - .178 2.544 .004 .168 I .200 .068 1.254 .211 075
group identity (BN) + 1.479 .140 .080 -.053 .958 -.003 -.933 .351 -.046 -.592 .554 -.034
collectivism: groups 
better (BR)
+ 1.288 .199 .073 .435 .664 .024 .365 .715 .019 .964 .336 .058
collectivism: accept 
group decisions (BP)
+ -.132 .895 -.008 1.739 .083 .097 1.214 .226 .063 1.833 .068 .112
happy with my 
group (BLnew)
+ -2.336 .020 -.123 -2.46 .015 -.126 -.358 .721 -.017 .234 .815 .013
no trust in supervisor 
(F)
+ . '.788 .016 1.176 .241 .0S8 .835 .454 .622 ■ . u r r 1
formerly no them-us 
feelings (C)
-.428 .669 -.023 -.006 .995 .000 .030 .976 .002 1.813 .071 .105
former trust in 
supervisor (E)
1.135 .257 .066 1.038 .300 .059 .345 .730 .018 -1.590 .113 -.099
dissatisfaction with 
pay (Hnew)
+ - 1.001 .318 -.058 -1.369 .172 -.077 -.673 .501 -.035 .110 .913 .007
them-us today (D) + -.235 .814 -.013 .214 .831 .011 .946 .345 .046 -1.303 .194 -.076
ext. attribution to 
mgt (J)
+ ox.; .034 .006 .972 .332 .067 .726 .468 .046 .212 .054
ext. att: politicians 
(AH)
+ .105 .917 .006 -.781 .435 -.042 1.305 .193 .066 .643 .521 .038
ext. attribution: mgt 
(AF)
+ 1.293 .197 .071 2.216 .028 .119 .894 .372 .044 .646 .519 .038
int. attribution: 
lacking work effort
(D
- -.497 .620 -.027 -2.719 .007 -.141 -1.684 .093 -.081 -2.145 .033 -.123
int. att.: high wages 
(U)
- .005 .996 .000 -2.351 .019 -.122 -1.059 .291 -.051 -2.797 .006 -.160
int. att.: lacking 
resistance (L)
- -.177 .860 -.011 -.401 .689 -.024 -1.304 .193 -.071 -1.651 .099 -.107
int. att.: lacking 
solidarity (V)
- .406 .685 .022 .746 .457 .039 .939 .349 .046 .506 .613 .029
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general job 
satisfaction (jobsatig)
.(541“ "371 .036' .66il .565 ■ ':037 ' '.904" “ W " ” 046 .321 .749 ' .019""
dissatisfaction with + 
work load (G)
2 .174 .031 .126 -1.850 .065 -.104 -.642 .521 -.033 .315 .753 .020
dissatisfaction with + 
job security (I)
.355 .723 .019 1.084 .279 .057 1.276 .203 .062 .862 .390 .050
gender (l=female, 
2=male) (BK)
2.28(5 .124 -.079 .937 -.004' -.304 .761 '-"0T3"' -2.242 .026 -.130
blue/ white collar 
(1= blue, 2 = white) 
(BI new)
-2.336 .020 -.123 -.626 .532 -.034 -1.258 .210 -.063 1.308 .192 .078
works council 
member (1= yes, 2= 
no) (AP)
•6.412 .000 -.352 -3.070 .002 -.163 -.544 .587 -.027 -2.798 .006 -.163
age (BJ) -.233 .816 -.012 -1.300 .195 -.067 -.780 .436 -.037 1.048 .295 .059
(* = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01)
admpartl: Rsquare (adj.) = .26564; standard error= .771941 F= 4.89171 (SigF=.00); AJ: Rsquare (adj.) = .30736; 
standard error = 1.05169; F = 5.72824 (SigF= .00); AK: Rsquare (adj.) = .40241; standard error = 1.00945, F = 
8.24486 (SigF= .00); AW: Rsquare (adj.) = .15515; standard error = 1.08591; F = 2.97567 (SigF= .00)
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A 3.4 Regression of antecedents of GTB
table 18: Predicting four antecedents of the GTB survey: standard regression coefficients for 17 variables
Independent variable
instrumentality union 
of collective identity 
action (cainst.b) (tuident2J
external 
attribution 
l (exatt.b)
specific job
dissatisfaction
(dissat.b)
negative instrumentality of works 
council/union (tuinst.b)
-.053 -.184** .229** .113
no necessity of works council (wcinst.b) -.051 -.140** -.118* -.021
instrumentality of coll. action (cainst.b) ./. .178** .140** .104
union identity (tuident2) .198** ./. .034 .083
collectivism (grcoll.b) .156**
#*cn00 -.015 -.019
work group identity (griden.b) -.002 .094 -.037 -.110*
former trust (ftrust.b) -.011 .055 .036 .081
current them-us (themus.b) -.039 .039 .128* .025
external attribution (ex att.b) .166** .037 ./. .098
int. attribution: lacking effort (att eff.b) -.027 .060 -.079 .127*
int. attribution: lacking solidarity (att sol.b) .012 .056 .157** .109
general job satisfaction (gensat.b) -.006 -.059 -.129* -.147**
specific job dissatisfaction (dissat.b) .112 .080 .088 ./.
gender (l=female, 2=male) (BK) .043 -.016 .039 -.130*
blue/white collar (l=blue, 2=white) (Blnew) .033 -.004 .006 -.134*
w. council member (1= yes, 2= no) (AP) .008 -.056 -.057 .013
age (BJ) .039 .196** .002 .004
(* = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01)
instrumentality of collective action: Rsquare (adj.) = .12097 (standard error: .55606), residual = 323, F = 3.91577 
(Sig F = .000);
union identity: Rsquare (adj.) = .21244 (standard error: .59922), residual = 323, F = 6.71527 (Sig F = .000); 
external attribution: Rsquare (adj.) = .26214 (standard error: .49961), residual 323, F = 8.52742 (Sig F = .000); 
specific job dissatissfaction: Rsquare (adj.) =.18478 (standard error: .53804), residual= 323, F=5.80242, sigF= 
.000
In the case of Bodywear regressions were conducted using the most important antecedents 
as dependent variables. Overall, the analysis of Bodywear did not reveal too many 
interrelations between its antecedents, which might be due to the item-based nature of the 
equations. The factor-based GTB regression seemed more rewarding. However, a major 
result was the association between items of instrumentality and of social identity. In more
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detail: With regard to "low intensity participation" two factors, an instrumentality measure 
(BC) and "interest in union information" (AZ) were used as dependent variables.267 
Union identity (BQnew) was a major antecedent for instrumentality (BC) and the 
information variable revealed an insignificant equation. With regard to the three measures 
of "high intensity participation", regressions were conducted for all major antecedents of 
the three factors. However, "standing for works council election" and "visiting union 
events" produced only associations with factors of the same concept or insignificant 
equations. With regard to "joining a strike" several significant correlations emerged. Pay 
dissatisfaction (CF) was influenced by information (AX), the information item was 
influenced by pay dissatisfaction (the more people think their pay is justified the more they 
perceive being well informed by the union) and union identity, and the instrumentality item 
(BB) was influenced by another instrumentality item and by a measure of group identity 
(Z).268
267 Instrumentality: Rsquare (adj.)=.15747 (standard error= 1.14308), residual= 129, F=3.86573 
(sigF=.0002); information: Rsquare (adj.)=.03111 (standard error= 1.02549), residual=129, F=1.49232 
(sigF=.1573).
268 xhe items tested were BB, BD, Z, CF, AX. BB: Rsquare (adj.)=.19156 (standard error= 1.12270), 
residual=144, F=5.02809 (sigF=.000); BD: Rsquare (adj.)=.17310 (standard error=1.10215), residual=144, 
F=4.55873 (sigF=.000); Z: Rsquare (adj.)=.06823 (standard error= 1.27241), residual=144, F=2.24493 
(sigF=.00223); CF: Rsquare (adj.)=. 13191 (standard error= 1.28745), residual= 144, F=3.58321 
(sigF=.0005); AX: Rsquare (adj.)=. 13388 (standard error=1.18660), residual=144, F=3.62777 (sigF=.0004).
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